History > 2011 > USA > Justice > Federal justice (I)
Reneging
on Justice at Guantánamo
November
19, 2011
The New York Times
In 2008,
the Supreme Court ruled that Guantánamo Bay prisoners who are not American
citizens have the right of habeas corpus, allowing them to challenge the
legality of their detention in federal court and seek release.
The power of the ruling, however, has been eviscerated by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. The appellate court’s wrongheaded rulings
and analyses, which have been followed by federal district judges, have reduced
to zero the number of habeas petitions granted in the past year and a half.
The Supreme Court must reject this willful disregard of its decision in
Boumediene v. Bush, and it can do so by reviewing the case of Adnan Farhan Abd
Al Latif, a Yemeni citizen imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay since 2002.
This month, the appeals court declassified an opinion it issued in October that
reversed a Federal District Court decision ordering Mr. Latif’s release. The
appellate court improperly replaced the trial court’s factual findings with its
own factual judgments. It also unfairly placed the burden on Mr. Latif to rebut
the presumption that the government’s main evidence was accurate: the government
should bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his
detention is warranted.
It is undisputed that Mr. Latif was in a car accident in Yemen in 1994 and
sustained head injuries. In 2001, he went to Pakistan to seek free medical
treatment, and eventually traveled to Kabul to find a Yemeni man who had
promised to help him. He was arrested near the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan and transferred to Guantánamo Bay, where he has been imprisoned
without a trial. The government contends that Mr. Latif was recruited by an Al
Qaeda operative and fought with the Taliban.
The federal trial judge found that the government’s evidence did not
sufficiently support its contention, that incriminating evidence was not
corroborated and that Mr. Latif had a plausible alternative explanation for his
travels.
The appeals court reversed that decision, arguing that the government’s
intelligence report on the Latif case should have been given “a presumption of
regularity” and that unless there is “clear evidence to the contrary,” trial
judges must presume that this kind of report is accurate. But as the strong
dissent by Judge David Tatel explains, there is no reason to make such an
assumption about the report, which was “produced in the fog of war, by a
clandestine method that we know almost nothing about.”
In ruling on 15 habeas cases since mid-2010, the appellate court has made the
standard of review toothless, and its views have affected lower court rulings.
Since July 2010, district judges have denied 10 habeas petitions in Guantánamo
cases and granted none, compared with 22 habeas petitions granted and 15 denied
in the two years before that.
Judge Tatel writes that it is “hard to see what is left of the Supreme Court’s
command” that habeas review in federal court be “meaningful.” The appeals court
has gone off on the wrong track. The justices need to reaffirm the right of
prisoners in Guantánamo to seek justice in federal court and to explain firmly
and clearly what that entails.
Reneging on Justice at Guantánamo, NYT, 19.11.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/opinion/sunday/reneging-on-justice-at-guantanamo.html
Twitter
Ordered to Yield Data in WikiLeaks Case
November
10, 2011
The New York Times
By SOMINI SENGUPTA
SAN
FRANCISCO — A federal judge on Thursday ruled that Twitter, the popular
microblogging platform, must reveal information about three of its account
holders who are under investigation for their possible links to the WikiLeaks
whistle-blower site.
The case has become a flash point for online privacy and speech, in part because
the Justice Department sought the information without a search warrant last
year. Instead, on the basis of a 1994 law called the Stored Communications Act,
the government demanded that Twitter provide the Internet protocol addresses of
three of its users, among other things. An Internet protocol address identifies
and gives the location of a computer used to log onto the Internet.
The three people came to the Justice Department’s attention because it believed
they were associated with WikiLeaks.
Twitter informed the three people — Jacob Appelbaum, an American computer
security expert, along with Rop Gonggrijp, a Dutch citizen, and Birgitta
Jonsdottir, a member of Iceland’s Parliament — of the government’s demand for
information earlier this year.
The petitioners argued in federal court that their Internet protocol addresses
should be considered private information and that the demand for information was
too broad and unrelated to WikiLeaks. They also argued that the order suppressed
their right to free speech.
The court disagreed. Judge Liam O’Grady, from the United States District Court
in Alexandria, Va., wrote in his opinion that “the information sought was
clearly material to establishing key facts related to an ongoing investigation
and would have assisted a grand jury in conducting an inquiry into the
particular matters under investigation.”
The judge said that because Twitter users “voluntarily” turned over the Internet
protocol addresses when they signed up for an account, they relinquished an
expectation of privacy.
“Petitioners knew or should have known that their I.P. information was subject
to examination by Twitter, so they had a lessened expectation of privacy in that
information, particularly in light of their apparent consent to the Twitter
terms of service and privacy policy,” Judge O’Grady wrote.
The court also dismissed a petition to unseal the Justice Department’s
explanation for why it sought the account information.
Neither the Justice Department nor Twitter company officials responded to e-mail
and telephone requests for comment.
The petitioners themselves spoke up on Twitter. “I would do it again,” Ms.
Jonsdottir posted.
“Today is one of those ‘losing faith in the justice system’ kind of days,” Mr.
Appelbaum wrote on Twitter.
Lawyers for one of the petitioners said they were still reviewing the judge’s
order and could not yet say what the next steps were.
Twitter Ordered to Yield Data in WikiLeaks Case, NYT,
10.11.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/technology/twitter-ordered-to-yield-data-in-wikileaks-case.html
Court
Blocks Graphic Labels on Cigarette Packs
November 7,
2011
The New York Times
By DUFF WILSON
A federal
judge on Monday blocked a Food and Drug Administration requirement that tobacco
companies put big new graphic warning labels on cigarette packages by next
September.
In a preliminary injunction, Judge Richard J. Leon of United States District
Court in Washington ruled that cigarette makers were likely to win a free speech
challenge against the proposed labels, which include staged photos of a corpse
and of a man breathing smoke out of a tracheotomy hole in his neck.
The judge ruled that the labels were not factual and required the companies to
use cigarette packages as billboards for what he described as the government’s
“obvious anti-smoking agenda!”
The 29-page ruling was a setback for Congressional and F.D.A. efforts to bolster
the warnings on tobacco packages. The agency has said they are the most
significant change to health warnings in 25 years.
The Justice Department is reviewing the ruling, a spokesman, Charles S. Miller,
said. The F.D.A. declined to comment, a spokeswoman said.
If the ruling is appealed — as both sides expect — it would join a different
federal judge’s ruling on similar issues on appeal and raise the possibility
that the issue will be decided by the United States Supreme Court.
Floyd Abrams, a New York lawyer and First Amendment specialist who argued the
case for Lorillard Tobacco of Greensboro, N.C., praised the ruling. He said the
companies had just objected to “grotesque” images, but not to new words of
warning.
“It’s basically rooted in the notion that compelled speech by the government is
presumptively unconstitutional,” Mr. Abrams said. “The only exception that could
fit here is the one which says that the government can require warnings to be
placed on products including tobacco products, but that the warnings must be
factual and uncontroversial in nature.”
Five tobacco companies had challenged the selection of nine specific graphic
warnings as an unconstitutional intrusion on commercial free speech. The judge
agreed with them on almost every point, saying the companies would suffer
irreparable harm if the provision were enforced before it was fully decided in
courts, a process that is likely to take years.
“It is abundantly clear from viewing these images that the emotional response
they were crafted to induce is calculated to provoke the viewer to quit, or
never to start, smoking: an objective wholly apart from disseminating purely
factual and uncontroversial information,” Judge Leon wrote.
“At first blush, they appear to be more about shocking and repelling than
warning,” Judge Leon added in a footnote.
Antismoking activists called on the Justice Department to appeal immediately.
“This ruling presents a direct and immediate threat to public health,” Charles
D. Connor, president and chief executive of the American Lung Association, said
in a statement. “The tobacco industry’s efforts to halt the replacement of
cigarette warning labels that are 25 years old, ineffective and hidden on the
side of packages, will result in more lives lost to tobacco.”
Matthew L. Myers, a lawyer and president of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids,
a Washington advocacy group, said Judge Leon had sympathized with tobacco
companies during oral arguments.
“The government has been expecting this decision and will appeal,” Mr. Myers
said. “In addition, many of the same issues are now pending before a panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because a federal judge
in Kentucky reached a decision different than Judge Leon’s decision today.”
In that case, Judge Joseph H. McKinley Jr. ruled the cigarette makers could be
forced to put graphic images and warnings on the top half of their packages, as
Congress required. But Judge Leon noted that Judge McKinley had not seen the
actual proposed images.
Judge Leon was appointed to the bench in 2002 by President George W. Bush. Last
year, Judge Leon also ruled against the F.D.A. over e-cigarettes, an electronic
device that looks like a cigarette and delivers nicotine, saying they should be
regulated as tobacco products rather than under the stricter regimen as drug
delivery devices. The government has not appealed that case.
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 gave the F.D.A.
authority for the first time to regulate tobacco products. It included a
provision directing the F.D.A. to require larger, graphic warning labels
covering the top half of the front and back of cigarette packs by Sept. 22,
2012, as well as 20 percent of print advertising.
The F.D.A. had studied 36 images and narrowed them down to nine after surveys of
effectiveness. The photos are similar to some included with cigarettes in
Canada. But the tobacco companies argued, and the judge agreed, that the F.D.A.
could not prove the images would make a statistically significant difference in
smoking rates in the United States.
“We are pleased with the judge’s ruling and look forward to the court’s final
resolution of this case,” Bryan D. Hatchell, a spokesman for R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco of Winston-Salem, N.C., makers of Camel cigarettes, said after the
ruling.
Other plaintiffs in the suit are Commonwealth Brands, the Liggett Group, and
Santa Fe Natural Tobacco. The Altria Group, parent company of Philip Morris,
makers of the dominant brand of Marlboro cigarettes, did not join the lawsuit.
Altria was also the only major cigarette maker to support the new legislation.
Court Blocks Graphic Labels on Cigarette Packs, NYT,
7.11.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/health/policy/court-blocks-graphic-labels-on-cigarette-packs.html
Russian
Is Convicted in Arms-Trafficking Case
November 2,
2011
The New York Times
By NOAH ROSENBERG
Viktor
Bout, a former Soviet Air Force officer who became known as the “Merchant of
Death” for running what American officials have described as an international
arms trafficking network, was found guilty on Wednesday of conspiring to sell
antiaircraft missiles and other weapons to men he believed were members of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
The verdict, in Federal District Court in Manhattan, was a rather prosaic end to
nearly two decades spent in the margins of international terrorism and
espionage; Mr. Bout has been accused of furnishing weapons to Al Qaeda and the
Taliban and into civil wars in Africa, and was reputed to have a grasp on
present-day Russian intelligence. His legend even inspired the 2005 film “Lord
of War,” starring Nicolas Cage.
Even Mr. Bout’s arrest and extradition were theatrical: he was taken into
custody in Bangkok in March 2008 after getting ensnared in a foreign sting
operation run by the Drug Enforcement Administration; his extradition to the
United States, which Russian officials strenuously opposed, took more than two
and a half years.
But the trial, presided over by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, took only three
weeks, nearly all of it spent by prosecutors in making their case. Mr. Bout’s
lawyer did not present any witnesses; the jury took less than two days to find
Mr. Bout guilty of all four charges against him.
Mr. Bout, 44, faces a sentence of up to life in prison for conspiring to kill
United States citizens, officers and employees by agreeing to sell weapons to
drug enforcement informants who he believed were members of the Colombian
terrorist organization known as the FARC; and for conspiring to acquire and
export surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles, a conviction that carries a
mandatory minimum of 25 years in prison.
Mr. Bout also faces a maximum of 15 years for conspiring to provide material
support or resources in the form of weapons to a foreign terrorist organization.
His sentencing is scheduled for Feb. 8.
The jury found that Mr. Bout believed that the men he and his associates had
been communicating with for months were, as the prosecution stressed, “waging
war” against the Colombian government and its American collaborators. In fact,
the men who Mr. Bout and his former associate, Andrew Smulian, had been
orchestrating a deal with were undercover Drug Enforcement Administration
informants.
