History > 2005 > UK > Terrorist attacks

Britain Drops Plan

to Shut Radical Mosques

December 16, 2005
By REUTERS
The New York Times

LONDON, Dec. 15 (Reuters) - Britain said Thursday that it was withdrawing a plan to close mosques considered to be breeding grounds for extremism after opposition from police officials and Muslim organizations.

The proposal was part of a 12-point antiterror plan put forward by Prime Minister Tony Blair in August, after the suicide bomb attacks on London's transit system in July.

After consultation, the Home Office said Muslim leaders and senior police officers believed that strengthening relations between Muslims and the police would be more effective. "I will not seek to legislate on this issue at the present time, although we will keep the matter under review," Home Secretary Charles Clarke said in a statement.

In its formal response to the proposed measure, the Muslim Council of Britain, the country's largest Islamic organization, said it had been deeply disturbed that the government was associating "the evil of violence" with its places of worship. The bombers, it added, "were indoctrinated by a subculture outside the mosque."

Britain Drops Plan to Shut Radical Mosques, NYT, 16.12.2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/international/europe/16britain.html

Focus:

Executed: Anatomy of a police killing

The real story of how an innocent man was shot by police is only now beginning to emerge. Jonathan Ungoed-Thomas investigates the accusations of incompetence and cover-up

August 21, 2005
The Times

The day after Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead by police at Stockwell Underground station, his grieving relatives and one of his closest friends filed into a mortuary to identify his body. They found him covered in a thin sheet and his face, unmarked, was ghostly white.

Gesio de Avila, a friend and fellow worker, looked carefully over the body, confused by de Menezes’s peaceful repose. Where were the wounds from the seven bullets to the head that killed him?

“Every bit of colour had left his face, but apart from that it was normal,” de Avila said last week. “There was a bandage on his head behind his ear and when I looked closer, I realised what had happened. He had been shot several times in the back of the head. It was like he had been killed by bandits.”

De Menezes’s cousins, Alex and Alessandro Pereira, who were also at Greenwich mortuary in southeast London, were outraged by what they saw.

In their view, seven bullets into the back of the head, almost certainly at close range, did not seem like an appalling accident; it seemed like an execution.

“He was on the train with a newspaper on his way to work and they killed him,” said Alex. “He would never have run from the police. He was assassinated.” Ever since de Menezes’s death, those who knew him have felt a double injustice: both the untimely loss of a loved one and a refusal by the British police to acknowledge fully the tragic errors that led to his death.

Although the police soon admitted they had killed an innocent man, it was only last week that a proper account of what happened emerged. Leaked documents from the investigation into de Menezes’s death revealed a shockingly different version of events to the original ac- counts, including those apparently sanctioned by the police.

The documents show de Menezes was behaving normally when confronted; he never ran from police; he did not leap a barrier at the station; he was not acting suspiciously; and he was already being restrained by an officer when he was shot.

To compound matters, it also emerged that Sir Ian Blair, the Metropolitan police commissioner, tried to block an immediate inquiry into de Menezes’s death by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). Late last week relatives of de Menezes accused Blair of misleading the public.

“The police knew Jean was innocent. Yet they let my family suffer,” said Alessandro. “For three weeks we have had to listen to lie after lie about Jean and how he was killed. The police even went to Brazil. Yet they still didn’t tell us the truth.”

Instead of facts, the police offered money: de Menezes’s parents claim they were offered possible compensation of £560,000, although this is denied by the police. The dead man’s mother angrily described it as “blood money”.

The controversy is likely to gather pace. It emerged last week that George Galloway’s political party, Respect, is jumping on the bandwagon by helping to galvanise demonstrations against police and government over the affair.

Battered by the allegations of a cover-up, Blair put up a robust defence. “I am not defending myself against making a mistake or being wrong,” he said. “But I am defending myself against an allegation that I did not act in good faith and I reject utterly the concept of a cover-up.” He adds in an interview published today that he did not know his officers had shot an innocent man until 24 hours after the killing of de Menezes.

But there was no escaping that the operation had been riddled with tragic errors.

SURVEILLANCE experts last week explained how a “textbook” operation against de Menezes should have proceeded. Undercover operatives watching a property, explained an expert who has trained MI5 officers and military teams, ought to form a surveillance perimeter known as “the box”. Their task is not to allow anyone to leave the box without being identified as their target or eliminated as not matching the target description.

