History > 2013 > UK > Politics (I)
Obituary
Margaret
Thatcher,
a
political phenomenon,
dies
aged 87
Britain's first female prime minister
whose three terms broke
the pattern of postwar politics
Anne
Perkins
The Guardian, Monday 8 April 2013 13.27 BST
This article was published on guardian.co.uk at 13.27 BST on Monday 8 April
2013. A version appeared on p32 of the Main section section of the Guardian on
Tuesday 9 April 2013. It was last modified at 18.01 BST on Monday 8 April 2013.
Margaret
Thatcher, who has died aged 87, was a political phenomenon. She was the first
woman elected to lead a major western power; the longest serving British prime
minister for 150 years; the most dominant and the most divisive force in British
politics in the second half of the 20th century. She was also a global figure, a
star in the US, a heroine in the former Soviet republics of central Europe, a
point of reference for politicians in France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
In Britain, the Thatcher years were a watershed. After them, the ideals of
collective effort, full employment and a managed economy – all tarnished by the
recurring crises of the 1970s – were discredited in the popular imagination.
They were replaced with the politics of me and mine, deregulation of the markets
and privatisation of the state's assets that echoed growing individual
prosperity. Thatcher did not cause these changes, but she legitimised and
embedded them. Her belief in the moral authority of the individual and the
imperative of freedom of choice led left as well as right to reappraise the
welfare state. Her perception of economics, society and Britain's place in the
world continue to shape British politics.
It is often claimed that she gave no warning of the revolution she was about to
unleash when she won her first majority in 1979. In fact, although the official
manifesto was opaque, her speeches in the years between defeating Edward Heath
for the leadership of the Conservative party in 1975 and coming to power laid
out the ideology that underpinned her policies over the next 11 years.
Thatcher was pragmatic about her methods but constant in her targets: socialism,
the Labour party and above all the collectivist state that Labour, abetted by
one-nation postwar Conservatism, had constructed. She believed that the state
was a burden on private enterprise. Its cost was crippling the economy and
overloading it with debt. Vested interest had been allowed to flourish, most
notably in the trade unions but also in the nationalised industries of coal,
steel and telecommunications.
Many others shared her analysis. The strength of her beliefs gave her the
courage to push on where others might have conciliated. She came to ignore
criticism with a ruthlessness that was in the end her undoing.
She was not the only person who saw a world divided between good and evil. What
marked her out was a willingness to say so, abroad as well as at home. Soviet
leaders, after years of detente, were startled to find their regime denounced as
the embodiment of inhumanity, bent on military expansion. Before she had won a
general election vote in the UK, Thatcher had won the sobriquet overseas of the
Iron Lady.
Only an outsider could have given birth to an ideology as iconoclastic as
Thatcherism, and Thatcher always regarded herself as a challenger of the status
quo, a rebel leader against established power. What mattered to her was less the
breadth of her support than the depth of her convictions.
In time, there grew around her a mythology that rooted her absolute faith in the
individual in her upbringing above the grocer's shop in the Lincolnshire town of
Grantham. She was the second of two daughters of Alderman Alfred Roberts and his
wife, Beatrice. The two girls were educated at Kesteven and Grantham girls'
school, and at 17 Margaret won a place to study chemistry at Somerville College,
Oxford, where she was tutored by the future Nobel prizewinner Dorothy Hodgkin
(with whom she remained on respectful terms, despite Hodgkin's passionate
opposition to nuclear weapons). She graduated in 1947.
Less than two years later she was selected to contest the hopeless Kent seat of
Dartford, despite the reservations of some party activists who were appalled at
the prospect of a 23-year-old woman as their candidate. She contested Dartford
in both the 1950 and 1951 general elections.
It was at a social function after her first adoption meeting that she met Denis
Thatcher, a businessman with a passion for rugby who had earlier rejected the
chance of fighting the seat himself. Denis drove the candidate back to London.
Well-off, divorced and amiable, Denis ran his family paint firm, which was later
absorbed into Burmah Oil. They were married in December 1951. In 1953, their
twins, Mark and Carol, were born. Denis, it was claimed, spent the day at a
cricket match – Carol later called their marriage "a partnership of parallel
lives" – and while still in the maternity hospital, Margaret signed up to study
for her bar finals. She was called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn in 1954.
For a young woman with a new family, to become an MP was unprecedented. But in
1958, she was selected for the rock-solid north London constituency of Finchley,
the seat she represented from October 1959 until she retired at the general
election in 1992.
In October 1961, after only 20 months on the backbenches, the then prime
minister, Harold Macmillan, made Thatcher a junior pensions minister (a job she
later gave to her own successor, John Major). It would be nearly 30 years before
she returned to the backbenches. In 1967, with her party in opposition, she was
promoted to the shadow cabinet by the new party leader, Heath, and when he won
the election of June 1970, she became education secretary, the only woman in the
cabinet.
Here, her public reputation was made as "Thatcher the milk-snatcher", the
minister who cut spending by ending universal free milk for primary school
children. It was a defining moment, but also a rare breach of the Conservatives'
unwillingness to disturb the postwar consensus. Much more in keeping was her
continuation of Labour's plan to replace grammar schools with comprehensives.
But she was at the ringside as Heath's experiments in monetarism and industrial
relations legislation crashed and burned. Heath resumed the interventionist
policies of the 1950s. In February 1974, as a miners' overtime ban prompted
power cuts and the introduction of a three-day working week, Heath asked: "Who
governs Britain?" He lost the general election. Thatcher later claimed she had
always been uncomfortable with Heath's consensual approach. At the time,
however, she was silent and loyal.
However, after Harold Wilson narrowly won a second election victory in October
1974, Thatcher was among the embryonic new right preparing to challenge Heath.
Its intellectual leader was Keith Joseph, but his chance of leading the party
vanished with a notorious speech, claiming that the poor had too many children.
Thatcher decided she would put her name forward for the contest. "Someone who
represents our viewpoint has to stand," she told Joseph. Denis told her she was
out of her mind, a view echoed in every newspaper. To a party that could not
decide whether it was worse to be female or to be suburban, she appeared
entirely unelectable.