In the government’s final rebuttal of the defense’s closing argument, Brendan R.
McGuire, a prosecutor, cited e-mail exchanges, text messages and recorded
telephone conversations among Mr. Bout, Mr. Smulian and other associates, as
well as Mr. Bout’s own Internet research into the FARC prior to his meeting with
the informants in a Sofitel hotel in Bangkok, in March 2008.
Since his extradition, Mr. Bout has been held at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center in Manhattan.
“We are very disappointed about this verdict,” Mr. Bout’s lawyer, Albert Y.
Dayan, said upon exiting the courthouse. “This is definitely not the end of the
process for us,” he said, indicating that further legal actions were
forthcoming.
Mr. Dayan said that Mr. Bout “believes that this is not the end,” and that they
maintain that he was wrongfully accused.
Mr. McGuire told jurors that the evidence against Mr. Bout had been
“overwhelming” and suggested that Mr. Bout’s lawyer had repeatedly tried to mold
the truth in Mr. Bout’s favor.
Mr. Dayan had painted his client as an innocent and financially troubled
businessman caught up in a desperate charade to sell nothing more than two cargo
airplanes to men Mr. Bout was “skeptical” were actually members of the FARC. Mr.
Bout’s promises of tens of thousands of AK-47 rifles, millions of rounds of
ammunition, hundreds of missiles, ultralightweight airplanes and other military
equipment was simply “a con,” Mr. Dayan told jurors.
Mr. Smulian, the former associate of Mr. Bout’s who began cooperating with
United States authorities shortly after his arrest with Mr. Bout in Bangkok,
suggested in his testimony that Mr. Dayan’s defense was completely erroneous.
Plans had been set in motion, he said, for a lucrative, long-term relationship
among him, Mr. Bout and the FARC that extended far beyond arms dealing and into
military training, money laundering and even political support.
Throughout the trial, prosecutors said they had needed to prove merely that such
a “criminal agreement” had existed between Mr. Bout and Mr. Smulian, and that
subsequent action or even an actual pact with the men posing as FARC was
irrelevant.
Mr. Smulian, who pleaded guilty in 2008 to conspiring to sell arms with Mr.
Bout, was among seven witnesses, including a Drug Enforcement Administration
agent, a computer forensics expert and two undercover informants, who testified
for the prosecution. Mr. Dayan criticized Mr. Smulian’s testimony as “a
dog-and-pony show.” He said that Mr. Smulian — who had admitted in his testimony
that he wished to get his sentence reduced for “substantial cooperation” with
the government — was “a bad liar” who had masterminded the “fake FARC” deal,
pushing it on Mr. Bout out of his own necessity for cash.
Mr. McGuire called Mr. Dayan’s defense strategy “a tap dance” that was “as
dizzying as it is ridiculous.” He brushed aside Mr. Dayan’s core argument as
mere assertion that withered in the face of what Mr. McGuire said was ultimately
an “inconvenient truth” for Mr. Bout.
“He did everything to show them he could be a one-stop shop for the FARC,” Mr.
McGuire said, underscoring Mr. Bout’s “numerous” incriminating actions during
the sting operation. Mr. McGuire referred jurors to a recorded conversation from
a meeting in Bangkok in which he said Mr. Bout had bragged to the supposed FARC
members about the “5,000 weapons deliveries” he had executed in the past.
At the same time, Mr. McGuire applauded the investigation that led to Mr. Bout’s
conviction by saying, “There was nothing political or improper” about it.
“It’s all over,” Mr. McGuire told jurors in his final rebuttal. “Viktor Bout is
guilty of every count in the indictment.”
Russian Is Convicted in Arms-Trafficking Case, NYT,
2.11.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/nyregion/viktor-bout-guilty-in-arms-trafficking-case.html
A
Judge’s Education, a Sentence at a Time
October 7,
2011
The New York Times
By BENJAMIN WEISER
ON Feb. 2,
2004, Marlo Kidd awaited sentencing before Judge Denny Chin of Federal District
Court in Manhattan. She had pleaded guilty to acting as a lookout for two masked
gunmen who had robbed a bank in Yonkers, and under federal sentencing
guidelines, she faced a prison term of up to six years.
Her lawyer, though, was asking the judge to sentence her only to home
confinement, because she was raising five children who ranged in age from 5 to
13, and also caring for her 14-year-old sister, as their own mother had been a
crack-cocaine addict. He had said that sending Ms. Kidd to prison would almost
certainly result in her children being placed in foster care, destroying what
was left of the family.
His arguments gave Judge Chin pause. Ms. Kidd had provided him with copies of
the children’s report cards, which showed them receiving B’s and B-pluses, even
a smattering of A’s, and very few absences from school.
“The report cards had an impact on me,” Judge Chin recalled in a recent
interview. “She was getting them out to school every day, and they were holding
their own. I was impressed by this.” Ms. Kidd, who had also apologized for her
crime in a letter to the judge, was “a decent mother,” he concluded. Moreover,
one of his law clerks had shown him a news report on the terrible conditions in
foster homes and facilities for children in New Jersey, where the children would
most likely be sent.
But the robbery had been violent, with one robber killed in a police shootout.
And the judge was seldom persuaded to grant leniency because of family
circumstances — it was, after all, the defendants’ crimes, not the sentence,
that caused hardships for families.
In the end, he decided that Ms. Kidd had to go to prison, but he imposed only a
30-month sentence. “I cared very much about the future of the children,” Judge
Chin recalled, “but I was willing to take the risk that they would be sent to
foster care, even with a shorter sentence.” His decision involved weighing
conflicting concerns and interests, he said, “something we have to do all the
time.”
Judge Chin, 57, who last year was elevated by President Obama to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, after nearly 16
years on the trial bench, is best known for the 150-year sentence he gave
Bernard L. Madoff, arguably the most prominent white-collar sentence in the
history of American law.
But it has been largely anonymous defendants like Ms. Kidd whose cases have
influenced his thinking about how to balance punishment and rehabilitation,
deterrence and compassion.
“There’s no doubt that all of these cases shaped me,” Judge Chin said, “and
shaped the way I think, and the way I respond to things.”
He took the bench in 1994 at age 40 with little experience in criminal law. He
has since sentenced more than 1,100 defendants, including at least a dozen who
received sentences of life or the equivalent, according to court statistics. He
quickly learned, he said, that preparation was crucial and that he must not
agonize over his decisions. One seasoned judge had advised: “Rule and roll.” Be
decisive. Don’t second-guess yourself.
In a series of interviews conducted in person and through e-mail over the past
year, Judge Chin discussed his most challenging sentencing decisions, cases that
became essential parts of his education as a judge. The interviews were unusual;
judges rarely agree to discuss cases, even closed ones, like these, outside
court. The exchanges provided a revealing look at how one judge approached the
task of sentencing, which he called “the hardest thing” about being on the
bench.
“It is just not a natural or everyday thing to do,” Judge Chin explained, “to
pass judgment on people, to send them to prison or not.”
“I mean, there is so much at stake,” he added, “and there are so many different
considerations that come into play.”
IN March 1996, Patrick Regan, a former New York City police officer, became the
first defendant Judge Chin sentenced who had been convicted in a trial at which
he presided.
The case had been bitterly fought: Mr. Regan, then 36, a highly decorated police
veteran, was convicted of perjury. Prosecutors said he had lied during a
grand-jury investigation of suspected misconduct by an anticrime unit of which
he was a member. His lawyer, David S. Greenfield, contended that the government
itself had engaged in misconduct, trying to catch the officer in a perjury trap,
an argument Judge Chin had rejected before the trial.
The government asked for a sentence within the guideline range of one-and-a-half
to two years. But Mr. Greenfield, citing Mr. Regan’s valorous record, sought
probation. His client had made or assisted in many felony arrests; had been shot
in the line of duty; and had been awarded the Police Combat Cross, the
department’s second most prestigious medal. The conviction and loss of his
shield would be punishment enough, Mr. Greenfield argued.
Judge Chin recalled that the sentencing came against the backdrop of several
high-profile police tragedies, including the suicide of an off-duty officer and
the funeral of an officer killed in a Bronx shootout. “I had already come to
appreciate how hard it is to be a police officer,” he said.
He noted that sentencing law recognized that individuals with different levels
of culpability should be treated differently, and that some crimes were more
evil than others. As always, he said, judges must also look at other factors,
like a defendant’s history, background and motivation.
“Where someone is guilty of lying to protect others, at least he is doing so not
out of greed or to help himself,” he said. “This motivation doesn’t make the
lying right, but at least it is understandable to some limited extent.”
But he knew that prosecutors felt Mr. Regan had blatantly lied and interfered
with a government investigation.
On the sentencing date, Judge Chin’s courtroom was packed with police officers,
who rose in unison when he asked the defendant to stand. The judge, who recalled
feeling a bit nervous because of the spotlight on the case, told Mr. Regan that
no matter how much good he had done in the past, he was bound by oath to tell
the truth. In the end, the judge departed from the guidelines and imposed a term
of one year plus one day (a technicality that allows a defendant to be released
slightly early for good behavior).
“What did I learn?” Judge Chin recalled 15 years later. “I learned that this was
going to be hard.” But he said he had gained confidence, and did not agonize
over the decision. “I felt I had done the right thing.”
If Judge Chin believed that some defendants deserved leniency because of their
otherwise unblemished history, in his eyes others forfeited their right to a
break.
Such was the case with Pat V. Stiso, a Bronx lawyer, who had pleaded guilty to
narcotics conspiracy and obstructing justice after being accused of, among other
things, hiding money for the leader of a drug gang. He faced a guideline range
of 70 to 87 months, for a possible term of more than seven years.
At the sentencing, in March 1999, Judge Chin cited the many letters he had
received depicting Mr. Stiso, then 38, as a loving father and committed defense
lawyer who had also been involved in charitable work. But he said, “I cannot be
compassionate.”
He said Mr. Stiso’s supporters had not seen his other side, which had allowed
him to accept “tens of thousands of dollars in cash in grocery bags, money that
was earned from the sale of heroin.” Defense lawyers had to do their jobs, he
said, “but this is not a case about the blurring of a line. This case doesn’t
even come close.” He sentenced Mr. Stiso to 87 months.
Looking back, Judge Chin said, the “mitigating factors did warrant leniency, and
that’s why it was a struggle for me internally.”
But he was keenly aware, he said, “of the seriousness of his crime.” It was also
painful, Judge Chin said, to watch a lawyer he knew, a courthouse regular, “just
fail as a human being.”
“In a sense, he was like one of our own,” he said.
LIKE most judges, Judge Chin faced defendants who promised to reform their ways.
Some fulfilled that pledge; others let him down. He tried not to become jaded or
cynical, he said, and retained hope that people who had made mistakes could turn
their lives around.
“A good judge has to care,” he said. “He has to want to make the world better.”
He also believed that rehabilitation, along with punishment, deterrence and
healing victims, was a legitimate goal of sentencing. As he put it, “I don’t
like to give up on people.”
But two cases showed how difficult that goal was to achieve.
The first, in November 1998, involved Alethea Pierce, 38, a drug addict who had
pleaded guilty to participating in a narcotics trafficking ring, and then had
seemingly transformed her life. She had cooperated with prosecutors, testified
against the ring’s leaders, and undergone drug treatment.
At sentencing, she said proudly that she was putting her life back together,
reuniting with two of her children, finding housing and taking courses to find a
job. “I just like who I am today,” she said.
“Sentencing is often very hard,” Judge Chin observed, adding that her case would
indeed be “an easy one.” He gave her time served — she was free to go.
But a year later she was back before him, after a series of positive drug tests.
Still, she made it clear that she wanted another chance. “What none of you all
know in this courtroom is the life of the addict,” she said.
“I’ve lived it,” she added, “and I like being clean.”
“Doing it your way hasn’t worked,” Judge Chin responded, but he decided to take
a chance, agreeing not to send her to prison and ending court supervision of her
case. He said he had one request: “I want you to write me a letter in a few
months telling me that you’re doing great.”