“The second that the person watching the door — whom we call the trigger — says someone is on the move, then you want a positive identification,” said the expert. “It shouldn’t take more than 30 seconds, perhaps a minute or two at the outside.

“If the trigger isn’t sure, then you use someone else. You get them to walk by and get a good look at the target.”

Such a tactic means that the operative making close contact is “burnt” for the rest of the surveillance and cannot be used again for close work. But it is a price that must be paid for certainty.

“If you still haven’t got a positive identification, then you burn someone else,” the expert said. “Still not sure? Burn someone else. You can’t afford to let the target out of the surveillance box without a proper identification. It comes down to experience and good judgment.”

On the morning of July 22 — the day after unsuccessful bomb attacks on the London Underground — a surveillance team was watching a three-storey block of flats in Tulse Hill. They had arrived there after finding evidence in the rucksack bombs that had failed to explode on three Tube trains and a bus.

One had contained a gym membership card belonging to Hussain Osman, suspected of an alleged bomb attack at Shepherd’s Bush Tube station. In addition, the number plate of a vehicle spotted at a suspected terror training camp (believed to be in central Wales) had been tracked to the Tulse Hill address.

The building housed numerous flats. The suspect address was No 21 on the third floor of the block; de Menezes lived a few doors down at No 17.

Experts say the correct way to have monitored the address would have been to install a small camera in the block, covering the flat under suspicion. But that entailed a number of risks and on July 22 the surveillance team was relying simply on an officer, armed with a video camera, covering the communal entrance.

There was another potential weakness, too. The operation involved two surveillance teams and a unit of armed police on standby. In the teams were both police officers and specialists on secondment from the military. Such a mix can lead to friction, say police sources.

“I can’t imagine what we would want to use the military for,” said an officer trained in surveillance. “Some of our officers have 15 years’ experience, whereas a military operator would have only a few.”

According to well-placed sources, tensions between the police and the Army were running so high that army bomb disposal experts could not even find out the type of explosives used in the July 7 and July 21 attacks. “[The Army] wanted basic details of the bombs that the terrorists had used,” one defence source said. “The Met told them ‘mind your own business’.”

That day, the trigger man, codenamed Tango Ten, was a soldier who had been on secondment to the police for about a year. That morning, according to his own testimony leaked last week, he began watching de Menezes’s block at about 6.30am.

His task was to take footage of anyone who left it and compare it with pictures of the suspects involved in the failed attacks the previous day.

At 9.33am de Menezes emerged from the communal entrance. He was on his way to north London to help his friend de Avila fit a fire alarm. Tango Ten was caught off guard because he was “relieving himself” as de Menezes walked into the street.

The surveillance officer noted down his observations in a logbook. “I observed a U/I [unidentified] male IC1 5’8” dark hair beard/stubble, blue denim jacket, blue jeans and wearing trainers exit the block, he was not carrying anything and at this time I could not confirm whether he was or was not either of our subjects.

“I should point out that as I observed this male exited [sic] the block I was in the process of relieving myself . . . At this time I was not able to transmit my observations and switch on the video camera at the same time.”

In many features de Menezes was strikingly similar to Hussain, and surveillance experts say it would have been a difficult judgment as to whether de Menezes matched the description of Hussain. But one key indicator was his skin colour. The trigger man had described de Menezes as IC1, which is police jargon for light-coloured skin; yet Hussain was IC3 — dark-coloured. Despite this discrepancy, the surveillance officers following de Menezes remained suspicious. They followed him for the next half hour as he travelled north on a bus towards Stockwell, still trying to establish whether he was Hussain.

Their observations and radio transmissions were being reported to Gold Command in Scotland Yard where the officer in charge was Commander Cressida Dick, an Oxford graduate on the fast track to the highest echelons of the police service.

Dick, who trains other officers in dealing with serious incidents, was known as an experienced hand with a cool head and deft judgment. But that morning tension was high and nerves stretched to the limit.

London had just faced a second string of attempted bombings. The biggest hunt Britain had known was in full swing. Thousands of officers were deployed, many armed. Fears of another attack were running high.

Dick had to decide whether the man sitting quietly on the No 2 bus heading towards Stockwell was a potential suicide bomber.

At 9.47am her suspicions may have started to grow. At that point de Menezes got off the bus, waited for a few moments and boarded it again. Quite why de Menezes acted in such a manner is not known. But to the watchers it may have looked like an evasive technique to check if he was being followed.

