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UK > History > 2010 > Iraq war > Chilcot inquiry (I)
Interrogation techniques
at 'Britain's Abu Ghraib' revealed
Video showing brutal mistreatment is submitted
during high court proceedings
brought by former Iraqi inmates
Friday 5 November 2010
12.17 GMT
Guardian.co.uk
Ian Cobain
This article was published on guardian.co.uk
at 12.17 GMT on Friday 5 November
2010.
It was last modified at 16.18 GMT
on Friday 5 November 2010.
Evidence of systematic and brutal mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners at a secret
British military interrogation centre that is being described as the UK's Abu
Ghraib emerged today during high court proceedings brought by more than 200
former inmates.
The court was informed that there is evidence detainees were starved, deprived
of sleep, subjected to sensory deprivation and threatened with execution at the
shadowy facilities near Basra operated by the Joint Forces Interrogation Team
(JFIT).
It also received allegations that JFIT's prisoners were beaten and forced to
kneel in stressful positions for up to 30 hours at a time, and that some were
subjected to electric shocks. Some of the prisoners say they were subjected to
sexual humiliation by female soldiers, while others allege that they were held
for days in cells as small as one metre square.
The evidence of abuse is emerging just weeks after defence officials admitted
that British soldiers and airmen are suspected of being responsible for the
murder and manslaughter of a number of Iraqi civilians in addition to the
high-profile case of Baha Mousa, the hotel receptionist tortured to death by
troops in September 2003. One man is alleged to have been kicked to death aboard
an RAF helicopter, while two others died after being held for questioning.
Last month, the Guardian disclosed that for several years after the death of
Mousa, the British military continued training interrogators in techniques that
include threats, sensory deprivation and enforced nakedness, in an apparent
breach of the Geneva conventions. Trainee interrogators were told that they
should aim to provoke humiliation, disorientation, exhaustion, anxiety and fear
in the prisoners they are questioning.
Lawyers representing the former JFIT inmates now argue that there needs to be a
public inquiry to establish the extent of the mistreatment, and to discover at
which point ultimate responsibility lies, along the chain of military command
and political oversight. Today's hearing marked the start of a judicial review
intended to force the establishment of an inquiry. Michael Fordham QC, for the
former inmates, said: "It needs to get at the truth of what happened in all
these cases. It needs to deal with the systemic issues that arise out of them,
and it needs to deal with the lessons to be learned."
Fordham said the question needs to be asked: "Is this Britain's Abu Ghraib?"
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) is resisting an inquiry, however. In a statement
to the Commons on Monday, Nick Harvey, the Liberal Democrat armed forces
minister, said the MoD should be allowed to investigate the matter itself,
adding: "A costly public inquiry would be unable to investigate individual
criminal behaviour or impose punishments. Any such inquiry would arguably
therefore not be in the best interests of the individual complainants who have
raised these allegations."
Harvey said an inquiry would not be ruled out, "should serious and systemic
issues" emerge as a result of the MoD's own investigations.
Among the most startling evidence submitted to the high court in London today
were two videos showing the interrogation of a suspected insurgent who was taken
prisoner in Basra in April 2007 and questioned about a mortar attack on a
British base.
The recordings – among 1,253 made by the interrogators themselves – show this
man being forced to stand to attention while two soldiers scream abuse at him
and threaten him with execution. They ignore his complaints that he is not being
allowed to sleep and that he has had nothing to eat or drink for two days. At
the end of each session, he is forced to don a pair of blackened goggles, ear
muffs are placed over his head, and he is ordered to place the palms of his
hands together so that a guard can grasp his thumbs to lead him away.
At the end of one session, an interrogator can be heard ordering the guard to
"rough the fucker off", or possibly "knock the fucker off". The guard then runs
down a corridor, dragging the prisoner behind him by his thumbs. This man's
lawyers say he was then severely beaten: they allege that the initial blows, and
their client's moans, can be heard faintly at the end of the video.