Yet she defeated Heath in the first ballot and four other contenders in the
second. The beaten favourites included William Whitelaw, the man who was later
her indispensable deputy. She won in an ambush that capitalised on discontent
with Heath rather than positive enthusiasm for her. As a result, she was never
sure of her party: "Is he one of us?" became the defining question of the next
11 years. Many of her backbench colleagues shared the prevailing view in the
Labour government that Thatcher's leadership made the Tories unelectable. She
worked assiduously to meet a barrage of criticism – criticisms that often
focused as much on attributes of gender as on matters of policy. Her hair, her
clothes and particularly her voice were attacked. Politics remained a largely
male preserve, about the strength to confront, whether it was trade union power,
economic crisis or Soviet threat.
Thatcher's only cabinet-level experience had been in a relative backwater. She
had always conformed to the norms of a woman in public life. Engaged in
discourse largely with men, she observed the conventions, flirted, sometimes
shouted and occasionally wept. Her advisers emphasised the feminine, softened
her appearance and lowered her voice. Yet she was always most authentic when she
was defiant. If a single phrase captured her political identity, it was from her
1980 party conference speech: "This lady's not for turning." She played by the
rules that demanded that she present herself as soft and yielding, but by her
diligent attention to detail, the concentration of her focus, and her appetite
for conflict, ultimately she subverted them.
Thatcher drew up a new settlement with the welfare state, and organised labour
and the City in a way that rewarded enterprise and individual effort over the
collective and the communitarian. She regarded group interests, from trade
unions to the professions, as protectors of privilege.
Although monetarism had already been forced upon the preceding Labour government
by the International Monetary Fund, under Thatcher it was presented as a
crusade, until it was discreetly abandoned in the mid-1980s.As the global slump
reached its nadir in early 1981, she and her chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, defied
all appeals for Keynesian-style reflation. In the first budget of the
administration, VAT was nearly doubled to 15% while personal taxes were slashed
– the top rate of income tax from 83% to 60%, and the standard rate from 33% to
30%. Over the next 10 years, the standard rate came down to 25%, and the top
rate to 40%. Interest rates were to be the principal method of controlling the
money supply. Removing exchange controls was the first symbolic piece of
deregulation. In September 1982, unemployment – which became the de facto weapon
against the trade unions – reached 3 million.
A series of employment acts were introduced which ended trade unions'
traditional show-of-hands votes and brought in secret pre-strike ballots as well
as decennial votes on the political levy. Wages councils were constrained. In a
second tranche of legislation in the late 1980s, the closed shop and secondary
strike action were outlawed.
Thatcher thought the government had no role to play in public sector pay
negotiations or in seeking to secure industrial peace. The steelworkers were the
first to clash, and although, in 1981, planned pit closures were aborted to
avert a miners' strike, by early 1984 the government was prepared – literally –
for what was to be the last stand of the old trade union movement in its heavy
industry heartland: the year-long showdown with the miners that culminated in
mass closures and ultimately privatisation.
Thatcher shrugged off record personal unpopularity and relished facing down her
critics. But she would not have survived without the crisis on the left which
led to the formation of the breakaway Social Democratic party. In 1981 there
were riots in Brixton, south London, Toxteth in Liverpool and Manchester's Moss
Side. From March 1984, striking miners and police were in frequent, violent
confrontation. In 1985 Brixton erupted again, and there was rioting too in the
Handsworth area of Birmingham. In the same year PC Keith Blakelock was murdered
during disturbances on the Broadwater Farm estate in Tottenham, north London.
Privatisation, which came to be a fundamental of the Thatcherite mission, was
only hinted at in 1979, and in the depression of the early 1980s caution
prevailed. When the ailing nationalised motor manufacturer British Leyland ran
into trouble in early 1980, Joseph, then Thatcher's industry minister, bailed it
out like a Heathite. Nonetheless, in 1980-81 more than £400m was raised from
selling shares in companies such as Ferranti and Cable and Wireless. Later came
North Sea oil (Britoil) and British Ports, and from late 1984 the major sales of
British Telecom, British Gas and British Airways, culminating at the end of the
decade in water and electricity. By this time these sales were raising more than
£5bn a year.
Conflict was at the heart of Thatcher's style. But it is a myth that she never
ducked a challenge. Ever a pragmatist, she was astute in the fights she picked.
The battles during her first term, from 1979 to 1983, ranged across a
forbiddingly wide terrain and set the tone for the years to come. Not all of the
challenges were sought: the IRA was behind many of them. In August 1979 Lord
Mountbatten and 18 soldiers were murdered in separate attacks. In April 1980,
she authorised the SAS to launch their live-on-TV rescue of 19 hostages from
Iraqi-trained terrorists in the Iranian embassy siege. The following year, she
refused to intervene to prevent the deaths of Bobby Sands and nine other
republican hunger strikers in the Maze prison in Northern Ireland.
The IRA's mainland bombing campaign that ensued added to the impression of a
government under siege. Airey Neave, who had run Thatcher's leadership campaign,
had been assassinated by the Irish National Liberation Army just before the 1979
election. She lost another intimate, Ian Gow, at the hands of the IRA 10 years
later. On 12 October 1984 the Provisionals' campaign nearly claimed Thatcher
herself. Five people died in the bombing of the Grand hotel during the
Conservative party conference in Brighton. Others, including the cabinet
ministers Norman Tebbit and John Wakeham, were seriously injured.
The prime minister responded with resilience. Betraying no sign of shock, she
delivered her speech to the conference later the same day, as planned. She was
already negotiating with Dublin what was to become a year later the Anglo-Irish
agreement, an attempt to improve security co-operation for which she faced down
her Ulster Unionist friends and conceded the acceptance of an Irish dimension in
the affairs of Northern Ireland. She did not seek a settlement, but with
hindsight the agreement can be read as a major step in the peace process.
The conflict with which she was most closely identified, and the one that
arguably rescued her from being just a one-term wonder, was the Falklands war.
On 2 April 1982, General Leopoldo Galtieri invaded the islands in the South
Atlantic. Discussions about a leaseback and the removal of a naval patrol vessel
had been misread as a sign that Britain was ready to abandon its distant colony.
Thatcher, ignoring the initial advice given to her by much of her cabinet – and
inspired by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach – took the extraordinary
risk of dispatching a taskforce to retake the islands. While negotiations for a
peaceful outcome stuttered on through the US secretary of state, Alexander Haig,
the Royal Navy steamed south. On 21 May the British landed and on 14 June the
Argentinians surrendered. Less than a year later, the Conservatives were
returned with a majority of 144 over a divided opposition.
