UK > History > 2011 > Iraq
Baha
Mousa's death
casts a
shadow over British army,
says top general
Sir Peter Wall, head of the British army,
reacts to the Gage report by saying
the 'shameful' incident must never be repeated
Richard
Norton-Taylor and Owen Bowcott
Guardian.co.uk
Thursday 8 September 2011
15.42 BST
This article was published
on guardian.co.uk at 15.42 BST
on Thursday 8 September 2011.
It was last modified at 16.29 BST
on Thursday 8 September 2011.
The death
of Baha Mousa, an innocent Iraqi citizen, "cast a dark shadow" over the British
army's reputation, its head has said.
General Sir Peter Wall said soldiers were now "in no doubt about the need to
treat detainees humanely and with respect", and he added that "had that been the
case in Basra in 2003, Baha Mousa would not have died in British custody".
Sir Peter said: "The shameful circumstances of Baha Mousa's death have cast a
dark shadow on that reputation, and this must not happen again."
His comments came as an inquiry into the death of Mousa found that British
soldiers inflicted "violent and cowardly" assaults on Iraqi civilians,
subjecting them to "gratuitous" kickings and beating. In a devastating
indictment of military culture, the retired appeal court judge Sir William Gage
ruled that there was widespread ignorance of what was permitted in handling
prisoners of war.
The prime minister also condemned the abuse. Speaking from Downing Street, David
Cameron said: "It is clearly a truly shocking and appalling incident. This
should not have happened. It should never be allowed to happen again.
"The British Army, as it does, should uphold the highest standards. We should
take every step possible to make sure this never happens again. If there is
further evidence that comes out of this inquiry that requires action to be
taken, it should be taken.
"Britain does not cover these things up, we do not sweep them under the carpet.
We deal with it."
Liam Fox, the defence secretary, told the Commons: "The events that led to the
death of Mousa were "deplorable, shocking and shameful".
Although Gage did not suggest there had been a policy of systematic abuse
towards Iraqi suspects, he deplored the absence of any "proper Ministry of
Defence doctrine on interrogation".
The report at the end of the two-year inquiry contains savage criticisms of
individual soldiers and officers, as well as damning descriptions of poor
internal communications, "loss of discipline and a lack of moral courage".
Mousa, 26, a hotel worker in Basra where the British army was stationed, died
after spending 36 hours in detention in the custody of soldiers from the 1st
Battalion Queen's Lancashire Regiment (1QLR). He was found to have suffered 93
external injuries.
Gage found that even senior commanders were ignorant of a ban, imposed in 1972,
on the use of five techniques; these included hooding, stress positions and
sleep deprivation.
The hooding, which was prohibited under the Geneva conventions, was "unjustified
and wholly unacceptable", he said. "For almost the whole of the period up to
Baha Mousa's death … the detainees were kept handcuffed, hooded and in stress
positions in extreme heat and conditions of some squalor," the report said.
Four soldiers were singled out for severe criticism, including Colonel Jorge
Mendonca, the unit's commander, who, Gage said, "bears a heavy responsibility
for these events".
Gage said Mendonca ought to have known what was going on in the detention centre
and should have appreciated the dangers of "conditioning". He is acquitted,
however, of having any knowledge of the beatings.
Corporal Donald Payne was the only soldier convicted of what the report
describes as a "dreadful catalogue of unjustified and brutal violence on the
defenceless detainees". Gage calls him a "violent bully".
Lieutenant Craig Rodgers, commander of the unit responsible for guarding the
prisoners, is accused of "a very serious breach of duty" for not reporting the
treatment meted out. "If he had taken action when he first knew what was
occurring, Baha Mousa would almost certainly have survived," the report said.
Major Michael Peebles, responsible for monitoring detainees, was accused of
"unacceptable" behaviour.
There was also stinging criticism of Father Peter Madden, the unit's Catholic
chaplain, who visited the temporary detention facility (TDF). Gage concluded
that he was a "poor witness".
He added: "I find that he did visit the TDF [the day Mousa died] … He must have
seen the shocking condition of the detainees and the deteriorating condition of
the TDF.
"He ought to have intervened immediately, or reported it up the chain of command
but, in fact, it seems he did not have the courage to do either."
Among the humiliations forced upon the detainees, the report said, were toilets
being flushed over their heads, beatings with metal bars, verbal abuse, being
forced to "dance like Michael Jackson" and having lighter fuel poured over them.
One officer who visited the detention centre told the inquiry that the detainees
looked as though they had been "in a car crash".
After the death of Baha Mousa, the surviving detainees were subjected to further
assaults. "Trophy photographs" were said to have been taken of them being
beaten.
The discovery of weapons at the hotel justified the suspects' arrest, Gage
commented. "However, I regard it as highly unlikely that the detainees or any of
them were in fact involved in insurgent or terrorist activity."
One of the principal causes was "an unfounded rumour circulating" through the
battalion that the detainees had been responsible for the murder of a popular
officer or of members of the royal military police.
The report paints a picture of "corporate" and "systemic failure" of the MoD to
provide clear and consistent guidelines about what was permitted in the
treatment of prisoners of war.
Techniques were used that had been banned 30 years earlier as "prohibited and
unlawful in warfare by reason of the Geneva convention". At the time of the
invasion of Iraq, "there was no proper MoD doctrine on interrogation of
prisoners of war that was generally available". A ban on hooding ordered by a
senior officer in Basra after the invasion was never effectively communicated to
1QLR.
But the incidents, Gage said, "did not amount to an entrenched culture of
violence in the [British] battlegroup" – a reference to the rest of the British
forces in southern Iraq.
Even after Mousa's death, an order reminding troops of the ban was not properly
passed down the chain of command. Prisoner handling was "not given a high
priority by the divisional commanders and their chiefs of staff".
The bans on hooding and other techniques were not even included in officers'
training at Sandhurst. The report added that there were "no standing orders or
general instructions in 1QLR as to the medical care for civilian detainees".
Summing up his findings, Gage declared: "The events of 14 to 16 September 2003
were indeed a very great stain on the reputation of the army, and no doubt they
did at the time greatly damage some of the good work done by 1QLR and other
units in Iraq.
"My judgment is that they constituted an appalling episode of serious,
gratuitous violence on civilians which resulted in the death of one man and
injuries to others. They represent a very serious breach of discipline by a
number of members of 1QLR."
Lee Hughes, secretary to the inquiry, said the report was now in the hands of
the Crown Prosecution Service which would have to decide whether to take action.
"The chairman has no powers to find criminal responsibility. It's for the
prosecution authorities to decide," he said.
Witnesses were protected from self-incrimination, but evidence from other
sources and witnesses about individuals could lead to criminal charges or civil
proceedings.
The report of the inquiry, which cost £13m, includes 73 recommendations. They
mainly call for clear guidance for all British forces handling prisoners,
including an absolute ban on hooding.
Baha Mousa's death casts a shadow over British army, says
top general, G, 8.9.2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/08/baha-mousa-shadow-british-army
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