An investigation by the army in January 2008, which examined just six cases of
alleged abuse by British troops, described them as cause for "professional
humility", but concluded that such incidents were not "endemic". However, the
report did not address the possibility that some mistreatment was systematic,
with those responsible acting under orders and in accordance with a pre-war
training regime that called for repeated use of abusive techniques.
Responding to today's hearing, Brigadier John Donnelly of the MOD's Judicial
Engagement Policy department, said in a statement: "These are unproven
allegations. We have set up the dedicated Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT)
to investigate them as quickly and thoroughly as possible. The IHAT is headed by
an independent former CID officer.
"The IHAT is the most effective way of investigating these unproven allegations
– to establish their truth or otherwise, identify any action that needs to be
taken, including dealing with any connected or systemic issues and, should it
uncover criminal behaviour, provide the proper means to deal with it. In our
view a costly new public inquiry is not necessary or appropriate. "It would be
unable to investigate individual criminal behaviour or impose punishments and
will not serve the interest of fair and expeditious justice."
Interrogation techniques
at 'Britain's Abu Ghraib' revealed, G, 5.11.2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/05/interrogation-techniques-iraq-inmates
Clare Short:
Tony Blair lied and misled parliament
in build-up
to Iraq war
• Blair 'lied' over war preparations
• Attorney general 'misled' government
• Brown 'marginalised and unhappy'
James Sturcke
Guardian.co.uk
Tuesday 2 February 2010
13.39 GMT
This article was published on guardian.co.uk at 13.39 GMT
on Tuesday 2 February
2010.
It was last modified at 15.43 GMT
on Tuesday 2 February 2010.
Clare Short, the former international development secretary, today accused
Tony Blair of lying to her and misleading parliament in the build-up to the Iraq
invasion.
Short, giving evidence to the Chilcot inquiry into the war, also said that the
2003 conflict had put the world in greater danger of international terrorism.
Declassified letters between Short and Blair released today show she believed
that invading Iraq without a second UN resolution would be illegal and there was
a significant risk of a humanitarian catastrophe.
She told the inquiry that she had a conversation with Blair in 2002. He told her
that he was not planning for war against Iraq and that the evidence has since
revealed that he was not telling the truth at that point, she said.
She also said she was "stunned" when she read the 337-word legal advice on the
war written by the then-attorney general Lord Goldsmith during a cabinet meeting
on 17 March 2003, three days before the war began. She was forbidden by Blair
from discussing it during the meeting.
"I said, 'That is extraordinary.' I was jeered at to be quiet. If the prime
minister says be quiet there is only so much you can do.
"I think for the attorney general to come and say there's unequivocal legal
authority to go to war was misleading."
Short, who was applauded by some audience members in public seats at the end of
her evidence, said the ministerial code was broken as cabinet colleagues were
not aware of Goldsmith's modifications to his legal advice over the previous
weeks. The inquiry has already heard how Goldsmith changed his mind over the
need for a second resolution after visiting the US the month before the war.
Short said cabinet colleagues were unaware of the legal advice given by the most
senior Foreign Office lawyers, Sir Michael Wood and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, which
called for a second UN resolution.
"The ministerial code said legal advice should be circulated and it wasn't. We
only had the answer to the parliamentary question [Goldsmith's short ruling].
There was a lot of misleading of parliament too by the prime minister of the
day.
"The ministerial code is unsafe because it is enforced by the prime minister and
if he's in on the tricks then that's it. When I found out what went into it I
think we were misled."
She added that she had "various cups of coffee" with Gordon Brown, at that time
the chancellor, who "was very unhappy and marginalised [in the run up to war]".
He was disillusioned about a number of issues, not specifically Iraq, and felt
Blair was "obsessed with his legacy".
Later, Short added that after the war "Gordon was back in with Tony and not
having cups of coffee with me any more".
Asked about the cabinet meetings in the run-up to the war, Short told the
inquiry that the cabinet did not operate in the manner it was required to
constitutionally.
"It was not a decision-making body. I don't think there was ever a substantive
discussion about anything in cabinet. If you ever raised an issue with Tony
Blair he would cut it off. He did that in July 2002 when I said I wanted to talk
about Iraq. He said he did not want it leaking into the press."