He never heard from her again.
Daniel Sangemino was a Queens resident who had used high-pressure telephone
tactics to solicit money for sham investments. He had even persuaded a
79-year-old Utah widow to liquidate her savings and take out a loan in order to
send him $149,000.
In April 2001, Judge Chin sentenced Mr. Sangemino, 25, to just over three years,
including additional time for exploiting a vulnerable victim. Mr. Sangemino
served his time but could not stay out of trouble. In February 2004, after
arrests for harassment and drug possession, he was back before Judge Chin for
violating the terms of his release.
He admitted to a longstanding drug problem. The judge told him he seemed bright
and articulate. “If it’s the drugs, you really have to kick it,” he said.
The judge imposed eight more months, and recommended drug treatment. Again Mr.
Sangemino did the time, and again he was arrested after his release, for
harassment. Judge Chin imposed an additional 16 months. “I don’t know what you
are doing with yourself,” he said, adding, “This is really your last chance.”
Mr. Sangemino, contacted recently, said that he had not returned to court and
had worked hard to address his addiction issues. “I have lived a clean and sober
life for five years,” he said.
Now 36, he said he had held a steady job, obtained an associate’s degree and
planned to attend Queens College next year. He has also been paying restitution.
“I really don’t feel good about what I did in the past,” he said. He added that
Judge Chin had treated him fairly. “I’ll never forget his expression. He wasn’t
angry. He was, like, ‘C’mon.’ ”
IN 2004, Judge Chin appeared on a bar association panel to discuss a new book
called “The Myth of Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do What’s
Right.” The author, Thane Rosenbaum, a Fordham law professor, had known the
judge for years.
“One of the interesting concepts in Professor Rosenbaum’s book,” Judge Chin told
the audience, “is that the law lacks a soul. The law lacks tenderness. The law
is objective and cold and inhumane. The law abhors emotion. I don’t think that’s
true.
“Every time I sentence a defendant, there is a lot of emotion,” he said. “I
think there is a lot of humanity in the law.”
But in one 2002 sentencing, a lawyer protested that Judge Chin showed too much
emotion. The defendant, Steven Chin Leung, facing passport fraud charges, had
then tried to fake his own death in the 9/11 attacks.
In court, Judge Chin called Mr. Leung’s actions despicable and selfish, and said
his ruse had diverted critical law enforcement resources after 9/11 while the
bogus claim was investigated. The guidelines called for a sentence of two to
two-and-a-half years, but Judge Chin, acknowledging that there was “a lot of
emotion involved,” went for a higher sentence, imposing four years.
Mr. Leung’s lawyer asked Judge Chin to reconsider, saying that the sentence was
“extreme” and that the judge had let his emotions weigh “more than they should.”
Judge Chin disagreed. “Emotion comes into play in every sentencing decision,” he
replied. “Obviously, however, you can’t let emotion cloud your judgment, and I
don’t believe I have done that here.”
IN discussing his decisions, Judge Chin acknowledged that he often wondered what
happened to defendants who had appeared before him — if his ideal was to balance
punishment and rehabilitation, how had it worked in the real world? To find out,
The New York Times tracked down some of those people.
Mr. Regan, now 52, said in an interview at his lawyer’s office that the support
he received from fellow officers had never wavered. When the time came for him
to surrender to the authorities, he said, a group of officers met him at his
house in the Bronx and flew with him, at their expense, to Kentucky, where he
served about eight months. Officers also met him at La Guardia Airport when he
came back.
Having lost his job and pension, Mr. Regan opened a contracting firm, remodeling
apartments in Manhattan. He said he appreciated Judge Chin’s rejection of the
government’s harsher sentencing request. He recalled returning to the courthouse
one day, perhaps for his appeal, and standing outside with other officers when
he saw Judge Chin leaving the building. The judge walked over, shook his hand
and wished him luck, Mr. Regan recalled, saying, “He seemed like a guy with a
great heart.”
Mr. Stiso, the former lawyer, spoke at his mother’s home in New Rochelle, N.Y.
He recalled being shocked when Judge Chin imposed the top of the recommended
range. “My knees buckled,” he said.
But today, Mr. Stiso, 50, said he feels lucky. After serving more than five
years in prison, he returned to the same house and loyal and loving family, he
said. Although he lost his law license and thriving legal practice, he found
work selling investments in life insurance policies and also consults with other
white-collar defendants about what they will face in prison, he said.
“I have no problem with the sentence I received,” Mr. Stiso said. “The entire
experience saved me.” He said it was not the amount of time that changed him; it
was “having to go through” the process.
THEN there is Ms. Kidd. Judge Chin had given her six weeks to surrender to begin
her 30-month sentence, but she failed to appear at the appointed time. She was
arrested again and given eight additional months by a different judge. Ms. Kidd,
37, said in an interview in June that she had been unable to find an acceptable
caretaker for the children. “I could never bring myself to leave my kids,” she
said.
While she served her sentence, she said, her mother, who had addressed her own
drug problem, and other relatives and friends came together to help care for the
children. “I had people that stepped in,” Ms. Kidd said, including some she did
not know well — “in such a great way,” she added.
Since her release in 2007, she said, the family has held together. She works in
retailing and is studying nursing, she said.
“I feel like I got that second chance that everybody’s talking about,” she said,
adding, “And I’m taking full advantage of that.”
Judge Chin was pleased to hear about the progress the defendants had made. He
had always felt Ms. Kidd “was doing something right,” he said.
But, he added, they were only a small fraction of the defendants he had
sentenced over the years; he would never learn what had happened to most.
“That’s why it makes it so hard. You can’t predict the future. You don’t know
what’s going to happen,” Judge Chin said. “You do what you think is best for the
defendant, for society, and you hope it works out.”
This article
has been revised to reflect the following correction:
Correction: October 7, 2011
An earlier version of this article erroneously stated that the guideline range
for Mr. Leung was two-and-a-half to three years.
A Judge’s Education, a Sentence at a Time, NYT, 7.10.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-of-federal-court-discusses-sentencing.html
Tucson
Shooting Suspect to Have More Treatment
September
28, 2011
The New York Times
By MARC LACEY
TUCSON — A
federal judge ruled on Wednesday that Jared L. Loughner would undergo four more
months of treatment in a federal psychiatric facility to see if he recovers
enough to stand trial on charges that he killed six people and wounded 13
others, including Representative Gabrielle Giffords, on Jan. 8.
Prosecutors wanted Mr. Loughner to remain at a federal treatment facility in
Springfield, Mo., for eight more months and to continue to be forcibly
medicated. But Mr. Loughner’s lawyers have been calling on Judge Larry A. Burns
of Federal District Court to end any additional efforts to make Mr. Loughner
understand the charges against him and assist in his defense.
“Today, in my lay view, he does appear to be more connected to the proceedings,”
Judge Burns said in calling another hearing for January to rule on Mr.
Loughner’s competency to stand trial.
Mr. Loughner, who has pleaded not guilty, has expressed remorse for what
occurred, which experts called a sign of progress. He has told his psychologists
that he wished he had been taking anti-psychotic medication for years and has
said the shooting might not have happened if he had, said Dr. James C.
Ballenger, a psychiatrist called to testify for the prosecution. “He says he
hates what he did when he looks in the mirror,” Dr. Ballenger said in an
interview after the proceeding. “He sees a murderer.”
There was little disagreement among the lawyers that Mr. Loughner had
schizophrenia, but a government Bureau of Prisons psychologist, Christina Pietz,
argued that the additional treatment time would allow Mr. Loughner to improve
markedly.
“If we take him off medications, it is our belief that he will deteriorate and
potentially die,” she said during testimony, after describing his exhibiting
delusional behavior, pacing in his cell and sometimes throwing his chair in
anger.
Mr. Loughner, who had not been seen since May when an appearance in open court
resulted in a dramatic, emotional outburst that included his being dragged from
the room, appeared largely oblivious to what was occurring around him.
Since May Mr. Loughner, 23, has been under psychiatric treatment, which has
included the use of powerful drugs — a practice that he has tried, through his
lawyers, to have stopped.
Mr. Loughner’s hair was trimmed short, and he had no facial hair. He wore a
simple white T-shirt and khaki pants. Three United States marshals were standing
within a few feet in case he had an emotional outburst.
Mr. Loughner watched intently as Dr. Pietz testified in detail about her
interactions with Mr. Loughner, including his talk of suicide, remorse he has
expressed at what occurred and continued doubts over a videotape of the
shooting, which he says was doctored.
Dr. Pietz testified that Mr. Loughner, who is kept separate from other inmates
at the facility in Missouri, had expressed doubts that Ms. Giffords survived the
shooting, but he later acknowledged that she had, which Dr. Pietz saw as a sign
of progress.
Mr. Loughner also had told doctors that he had several imaginary friends. The
psychologist said that he had been given a television in his cell, but that it
was removed after a half hour because he believed he was receiving messages from
it. After he received medication, the set was returned, she said.
During the testimony, Mr. Loughner rarely made eye contact with others in the
courtroom, and the smirk on his face during previous court appearances was gone.
Every now and then, his eyes closed for extended periods, then popped open when
he heard his name mentioned.
Judy Clarke, who leads Mr. Loughner’s defense team, used his lack of expressions
to make her point that he had not made the progress that Dr. Pietz claimed.
Tucson Shooting Suspect to Have More Treatment, NYT,
28.9.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/us/loughner-makes-court-appearance.html
Sentence
for Terrorist Is Too Short, Court Rules
September
19, 2011
The New York Times
By LIZETTE ALVAREZ
MIAMI — A
federal appeals court ruled on Monday that the 17-year prison sentence imposed
on Jose Padilla, who was convicted of terrorism conspiracy in 2007, was too
lenient and sent the case back to the district court here for a new hearing.
In a 2-to-1 opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in
Atlanta, ruled that the sentence was “substantively unreasonable” and did not
take into account Mr. Padilla’s violent criminal history as a former gang member
in Chicago. It also said the lower court did not take seriously enough Mr.
Padilla’s time at a Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, where he was trained to kill.
“Padilla poses a heightened risk of future dangerousness due to his Al Qaeda
training,” the court said. “He is far more sophisticated than an individual
convicted of an ordinary street crime.”
The appellate court also affirmed Mr. Padilla’s conviction and that of his two
co-defendants.
The government had appealed Mr. Padilla’s sentence, which was 17 years and 4
months, seeing it as too great a departure from federal sentencing guidelines.
After a four-month trial in 2007, Mr. Padilla, a Brooklyn-born convert to Islam
who grew up in Chicago, and two co-defendants were convicted of conspiring to
murder, kidnap and maim people in foreign countries. Prosecutors said the three
helped foster jihad as part of a North American cell that provided money,
recruits and supplies to Islamic extremists. The sentences of Mr. Padilla’s
co-defendants stand.
Mr. Padilla, now 40, was first arrested in 2002 at O’Hare International Airport
in Chicago on suspicion that he was planning to set off a radioactive dirty
bomb. He was held in military detention in South Carolina as an enemy combatant
for more than three years. Subsequently, he was transferred to civilian custody
and was tried in federal court. His case became a focus of the debate over the
Bush administration’s approach to prosecuting terrorism.
The dirty-bomb accusation was eventually dropped and not raised in court.
Judge Marcia G. Cooke of Federal District Court, who presided over the trial,
said at the sentencing in January 2008 that while she understood the gravity of
the crimes, no evidence linked Mr. Padilla and his co-defendants to specific
acts of terrorism. She also took into account his age, the sentences of other
people convicted on terrorism-related charges and his time in the naval brig in
South Carolina.
But the federal appeals court said Judge Cooke made several errors in
calculating Mr. Padilla’s sentence. For one, she “unreasonably discounted” his
troubled past, which included 17 prior arrests and participation as a juvenile
in an armed robbery that ended in the victim’s death. Mr. Padilla served four
years in juvenile detention.
The trial judge also overestimated Mr. Padilla’s potential for turning his life
around upon release from prison, the court stated. Mr. Padilla’s terrorist
training sets him apart from an ordinary street thug, the court argued. And
while the appeals court said it was permissible to reduce a sentence on account
of harsh conditions during pretrial confinement, Judge Cooke went too far when
she shaved off more than nine years.