It was also increasingly clear that de Menezes was heading for Stockwell Tube station — where three of the suspected bombers had set out the previous day.

Exactly what instructions Dick issued remain unclear. According to some reports, she ordered that the suspect be “detained” or “intercepted”. What is clear is that an armed CO19 unit that had been on standby began to move in.

Last week one senior police officer said a decision to call in CO19 would normally occur only when there was a high likelihood the suspect would have to be shot. The independent inquiry is likely to concentrate on the exact nature of the communications from that point between the surveillance officers, Gold Command, and the CO19 men.

As de Menezes walked toward Stockwell station, he had no inkling of the armed team closing in on him. He phoned de Avila and explained that he might be late for work because he expected delays on the Underground.

“I had called him about 45 minutes previously, so I wasn’t surprised to get his call,” de Avila said last week. “He was in the street and I think he was just about to walk into the station.”

As de Menezes walked into the foyer of the station, he picked up a copy of Metro newspaper. He passed his Oyster card across the ticket reader and descended the escalator. About halfway down he began to run — just as any commuter might to catch a train at the platform.

An officer of the surveillance team, codenamed Hotel Three, was close by. In an account provided to investigators, Hotel Three said he followed de Menezes into a train carriage.

“He sat down with a glass panel to his right about two seats in. I took a seat to his left-hand side on the same carriage and there were about two or three members of the public between me and the male in the denim jacket.”

When Hotel Three saw plainclothes CO19 officers arriving on the platform, he stood up and moved to the door of the carriage.

“I placed my left foot against the open carriage door to prevent it shutting . . . I shouted ‘He’s here’ and indicated the male in the denim jacket with my right hand.”

Under Operation Kratos, the guidelines to combat potential suicide bombers, armed officers were advised to shoot suspects in the head, without warning, to prevent them setting off their bombs.

But as the shouts went up and officers piled onto the train, such surprise was lost. It was obvious to de Menezes that something odd was happening, and he stood up and moved forward.

As Hotel Three later recorded: “He immediately stood up and advanced towards me and the [CO19] officers. I grabbed the male in the denim jacket by wrapping both my arms around his torso pinning his arms to his side.

“I then pushed him back onto the seat where he had previously been sitting with right-hand side of my head pressed against the right-hand side of his torso.” In the melee the police still saw de Menezes as a threat, even though he was now being restrained, perhaps negating the arguments for shooting to kill. Events, however, had taken on a momentum of their own.

“At this stage his body seemed straight and he was not in a natural sitting position,” recorded Hotel Three. “I then heard a gunshot very close to my ear and was dragged away onto the floor of the carriage. I shouted ‘police’ and held up my hands. I was then dragged out of the carriage by an armed officer who appeared to be carrying a long-barrelled weapon. I heard several gunshots as I was being dragged out of the carriage.”

Terrified commuters scrambled out of the train and fled from the platform. One of the last to leave said she saw an empty platform apart from four or five men in plain clothes. They were standing over the body of de Menezes.

Among de Menezes’s possessions were his driving licence and mobile phone. The name on the licence was nothing like that of the man the police were hunting — so almost immediately there were signs of a tragic mistake.

In addition, even as the Met commissioner was declaring that there were “direct links” between the shooting and the investigation into the bombers, de Menezes’s mobile phone began to ring regularly. It was de Avila. “I tried to call many times and sent him text messages,” he said. “In the morning it just rang and rang and in the afternoon it went to the message service.”

De Avila went to bed that night still not knowing what had happened to his friend. Then the police rang. “I was phoned in the early hours,” he said. “They contacted because my number had been on his phone.”

About an hour later a balding detective inspector and a uniformed woman police officer arrived at de Avila’s flat in Dollis Hill, north London. Over the next two hours, they questioned de Avila on everything he knew about de Menezes. “The detective wouldn’t tell me what had happened to him,” said de Avila, “but he said ‘we suspect this person is a terrorist suspect’.

“I told him, ‘It’s not true and I just don’t believe that. I know him. We have a social life together. He doesn’t come from Muslim peoples.’ I told him he was a Catholic.

“At the end, he showed me some pictures of Menezes. He said: ‘Are you sure this is the person we are talking about?’ I told him I was. He then told me: “Well, then, maybe this person is dead.”