Thatcher's years in office were bookended by two defining events of global
significance. On Christmas Day 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Ten
years later, the Berlin Wall came down, heralding the collapse of the Soviet
empire. The invasion of Afghanistan reinforced Thatcher's belief in the
expansionist intent of the Soviet empire. She became the evangelist for
America's ambition to upgrade its own and Nato's nuclear defences with Cruise
and Pershing missiles. In 1980 she announced Cruise would come to Britain. As a
result, the perimeter fence around the RAF base at Greenham Common, Berkshire,
became the centre for a decade of anti-nuclear campaigning by women's groups.
She negotiated to upgrade Britain's independent nuclear deterrent by acquiring
Trident II, at a cost of £7.5bn.
Yet for all the attention to hardware, Thatcher always believed its citizens
would be the ones to destroy the Soviet empire. Visiting the Berlin Wall in
1982, she prophesied that it would be brought down by the "anger and frustration
of the people". She promoted co-operation and fostered relations with Poland and
Hungary, encouraging their leaders to imagine a world after communism. At the
same time, she sought out modernisers in the Soviet Union and brought Mikhail
Gorbachev, when he was still a relatively minor figure in the Politburo, to the
attention of Ronald Reagan as a man "to do business with". She made a triumphant
visit to Russia in 1987 where she was mobbed by the public and took the argument
against communism direct to live television, "as if she was fighting a
byelection in Moscow North," this paper's correspondent wrote. If her subsequent
reluctance to accept German reunification suggests her belief in the people was
less deep-rooted than she would claim, she was a leading force in undermining
the power of the Soviet Union.
In her battle against communism, she marched in step with the US. She and Reagan
were in particular sympathy (sorely tested when, in October 1983, the US invaded
the Caribbean island of Grenada, a Commonwealth member), although she disagreed
strongly with his dream of major nuclear disarmament. That, she considered, was
a threat to European security.
The Westland affair early in 1986 marked the beginnings of Thatcher's break with
Europe. She preferred to see the ailing British helicopter company merge with
the American Sikorsky rather than accept the European solution that her defence
secretary and leading critic, Michael Heseltine, had wanted. He resigned. In the
ensuing row, Thatcher came close to being implicated in the deliberate
discrediting of her rival. Her protege, the trade secretary Leon Brittan, was
forced to resign. Her pro-Americanism was sealed in April 1986 by her support,
alone in Europe, for the US bombing raid on Libya.
Thatcher had originally been a supporter of Britain's membership of the Common
Market and Labour's complete rejection of it after the successful referendum in
1975 only strengthened its appeal to her. However, she was elected in 1979 on a
promise to seek a budget rebate, a preoccupation that dogged every summit for
her first five years until she reluctantly agreed a settlement at Fontainebleau
in 1984.
A period of relative calm, during which Thatcher advocated speeding up the
single market negotiations followed, until the passage of the Single European
Act in 1987. At that point, she realised that her ideal of Europe as a trading
partner, a market for British goods and services where remaining trade barriers
would wither away, was at odds with the vision of closer political integration
shared by the European commission president, Jacques Delors, and most other
European nations. Her battles against it became one of the deadly fissures in
her relations with her cabinet.
It is one of the paradoxes of an era that will be remembered for its hostility
to the EU that in the Single European Act (which led to the Maastricht treaty),
Thatcher ceded more control over British affairs than any prime minister before,
while in sponsoring the Channel tunnel, she established a permanent land route
to the continent.
In 1988, she made a speech in Bruges attacking "creeping Euro-federalism".
Throughout the following year, her chancellor, Nigel Lawson, fought for a date
for sterling to join the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), to which the UK was
committed and which would allow interest rates to fall. Thatcher was determined
that the value of the pound should not be pegged to European currencies.
Protesting at the influence of the economist Alan Walters as a rival centre of
advice, Lawson resigned.
Thatcher's desire to build a free-market Europe was matched by her attempt to
strengthen the role of the individual against the state at home. The election of
June 1987 produced another landslide, her third election victory. It heralded a
programme of radical public sector reform intended to assert the power of the
consumer and bring market discipline into schools and hospitals.
The 1988 Education Act brought in city technology colleges and grant-maintained
schools, free of local authority control. Housing action trusts further limited
local councils' room for manoeuvre. A purchaser-provider split was introduced
into the NHS. The rhetoric of public spending cuts continued, although the
records show that public spending rose every year in her time in office,
declining only as a share of GDP.
Local councils, particularly Ken Livingstone's Greater London council, were
among Thatcher's most effective critics. Her response was the poll tax, properly
known as the community charge, levied on an individual basis that would link
council spending to local taxes. She ignored advice that such a tax would be
impossible to collect and that it was also severely regressive. In March 1990
there were protests and riots in a mass rejection of an unjust tax.
Meanwhile the party splits over Europe were reaching a climax. Geoffrey Howe, an
early and loyal Thatcherite, had supported Lawson over Britain's membership of
the ERM. Only the threat of their resignation had forced her to agree to join.
In revenge, Howe was sacked as foreign secretary and made leader of the House
and deputy prime minister. In October 1990, as Thatcher stood at the dispatch
box after the Rome summit (where she had been ambushed with demands for further
integration) dismissing, it seemed, any progress at all with "No! No! No!", Howe
finally resolved to resign.
The defiance that had once so impressed her party, and many in the country, now
sounded dangerously deluded even to some of her closest supporters, especially
those in marginal seats. It took less than 10 days – from 13 November when Howe
made his resignation speech to 22 November when Thatcher announced her
resignation – for Conservative MPs to eject her.
At the 1992 election, Thatcher retired from the Commons and took a seat in the
Lords. Powerfully affected by a sense of injustice, she found it hard to desert
the field of domestic politics. Her only consolation was that in ensuring the
accession for her favourite, Major, she denied it to Heseltine. But she was soon
letting it be known that Major was not, after all, one of us. After his defeat
in May 1997, his successors – with the exception of Iain Duncan Smith – were
found to be disappointments too.