Mr. Padilla’s lawyer presented evidence that Mr. Padilla spent long periods in
isolation while in military detention and said he was subjected to
interrogation, sleep and sensory deprivation, and temperature variations, among
other things.
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rosemary Barkett said Judge Cooke had properly
weighed all of these factors, including Mr. Padilla’s time in the brig, and did
not abuse her discretion. Instead, Judge Barkett said, the appellate court was
overstepping its bounds.
Both sides can ask the full appeals court to rehear the case or petition the
Supreme Court to review the decision.
Sentence for Terrorist Is Too Short, Court Rules, NYT,
19.9.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/jose-padillas-prison-sentence-too-short-appeals-court-says.html
Terrorism and the Law
July 16,
2011
The New York Times
The prosecution of a Somali national accused of supporting Al Qaeda is now
headed for trial in a federal court, where it belonged all along. The Obama
administration finally made the right decision over the usual self-serving
objections of grandstanding senators from both parties. But it is troubling that
the administration delayed this step for almost two months.
During those months, Ahmed Abdulkadir Warsame, who was seized by American forces
in international waters, was secretly held in extralegal detention on a United
States naval vessel. There, he was interrogated without being read the Miranda
rights that apply to all federal criminal prosecutions. After weeks of military
investigation, a separate team of law enforcement officials concluded that he
was not a legitimate candidate for military detention and trial. They read him
his rights. He promptly waived them and continued cooperating with his captors,
but it may prove hard to disentangle those later statements, fully admissible in
court, from his earlier, inadmissible ones.
Approving his secret interrogation at sea gave the administration a convenient
alternative to sending him to Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. That would have made trial
in a civilian court nearly impossible, because Congress has inexcusably
hamstrung the justice system by barring the use of funds to transfer prisoners
from the detention camp.
Any suggestion that moving Mr. Warsame to civilian court shows weakness against
terrorism is absurd. Had Mr. Warsame been brought before a military commission,
prosecutors would have had to prove that he was either an actual member of Al
Qaeda or was personally involved in plotting attacks on the United States. But
Mr. Warsame is not accused of any actual terrorist acts, just “material support”
of Al Qaeda and its alleged Somali affiliate, the Shabab. In a civilian court,
proving material support for the Shabab alone would be enough to convict.
Conviction on all counts of material support carries a possible life sentence.
So Mr. Warsame’s trial can proceed, but at an unfortunate cost. President Obama
has created yet another parallel system of unlimited detention and interrogation
without rights outside the constitutional norms that served us well for more
than two centuries before the Bush administration carelessly and needlessly
tossed them aside for terrorism cases after Sept. 11, 2001.
The Obama administration justifies its handling of the Warsame case under the
laws of war. But Mr. Warsame was not picked up on any recognized battlefield.
The administration claims continuing authority for military detention,
interrogation and trial. This applies not just to battlefield detentions, where
it is often appropriate, but to detentions anywhere, and not just to personal
involvement in violent attacks, but to a broad range of offenses directly or
indirectly related to terrorism. That is far too broad a claim.
Two important goals must guide terrorist-related cases — eliciting information
to thwart future plots and punishing the guilty. The overwhelming evidence from
the past decade is that both are most reliably served by lawful interrogation
and prosecution in civilian courts.
Hundreds of accused terrorists have been convicted in civilian courts since
9/11. Only six — none of them major Qaeda figures — have been convicted in the
military commissions carelessly confected by the Bush administration and
renewed, with significantly stricter rules and procedures, by the Obama
administration.
Mr. Obama came to office vowing to stop these costly travesties of justice that
so damaged America’s international reputation. But he has steadily retreated,
sometimes in the face of political opposition, sometimes on his own. Now he is
drifting toward establishing his own system of extralegal detention and tainted
questioning. It is time to stop that drift and return to a constitutional system
of law enforcement.
Terrorism and the Law, NYT, 16.7.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/opinion/sunday/17sun1.html
The
Courts Step In
July 13,
2011
The New York Times
In three new rulings, federal judges in different states have acted to block
immediate enforcement of measures that restrict abortion rights and women’s
access to affordable contraception, lifesaving cancer screenings and treatment
for sexually transmitted diseases. These rulings are important victories for
women’s health and reproductive rights.
On June 24, Judge Tanya Pratt of the Federal District Court in Indianapolis
issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of a new Indiana law
banning the use of Medicaid funds at Planned Parenthood clinics, which provide
essential health services to low-income women. The mean-spirited law is part of
a Republican-led national campaign to end public financing for Planned
Parenthood. The Obama administration promptly told Indiana, and other states
weighing similar legislation, that the measure violated federal law by imposing
impermissible restrictions on the freedom of Medicaid beneficiaries to choose
health care providers. Judge Pratt agreed with that assessment in her decision.
In another ruling six days later, a federal trial judge in South Dakota issued a
preliminary injunction blocking, on constitutional grounds, a deeply intrusive
state law requiring women to wait at least 72 hours after an initial doctor’s
visit before terminating a pregnancy — the longest waiting period in the nation.
This law also requires that women seeking abortions endure counseling at
so-called pregnancy help centers run by antiabortion activists with the aim of
discouraging abortions.
“Forcing a woman to divulge to a stranger at a pregnancy help center the fact
that she has chosen to undergo an abortion humiliates and degrades her as a
human being,” Judge Karen Schreier wrote in her decision.
On July 1, Judge Carlos Murguia, a federal district judge in Kansas, blocked
immediate enforcement of a new Kansas licensing law and health department
regulations imposing extensive, medically unnecessary requirements on the
state’s three remaining abortion providers — like mandating 50 square feet of
storage space for janitorial supplies — with the obvious goal of shutting them
down.
While these rulings are preliminary, each is a determination that enforcing the
law would cause irreparable harm and that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail
at trial. They do not, however, address other threats to women’s health. Those
include the slashing of state support for family-planning services by governors
like Chris Christie of New Jersey, and attacks from Congress like the bill
Republicans pushed through the House in May that would use the nation’s tax
system as a weapon to end abortion insurance coverage in the private market.
Still, these rulings serve as a reminder that courts have a vital role to play
in blocking the extreme anti-abortion, anti-family-planning movement
accelerating in the states and in Washington.
The Courts Step In, R, 13.7.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/opinion/14thurs1.html
Rajaratnam guilty on all insider trading counts
NEW YORK
| Wed May 11, 2011
1:29pm EDT
Reuters
By Grant McCool and Basil Katz
NEW YORK
(Reuters) - Hedge fund founder Raj Rajaratnam was found guilty on all 14 counts
in a sweeping insider trading verdict on Wednesday that vindicated the
government's aggressive use of phone taps to prosecute Wall Street figures.
Rajaratnam, founder of the Galleon Group and the central figure in the broadest
Wall Street insider trading probe in decades, will appeal the use of the secret
recordings, tactics historically deployed in organized crime and drug
trafficking cases, not white-collar probes.
One-time billionaire Rajaratnam, the richest Sri Lankan in the world, faces a
minimum of 15-1/2 years in prison after the verdict in Manhattan federal court
convicting him on all 14 counts of conspiracy and securities fraud. The jury's
decision affirmed the prosecution case that Rajaratnam ran a web of
highly-placed insiders from McKinsey & Co consultancy to Intel Corp to a former
Goldman Sachs Group Inc board member to leak valuable corporate secrets to him.
Rajaratnam, 53, showed little emotion during the two month-long trial and sat
expressionless between his lawyers as the verdict was read in a tense Manhattan
federal courtroom.
"It's an historic verdict. It's a dramatic verdict," said Bill Singer,
securities lawyer with Gusrae, Kaplan, Bruno & Nusbaum.
"It will likely set the stage for a dramatic change not only in the way that the
Wall Street insider-trader activities are investigated and prosecuted, but most
likely this will have a chilling effect on individuals and companies that
trade."
The case was the first Wall Street insider trading trial to draw such public
attention since the mid-1980s scandal involving speculator Ivan Boesky and junk
bond financier Michael Milken.
The jurors filed into the tense courtroom in mid-morning and the verdict was
read by the judge's deputy. The official read from the jury's completed verdict
form, saying "guilty" for each of the five counts of conspiracy and nine counts
of securities fraud. He then asked each individual juror whether that was their
verdict.
After the jury was dismissed, Rajaratnam was released until his July 29
sentencing. He is free under a $100 million bail package that will now include
an electronic monitoring device and house arrest in his Manhattan apartment.
His main lawyer, John Dowd, told dozens of reporters outside the courthouse that
his client would keep fighting.
"We're gonna take an appeal for this conviction," Dowd said. "We started out
with 37 stocks, we're down to 14 so the score I'd say is 23-14 in favor of the
defense. We'll see you in the 2nd circuit" a reference to the appeals court in
New York.
TWO
MONTH-LONG TRIAL
The trial lasted two months and the verdict was read on the 12th day of jury
deliberations in which jurors requested replays of several of the phone
recordings at the heart of the government's case.
Litigation experts said the phone taps strengthened insider trading charges,
which historically have been difficult to prove because they rely on
circumstantial evidence.
Defense lawyers had stuck consistently to their main theme that Rajaratnam's
trades were guided by a trove of research and public information, not secrets
leaked by highly-placed corporate insiders.
Most litigation experts said the prosecution had a strong case using FBI phone
taps and witness stand testimony of three former friends and associates of
Rajaratnam -- former McKinsey & Co partner Anil Kumar, former Intel treasury
group executive Rajiv Goel and former Galleon employee, Adam Smith.
All three pleaded guilty to criminal charges and agreed to cooperate with the
government in the hopes of receiving lighter sentences.
Rajaratnam is the only one out of 26 people charged in the broad Galleon case to
go on trial so far. Twenty-one pleaded guilty and one defendant is at large. A
second trial of three former securities traders, one of them a former Galleon
hedge fund employee, is scheduled to start on Monday with phone tap also key to
the prosecution evidence.
The case is USA v Raj Rajaratnam et al, U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, No. 09-01184.
(Additional
reporting by Jonathan Stempel, Dan Levine, Scot Paltrow),
editing by Dave Zimmerman)
Rajaratnam guilty on all insider trading counts, R,
11.5.2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/11/us-galleon-rajaratnam-idUSTRE74A3XM20110511
Saudi Man Accused in Bomb Plot to Be Arraigned
March 28, 2011
The New York Times
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
LUBBOCK, Texas (AP) — A Texas college student from Saudi
Arabia who is accused of buying chemicals and equipment to build a weapon of
mass destruction is set to be arraigned.
The arraignment for Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari (al-daw-SAW'-ree) is scheduled for
Monday morning at the federal courthouse in Lubbock. He faces up to life in
prison if he's convicted of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.
Court documents allege he had hatched plans to attack various U.S. targets,
including New York City and former President George W. Bush's Dallas home.
Aldawsari was arrested Feb. 23. Court records indicate that federal agents
traced his online purchases, discovered extremist online posts he made and
secretly searched his apartment, computer and e-mail accounts and read his
diary.
Saudi Man Accused in
Bomb Plot to Be Arraigned, NYT, 28.3.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/03/28/us/AP-US-Terror-Bomb-Plot.html
The
Right to Sue Over Wiretapping
March 22,
2011
The New York Times
Federal
authorities have always made it difficult to bring a legal challenge against the
government’s warrantless wiretapping enterprise that was set up by the Bush
administration in the years after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Because the
wiretaps were secret, no one could know for certain if they were being tapped,
so the government urged judges to throw out lawsuits for lack of proof of real
harm.
That strategy was halted on Monday when a federal appeals court said that civil
liberties and journalism groups challenging an eavesdropping law could pursue a
suit trying to get the government’s wiretapping declared illegal. In an
important ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reinstated a lawsuit that a federal district judge had thrown out in 2009.
The new decision might lead to a significant — and far too long delayed — legal
review of the statute.