Short described cabinet meetings as "little chats" rather than decision-making
opportunities.
"There was never a meeting … that said: 'What is the problem? What are we trying
to achieve? What are our options?'"
The declassified documents showed that Short believed the situation in Iraq to
be "fragile" before hostilities began.
In one, written on 14 February 2003, she wrote: "Any disruption could lead to a
humanitarian catastrophe. With some more time, sensible measures can be taken to
reduce these risks and improve people's prospect of stability after the
conflict."
Short told the panel that both the British and US armies failed to honour their
Geneva convention responsibilities to keep order, describing the situation in
the post-invasion aftermath as "mad", with food for refugees only being ordered
at the last minute.
Short said Blair persuaded her against resigning on the same day as Cook by
assuring her that the UN would have the lead role in reconstructing Iraq and
that George Bush would support the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
Asked why she didn't resign earlier, she said: "If I knew then what I know now,
I would have." As for the pronouncements that the French would not back a second
resolution, it was one of the "big deceits" of the British, Short said.
The French president, Jacques Chirac, could have supported military action but
not while UN weapons inspectors wanted more time and it should have been given.
"There was no emergency. No one had attacked anyone. There wasn't any new WMD.
We could have taken the time and got it right. The forces weren't ready to go
in. They have said that themselves."
Short ended her evidence by calling for a serious debate about the "special
relationship" with the US, calling the current one "poodle-like".
Short stood down from the cabinet on 12 May 2003, nearly eight weeks after the
invasion.
Clare Short: Tony Blair
lied and misled parliament in build-up to Iraq war, G, 2.2.2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/02/clare-short-warned-tony-blair
Righteous, responsible but no regrets: Tony Blair's day in the
dock
Former PM gives no substantial ground on why he sent troops to Iraq to disarm
Saddam of weapons he did not possess
Friday 29 January 2010
19.52 GMT
Guardian.co.uk
Patrick Wintour and Richard Norton-Taylor
Tony Blair ended an epic six-hour inquisition by the Chilcot inquiry tonight
by insisting he had "no regrets" over toppling Saddam Hussein, arguing that the
world was more secure and that Iraq has replaced "the certainty of suppression"
with "the uncertainty of democratic politics".
The former prime minister blamed "the very near failure of the Iraqi occupation"
on Iranian interference, misplaced assumptions and a lack of US troops.
During the long-awaited cross-examination he gave no substantial ground over why
he sent 40,000 UK troops to war to disarm Saddam of weapons he did not possess,
arguing that if the west had backed off he would have reassembled them as he had
the intent and ability to do so.
"I had to take this decision as prime minister. It was a huge responsibility
then and there is not a single day that passes by that I do not think about that
responsibility, and so I should," Blair said.
Faced with the charge that 100,0000 Iraqi civilians had lost their lives owing
to cavalier planning, he responded: "I genuinely believe that if we had left
Saddam in power, even with what we know now, we would still have had to deal
with him in circumstances when the threat was worse, and possibly in
circumstances when it was hard to mobilise any support for dealing with that
threat.
"In the end, it was divisive, and I am sorry about that, and I did my level best
to try to bring people back together again."
Asked in the final minute if he had regrets, he replied without reference to the
families of dead British soldiers listening in the room: "Responsibility – but
not a regret for removing Saddam Hussein. I think he was a monster." As he left
the room there were shouts of "you are a liar and a murderer".
During the day the thoroughly briefed Blair seemed able to handle the
five-strong inquiry team with ease, but he was forced to concede in the late
afternoon to many failures in British post-war planning, and fundamental
disagreements with the US over strategy. He also tried to minimise the
intelligence community's mistaken assessment in 2002 that Saddam possessed a
growing threat by insisting Saddam did have the capability and intent to produce
weapons of mass destruction, and would have reconstituted that capability if the
international community had not enforced UN resolutions in 2003 by removing him
from power.
In his newest, if necessarily hypothetical, argument in defence of the war, he
contended: "Don't ask the March 2003 question, but ask the March 2010 question.