The first of her two volumes of memoirs, The Downing Street Years, appeared in
1993, followed two years later by The Path to Power. She also established the
Thatcher Foundation, which, funded by the large fees she could command for
public speaking in the US and Japan, was intended to promote her ideas, not
least in the emerging democracies of eastern Europe. In March 2002, after a
series of minor strokes, she gave up public speaking.
Thatcher broke the pattern of postwar politics and changed its nature. Labour
accommodated rather than reversed her attack on the welfare state and left her
employment legislation almost untouched. When the Conservatives finally returned
to power in May 2010, in coalition with the Liberal Democrats, David Cameron and
George Osborne shared her priorities and used her language. So complete, it
seems, was her undermining of the role of the state that even the catastrophic
failure of deregulated markets has yet to trigger a reappraisal.
It is a paradox of her period in office that, while seeking to limit the scope
of government, she introduced a style of command and control, top-down,
centralised authority that strengthened it and has proved hard for her
successors to resist. It has leaked into the way political parties are managed,
so that they struggle to regenerate a spirit of local activism. Some of the most
valuable institutions of civil society from the churches to the trade unions
have been scarred by her attacks on collective enterprise.
Denis, to whom Thatcher had awarded a baronetcy in her resignation honours, died
in 2003.
She is survived by Mark and Carol and her two grandchildren, Michael and Amanda.
• Margaret Hilda Thatcher, Lady Thatcher, politician, born 13 October 1925; died
8 April 2013
Margaret Thatcher, a political phenomenon, dies aged 87, G, 8.4.2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/apr/08/margaret-thatcher-political-phenomenon-dies
Margaret Thatcher,
Conservative Who Reforged Britain,
Dies
April 8,
2013
The New York Times
By JOSEPH R. GREGORY
Margaret
Thatcher, the “Iron Lady” of British politics, who turned her country in a
sharply conservative direction, led it to victory in the Falklands war and
helped guide the United States and the Soviet Union through the cold war’s
difficult last years, died on Monday. She was 87.
Her spokesman, Tim Bell, said the cause was a stroke. She had been in poor
health for months and had dementia.
Her death brought tributes from Queen Elizabeth II and Prime Minister David
Cameron, who cut short a visit to Continental Europe to return to Britain, and
Queen Elizabeth II, who authorized a ceremonial funeral — a step short of a
state funeral — to be held at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London with military
honors, The Associated Press reported. A statement from the White House said
that “the world has lost one of the great champions of freedom and liberty, and
America has lost a true friend.”
Mrs. Thatcher was the first woman to become prime minister of Britain and the
first to lead a major Western power in modern times. Hard-driving and
hardheaded, she led her Conservative Party to three straight election victories
and held office for 11 years — May 1979 to November 1990 — longer than any other
British politician in the 20th century.
The tough economic medicine Mrs. Thatcher administered to a country sickened by
inflation, budget deficits and industrial unrest brought her wide swings in
popularity, culminating with a revolt among her own cabinet ministers in her
final year and her shout of “No! No! No!” in the House of Commons to any further
integration with Europe.
But by the time she left office, the principles known as Thatcherism — the
belief that economic freedom and individual liberty are interdependent, that
personal responsibility and hard work are the only ways to national prosperity,
and that the free-market democracies must stand firm against aggression — had
won many disciples. Even some of her strongest critics accorded her a grudging
respect.
At home, Mrs. Thatcher’s political successes were decisive. She broke the power
of the labor unions and forced the Labour Party to abandon its commitment to
nationalized industry, redefine the role of the welfare state and accept the
importance of the free market.
Abroad, she won new esteem for a country that had been in decline since its
costly victory in World War II. After leaving office, she was honored as
Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven. But during her first years in power, even many
Tories feared that her election might prove a terrible mistake.
In October 1980, 17 months into her first term, Mrs. Thatcher faced disaster.
More businesses were failing and more people were out of work than at any time
since the Great Depression. Racial and class tensions smoldered so ominously
that even close advisers worried that her push to stanch inflation, sell off
nationalized industry and deregulate the economy was devastating the poor,
undermining the middle class and courting chaos.
At the Conservative Party conference that month, the moderates grumbled that
they were being led by a free-market ideologue oblivious to life on the street
and the exigencies of realpolitik. With electoral defeat staring them in the
face, cabinet members warned, now was surely a time for compromise.
To Mrs. Thatcher, they could not be more wrong. “I am not a consensus
politician,” she had often declared. “I am a conviction politician.”
In an address to the party, she played on the title of Christopher Fry’s popular
play “The Lady’s Not for Burning” in insisting that she would press forward with
her policies. “You turn if you want to,” she told the faltering assembly. “The
lady’s not for turning.”
Her tough stance did the trick. A party revolt was thwarted, the Tories hunkered
down, and Mrs. Thatcher went on to achieve great victories. She turned the
Conservatives, long associated with the status quo, into the party of reform.
Her policies revitalized British business, spurred industrial growth and swelled
the middle class.
But her third term was riddled with setbacks. Dissension over monetary policy,
taxes and Britain’s place in the European Community caused her government to
give up hard-won gains against inflation and unemployment. By the time she was
ousted in another Tory revolt — this time over her resistance to expanding
Britain’s role in a European union — the economy was in a recession and her
reputation tarnished.
To her enemies she was — as Denis Healey, chancellor of the Exchequer in Harold
Wilson’s government, called her — “La Pasionaria of Privilege,” a woman who
railed against the evils of poverty but who was callous and unsympathetic to the
plight of the have-nots. Her policies, her opponents said, were cruel and
shortsighted, widened the gap between rich and poor and worsened the plight of
the poorest.
Her relentless hostility to the Soviet Union and her persistent call to
modernize Britain’s nuclear forces fed fears of nuclear war and even worried
moderates in her own party. It also caught the Kremlin’s attention. After a
hard-line speech in 1976, the Soviet press gave her a sobriquet of which she was
proud: the Iron Lady.
Yet when she saw an opening, she proved willing to bend. She was one of the
first Western leaders to recognize that the Soviets would soon be led by a
member of a new generation, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and invited him to Britain in
December 1984, three months before he came to power. “I like Mr. Gorbachev,” she
declared. “We can do business together.”
Her rapport with the new Soviet leader and her friendship with President Ronald
Reagan made her a vital link between the White House and the Kremlin in their
tense negotiations to halt the arms race of the 1980s.