De Avila’s testimony was convincing. De Menezes was from the same impoverished region of Brazil and was simply trying to save enough money in Britain to fund a business in his home country.

It meant that less than 24 hours after the shooting the police knew they had killed an innocent man. Yet they did nothing to quash misleading reports that the dead man had been a terrorist.

All police shootings are investigated — but Blair wrote to the Home Office asking for any independent investigation to be delayed. According to Blair this was because he believed his officers should not be distracted from the urgent hunt for the terrorists.

His intentions might have been good, but it looked less than open. A similar impression was given when Scotland Yard issued a statement the day after the shooting admitting de Menezes’s death was a tragic and regrettable error.

In the statement the police seemed to put forward a misleading element of justification. It said that de Menezes was followed by surveillance officers and his “clothing and behaviour added to their suspicions”. Yet he had dressed normally and behaved, apart from getting on and off the bus, like any other commuter.

There is not even a single police version of what happened. According to police sources, memebers of the surveillance team who followed de Menezes into the station believed he was not a threat but the firearms officers who arrived later tooka different view. If true, this could prove significant for any prosecution resulting from the shooting.

The family of de Menezes want to know why the Independent Police Complaints Commission did not take over the investigtion until July 27. Blair attended a high-level meeting at the Home Office two days after the shooting, and the family suspect he was still lobbying for an internal investigation rather than one by the IPCC.

This is denied by Scotland Yard. A spokesman said yesterday: “It had already been agreed by the time of that meeting that the Metropolitan police would hand over the investigation to the IPCC.”

Faced with the reluctance of police to provide a full account of the circumstances, the de Menezes family approached seasoned legal advisers and campaigners for help. Gareth Peirce, who represented the Guildford Four, wrongly convicted of being IRA bombers, was asked to represent them.

One of the family’s key advisers has been Asad Rehman, a founder of the Stop the War campaign who worked as a political assistant to Galloway in the last general election.

The Home Office’s action is one of the family’s sources of anger. Shortly after the shooting, it released a statement that suggested de Menezes had been in the country illegally. It seemed to give a possible reason for why he might have tried to flee from police. Later accounts suggested he had not in fact tried to run away, although it does now appear he was in Britain illegally.

Lawyers acting for the de Menezes family say they do not want his death to be in vain and believe it should be used to highlight the wider issue of the accountability to parliament of police protocol. They say a shoot-to-kill policy was introduced without the sanction of the politicians or the public. One reason Peirce is pressing for a public inquiry is that the IPCC findings are likely to be confidential for many months, possibly years, unless there are more leaks.

The commission says it will take three to six months to complete its inquiry and will then pass the file to the Crown Prosecution Service, which will decide whether charges are warranted against the firearms officers involved.

Meanwhile, although the Kratos guidelines are under review, the threat of suicide bombings remains — and so does the shoot-to-kill policy.

    Focus: Executed: Anatomy of a police killing, Times, 21.8.2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1743478,00.html

New claims emerge over Menezes death

· Brazilian was held before being shot
· Police failed to identify him
· He made no attempt to run away

Wednesday August 17, 2005
The Guardian
Rosie Cowan, Duncan Campbell and Vikram Dodd

The young Brazilian shot dead by police on a London tube train in mistake for a suicide bomber had already been overpowered by a surveillance officer before he was killed, according to secret documents revealed last night.

It also emerged in the leaked documents that early allegations that he was running away from police at the time of the shooting were untrue and that he appeared unaware that he was being followed.

Relatives and the dead man's legal team expressed shock and outrage at the revelations. Scotland Yard has continued to justify a shoot-to-kill policy.

Jean Charles de Menezes died after being shot on a tube train at Stockwell station in south London on July 22, the morning after the failed bomb attacks in London.

But the evidence given to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) by police officers and eyewitnesses and leaked to ITV News shows that far from leaping a ticket barrier and fleeing from police, as was initially reported, he was filmed on CCTV calmly entering the station and picking up a free newspaper before boarding the train.

It has now emerged that Mr de Menezes:

· was never properly identified because a police officer was relieving himself at the very moment he was leaving his home;

· was unaware he was being followed;

· was not wearing a heavy padded jacket or belt as reports at the time suggested;

· never ran from the police;

· and did not jump the ticket barrier.