The law in question, passed in 2008, amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. It essentially legalized retroactively President George W.
Bush’s outlaw program of wiretapping certain terror suspects without a warrant.
It also immunized telephone companies that cooperated in the program.
And it permitted the government to listen to the international phone calls of
Americans who are not engaged in criminal activity, and to read their e-mail
messages. At great cost to the privacy of innocent people, it reduced the
longstanding protections of judicial supervision over these powers.
The law was challenged by human rights, labor and news media organizations, led
by the American Civil Liberties Union. They argued that their communications
with clients and interview subjects outside the country would almost certainly
be monitored under the law, in part because their jobs required conversations
with activists and others whose work would be of interest to the government.
Some are lawyers representing accused terror suspects in the United States and
often need to communicate with the suspects’ family members or acquaintances
outside of the country.
The government argued that the plaintiffs had to prove that they were monitored
or harmed, but the Second Circuit didn’t buy that defense. The plaintiffs had
every reason to believe that they were being monitored, the court said, and some
even spent considerable sums to go abroad for meetings to avoid the
eavesdropping.
The final outcome of this legal challenge is far from certain; the government,
if it follows its pattern, is likely to cite another familiar defense that a
full trial would reveal state secrets. But just by allowing this lawsuit to
proceed, the Second Circuit has sent an important message: The government cannot
count on simplistic legal arguments to avoid scrutiny of its program to spy on
civilians. When one challenge is allowed, others will follow.
The Right to Sue Over Wiretapping, NYT, 22.3.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/opinion/23wed1.html
Judge
Orders Loughner to Have Mental Exam in Missouri
March 21,
2011
The New York Times
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
PHOENIX
(AP) — A federal judge on Monday ordered the suspect in the January shooting
rampage in Tucson to undergo a mental evaluation at a specialized facility in
Missouri as soon as possible.
The evaluation will be videotaped and provided to prosecutors and defense
attorneys, U.S. District Judge Larry Burns said in his late Monday ruling. The
judge also ordered that the exam be conducted no later than April 29, and that
findings be reported to the court and attorneys on both sides by May 11.
Prosecutors had argued that Jared Lee Loughner's exam should be conducted at a
so-called medical referral center that provides forensic services and has
increased resources, and recommended the federal Bureau of Prisons facility in
Springfield, Mo.
Medical referral centers use psychiatrists employed by the bureau.
Loughner's lawyers have said the exam should be done by an outside expert, not
by a Bureau of Prisons employee, at a Tucson prison. They also wanted assurances
that the evaluation doesn't expand into a review of their client's sanity.
Lead defense attorney Judy Clarke wrote in a court filing last week that moving
Loughner would harm the defense team's efforts to develop an attorney-client
relationship. The defense also was concerned that Loughner is "seriously ill,"
and that moving him to Missouri could worsen his state.
Loughner, 22, has pleaded not guilty to charges stemming from the Jan. 8 attack
that killed six and wounded 13, including Rep. Gabrielle Giffords. She remains
at a rehabilitation center in Houston as she recovers from a bullet wound to the
brain.
Burns agreed that the Springfield facility is the best place for the exam, and
ordered that the scope of the exam should be limited to whether Loughner is
competent to stand trial, not whether he was sane at the time of the shooting.
"The question at issue is whether the defendant is presently suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that
he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him, or to assist properly in his defense," Burns wrote.
Burns cited a memo written by Dr. Donald Lewis, chief of psychiatry for the
Bureau of Prisons. He wrote that the Springfield facility is best for Loughner's
exam because it "has medical staff available for neurology and other organic
testing, and has far more forensic staff and full-time psychiatrists available
to provide round-the-clock assistance."
Lewis also argued that the Tucson prison was inappropriate because as a
high-security facility, precautions taken there would be disruptive and likely
prevent an examiner from doing a thorough job.
He acknowledged that transferring Loughner would be inconvenient for defense
attorneys but ruled that it is "unavoidable in light of the need to reliably and
definitively resolve the question of the defendant's present competency." The
judge also said the defense can visit Loughner while he is in Missouri.
Burns also wrote that the defense can seek a separate competency exam by an
independent psychiatrist. "This should help assuage any concern the defense team
has about the impartiality of the Springfield medical staff," Burns wrote.
Loughner's exam could take as little as a few days, and he cannot legally be
held at the Springfield facility for more than a month.
Prosecutors have brought 49 counts against Loughner, including trying to
assassinate Giffords, attempting to kill two of her aides, and killing U.S.
District Judge John Roll and Giffords staffer Gabe Zimmerman. Loughner also is
charged with causing the deaths of four others who weren't federal employees,
causing injury and death to participants at a "federally provided activity" and
using a gun in a crime of violence.
Many of the counts could bring a death sentence, but prosecutors have not
announced if they will pursue that penalty. State charges are on hold until the
federal case is complete but also carry the potential for the death penalty if
Loughner is convicted.
Defense lawyers have not said if they intend to present an insanity defense.
Judge Orders Loughner to Have Mental Exam in Missouri,
NYT, 21.3.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/03/21/us/AP-US-Congresswoman-Shot-Mental-Exam.html
A Right
Without a Remedy
February
28, 2011
The New York Times
In a
landmark case three years ago, the Supreme Court ruled that detainees at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, who are not American citizens have “the constitutional
privilege of habeas corpus.” It gives them the right to have a federal judge
decide promptly whether their detention is illegal and, if so, order their
release because the United States controls the place they are held. The 5-to-4
decision in what is known as the Boumediene case was a repudiation of the Bush
strategy of imprisoning the detainees outside American territory so the
Constitution would not apply. Or so many thought.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the
only circuit where detainees can challenge their detention, has dramatically
restricted the Boumediene ruling. In its hands, habeas is no longer a remedy for
the problem the Boumediene majority called “arbitrary and unlawful restraint.”
The sole recourse is for the Supreme Court, once again, to say what the
Constitution requires judges to do in habeas cases. Fortunately, a case is at
hand for the justices to do so in an appeal from the District of Columbia
Circuit. In the Kiyemba case recently, five Uighur, or Chinese Muslim, detainees
filed a brief with the Supreme Court in support of their petition for it to
restore the power of federal trial judges to free them.
This appeal in no way threatens national security. The government has admitted
that the Uighurs are not enemies, let alone enemy combatants. Refugees from
China, they were mistakenly imprisoned during the Afghanistan war and sent to
Guantánamo Bay in 2002. Other Uighurs accepted release to the island of Palau,
500 miles from the Philippines, but these five declined the offer because they
have no connection to the island.
The appeal is about judicial power and the duty to use it. In 2008, a District
of Columbia trial judge ordered the government to bring the Uighurs to his court
to resolve how they should be released. The appeals court ruled that the judge
lacked authority to free them in the United States because the “political
branches” have “exclusive power” to decide which non-Americans can enter this
country.
Judge Raymond Randolph of the District of Columbia Circuit wrote the key Kiyemba
opinion. The Uighurs’ brief says, “The constant in this case is the court of
appeals’ refusal to apply, or even acknowledge,” the Boumediene ruling.
Judge Randolph also wrote the opinion for the District of Columbia Circuit that
the Supreme Court overturned in Boumediene. In a speech called “The Guantanamo
Mess” last fall, he said that the justices were wrong to do so and all but
expressed contempt for the holding. As the basis for the speech’s title, he
compared the justices who reached it to characters in “The Great Gatsby.” “They
were careless people,” he read. “They smashed things up ... and let other people
clean up the mess they had made.”
In Kiyemba and related cases, however, it is Judge Randolph and others on the
District of Columbia Circuit who are making the mess. Respected lawyers say they
are subverting the Supreme Court and American justice. Of 140 challenging their
detentionsin the face of this hostility, dozens who should have been freed will
likely remain in prison.
Alexander Hamilton called “arbitrary imprisonments” by the executive “the
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.” In Boumediene, Justice
Anthony Kennedy stressed that habeas is less about detainees’ rights, important
as they are, than about the vital judicial power to check undue use of executive
power.
The appellate court has all but nullified that view of judicial power and
responsibility backed by Justice Kennedy and the court majority. The Supreme
Court should remind the appellate court which one leads the federal judicial
system and which has a solemn duty to follow.
A Right Without a Remedy, NYT, 28.2.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01tue1.html
In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights
February 23, 2011
The New York Times
By CHARLIE SAVAGE and SHERYL GAY STOLBERG
WASHINGTON — President Obama, in a striking legal and
political shift, has determined that the Defense of Marriage Act — the 1996 law
that bars federal recognition of same-sex marriages — is unconstitutional, and
has directed the Justice Department to stop defending the law in court, the
administration said Wednesday.
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced the decision in a letter to
members of Congress. In it, he said the administration was taking the
extraordinary step of refusing to defend the law, despite having done so during
Mr. Obama’s first two years in the White House.
“The president and I have concluded that classifications based on sexual
orientation” should be subjected to a strict legal test intended to block unfair
discrimination, Mr. Holder wrote. As a result, he said, a crucial provision of
the Defense of Marriage Act “is unconstitutional.”
Conservatives denounced the shift, gay rights advocates hailed it as a
watershed, and legal scholars said it could have far-reaching implications
beyond the marriage law. For Mr. Obama, who opposes same-sex marriage but has
said repeatedly that his views are “evolving,” there are political implications
as well. Coming on the heels of his push for Congress to repeal the “don’t ask,
don’t tell” law barring the military from allowing gay people to serve openly,
the administration’s move seems likely to intensify the long-running cultural
clash over same-sex marriage as the 2012 political campaign is heating up.
“This is a great step by the Obama administration and a tipping point for the
gay rights movement that will have ripple effects in contexts beyond the Defense
of Marriage Act,” said Anthony D. Romero, the executive director of the American
Civil Liberties Union. “It will reach into issues of employment discrimination,
family recognition and full equality rights for lesbian and gay people.”
But some conservatives questioned Mr. Obama’s timing and accused him of trying
to change the subject from spending cuts to social causes. Others portrayed the
Justice Department’s abandonment of the Defense of Marriage Act as an outrageous
political move that was legally unjustified.
“It is a transparent attempt to shirk the department’s duty to defend the laws
passed by Congress,” Representative Lamar Smith, the Texas Republican who is
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said in a statement. “This is the
real politicization of the Justice Department — when the personal views of the
president override the government’s duty to defend the law of the land.”
While the issue at hand is whether gay couples in the eight states that already
legally recognize same-sex marriage may be discriminated against by the federal
government, the administration’s decision raised anew the more fundamental
question of whether same-sex couples should have a right to marry.
Mr. Obama takes a nuanced position on same-sex marriage, and the White House was
careful to say on Wednesday that his position on that issue — he favors civil
unions — remains unchanged. Many advocates of same-sex marriage, though,
perceived the administration’s new legal stance as a signal that Mr. Obama would
soon embrace their cause.
Polls show the public is broadly supportive of equal rights for gay people —
with the exception of the right to marry. Nearly 90 percent of Americans favor
equality of opportunity in the workplace, and more than 60 percent favored
overturning “don’t ask, don’t tell.” But the public remains evenly divided on
same-sex marriage.
Tobias B. Wolff, a University of Pennsylvania law professor who has advised Mr.
Obama on gay rights issues, said Wednesday’s decision may have bought the
president some time with gay rights leaders, many of whom have been deeply
critical of his position on the marriage issue.
“He has said that he has been struggling with the issue, and I think he has
earned a certain benefit of the doubt,” Mr. Wolff said.
But the move also sharpened criticism of Mr. Obama from the right. Senator
Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, said the shift was “clearly based more
on politics than the law.”
While Mr. Obama has called for Congress to repeal the marriage law, in court his
administration has supported the constitutional right of Congress to enact such
a measure. But his legal team was forced to take a second look at the
sustainability of that position because of two recent lawsuits challenging the
statute. The Justice Department must file responses to both suits by March 11.
For technical reasons, it would have been far more difficult — both legally and
politically — for the administration to keep arguing that the marriage law is
constitutional in these new lawsuits. To assert that gay people do not qualify
for extra legal protection against official discrimination, legal specialists
say, the Justice Department would most likely have had to conclude that they
have not been historically stigmatized and can change their orientation.