Brisk and argumentative, she was rarely willing to concede a point and loath to
compromise. Colleagues who disagreed with her were often deluged in a sea of
facts, or what many referred to as being “handbagged.”
“She had high standards, and she expected everyone to do their work,” John
O’Sullivan, a special adviser to the prime minister, recalled in 1999. “But
there was a distinction. She was tougher on her ministers than she was on her
personal staff. The more humble the position, the nicer she was.”
Despite her being the first woman to lead a major political party in the West,
she rubbed many feminists the wrong way. “The battle for women’s rights has
largely been won,” she declared. “I hate those strident tones we hear from some
women’s libbers.”
She relished being impolitic. “You don’t follow the crowd,” she often said. “You
make up your own mind.”
Britain’s arts and academic establishments loathed her for cutting their
financing and considered her tastes provincial, her values narrow-minded. In
1985, two years into her second term, she was proposed for an honorary doctorate
at Oxford, a laurel traditionally offered prime ministers who had attended the
university, as she had. The proposal, after debate among the faculty, was
rejected.
Yet her popularity remained high.
“Margaret Thatcher evoked extreme feelings,” wrote Ronald Millar, a playwright
and speechwriter for the prime minister. “To some she could do no right, to
others no wrong. Indifference was not an option. She could stir almost physical
hostility in normally rational people, while she inspired deathless devotion in
others.”
The Grocer’s Daughter
Margaret Hilda Roberts was born on Oct. 13, 1925, in Grantham, Lincolnshire, 100
miles north of London. Her family lived in a cold-water flat above a grocery
store owned by her father, Alfred, the son of a shoemaker. Alfred Roberts was a
Methodist preacher and local politician, and he and his wife, Beatrice, reared
Margaret and her older sister, Muriel, to follow the tenets of Methodism:
personal responsibility, hard work and traditional moral values.
Margaret learned politics at her father’s knee, joining him as he campaigned as
an independent candidate for alderman and borough councilman. “Politics was in
my bloodstream,” she said.
She won a scholarship to Kesteven and Grantham Girls School. In 1943, at 17, she
was admitted to Somerville College, Oxford, where she studied chemistry. Barred
from joining the Oxford Union debating society — it did not admit women until
1963 — she became a member of the Oxford University Conservative Association and
its president in 1946. She graduated in 1947 and later earned a master’s degree
in chemistry, then worked as a chemical researcher and studied law.
Politics exerted an even stronger pull, and at 23 she was selected to be a
Conservative Party candidate for Parliament. Shortly afterward, in 1949, she met
Denis Thatcher, a well-to-do businessman and former artillery officer who had
been decorated for bravery during World War II. They married in December 1951.
In August 1953, Mrs. Thatcher gave birth to twins, Mark and Carol, who survive
her, along with grandchildren. (Sir Denis died in 2003.) That December, she was
admitted to the bar and came to specialize in patent and tax law. As the couple
prospered, Mrs. Thatcher achieved the financial independence to devote herself
to politics. “Being prime minister is a lonely job,” she wrote in her memoirs,
“The Downing Street Years,” published in 1993. “It has to be; you cannot lead
from the crowd. But with Denis there, I was never alone.”
In 1950 she campaigned to be a member of Parliament from Dartford, a Labour
Party preserve. She was the youngest woman to run for a seat that year, a time
when Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who had oustedWinston Churchillin an upset
on July 5, 1945, was seeking re-election. Mr. Attlee had gone on to create a
welfare state that promised full employment, state ownership of industry, public
housing and a national health service. As expected, Mrs. Thatcher was defeated.
She ran again the next year, and lost, but she did better than expected in both
races.
In 1951 the Tories began a 13-year run as the party in power, first under the
aging Churchill and then under Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and Alec
Douglas-Home. But in exchange for support on foreign affairs, the Tories
compromised with the unions and accepted the government’s growing role in the
marketplace. This “policy of consensus” proved successful. Mr. Macmillan,
seeking re-election in 1959, declared, “Most people have never had it so good.”
Few Tories dared voice their misgivings as inflation spread, productivity
dropped and deficits grew. Mrs. Thatcher, who was elected to the House of
Commons that year from the largely middle-class Finchley district in north
London, was among those who swallowed their doubts.
In 1964, the Tories, exhausted by scandal, a souring economy and internal
divisions, lost power to Harold Wilson’s Labour Party. But as the economy grew
more feeble and the unions more militant, Mr. Wilson was ousted in 1970 by the
Conservative leader,Edward Heath, who pledged to replace the politics of
consensus with a “quiet revolution” that would reduce the state’s role in the
marketplace and tame the unions.
He appointed Mrs. Thatcher secretary for education. As a Conservative cabinet
minister, wrote Hugo Young, journalist and author of a critical 1989 biography,
“The Iron Lady,"she fought budget cuts in the British university system and
pushed to rebuild schools in poor areas with a zeal that “would have done credit
to the best of the socialists.”
But it was her efforts to restrict a program that provided free milk to
schoolchildren that made her a national figure. Though poor children were exempt
from the cutbacks, and the previous Labour government had also reduced free milk
in schools, the opposition leapt to the attack. When she argued in Parliament
that the cuts would help finance more worthwhile programs, she was roundly
jeered. The tabloids labeled her “Thatcher the Milk Snatcher.” Her husband,
worried by the strain on his wife and children, who were being taunted at
school, suggested that perhaps she should quit politics.
The government stood firm on the milk issue. But as the economy worsened, Mr.
Heath retreated, imposing wage and price controls as inflation surged and
igniting strikes. His U-turn angered the Tory right. Moreover, it proved futile.
In the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the oil-producing nations of OPEC
imposed huge price increases that stoked inflation. By winter 1974 Mr. Wilson
was back in power.
The following December, the Conservative Party revised its rules for choosing a
leader and opened a series of votes to the rank and file. Mrs. Thatcher, in what
many regarded as an act of political gall, declared her candidacy. One British
bookmaker, Ladbrokes, put the odds against her at 50 to 1.
Mrs. Thatcher, in an aggressive campaign, finished Mr. Heath on the first
ballot, 130 to 119. The margin was not enough for victory, but Mr. Heath was
forced to drop out. In the second ballot, on Feb. 11, 1975, Mrs. Thatcher
defeated the other contenders, all of them men.