But the revelation that will prove most uncomfortable for Scotland Yard was that the 27-year-old electrician had already been restrained by a surveillance officer before being shot seven times in the head and once in the shoulder.

The documents reveal that a member of the surveillance team, who sat nearby, grabbed Mr de Menezes before he was shot: "I heard shouting which included the word 'police' and turned to face the male in the denim jacket.

"He immediately stood up and advanced towards me and the CO19 [firearms squad] officers ... I grabbed the male in the denim jacket by wrapping both my arms around his torso, pinning his arms to his side. I then pushed him back on to the seat where he had been previously sitting ... I then heard a gun shot very close to my left ear and was dragged away on to the floor of the carriage."

The leaked documents and pictures showed the failures in the police operation from the time Mr de Menezes left home.

A surveillance officer admitted in a witness statement that he was unable to positively identify Mr de Menezes as a suspect because the officer had been relieving himself when the Brazilian left the block of flats where he lived.

The police were on a high state of alert because of the July 7 and July 21 bombings, and had been briefed that they may be called upon to carry out new tactics - shooting dead suspected suicide bombers in order to avoid another atrocity.

The IPCC investigation report states that the firearms unit had been told that "unusual tactics" might be required and if they "were deployed to intercept a subject and there was an opportunity to challenge, but if the subject was non-compliant, a critical shot may be taken".

But it now appears, that contrary to earlier claims, Mr de Menezes was oblivious to the stakeout operation. On the morning of July 22, police officers were in Scotia Road, Tulse Hill, watching a property they believed contained one or more of the would-be bombers who had tried to detonate four bombs on London transport less than 24 hours before.

One firearms officer is quoted as saying: "The current strategy around the address was as follows: no subject coming out of the address would be allowed to run and that an interception should take place as soon as possible away from the address trying not to compromise it."

But the report shows that there was a failure in the surveillance operation and officers wrongly believed Mr de Menezes could have been one of two suspects.

The leaked papers state: "De Menezes was observed walking to a bus stop and then boarded a bus, travelling to Stockwell tube station.

"During the course of this, his description and demeanour was assessed and it was believed he matched the identity of one of the suspected wanted for terrorist offences ... the information was passed through the operations centre and gold command made the decision and gave appropriate instructions that de Menezes was to be prevented from entering the tube system. At this stage the operation moved to code red tactic, responsibility was handed over to CO19."

CCTV footage shows Mr de Menezes was not wearing a padded jacket, as originally claimed, and that he walked calmly through the barriers at Stockwell station, collecting a free newspaper before going down the escalator. Only then did he run to catch the train.

A man sitting opposite him is quoted as saying: "Within a few seconds I saw a man coming into the double doors to my left. He was pointing a small black handgun towards a person sitting opposite me. He pointed the gun at the right hand side of the man's head. The gun was within 12 inches of the man's head when the first shot was fired."

A senior police source last night told the Guardian that the leaked documents and statements gave an accurate picture of what was known so far about the shooting. But the IPCC refused to confirm the documents were genuine adding: "Our priority is to disclose any findings direct to the family, who will clearly be distressed that they have received information on television concerning his death."

The home secretary, Charles Clarke, said: "It is critically important for the integrity of the independent police investigating process that no pressure is put upon the IPCC before their full report is published and that no comment is made until that time."

Harriet Wistrich, lawyer for the family, said: "There is incompetence on the part of those watching the suspect and a serious breakdown of communication."

Asad Rehman, spokesman for the family's campaign, called for a public inquiry. "This was not an accident," he said. "It was serious neglect. Clearly, there was a failure both in police intelligence and on an operational level."

    New claims emerge over Menezes death, G, 17.8.2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,16132,1550565,00.html

Leaked US intelligence

document warning

of terrorist attacks

on London and America

using fuel tankers

The Times
August 14, 2005

(Fuel Laden VBIED)


Advisory General
New York State Office of Homeland Security
Message
Green

August 11, 2005

This communication from the New York State Office of Homeland Security is Sensitive. The New York State Office of Homeland Security in conjunction with the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center,
issues the following advisory to the Oil, Gas, and Transportation sectors:

George Pataki
Governor
James Kallstrom
Advisor on
Counter-Terrorism

The United States Intelligence Community has repeatedly advised of threat streams suggesting al Qaeda and affiliated groups have considered using a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) in a US-based attack.