The development floored Edith S. Windsor, an 81-year-old widow who filed one of
the two new lawsuits in New York. Ms. Windsor is seeking the return of about
$360,000 in estate taxes she had to pay because the federal government did not
recognize their marriage when her wife died two years ago. The couple married in
Toronto.
“It’s almost overwhelming,” Ms. Windsor said in an interview. “I don’t know what
it means in terms of what follows. But the very fact that the president and the
Department of Justice are making such a statement is mind-blowing to anybody gay
or anybody who is related to anybody gay. I think it removes a great deal of the
stigma. It’s just great.”
If the courts agree with the administration’s view of how to evaluate gay-rights
claims of official discrimination, it could open the door to new legal
challenges to many other government policies that treat gay people unequally —
including federal laws that make it easier for noncitizen spouses to apply for
legal residency and state laws governing who may adopt a child.
While it is rare for an administration not to defend the constitutionality of a
statute, it happens occasionally. Congress may opt to appoint its own lawyers to
defend the law, or outside groups may try to intervene. And while the Justice
Department’s lawyers will no longer defend the law in court, Mr. Holder said the
administration would continue to enforce the act unless Congress repeals it or a
court delivers a “definitive verdict against the law’s constitutionality.”
The administration’s change in position grew out of an internal debate, first
reported in January by The New York Times, over how to respond to the two
lawsuits filed last year that challenged the 1996 act.
The same-sex marriage reversal followed weeks of high-level deliberations, first
in the Justice Department’s Civil Division, and then at the White House.
The lawsuits were brought by people including Ms. Windsor, whose same-sex
marriages are recognized as legal by state law, but who have been denied certain
federal benefits granted to opposite-sex married couples. The plaintiffs,
represented by the A.C.L.U. and Glaad — Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders
— contended that such treatment violated their right to equal protection of the
law.
In previous cases, the Justice Department defended the act by citing precedents
that directed judges to uphold any law that treats gay people unequally unless a
challenger can prove there is no conceivable rational basis for the act. But the
two new cases were filed in districts covered by the federal appeals court in
New York, one of the few circuits that lack such a precedent.
As a result, the administration, for the first time, confronted the difficult
question of how much protection gay people, as a group, should receive against
official discrimination.
Mr. Holder said Justice and White House officials had concluded that gay people
qualified for the greater protection afforded to a handful of classes, like race
or gender. Under that test, discrimination is presumed to be unconstitutional,
and Mr. Holder said it was untenable to keep defending the marriage law.
In Turnabout, U.S.
Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, NYT, 23.2.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/24marriage.html
On Health Care, Justice Will Prevail
February 7, 2011
The New York Times
By LAURENCE H. TRIBE
Cambridge, Mass.
THE lawsuits challenging the individual mandate in the health care law,
including one in which a federal district judge last week called the law
unconstitutional, will ultimately be resolved by the Supreme Court, and pundits
are already making bets on how the justices will vote.
But the predictions of a partisan 5-4 split rest on a misunderstanding of the
court and the Constitution. The constitutionality of the health care law is not
one of those novel, one-off issues, like the outcome of the 2000 presidential
election, that have at times created the impression of Supreme Court justices as
political actors rather than legal analysts.
Since the New Deal, the court has consistently held that Congress has broad
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. This includes authority
over not just goods moving across state lines, but also the economic choices of
individuals within states that have significant effects on interstate markets.
By that standard, this law’s constitutionality is open and shut. Does anyone
doubt that the multitrillion-dollar health insurance industry is an interstate
market that Congress has the power to regulate?
Many new provisions in the law, like the ban on discrimination based on
pre-existing conditions, are also undeniably permissible. But they would be
undermined if healthy or risk-prone individuals could opt out of insurance,
which could lead to unacceptably high premiums for those remaining in the pool.
For the system to work, all individuals — healthy and sick, risk-prone and
risk-averse — must participate to the extent of their economic ability.
In this regard, the health care law is little different from Social Security.
The court unanimously recognized in 1982 that it would be “difficult, if not
impossible” to maintain the financial soundness of a Social Security system from
which people could opt out. The same analysis holds here: by restricting certain
economic choices of individuals, we ensure the vitality of a regulatory regime
clearly within Congress’s power to establish.
The justices aren’t likely to be misled by the reasoning that prompted two of
the four federal courts that have ruled on this legislation to invalidate it on
the theory that Congress is entitled to regulate only economic “activity,” not
“inactivity,” like the decision not to purchase insurance. This distinction is
illusory. Individuals who don’t purchase insurance they can afford have made a
choice to take a free ride on the health care system. They know that if they
need emergency-room care that they can’t pay for, the public will pick up the
tab. This conscious choice carries serious economic consequences for the
national health care market, which makes it a proper subject for federal
regulation.
Even if the interstate commerce clause did not suffice to uphold mandatory
insurance, the even broader power of Congress to impose taxes would surely do
so. After all, the individual mandate is enforced through taxation, even if
supporters have been reluctant to point that out.
Given the clear case for the law’s constitutionality, it’s distressing that many
assume its fate will be decided by a partisan, closely divided Supreme Court.
Justice Antonin Scalia, whom some count as a certain vote against the law,
upheld in 2005 Congress’s power to punish those growing marijuana for their own
medical use; a ban on homegrown marijuana, he reasoned, might be deemed
“necessary and proper” to effectively enforce broader federal regulation of
nationwide drug markets. To imagine Justice Scalia would abandon that
fundamental understanding of the Constitution’s necessary and proper clause
because he was appointed by a Republican president is to insult both his
intellect and his integrity.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, whom many unfairly caricature as the “swing vote,”
deserves better as well. Yes, his opinion in the 5-4 decision invalidating the
federal ban on possession of guns near schools is frequently cited by opponents
of the health care law. But that decision in 1995 drew a bright line between
commercial choices, all of which Congress has presumptive power to regulate, and
conduct like gun possession that is not in itself “commercial” or “economic,”
however likely it might be to set off a cascade of economic effects. The
decision about how to pay for health care is a quintessentially commercial
choice in itself, not merely a decision that might have economic consequences.
Only a crude prediction that justices will vote based on politics rather than
principle would lead anybody to imagine that Chief Justice John Roberts or
Justice Samuel Alito would agree with the judges in Florida and Virginia who
have ruled against the health care law. Those judges made the confused assertion
that what is at stake here is a matter of personal liberty — the right not to
purchase what one wishes not to purchase — rather than the reach of national
legislative power in a world where no man is an island.
It would be asking a lot to expect conservative jurists to smuggle into the
commerce clause an unenumerated federal “right” to opt out of the social
contract. If Justice Clarence Thomas can be counted a nearly sure vote against
the health care law, the only reason is that he alone has publicly and
repeatedly stressed his principled disagreement with the whole line of post-1937
cases that interpret Congress’s commerce power broadly.
There is every reason to believe that a strong, nonpartisan majority of justices
will do their constitutional duty, set aside how they might have voted had they
been members of Congress and treat this constitutional challenge for what it is
— a political objection in legal garb.
Laurence H. Tribe, a professor at Harvard Law School, is the author of “The
Invisible Constitution.”
On Health Care, Justice
Will Prevail, NYT, 7.2.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/opinion/08tribe.html
Federal
Judge Rules That Health Law Violates Constitution
January 31,
2011
The New York Times
By KEVIN SACK
A second
federal judge ruled on Monday that it was unconstitutional for Congress to enact
a health care law that required Americans to obtain commercial insurance,
evening the score at 2 to 2 in the lower courts as conflicting opinions begin
their path to the Supreme Court.
But unlike a Virginia judge in December, Judge Roger Vinson of Federal District
Court in Pensacola, Fla., concluded that the insurance requirement was so
“inextricably bound” to other provisions of the Affordable Care Act that its
unconstitutionality required the invalidation of the entire law.
“The act, like a defectively designed watch, needs to be redesigned and
reconstructed by the watchmaker,” Judge Vinson wrote.
The judge declined to immediately enjoin, or suspend, the law pending appeals, a
process that could last two years. But he wrote that the federal government
should adhere to his declaratory judgment as the functional equivalent of an
injunction. That left confusion about how the ruling might be interpreted in the
26 states that are parties to the legal challenge.
The insurance mandate does not take effect until 2014. But many new regulations
are already operating, like requirements that insurers cover children with
pre-existing health conditions and eliminate lifetime caps on benefits. States
are also preparing for a major expansion of Medicaid eligibility and the
introduction of health insurance exchanges in 2014.
David B. Rivkin Jr., a lawyer for the states, said the ruling relieved the
plaintiff states of any obligation to comply with the health law. “With regard
to all parties to this lawsuit, the statute is dead,” Mr. Rivkin said.
But White House officials declared that the opinion should not deter the
continuing rollout of the law. “Implementation would continue apace,” a senior
administration official said. “This is not the last word by any means.”
At the same time, Stephanie Cutter, an assistant to the president, noted in a
post on the White House blog that the ruling had struck down the entire law. She
called it “a plain case of judicial overreaching,” and added, “The judge’s
decision puts all of the new benefits, cost savings and patient protections that
were included in the law at risk.”
The Justice Department, which represents the Obama administration in the
litigation, said it was exploring options to clarify the uncertainty, including
requesting a stay of the decision, either from Judge Vinson or from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
On Capitol Hill, Republicans sent out a stream of e-mails praising the ruling,
while Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, said he would convene a
Judiciary Committee hearing on Wednesday to examine the constitutionality of the
law.
In his 78-page opinion, Judge Vinson held that the insurance requirement
exceeded the regulatory powers granted to Congress under the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution. He wrote that the provision could not be rescued by an
associated clause in Article I that gives Congress broad authority to make laws
“necessary and proper” to carrying out its designated responsibilities.
“If Congress can penalize a passive individual for failing to engage in
commerce, the enumeration of powers in the Constitution would have been in
vain,” the judge asserted.
In a silver lining for the Obama administration, Judge Vinson rejected a second
claim that the new law violated state sovereignty by requiring states to pay for
a fractional share of the planned Medicaid expansion.
The judge’s ruling came in the most prominent of more than 20 legal challenges
to the sweeping health law, which was signed last March by President Obama.
The plaintiffs include governors and attorneys general from 26 states, all but
one of them Republicans, as well as the National Federation of Independent
Business, which represents small companies. Officials from six states joined the
lawsuit in January after shifts in party control brought by November’s
elections.
The ruling by Judge Vinson, a senior judge who was appointed by President Ronald
Reagan, solidified the divide in the health litigation among judges named by
Republicans and those named by Democrats.
In December, Judge Henry E. Hudson of Federal District Court in Richmond, Va.,
who was appointed by President George W. Bush, became the first to invalidate
the insurance mandate. Two other federal judges named by President Bill Clinton,
a Democrat, have upheld the law.
Judge Vinson’s opinion hangs on a series of Supreme Court decisions that have
defined the limits of the Commerce Clause by granting Congress authority to
regulate “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”
The plaintiffs characterized the insurance requirement as an unprecedented
effort to regulate inactivity because citizens would be assessed an income tax
penalty for failing to buy a product.
Justice Department lawyers responded that a choice not to obtain health
insurance was itself an active decision that, taken in the aggregate, shifted
the cost of caring for the uninsured to hospitals, governments and privately
insured individuals.
In his decision, Judge Vinson wrote, “It would be a radical departure from
existing case law to hold that Congress can regulate inactivity under the
Commerce Clause.” If Congress has such power, he continued, “it is not
hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted.”
The Pensacola case is now likely to head to the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta,
considered one of the country’s most conservative appellate benches. The
Richmond case is already with another conservative court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Richmond, which has set oral
arguments for May.
That court will consider diametrically opposed rulings from courthouses situated
116 miles apart, as it was a judge in Lynchburg, Va., Norman K. Moon, who issued
one of the two decisions upholding the law. Meanwhile, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati is already receiving briefs on
the other decision backing the law, which was delivered by Judge George C. Steeh
in Detroit.