For the next four years, as Labour ran the country, she fought to reshape her
party. The conservatism she espoused was shaped by the tenets of classic
liberalism: faith in the individual, in economic freedom and in limited
government power. But she had to contend with conservatism’s basic reluctance to
change with the times.
The Tories were the party of tradition, and traditionally women had little place
in its upper echelons. All party leaders, for example, joined the Carlton Club,
which excluded women. The club would not change its rules for Mrs. Thatcher, but
she was accorded an honorary membership. Still, resentment lingered. At a party
conference Mr. Heath studiously ignored her.
Mrs. Thatcher’s prescription for change was based on the ideas of the
conservative economists Friedrich von Hayek andMilton Friedman. Hayek believed
that political and economic freedom were inseparable; Friedman argued that
economic productivity and inflation were determined by the amount of money the
government put into the economy, and that the heavy government spending
advocated by Keynesian economics distorted the natural strength of the
marketplace.
Mrs. Thatcher and her allies asserted that the Tory policy of consensus had
allowed the country to lurch leftward as each successive leader, seeking the
middle of the road, was forced to compromise with a leftist agenda. For her
part, she cared little for theories. She called for an all-out attack on
inflation, pledged to denationalize basic industry and promised to curb union
power.
By the mid-1970s, Britain was the sick man of Europe. Nearly half of the average
taxpayer’s income went to the state, which now determined compensation for a
third of the nation’s work force: those employed by nationalized industries. In
late 1978 and early ’79, strikes paralyzed Britain. As the “winter of
discontent” dragged on, Prime Minister James Callaghan, of the Labour Party,
failed to survive a no-confidence vote and called an election for May 3.
Callaghan, who was known as Sunny Jim, drew higher personal ratings in opinion
polls than Mrs. Thatcher. But on election day the Tories walked away with 43.9
percent of the vote. Labour received 37 percent and the Liberals 13.8 percent.
It was the largest swing to the right in postwar history.
The First Term
Mrs. Thatcher moved swiftly. “I came to office with one deliberate intent,” she
later said. “To change Britain from a dependent to a self-reliant society, from
a give-it-to-me to a do-it-yourself nation.”
It was a painful beginning. Income tax cuts balanced by rising gasoline duties
and sales taxes fueled inflation. Unemployment spread as she slashed subsidies
to faltering industries. Tight money policies drove up interest rates to as high
as 22 percent, strengthening the pound, hobbling investment at home and hurting
competitiveness overseas. A record 10,000 businesses went bankrupt. Saying it
would take years to cure Britain of the havoc wrought by socialism, Mrs.
Thatcher warned, “Things will get worse before they get better.”
In the summer of 1981 — the same one in which Charles, the Prince of Wales,
married Lady Diana Spencer— discontent boiled over into days of rioting in the
London district of Brixton and in the inner cities of Liverpool, Manchester,
Bristol and many other areas. Televised reports of rioting, arson and looting
shocked the nation.
The prime minister, resisting advisers who counseled more social spending and
jobs programs, called for greater police powers. Yet, in the face of national
shame over the violence, she was forced to give way.
There were other compromises. The government retreated from its declaration that
state industries must sink or swim in the free market and came to the aid of
British Airways and British Steel.
Mrs. Thatcher later said that 1981 was her worst year in office. But by the
spring of 1982, things were looking up. Inflation was falling; so was the value
of the pound, which gave a boost to Britain’s exports and, along with tax cuts,
began to feed economic growth.
In foreign affairs, she won some small victories. Standing up to the European
Community over the amount of money Britain provided to the organization, she
argued that her country paid out much more than it got back in benefits, and won
a significant reduction in contributions. Though her rhetoric and style had
caught the world’s eye, she had yet to stake a position as a world leader. Then,
on April 2, 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.
British settlers had lived on those remote islands in the South Atlantic, long
claimed by Argentina, since the 1820s. Negotiations over their future had been
dragging on for years when the Argentine military junta under Gen. Leopoldo
Galtieri, eager to divert attention from economic and social unrest, moved to
take the Falklands by force, gambling that once the islands were occupied,
Argentine forces would never be ousted.
As the United States and other allies pushed for talks to avoid bloodshed, Mrs.
Thatcher ordered a Royal Navy fleet to the South Atlantic. In a 10-week war, the
British retook the islands in fighting that left some 250 British servicemen and
more than 1,000 Argentines dead. The victory doomed Argentina’s military
government and cemented Mrs. Thatcher’s reputation as a leader to be reckoned
with.
The Second Term
Her political fortunes were enhanced by squabbling among her opponents. Far-left
factions and militant union leaders were gaining strength in the Labour Party as
economic discontent and tensions with the Soviet Union grew.
In 1980, Mrs. Thatcher and PresidentJimmy Carterhad agreed to deploy American
intermediate-range cruise missiles in Britain in response to a Soviet arms
buildup in Eastern Europe. Under Mr. Reagan, who succeeded Mr. Carter the
following year, the United States, with Mrs. Thatcher’s support, persuaded other
European allies to deploy the missiles. The arms buildups ignited demonstrations
across Western Europe.
When Mrs. Thatcher called an election in June 1983, Labour’s new chief, Michael
Foot, called in the campaign for a unilateral ban on nuclear weapons, withdrawal
from the European Community, further nationalization of industry and a huge jobs
program.
Mr. Foot’s swing to the left alienated Labour’s center and right wing, and
disaffected members fell away from the Social Democratic Party, which supported
private enterprise and a mixed economy, membership in the European Community and
a nuclear defense in which Britain and the United States had dual control over
weapons.
This time the bookmakers put the odds heavily in Mrs. Thatcher’s favor, and they
had no regrets. The conservatives won 397 of the 650 seats in Parliament, the
biggest swing in voting since Labour’s landslide victory against Churchill in
1945. The working class voted heavily for the Conservatives. Even Dartford, the
“safe” Labour seat where Mrs. Thatcher had made her first failed bid for office
in 1950, elected a Tory.
It was an axiom of British politics that one never picked a quarrel with the
pope or the National Union of Mineworkers. Mrs. Thatcher flouted it. The coal
mines, nationalized in 1947, were widely seen as unprofitable, overstaffed and
obsolescent, and in 1984 the government announced plans to shut down several
mines and to eliminate 20,000 of the industry’s 180,000 jobs.