There are numerous historical and current threat streams to suggest the terrorist use of tanker fuel trucks, among other vehicle types, to facilitate a major explosion targeting critical infrastructure and designed to create mass casualties or economic destruction.

Senior al Qaeda operational planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, captured in Pakistan in March 2003, has told interrogators that he had developed terrorist plots targeting gas stations due to their apparent vulnerability and the potential destructive force of a fuel-driven explosion. Terrorists in Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have effectively used large fuel trucks as VBIEDs against military and civilian coalition targets.

The following tear line information, provided by the Intelligence Community, identifies a possible threat to the United States involving the use of fuel tankers as Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices. This tear line has been widely disseminated throughout law enforcement channels, generating numerous inquiries regarding the imminent nature of the threat.

Although this report makes an attack appear imminent, no other intelligence exists to corroborate this specific threat stream. This scenario represents just one of many possible methods of attack known to be considered by terrorist organizations.

Begin tear line:

1. (FOUO) Al Qaeda leaders plan to employ various types of fuel trucks as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) in an effort to cause mass casualties in the US (and London), prior to 19 September. Attacks are planned specifically for New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. It is unclear whether the attacks will occur simultaneously or be spread over a period of time. The stated goal is the collapse of the US economy.

2. (FOUO) Some of the vehicles used will be hijacked. The type of vehicle may be anything from gasoline tanker trucks to trucks hauling oxygen and gas cylinders. Water trucks filled with gasoline or other highly combustible material may also be used. The detonation of the vehicles will be carried out by driving them into gas stations or ramming explosive-laden vehicles into the trucks carrying the fuel.

Page 1

Fuel Laden VBIED

3. (FOUO) The attackers will be members of small Al Qaeda cells which are spread throughout the US. The cell responsible for the specific attack will execute the plan upon receipt of an order.

4. (FOUO) It is possible that the tape recently released on television by Zawahiri was meant as the activation signal to the cells and not so much as an indictment to Bush or Blair.

End tear line:

In light of a potential VBIED threat in the US, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has disseminated bulletins incorporating the advantages for terrorists in using large, official looking vehicles, and suggested measures for owners and operators of facilities where large vehicles are housed.

Excerpts of FBI Bulletin #166, dated May 10, 2005 are included below:

VEHICLES AS VBIEDS

On January 12, 2005, DHS and the FBI published Joint Bulletin 162, titled "Terrorist Tactics: Analysis of the Surveillance Notes Concerning Certain U.S. Financial Buildings." This bulletin provides information on VBIED attacks using a limousine, to which security personnel provide some degree of deference, or in a service/delivery vehicle, because they do not attract unwanted attention. Exploding a device in an underground parking lot, VIP area, or near the main entrance or a support column were the main attack options offered in the notes. Terrorists have shown creativity in their VBIED platforms, ranging from tanker trucks (Khobar Towers in 1996) to rental trucks (World Trade Center in 1993). A delivery vehicle acquired through a legitimate source could provide the following advantages when deployed as a VBIED:

Heavy/large payload capacity.

Vehicle interior and contents are not visible.

Vehicle, due to its size, could ram security barriers.

Access to high value symbolic or economic targets.

Can fit in parking garages (based on the size of the vehicle).

Easy licensing procedures (based on the size and purpose of the vehicle).

Delivery vehicles can typically remain stationary for extended periods without drawing suspicion.

Public perception as a recognized entity (recognized company delivery van).

Rigging vehicle for VBIED use in privacy (e.g. at night, in a private garage after hours).

Page 2

Fuel Laden VBIED

POTENTIAL SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES

The Office of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center, encourages owners and operators of fuel depots, truck companies and gas stations to report any of the following activities to the UNYRIC Counter Terrorism Center at 1-866-SAFE-NYS.

Individuals videotaping or photographing premises for no apparent reason.

Suspicious individuals apparently surveilling delivery of fuel from tanker-trucks.

Inquiries regarding the frequency of fuel deliveries to your business.

Any information regarding the loss, theft or attempted theft of any tanks, vehicles, or driver's license credentials or licenses used in the transportation of bulk fuel to your station.

Theft of fuel or unexplained loss from your business inventory or tractor-trailer-tanker.

Customer requests to purchase unusual amounts of fuel, not typical of most transactions, or an unusual method of payment.

Unusual inquiries from strangers concerning how to store bulk fuel or handle it on premises.