Judge Vinson’s ruling further arms Republicans in Congress who are waging a
fierce campaign against the health care act. The new Republican majority in the
House voted this year to repeal the law, a largely symbolic measure that is
given no chance in the Democratic-controlled Senate.
The Obama administration argues that without the insurance mandate consumers
might simply wait until they are sick to enroll, undercutting the actuarial
soundness of risk pooling and leading to an industry “death spiral.”
But the mandate’s legal and political problems have prompted a few Democratic
senators to join Republicans in exploring alternatives that would encourage
citizens to buy insurance without requiring it.
For instance, people could be given a narrow window to enroll, and those who
miss the deadline would face lengthy waiting periods for coverage.
Alternately, those who apply late and are eligible for government tax credits
under the law coverage could be penalized through a reduction of their
subsidies.
Sheryl Gay Stolberg contributed reporting.
Federal Judge Rules That Health Law Violates Constitution,
NYT, 31.1.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/us/01ruling.html
Tucson Suspect Pleads Not Guilty
January 24, 2011
The New York Times
By MARC LACEY
PHOENIX — Jared L. Loughner, who the police said was responsible for the
shooting rampage outside a Tucson supermarket on Jan. 8, pleaded not guilty on
Monday to charges that he tried to murder Representative Gabrielle Giffords and
two of her aides.
Appearing in Federal District Court alongside his defense lawyer, Judy Clarke,
Mr. Loughner entered a written plea to Judge Larry A. Burns of San Diego without
uttering a word.
Dressed in an orange prison jumpsuit and wearing glasses, Mr. Loughner, 22,
smiled through most of the proceedings and chuckled when a clerk read out the
name of the case: the United States of America v. Jared Lee Loughner.
Ms. Clarke offered no objection to a request by Wallace Kleindienst, an
assistant United States attorney, to move the court proceedings to Tucson. But
Mr. Kleindienst, who is considered an expert in murder cases, indicated that Ms.
Clarke would have additional opportunities to push for the trial to be held
elsewhere.
The indictment unsealed against Mr. Loughner was preliminary, prosecutors have
said, and did not involve any of the other shooting victims. A superseding
indictment is expected to be filed after more investigation.
During the arraignment, which was conducted under high security, Judge Burns
asked Ms. Clarke whether she had any concerns about her client’s ability to
understand the case against him. “We are not raising any issues at this time,”
she said.
The prosecution on Monday turned over to Ms. Clarke records from Mr. Loughner’s
computer and transcripts of 250 witness interviews.
The shooting, which left six dead and 13 wounded, is expected to be addressed
during President Obama’s State of the Union speech on Tuesday, as several people
who helped the wounded have been invited to attend.
Daniel Hernandez, the intern who gave first aid to Ms. Giffords after she was
shot and who was called a hero by Mr. Obama during his speech in Tucson on Jan.
12, will attend, along with Peter Rhee, G. Michael Lemole Jr. and Randall S.
Friese, all doctors who treated her at University Medical Center, said C. J.
Karamargin, Ms. Giffords’s spokesman.
Also expected to be in attendance is Tracy Culbert, a trauma and intensive care
nurse who treated Ms. Giffords. On Friday, Ms. Culbert accompanied Ms. Giffords
on her flight to Houston, where her recovery is continuing in an intensive care
unit at Memorial Hermann hospital. When her health improves, she will be
transferred to the Institute for Rehabilitation and Research at Memorial
Hermann.
Over the weekend, Dr. John Holcomb, a trauma surgeon at Memorial Hermann, said
Ms. Giffords could not begin intensive rehabilitation right away. He said a
slight buildup of spinal fluid in her brain after her transfer by air to Houston
from Tucson on Friday made it impossible to shift her to the rehabilitation
center in the complex.
The congresswoman has a catheter draining fluid from her skull, part of which
was removed to relieve pressure after the shooting
Sam Dolnick and Ford Burkhart contributed reporting from Tucson, and James C.
McKinley Jr. from Houston.
Tucson Suspect Pleads
Not Guilty, NYT, 24.1.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/us/25loughner.html
Differences in Federal and State Systems Could Complicate
Prosecution
January 14, 2011
The New York Times
By KIRK JOHNSON and CHARLIE SAVAGE
TUCSON — The investigation into the bloody attack here last
weekend is virtually certain to rank among the highest-profile criminal cases of
the year, with as many as 250 federal law enforcement officials and dozens of
sheriff’s deputies and detectives operating under blanket news media scrutiny.
But the paradox is that it has also turned out to be among the simplest of cases
to investigate, with the answers to most questions clear within hours.
Now, however, as the prosecution phase nears and both federal and state courts
pursue the case, complications will inevitably appear — beginning with the vast
number of potential witnesses, and further magnified by the sometimes sharply
different requirements of the two court systems.
The complications extend to the rules of evidence. Arizona state and federal
rules differ significantly on what defense attorneys are entitled to hear before
trial, and the federal and state teams could also head toward very different
outcomes as well if — as many legal experts expect — Jared L. Loughner’s lawyers
mount an insanity defense. Arizona, unlike federal law, does not allow a finding
of not guilty by reason of insanity. A defendant can only be found guilty, not
guilty or guilty but insane.
“This is not a whodunit — it’s pretty straightforward,” said the Pima County
attorney, Barbara LaWall, whose office is expected to file a state criminal case
in the coming weeks against Mr. Loughner, 22, on top of the federal charges
already filed. “It’s also very complicated.”
While the systems differ, the facts are clear-cut: Mr. Loughner, the accused
gunman, was caught in the act in front of many witnesses; after a brief search
for a man who turned out to be an innocent taxi driver, it became clear that
there was no conspiracy; records showed that Mr. Loughner bought the gun
legally; there were no interstate connections to explore, nor fugitives to hunt
down; the suspect’s Internet postings and papers at his home provided a roadmap
to his mental state and fixation on his apparent target, Representative
Gabrielle Giffords, who was having an event in the shopping center parking lot
where the shooting occurred.
There are human entanglements too. Ms. LaWall, in preparing to counter an
insanity defense on the state side, said in an interview that she may get help,
in a way, from one of the murder victims: John M. Roll, the chief federal judge
in Arizona, who had been a supervising prosecutor in the Pima County attorney’s
office decades ago, when she joined it as a young prosecutor.
“I learned to defend against the insanity defense from John Roll,” she said.
The disconnect between the relative simplicity of the investigation and its
extraordinary importance is also manifested in appearances.
After the attack, President Obama asked the F.B.I. director, Robert S. Mueller
III, to fly out to Tucson and personally oversee the effort. He did, and the
news conference he gave on Sunday sent a calming message to the public that the
government was in control of the matter.
But Mr. Mueller’s role was not to run the investigation. He flew back to
Washington on Monday, then returned briefly to Tucson later in the week. And
while he attended some briefings in Arizona as the inquiry unfolded, he also
spent time visiting victims in the hospital.
Instead, the investigation has been primarily run by Nathan Thomas Gray, the
special agent in charge of the F.B.I.’s Phoenix division, who has nearly three
decades of law enforcement experience and a long history of important bureau
positions. He is being helped by an assistant special agent in charge, Annette
Bartlett, who runs the division’s branch office in Tucson.
At the F.B.I. offices here in a sixth-floor suite downtown, people are working
at every available space, according to a description provided by two F.B.I.
agents, all revolving around a glossy dark brown conference table that agents
refer to as the main battle station, seating 18 to 20 people.
Phone lines and computer cables thread the room together, but there are also
voluminous stacks of paper, neatly organized, extending to chairs along the
walls. A projector illuminating the list of various leads to cover, referred to
as the virtual command center, hangs overhead.
Judy Clarke, Mr. Loughner’s lawyer, did not return a phone call or e-mail
requests for comment.
Even as the F.B.I. leads the investigation, however, the Pima County Sheriff’s
Department, five miles away in a low-rise complex hard between the County
Fairgrounds and an industrial park, has become the main source of information
about what has actually been uncovered. The discovery of a black bag on Thursday
in a Tucson neighborhood by a man walking his dog illuminated the odd trajectory
of news, evidence and turf that swirls around the case.
Investigators had been looking for the bag since being told by Mr. Loughner’s
father that he had confronted his son about it on Saturday, before the
shootings, and Jared Loughner ran into the desert carrying it. The recovery and
detail about its contents, 9-millimeter ammunition — the caliber used in the
attack — was the stuff of a sheriff’s press release. Later in the day a
sheriff’s spokesman said the bag had been turned over to the F.B.I., which had
not commented about it.
Federal officials say this dynamic is less the result of any culture clash than
of differing rules: under Justice Department regulations, they have far less
freedom to release information — even mug shots — than do local police operating
under Arizona’s open-government laws.
Meanwhile, the investigative tempo and the number of agents performing tasks for
it, officials say, has waxed and waned. It was a frenzy in the immediate
aftermath, as agents fanned out to search Mr. Loughner’s house and car,
interview witnesses at the hospital, research the gun, review surveillance tapes
and find his associates.
Much of that work was completed in the first few days.
“The basic set of facts of what happened in the case, I think within 48 hours
they had a really good handle on them,” said Special Agent Jason Pack, an F.B.I.
spokesman. “They identified the second person they were looking for and had a
pretty good idea that just one person was responsible for this particular act.”
As the week progressed, some technical work remained — notably, the laboratory
reconstruction of the crime scene, and efforts to scour Mr. Loughner’s computer,
using computer specialists, some of whom have been tapping in remotely from
elsewhere in the country.
But a second major wave of investigative activity resulted from the other major
remaining task: to speak with every person who crossed Mr. Loughner’s path, each
of whom seemed to suggest several other leads to run down — a ballooning effort
to make sure investigators did not miss anything important.
Already, agents have interviewed well over 100 people, with written reports then
collated and compiled into the F.B.I.’s Operational Response and Investigative
Online Network, or Orion, a computerized case management system that helps
agents fit pieces into the larger puzzle.
But those volumes of interviews could in turn be a major wrinkle on the state
side of the case because of what legal experts say are Arizona’s unusual
procedural rules that allow defense attorneys to interview, before trial, every
witness, except victims, that might be called to testify by the prosecution,
including F.B.I. agents.
“Every single witness on the prosecution side is likely to be questioned, other
than the victims,” said Prof. Gabriel J. Chin, who teaches criminal law and
procedure at the University of Arizona’s James E. Rogers College of Law in
Tucson.
Another variable that could enter the case — given the well-documented history
of odd and disruptive, if not threatening, behavior by Mr. Loughner, especially
at Pima Community College — is the question of his mental competency to stand
trial.
And there again the state-federal wrinkle could emerge. Arizona, Professor Chin
said, has a very sophisticated system designed to restore mental competency,
often through medical treatment, so that people can continue through the
criminal justice system. It was conceivable, he said, that that system could
come into play even if a federal court found Mr. Loughner unable or unfit to
proceed.
Differences in
Federal and State Systems Could Complicate Prosecution, NYT, 14.1.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/us/15investigate.html
U.S.
Subpoenas Twitter Accounts of WikiLeaks Figures
January 8,
2011
The New York Times
By JOHN F. BURNS and RAVI SOMAIYA
LONDON —
The United States Department of Justice has issued a subpoena for the Twitter
account activity of several people linked to the WikiLeaks organization,
including its founder, Julian Assange, according to the group and official
documents.
The subpoena, issued last month, offers the most detail yet about how the United
States government is conducting its investigation, and likely prosecution, of
WikiLeaks officials and their anti-secrecy campaign to release classified and
often highly sensitive documents on the Internet. A task force composed of
dozens of Pentagon and justice department officials, among others, has been
active for months in investigating the damage done to American diplomatic and
military operations.