In response, Arthur Scargill, the Marxist president of the union, used union
rules to elude a rank-and-file vote and, on March 6, 1984, called a walkout.
It was a violent strike. Night after night, the television news broadcast images
of hundreds of miners battling the police. On Nov. 30, at a mine in South Wales,
a taxi driver taking a miner to work was fatally injured when a concrete slab
was dropped on his cab.
Though the episode shocked the Labour Party and many miners, Mr. Scargill
refused to condemn it, alienating Neil Kinnock, the new Labour leader, and other
supporters. As members of his own union sought to have the strike declared
illegal, newspaper cartoons pictured Mr. Scargill flinching under Mrs.
Thatcher’s flailing handbag. The strike finally ended in March 1985, after 362
days, without a settlement.
‘Popular Capitalism’
Mrs. Thatcher now pushed harder to fulfill her vision of “popular capitalism.”
The sale of state-owned industries shifted some 900,000 jobs into the private
sector. More than one million public housing units were sold to their occupants.
And the chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, announced in 1985 that for
the first time since the 1960s, the Treasury would not require deficit spending
in its next fiscal budget.
Across the Atlantic, Mr. Reagan cheered Britain’s turnaround. He and Mrs.
Thatcher did not always agree; he thought she was too reluctant on cutting
taxes, while she was wary of his insouciance over rising federal deficits. When
Mr. Reagan, without warning the British, ordered troops to invade the Caribbean
nation of Grenada, a member of the Commonwealth, in the wake of a Communist
coup, Mrs. Thatcher gave him a dressing down. Nevertheless, the Reagan-Thatcher
axis was, in the words of Hugo Young, “the most enduring personal alliance in
the Western world throughout the 1980s.”
The prime minister supported Mr. Reagan’s stand against Communism, echoing White
House assertions that Fidel Castro’s Cuba was exporting revolution to Nicaragua
and other Latin American states. She was equally vigorous in supporting the
United States’ fight against terrorism, even when it cost her political capital
at home. In April 1986, after terrorist attacks in Western Europe, the United
States sought permission to launch American warplanes from bases in Britain for
attacks on Libya. Mrs. Thatcher granted it. The bombing destroyed the living
quarters of the Libyan leader, Col.Muammar el-Qaddafi, and killed one of his
children. Mrs. Thatcher’s support for the mission outraged many Britons. But she
countered that terrorism demanded a united response.
Mrs. Thatcher had shown a similar kind of resolve at the Conservative Party
conference in Brighton in 1984. On the evening of Oct. 12, as she worked on a
speech in her hotel room, a bomb exploded on the floor below, killing four
people and wounding more than 30 others. Among the dead was the wife of the
Tories’ chief whip, John Wakeham. A cabinet minister, Norman Tebbit, and his
wife were badly wounded. The Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility. The
next day Mrs. Thatcher addressed the party as scheduled, declaring, “All
attempts to destroy democracy by terrorism will fail.”
Despite the sectarian violence, Northern Ireland was not high on her agenda.
Mrs. Thatcher saw the troubles there as intractable and her policies as simply
preserving the status quo.
She was more flexible over South Africa, where the struggle against
institutionalized racism was growing more violent. Though she regarded apartheid
as repugnant, she initially refused to impose economic sanctions on South
Africa, arguing that apartheid would ultimately be undone by greater trade and
the prosperity and yearnings for democracy that come with it. But pressured by
other Commonwealth countries, she grudgingly reversed herself and endorsed some
sanctions.
On another daunting problem involving the British Empire’s complex legacy, Mrs.
Thatcher had more success, at least at first. In 1984, Britain reached an
agreement with China over the fate of Hong Kong, which was to revert to China in
1997. Under a formula of “one country, two systems,” the political freedoms and
economic structure of Britain’s wealthiest colony would stand for 50 years,
preserving Hong Kong’s capitalist economy under a Communist state.
But in the turmoil after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, China, fearing a
democratic Hong Kong’s influence on the mainland, was far less amenable to
granting the territory representative government. When the British governor,
Chris Patten, handed over the colony to China in 1997, Hong Kong’s political
future remained uncertain.
The Cold War’s End
“Some of these diplomatic minuets you have to go through I cannot stand,” Mrs.
Thatcher once said, by way of paying a compliment to Mr. Gorbachev. He forsook
rhetoric for blunt realism, she said, and “that suits me better.”
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union was rife with political disillusion and economic
chaos. The Reagan administration sought to add pressure by moving ahead with
high-tech weapons, including plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative, the
space-based defense system known as Star Wars, which would in theory enable the
United States to intercept incoming nuclear missiles.
Mr. Gorbachev was unalterably opposed to Star Wars, as were many in the West.
Mrs. Thatcher was also against it, though she publicly supported it. At a White
House meeting she warned that the project was a costly pipe dream. “I am a
chemist,” she is said to have told the president. “I know it won’t work.”
But she changed her mind after being assured that Britain would receive a goodly
share of the business in researching and developing the system. At a meeting in
Washington in December 1984, she helped draft a position on Star Wars that
Reagan later adopted, assuring the Soviets that the program would enhance
nuclear deterrence, not undercut it, and that it would not get in the way of
arms control talks.
Nevertheless, it did. During a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October
1986, Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev came close to an agreement to ban nuclear
weapons. But when Mr. Gorbachev insisted first on an American promise to drop
the Strategic Defense Initiative, Mr. Reagan refused, and the negotiations fell
apart.
The president’s position infuriated his critics. But many people in NATO and the
Pentagon were relieved. “The fact is that nuclear weapons have prevented not
only nuclear war but conventional war in Europe for 40 years,” Mrs. Thatcher
said in a speech. “That is why we depend and will continue to depend on nuclear
weapons for our defense.”
Mrs. Thatcher did not fare so well in other battles. In the face of popular
opposition, she retreated from plans to privatize the water industry and the
National Health Service, replace college grants with a student loan program, cut
back pensions and revamp the social security system. Many predicted that she
would not win a third term.
But the economy continued to work in her favor. When she called an election in
1987, the Tories were returned to power on June 11.
The Third Term
That October, Wall Street crashed. In the following months, disagreements among
the Tories over Britain’s future in the European Community and a series of other
events forced Mrs. Thatcher to surrender hard-fought gains.