Suppose we backed off. What we now know is that he retained absolutely the
intent and intellectual know how to restart a nuclear and chemical weapons
programme when weapons inspectors were out and the sanctions were changed."
Saddam would have been emboldened, backed by an oil price of $100 a barrel.
He told the inquiry: "This isn't about a lie or a conspiracy or a deceit or a
deception. It's a decision. And the decision I had to take was could we take the
risk of this man reconstituting his weapons programmes or is that a risk that it
would be irresponsible to take?"
He insisted that he had never entered a secret pact with George Bush in the
spring of 2002 to commit the UK to regime change in Iraq. He said his objective
throughout had been to disarm Saddam of weapons of mass destruction through
diplomacy but backed by force.
Asked why he appeared to have endorsed regime change explicitly in a BBC
interview with Fern Britton, he said he had not answered as he wanted. "Even
with all my experience of dealing with interview it still indicates that I've
got something to learn," he said in a rare moment of levity.
He admitted to a series of errors in the occupation. Britain had planned for a
non-existent humanitarian disaster in the immediate wake of the invasion, he
said, but had not foreseen that the Iraqi state could not function.
He revealed he had been "shocked and angered" by the US torture of Iraqi
prisoners in Abu Ghraib, protested to the White House when US troops "went in
too hard in Falluja" in 2004 and had to be "very strong" with the Americans over
the chaos inside the initial post-war reconstruction organisation.
He admitted: "If we had not know what we know now we would have done things very
differently. People didn't think that al-Qaida and Iran would play the role that
they did. It was really the external elements of al-Qaida and Iran that really
caused this mission very nearly to fail."
He said at one point the actual threat posed by Saddam did not change after the
9/11 attack in New York, but instead talked of "the calculus of risk". It became
clear terrorists were willing to kill not just 3,000 but 30,000 if they could,
Blair said.
But he repeatedly denied claims that he had given private assurances to send
British troops regardless into battle to remove Saddam. He said: "The only
commitment I gave was to deal with Saddam. That was not a covert position, but a
public position. I was not dissembling."
Righteous, responsible
but no regrets: Tony Blair's day in the dock, G, 29.1.2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/29/responsible-no-regrets-blair-iraq
Iraq inquiry: Second UN resolution was not necessary, says
Lord Goldsmith
Former attorney general admitted to changing his mind over necessity of
further justification for military action
Wednesday 27 January 2010
11.12 GMT
Guardian.co.uk
Stephen Bates
This article was published on guardian.co.uk at 11.12 GMT on Wednesday 27
January 2010.
It was last modified at 14.44 GMT on Wednesday 27 January 2010.
Lord Goldsmith, the government's attorney general at the time of the Iraq war,
has told the Chilcot inquiry that he believed in 2002 there was no imminent
threat from Saddam Hussein's regime that would have justified the use of force
against him.
While he told the inquiry this morning that he believed a second UN resolution
would have been "safer" to justify military action, he admitted he eventually
concluded that a further reinforcement to the earlier resolution 1441 was not
necessary.
Goldsmith has told the inquiry he changed his mind "for good reasons" but has
not spelled them out, nor yet been asked by the inquiry what they were.
The change appears to have happened in late February 2003, just before the war,
when he told the prime minister's advisers that there was "a reasonable case"
that a second UN resolution was not needed. This was sufficient to constitute a
"green light," he said. His previous advice had been preliminary.
The former attorney general spoke of the government as his "client". He said the
prime minister had told him at a meeting shortly before the war: "'I do
understand that your advice is your advice.' He accepted it was for me to reach
a judgment and he had to accept that."
Goldsmith told the inquiry that he subsequently learned, over lunch with the
French ambassador to London, that the French government did not believe it was
necessary either. In the run-up to the war, the French president, Jacques
Chirac, had made clear that France would not support a new resolution.
Goldsmith has also told the inquiry that in his judgment regime change was not a
legitimate basis for the invasion.