The quest to get the information from five prominent figures at the group was
revealed Saturday when Birgitta Jonsdottir, a former WikiLeaks activist who is
also a member of Iceland’s parliament, received a notification of the subpoena
from Twitter, a social Web site that allows users to post short messages. The
United States government, she said in a subsequent message, “wants to know about
all my tweets and more since November 1st 2009.” The subpoena, obtained by the
Web site Salon.com, was issued by the United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Virginia on Dec. 14 and asks for the complete account information of
Pfc. Bradley Manning, the United States Army intelligence specialist awaiting a
military court martial under suspicion of leaking materials to WikiLeaks, as
well as Ms. Jonsdottir, Mr. Assange and two computer programmers, Rop Gongrijp
and Jacob Appelbaum.
Mr. Appelbaum wrote on his Twitter account on Saturday that the lawyers for the
short-messaging service had been responsible for getting the grand jury subpoena
unsealed and warned followers against sending him private messages. “Do not send
me Direct Messages,” he wrote. “My twitter account contents have apparently been
invited to the (presumably-Grand Jury) in Alexandria.”
While many messages on Twitter are posted publicly, the service also allows
users to send private or “direct” messages to other users.
The subpoena was unsealed on Jan. 5, which allowed Twitter to inform those
concerned.
The facsimile of the subpoena showed that it had been authorized by the U.S.
attorney’s office in Alexandria, Va., outside Washington, an office that has
often been used by the federal government in highly sensitive criminal
inquiries. Some published reports in recent weeks have suggested that the
justice department may have secretly empanelled a grand jury in Virginia to take
evidence in the WikiLeaks probe. But a tickbox on the subpoena saying “grand
jury information” was left blank.
Ms. Jonsdottir did not immediately return messages seeking comment but has said
in messages on Twitter that she will fight the subpoena.
Of the five individuals named in the subpoena, only two — Mr. Manning and Jacob
Appelbaum — are American citizens. The others include an Australian, Mr.
Assange, Ms. Jonsdottir, from Iceland, Mr. Gongrijp, a Dutch national. This
immediately raised the possibility of a diplomatic row between the United States
and allied nations whose citizens were among those covered by the subpoena. They
could argue that American laws were being used to stifle free communications
between individuals who were not American citizens, and who were not in the
United States at the time of the messages that were the target of the subpoena.
An early indication of the potential for protest came from Ms. Jonsdottir, the
Icelandic parliamentarian, who used her Twitter account to ask, “Do they realize
I am a member of parliament in Iceland?” In a later Twitter messages, she said
she had spoken to Iceland’s minister of justice, who, she said, was “now looking
into the case.” She said she had also spoken to Iceland’s interior minister,
Ogmundur Jonasson, who, she said, had described the subpoena as “very odd and
grave.”
Twitter said it would not comment on the specific case, but noted that its
policy is “to notify users about law enforcement and governmental requests for
their information, unless we are prevented by law from doing so.”
In messages on its own Twitter feed, WikiLeaks confirmed the subpoena, and
suggested that Google and Facebook might also have been issued with such legal
demands. A communications official for Facebook said on Saturday that the
company had no comment.
The unsealed subpoena offers the first window into how the United States has
been maneuvering to build its case against Mr. Assange. The government, in
seeking all information related to the accounts since Nov. 1, 2009, is likely
hoping to discover private discussions about the leaks or details of timing to
help prove that either Mr. Assange or one of his surrogates pushed Mr. Manning
to leak the government documents.
The Justice Department has so far avoided discussing details its investigation
into WikiLeaks and declined to outline any grand jury activity, though Attorney
General Eric Holder said he authorized investigators to take “significant”
steps.
But those familiar with the department’s actions said there is intense pressure
to find some way of criminally prosecuting Mr. Assange as a co-conspirator in
order to deter future large-scale leaks via the Internet. The subpoena, unsealed
on Saturday, describes an “ongoing criminal investigation.”
By seeking to prove Mr. Assange was a conspirator in the leak, the government
seeks to differentiate the actions of WikiLeaks from those of traditional news
organizations or investigative journalists who also disclose government
information.
The United States has also taken steps to protect against future leaks,
including suggesting employees of various agencies that handle sensitive
material take measures to evaluate the “trustworthiness” of co-workers,
according to a memo circulated last week by the Office of Management and Budget.
The memo, distributed to the heads of all executive branch departments and
agencies, urged managers to implement programs that can evaluate “insider
threats” and “detect behavioral changes in cleared employees.”
“Do you use a psychiatrist or sociologist to measure despondence and grumpiness
as a means to gauge waning trustworthiness?” the memo asks agencies to consider.
In a message on Saturday, WikiLeaks compared the subpoena to the Iranian
government seeking information on activists in that country. Using the acronym
for direct messages, the only messages on Twitter that are not publicly
accessible for some users, it said, “If the Iranian govt asked for DMS of
Iranian activists, State Dept. would be all over this violation of ‘Internet
freedom.’ ”
J. David
Goodman contributed reporting from New York.
U.S. Subpoenas Twitter Accounts of WikiLeaks Figures, NYT,
8.1.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/world/09wiki.html
David G.
Trager, Judge in Crown Heights Case, Dies at 73
January 6,
2011
The New York Times
By ROBERT D. McFADDEN
David G.
Trager, a federal judge in Brooklyn whose rulings were pivotal in a racially
charged case in Crown Heights and in the first civil suit to challenge the Bush
administration’s practice of sending terrorism suspects to countries that employ
torture, died on Wednesday at his home in Brooklyn. He was 73.
The cause was pancreatic cancer, his wife, Roberta E. Weisbrod, said.
After three decades as a lawyer, state investigation commissioner, federal
prosecutor and law school professor and dean, Mr. Trager was named to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District by President Bill Clinton in
1993. After assuming senior status in 2006, Judge Trager worked full time until
recently. The district encompasses Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island and Nassau
and Suffolk Counties.
In a wide-ranging career, Judge Trager, a Republican known for political
independence, was United States attorney for the Eastern District from 1974 to
1978. He was also a professor at Brooklyn Law School for 17 years and, for a
decade, its dean. From 1983 to 1990, he headed the State Commission of
Investigation, and in the 1980s he advised New York mayors on judicial
appointments and helped to revise the City Charter.
But he was perhaps best known as the judge in the trial of two black men,
Lemrick Nelson Jr. and Charles Price, who were convicted in 1997 of civil rights
violations for their roles in the killing of a Hasidic scholar, Yankel
Rosenbaum, in 1991 on a night of mob violence in Crown Heights, Brooklyn.
The verdict appeared to close a wrenching case that had exemplified troubled
race relations in New York. But an appeals court overturned it in 2002, saying
that Judge Trager, in trying to seat a racially and religiously balanced jury,
had improperly manipulated the panel’s composition. The court said he had erred
in a well-intended desire to be fair and to avoid a polarizing verdict,
violating constitutional trial guarantees. Mr. Nelson was retried and again
convicted; Mr. Price entered a guilty plea.
Another ruling by Judge Trager figured prominently in a civil suit against the
government by the Center for Constitutional Rights and Maher Arar, a Syrian-born
Canadian citizen who was suspected of being a Qaeda terrorist and was detained
at Kennedy International Airport in 2002 on his way home from a vacation.
Mr. Arar was held in solitary confinement in Brooklyn, interrogated without
access to legal counsel and, under the Bush administration’s practice of
“extraordinary rendition,” sent without charges or a trial to Syria, where he
was imprisoned for 10 months in a rat-infested dungeon and tortured repeatedly.
Syria found no evidence that Mr. Arar was a terrorist, and released him.
In 2006, Judge Trager dismissed Mr. Arar’s suit for damages, upholding the
government’s contention that torture in rendition cases was a foreign-policy
issue not appropriate for judicial review and that the case might disclose state
secrets. The decision was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court declined to hear the case.
David Gershon Trager was born in Mount Vernon, N.Y., on Dec. 23, 1937, the son
of Sol and Clara Trager, who had emigrated from Austria. He graduated from
Columbia University in 1959 and received his law degree from Harvard in 1962.
Mr. Trager practiced law in New York from 1963 to 1967, and after a year as an
assistant city corporation counsel, he was a law clerk in 1968 for Judge Kenneth
B. Keating and in 1969 for Chief Judge Stanley H. Fuld, both of the New York
Court of Appeals.
Besides his wife, whom he married in 1972, Judge Trager is survived by a son,
Josiah; two daughters, Naomi Trager and Mara Trager; and two grandchildren.
In the early 1970s, Mr. Trager was an assistant federal prosecutor in Brooklyn
and an associate professor at Brooklyn Law School. He taught constitutional law
at the school, where he was a full professor from 1978 to 1993 and the dean from
1983 to 1993.
As the United States attorney in Brooklyn in the mid-1970s, Mr. Trager was known
for vigorously pursuing organized crime. While he had no prosecutorial powers as
chairman of the State Commission of Investigation in the 1980s, he exposed
numerous cases of official corruption, notably on Long Island.
In 1987, after a 14-month inquiry, he disclosed what he called a “startling lack
of professionalism” in the Suffolk County Police Department, with instances of
perjury, fabrication and illegal wiretapping that he said were “shamefully
tolerated” by the district attorney’s office. A wave of retirements,
resignations, transfers and reforms ensued.
Mr. Trager was a member of panels that advised Mayors Edward I. Koch and David
N. Dinkins on judicial appointments and that revised the New York City Charter,
eliminating the Board of Estimate, which had been the center of civic affairs
for a century, and redistributing the board’s powers to an expanded City
Council, the mayor and a reconstituted Planning Commission.
David G. Trager, Judge in Crown Heights Case, Dies at 73,
NYT, 6.1.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/nyregion/07trager.html
15-Year
Sentence for 1968 Hijacking
January 4,
2011
Filed at 12:29 p.m. EST
The New York Times
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEW YORK (AP) — A judge sentenced a man who hijacked a plane from New York to
Cuba four decades ago to 15 years in prison Tuesday, citing the fear that must
have spread among passengers and the flight crew when he put a knife to the
throat of a flight attendant and a gun to her back and then entered the cockpit.
U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein announced the sentence for 67-year-old
Luis Armando Pena Soltren, who returned to the United States from Cuba in
October 2009 to face charges of conspiracy to commit air piracy, interfering
with a flight crew and kidnapping. He pleaded guilty in March.
"This is a very serious offense. Sometimes it's important to have a strict
sentence," Hellerstein said as he rejected pleas for leniency from a defense
lawyer who insisted Pena Soltren only joined the hijacking to get to visit his
father in a Cuban hospital and then lived an honorable life afterwards.
"Hijacking is a frightening crime," the judge said. "I tried to imagine how I
would feel if someone put a knife to my throat and a gun to my back and I wonder
how many nightmares would follow."
Pan American Flight 281, which had 103 passengers and crew, was traveling from
New York's Kennedy Airport to Puerto Rico on Nov. 24, 1968 when Pena Soltren
rose from his seat and attacked the flight attendant before entering the
cockpit. No one was hurt.
Speaking through a Spanish translater, Pena Soltren apologized for the hijacking
and said he wished for forgiveness from the flight attendant "and all those
people who felt threatened by my desperate attack."
"I'd like to express my remorse," he said. As he finished a statement that
lasted several minutes, he began to cry and slumped into his seat. On a bench
where his wife and daughter watched the proceedings, his daughter dabbed tears
from her eyes.
The hijacking was carried out when Pena Soltren and at least two co-defendants
brought pistols and large knives aboard in a baby's diaper bag. The pilots were
forced to divert Puerto-Rico bound Pan American Flight 281 from Kennedy Airport
to Havana.
His lawyer, James Neuman, said Pena Soltren had wanted to come back since at
least 1979 because he was remorseful.
Two of the men were arrested in the mid-1970s and pleaded guilty to their roles
in the skyjacking. One co-defendant ended up serving 7 years in prison while the
other served 4 years.
Another man, who was not on the flight but was described as a leader of the
Puerto Rican Movement for Liberation, was indicted in the hijacking. He was
found not guilty on all charges.
Neuman argued that Pena Soltren should serve less time than the other two
because he had a lesser role.
15-Year Sentence for 1968 Hijacking, NYT, 4.1.2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/01/04/us/AP-US-1968-Airline-Hijacking.html
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