She believed that linking the pound to other currencies would erode Britain’s
political independence. Mr. Lawson, her chancellor of the Exchequer, argued that
it would be better to lay the groundwork for joining the European monetary
system by tying the pound to the more stable German mark. Without telling the
prime minister, Mr. Lawson, in January 1987, had informally begun to peg the
pound to the mark.
Meanwhile, the government’s tax-cutting and easy-credit policies fed an
investment and housing boom, again fueling inflation. Mr. Lawson, reluctant to
allow the value of the pound to rise above the ceiling he had imposed to keep it
in range with the mark, ignored calls for higher interest rates. As his actions
became apparent, the prime minister accused him of misleading her and warned
artificially holding down the pound had to stop.
But Mr. Lawson and his supporters saw the European monetary system not only as a
step toward European integration but also as a safeguard against the kind of
wide swings in the pound’s value that had so disrupted Britain’s economic health
in the past. On this fundamental issue the Tories were split, the two sides set
on a collision course.
As inflation rose, Mr. Lawson reversed himself and raised interest rates. The
sudden effort to stanch the money flow threw Britain into recession. In October
1989, Mr. Lawson resigned, but many devoted Thatcherites admitted that she bore
much of the blame.
Other misjudgments were laid at her door. In an effort to make local authorities
more accountable for the way they spent tax money, Mrs. Thatcher pushed through
a measure that replaced the income tax with a “poll tax” on all adult residents
of a community. The tax — so named because it used voter registration lists to
identify prospective taxpayers — was intended to make everyone, not just
property owners, pay for local government services. In practice, the measure was
manifestly unfair and deeply unpopular. In March 1990, protests in Trafalgar
Square flared into riots. Within her own party, there was a growing feeling that
the Iron Lady had become a liability.
The Fall
That November, tensions among the Tories exploded. The deputy prime minister,
Geoffrey Howe, the last survivor of the original Thatcher cabinet of 1979, was
known for his loyalty, though he disagreed with the prime minister on Britain’s
policy toward Europe. Now that disagreement came to a boil. At a cabinet
meeting, “Margaret was incredibly rude to Geoffrey,” Kenneth Baker, another
minister, recalled. “It was the last straw for Geoffrey, and he resigned that
night.”
The next day Michael Heseltine, a former defense minister who favored greater
links with Europe, announced that he would challenge Mrs. Thatcher for the party
leadership. On Nov. 20, as the prime minister was attending a summit meeting in
Paris, the Tories took a vote. For Mrs. Thatcher, whose approval ratings in the
polls were falling, the outcome was bleak: though she beat Mr. Heseltine, 204
votes to 152, under party rules her majority was not strong enough for her to
keep her place.
The race, now wide open, took an unexpected turn. Mrs. Thatcher was awaiting the
results of the party ballot with her family and friends at 10 Downing Street
when she learned that Mr. Heseltine had lost to the soft-spoken chancellor of
the Exchequer,John Major, a protégé of hers. When someone remarked that her
colleagues had done an awful turn, she replied, “We’re in politics, dear.”
Though vowing at first to “fight on and fight to win” the second ballot, she was
persuaded to withdraw. After speaking to the queen, calling world leaders and
making a final speech to the House of Commons, she resigned on Nov. 28, 1990,
leaving 10 Downing Street in tears and feeling betrayed.
After leaving office, Mrs. Thatcher traveled widely and drew huge crowds on the
lecture circuit. She sat in the House of Lords as Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven,
wrote her memoirs and devoted herself to the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, set
up to promulgate the values she had championed.
She remained forthright in expressing her opinions. During her final months in
office, she had bolstered President George Bush in his efforts to build a United
Nations coalition to oppose Iraq after it invaded Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990. At the
time of the invasion, Mrs. Thatcher was meeting with Mr. Bush and other world
leaders at the Aspen Institute in Colorado. “Remember, George,” she is said to
have told him, “this is no time to go wobbly.”
In retirement, she continued to call for firmness in the face of aggression,
advocating Western intervention to stop the ethnic bloodshed in the Balkans in
the early 1990s. After the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, she endorsed
PresidentGeorge W. Bush’s policy of sanctioning pre-emptive strikes against
governments that sponsored terrorism. She also backed the war to oust the Iraqi
leader,Saddam Hussein.
By then, according to her daughter, Mrs. Thatcher had begun to show signs of the
dementia that would overtake her and become, to much criticism, the focus of
“Iron Lady,” a 2011 film about her withMeryl Streepin the title role.
But while she was still of sound mind, Mrs. Thatcher never let up on her
anti-Europe views. “In my lifetime, all the problems have come from mainland
Europe, and all the solutions have come from the English-speaking nations across
the world,” she told the annual Conservative Party conference in 1999. Her words
drew predictable outrage, but few people doubted that Mrs. Thatcher, as usual,
had meant exactly what she said.
She also did not shy from criticizing her successors’ actions, including Mr.
Major’s handling of the economy. Her frankness often embarrassed the Tories. It
seemed to many that Mrs. Thatcher preferred Labour’s new leader,Tony Blair, to
her former protégé.
That perception was not surprising, since Mr. Blair’s victory over Mr. Major in
1997 seemed in a curious way to emphasize the success of Mrs. Thatcher’s
policies. Mr. Blair led his “New Labour” party to victory on a platform that
promised to liberate business from government restrictions, end taxes that
discouraged investment and reduce dependence on the state.
Mrs. Thatcher’s legacy, “in most respects, is uncontested by the Blair
government,” Mr. Young, her biographer, said in a 1999 interview. “It made
rather concrete something she once said: ‘My task will not be completed until
the Labour Party has become like the Conservative Party, a party of capitalism.’
”
This article
has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: April 8, 2013
An earlier version of this obituary misquoted Lady Thatcher when,
in an address
to her party,
she played on
the title of Christopher Fry’s play
“The Lady’s
Not for Burning.”
She said: “You
turn if you want to. The lady’s not for turning.”
She did not
say, “Turn if you like.”
Margaret Thatcher, Conservative Who Reforged Britain, Dies,
NYT, 8.4.2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/09/world/europe/
former-prime-minister-margaret-thatcher-of-britain-has-died.html
Related > Anglonautes > History > UK
Margaret Hilda Thatcher (1925-2013)
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