SUGGESTED PROTECTIVE MEASURES

The following are the recommended general protective measures that apply to facilities with both controlled and uncontrolled access, and specific protective measures recommended for soft targets with controlled access.

General Protective Measures for Controlled and Uncontrolled Access:

Security personnel and private citizens should be advised to remain vigilant in ensuring that large vehicles of any kind in the vicinity of critical infrastructure facilities are viewed as a security risk until proven otherwise.

Ensure all personnel are provided periodic security briefings regarding present and emerging threats.

Specific Protective Measures for Soft Targets with Controlled Access:

Be alert to the necessity for thoroughly checking large vehicles of any kind attempting to gain access to controlled critical infrastructure facilities.

Review existing vehicle bombing prevention procedures to incorporate thwarting the use of a moving vehicle bomb, and consider adjusting buffer zones further from potential targets.

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Fuel Laden VBIED

Adjusting buffer zones further from potential targets.

Periodically rearrange exterior vehicle barriers, traffic cones and road blocks to alter traffic patterns near facilities.

Limit the number of access points and strictly enforce access control procedures.

Approach all illegally parked vehicles in and around facilities, question drivers and direct them to move immediately; if the owner cannot be identified, have vehicle towed by law enforcement.

Provide vehicle inspection training to security personnel, and institute a robust vehicle inspection program to include checking the undercarriage of vehicles, under the hood and in the trunk.

Deploy explosive detection devices and explosive detection canine teams.

Institute/increase security patrols varying in size, timing and routes.

Increase perimeter lighting and maintain/remove vegetation in and around perimeters.

Encourage personnel to be alert and to immediately report any situation that appears to constitute a threat or suspicious activity.

Guard force turnover and personnel authentication procedures.

Implement random security guard shift changes.

Deploy visible security cameras and motion sensors - review security camera footage daily to detect possible indicators of pre-operational surveillance.

As always, observance of suspicious individuals and activities, or any threats received should immediately be reported to the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center, Counter Terrorism Center, at 1866-SAFE-NYS.

Please treat this and all other communications from the Office of Homeland Security as SENSITIVE

Page 4

    Leaked US intelligence document warning of terrorist attacks on London and America using fuel tankers,Times, August 14, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,2087-1733874_1,00.html

10.45pm update

38 dead in London blasts

· At least 38 dead as bus and tube hit
· Jack Straw: 'hallmarks of al-Qaida'
· Blair condemns 'barbaric' attack
· Claim by al-Qaida group
· Emergency hotline: 0870 1566 344

Thursday July 7, 2005
Sarah Left, Mark Oliver and agencies
Guardian Unlimited

A series of explosions ripped through London today as suspected terrorist attacks on tube trains and a bus killed at least 38 people, plunging the capital into chaos.
The Metropolitan police confirmed 35 deaths in the three tube blasts, and two further fatalities on a double-decker bus gutted by a bomb. Another person died later in hospital. The London ambulance service said it had treated 45 people with serious or critical injuries, including burns and amputations, and another 300 people with minor injuries. London hospitals reported treating hundreds of wounded. Police said the overall number of wounded was as high as 700.

Police also said no one remained trapped on tube trains, and that there was no intelligence that any further bombs were on the network.

The death toll could be at least 50, according to the French interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy, who was quoting a conversation he had held with the home secretary, Charles Clarke.

"I've spoken to the British interior minister twice today... He told me that the provisional toll was 50 dead, 300 wounded, including 50 very seriously," Mr Sarkozy said on France 2 television.

Tony Blair said it was "reasonably clear" that the blasts were the work of terrorists, and added that it was "particularly barbaric" that attacks had been timed to coincide with the start of the G8 summit. The prime minister left the summit venue, Gleneagles, in Scotland, to return to London.

With Mr Blair in the capital, the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, took on the chairmanship of the G8, which is meeting for its annual summit to discuss climate change and development issues.

Mr Straw said today's blasts, which bore some similarities to the Madrid train bombings in March 2004, had the "hallmarks of an al-Qaida related attack".

He said neither the police nor the intelligence services had been given any warning of the attacks.

Mr Blair returned to Gleneagles tonight, touching down in his helicopter at 9pm BST, to rejoin the other seven G8 leaders.

Earlier in the day he lined up with them to condemn the London bombs as "barbaric attacks".