He told the inquiry he had not attended cabinet meetings or cabinet committees
discussing the possibility of war during 2002 and that he gleaned information
about possible allied military plans from the press. He said "it would have been
better" if he had attended cabinet; his judgement would have been important once
the government's course of action had been agreed.
Goldsmith said: "My judgment was that there was not an imminence of threat that
would justify us resorting to the use of force."
He said that he did not think his advice was welcome to the prime minister.
Smiling, he told the inquiry: "I don't know, you'd have to ask Mr Blair that."
The former prime minister is to appear before the inquiry on Friday.
He told the inquiry that he had told the then defence secretary, Geoff Hoon,
that he was wrong to say that there was a clear basis for military action.
Goldsmith told the inquiry that the three justifications for the use of force
against Iraq would have been self-defence, to avert a humanitarian catastrophe
or authorisation by the UN.
He said he did not agree with the US policy of pre-emption. "The self-defence
argument did not apply. There was no immediate threat," he said.
Goldsmith added that he was frustrated by the government's decision not to
declassify some documents – a frustration clearly shared by Sir John Chilcot,
chairman of the inquiry.
The former attorney general told the panel: "What I was anxious to do was to
reach correct legal advice. I also had some concerns about public statements
being made about what our position would be."
Iraq inquiry: Second UN resolution was not
necessary, says Lord Goldsmith, G, 27.1.2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/27/lord-goldsmith-iraq-inquiry
Chilcot inquiry: Lawyers expose pressure to give green light
for war
• Foreign secretary resisted legal advice on invasion of Iraq
• Attorney general's advice not sought until eleventh hour
Richard Norton-Taylor
Guardian.co.uk
Tuesday 26 January 2010
22.00 GMT
This article was published on guardian.co.uk at 22.00 GMT on Tuesday 26 January
2010.
A version appeared on p10 of the Top stories section of the Guardian on
Wednesday 27 January 2010.
While Jack Straw, then foreign secretary, was roundly dismissing the
unanimous advice of his top lawyers that an invasion of Iraq would be illegal,
officials in Downing Street were strongly resisting similar unwelcome advice,
this time from Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general.
Previously classified documents released today at the Chilcot inquiry offer a
rare, perhaps unprecedented, insight into manoeuvring at the heart of government
about one of the most serious issues to confront ministers – whether to go to
war, and the lawfulness of it.
The documents reveal Goldsmith expressed concern to Jonathan Powell, Blair's
chief of staff, that he was said to have had an "optimistic view" of the
legality of an invasion without fresh UN backing. Goldsmith made it clear that
was not his view. That was in November 2002 when Goldsmith had been struggling
to get his voice heard, the inquiry was told. "Was the attorney general
discouraged from giving advice?" David Brummell, the former attorney's legal
secretary was asked. "Yes," Brummell replied.
When Blair finally asked Goldsmith for his formal legal advice, it came very
late, on 7 March 2003, less than two weeks before the invasion. Goldsmith, who
had originally shared the view of top Foreign Office lawyers that a fresh UN
resolution was essential, now told Blair that an invasion without one would
still carry risks but the government might get away with it.
But over the next 10 days Goldsmith was under pressure to come up with clear
"unequivocal" advice, not least from Lord Boyce, chief of the defence staff.
The inquiry heard how Brummell asked Downing Street for an assurance to give to
the head of the armed forces that an invasion would indeed be lawful without a
new UN resolution.
Sir Roderic Lyne, an inquiry panel member, asked why an assessment that Iraq was
still in breach of its disarmament obligations – a decision that would trigger
an invasion – could be made by the prime minister when the legal advice up to
then had been that only the UN security council could decide. Brummell replied:
"The evidence had to be confirmed by someone."
He added: "It came from the prime minister in the name of the British
government". The decision flew in the face of all the advice Whitehall lawyers
had been giving.
While Downing Street was pressing Goldsmith hard, and eventually successfully,
to come round to the view that a UN resolution would not be necessary, Straw was
battling it out with his lawyers in the FO. Sir Michael Wood, Downing Street's
chief legal adviser, wrote to Straw on 24 January 2003 expressing concern about
comments Straw had made to then-US vice president, Dick Cheney, in Washington.