"All of our countries have suffered from terrorism ... We are united in our resolve to confront and defeat this terrorism that is not an attack on one nation but on all nations and on civilised society everywhere," he said.

He insisted the G8 leaders would continue their discussions and would not allow the terrorists to halt a summit aimed at helping the world's poorest people.

After arriving in London he said that the "most intense police and security service action" was ongoing "to make sure we bring those responsible to justice".

Mr Blair indicated he believed those responsible were Islamist terrorists. They "act in the name of Islam" but most Muslims worldwide "deplore this act of terrorism", he said.

The police refused to speculate on who had carried out the attacks, but said they had received neither a warning nor a claim of responsibility. BBC Monitoring said it had found a website carrying a brief statement in which an al-Qaida-related organisation claimed responsibility for today's blasts.

London Underground said the whole of its system would remain shut down today, although service would be resumed on the Docklands Light Railway. Transport for London said central London buses would start running again over the course of the afternoon. Tim O'Toole of London Underground said he aimed to have the tube back in service tomorrow, though services on some lines would be severely restricted.

The police said the first blast occurred at 8.51am on a tube train about 100 metres into a tunnel from Liverpool Street station. Seven people died. The second blast, with the highest confirmed death toll so far, came five minutes later on a tube train on the Piccadilly line near King's Cross. Police confirmed 21 deaths.

At 9.15am, a third explosion hit a train in Edgware Road station, blowing a hole through the wall of a second train and possibly affecting a third. The explosion killed seven people.

The final blast came half an hour later on a number 30 bus at Tavistock Square, near Russell Square.

Police said there were "many casualties" and confirmed two fatalities. The blast ripped the red double-decker bus apart, peeling away its sides, blowing off the roof and leaving the few remaining seats exposed.

Amid the confusion, early reports spoke of seven attacks, as incidents were reported by those in stations at both ends of the affected track. The first reports blamed power problems on the tube but it soon became clear the capital had been targeted by what the Metropolitan police commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, called terrible "co-ordinated attacks".

Scotland Yard set up a casualty bureau for people to call if they were worried about loved ones. The number is 0870 1566 344.

Hospitals deal with horrific injuries

The Royal London hospital said it had treated 208 people, including 10 with critical injuries. The Royal Free hospital treated 55 people, and University College hospital treated another 50.

St Mary's hospital, in Paddington near Edgware Road, said later it had received 36 casualties, of whom six were critically injured, 17 seriously injured and 13 had minor injuries. Julian Nettle, of St Mary's hospital, said that staff were dealing with injuries such as the loss of limbs and head wounds, as well minor injuries, including temporary hearing loss.

Emergency services treated survivors outside tube stations; there were walking wounded covered in blood and soot. Survivors described seeing bodies in the wreckage.

'There were loads of people screaming'

Belinda Seabrook said she saw the explosion rip though the double-decker bus as it approached Tavistock Square, between Euston and Russell Square stations. "I was on the bus in front and heard an incredible bang. I turned round and half the double-decker bus was in the air," she said.

Police would not comment on whether the bomb was detonated by a suicide bomber.

Simon Corvett, 26, from Oxford, was on the eastbound train leaving Edgware Road tube station when the explosion on that train happened. "All of a sudden there was this huge bang. It was absolutely deafening and all the windows shattered. The glass did not actually fall out of the windows, it just cracked. The train came to a grinding halt and everyone fell off their seats," he said.

Mr Corvett, who works in public relations, said the commuter train was absolutely packed. He said: "There were just loads of people screaming and the carriages filled with smoke. You couldn't really breathe and you couldn't see what was happening. The driver came on the Tannoy and said: 'We have got a problem; don't panic.'"

Mr Corvett joined other passengers to force open the train doors with a fire extinguisher. He said the carriage on the other track was destroyed. "You could see the carriage opposite was completely gutted. There were some people in real trouble."

Public told to avoid London

The public were warned to stay clear of London for non-essential journeys. A Network Rail spokesman said southbound services into the capital were terminating at Watford, with no onward bus transfers, but services began to resume later in the day. The total shutdown of the Underground system is thought to be unprecedented.

Earlier the home secretary, Charles Clarke, had urged people to stay at home until further notice, telling them not to go into central London. Police asked people working in the centre of the capital to begin making their way home early to avoid the usual 5pm rush hour.

    38 dead in London blasts, G, 7.7.2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,12780,1523169,00.html

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