Straw told Cheney Britain would "prefer" a second resolution but it would be
"OK" if they tried and failed to get one "à la Kosovo".
Wood commented that this was "completely wrong from a legal point of view". He
told Straw: "I hope there is no doubt in anyone's mind that, without a further
decision of the [UN security] council, and absent extraordinary circumstances of
which at present there is no sign, the UK cannot lawfully use force against Iraq
to ensure compliance with its security council WMD obligations." In a memo to
Straw, Wood added: "To use force without security council authority would amount
to a crime of aggression". Straw, now justice secretary, replied: "I note your
advice but I do not accept it."
Wood told the inquiry: "He took the view that I was being very dogmatic and that
international law was pretty vague and that he wasn't used to people taking such
a firm position. When he had been at the Home Office, he had often been advised
things were unlawful but he had gone ahead anyway and won in the courts."
Wood said it was "probably the first and only occasion" that a minister rejected
his legal advice in this way. "The problem for the government as a whole was
they needed advice even if they didn't want it," Wood told the inquiry.
Some of the most damning evidence came from Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Wood's
deputy who resigned in protest against the invasion. In a statement, she said:
"I regarded the invasion of Iraq as illegal … The rules of international law on
the use of force by states are at the heart of international law. Collective
security, as opposed to unilateral military action, is a central purpose of the
Charter of the United Nations.
"Acting contrary to the charter, as I perceived the government to be doing,
would have the consequence of damaging the United Kingdom's reputation as a
state committed to the rule of law in international relations and to the United
Nations."
Key exchanges with legal advisers
• Elizabeth Wilmshurst, a Foreign Office lawyer who resigned days before the
2003 invasion because she thought it was illegal, revealed that when the then
attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, wrote the first draft of his legal advice on
January 14 2003 he said there would have to be a second UN resolution for the
invasion to be legal. "His draft advice, his provisional view, was that a second
resolution was needed, as I recall," Wilmshurst said.
• Commenting on the fact that Goldsmith was saying by 17 March that there was no
need for a second resolution, Wilmshurst told the inquiry "it was clear that the
attorney general was not going to stand in the way of the government".
She added: "For the attorney to have advised that the conflict would have been
unlawful without a second resolution would have been very difficult at that
stage, I would have thought handing Saddam Hussein a massive public relations
advantage. It was extraordinary, frankly, to leave asking him so late in the
day. I think the process that was followed in this case was lamentable."
• Sir Michael Wood, the top Foreign Office lawyer at the time of the invasion,
said the then foreign secretary, Jack Straw, had overruled his advice that an
invasion would be illegal without UN backing – which challenged the evidence
Straw gave to the inquiry last week that he had only "very reluctantly"
supported the conflict.
"To use force without security council authority would amount to a crime of
aggression," Wood wrote in a memorandum to Straw.
Straw replied: "I note your advice but I do not accept it."
Michael told the inquiry: "He took the view that I was being very dogmatic and
that international law was pretty vague and that he wasn't used to people taking
such a firm position. When he had been at the Home Office, he had often been
advised things were unlawful but he had gone ahead anyway and won in the
courts."
• Wilmshurst appeared to criticise Straw for rejecting the advice of his
lawyers. "He's not an international lawyer," she said.
• Sir Roderic Lyne, one of the inquiry committee members, appeared to criticise
the process of the legal advice, asking Wilmshurst about whether it was right
Goldsmith's draft advice was shown to Tony Blair. Lyne asked: "Do you think it
was appropriate and in line with established practice for the attorney to give
what was intended to be formal law officers' advice in draft to its ultimate
recipient, conceivably thereby opening up a process of negotiation?"
Wilmshurst replied: "I'm not myself aware of a previous precedent for this. I
have to say that I was surprised."
Chilcot inquiry: Lawyers expose
pressure to give green light for war, G, 27.1.2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/26/chilcot-inquiry-iraq-invasion-lawyers
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