History > 2006 > UK > Terrorism (III)
Bin Laden is alive
and hiding in Afghanistan,
insists
Musharraf
It's not a hunch. We have got good intelligence,
the
Pakistan President tells our correspondent
in New York
September 28, 2006
The Times
By James Bone
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF, dismissing a French intelligence
report that Osama bin Laden had died of typhoid, said yesterday that he believed
the al-Qaeda leader to be hiding in the eastern Afghan province of Kunar,
possibly with the help of an Afghan warlord.
“It’s not a hunch,” the Pakistani President told The Times. “Kunar province
borders on Bajaur Agency. We know there are some pockets of al-Qaeda in Bajaur
Agency. We have set a good intelligence organisation. We have moved some army
elements. We did strike them twice there. We located and killed a number of
them.”
General Musharraf has been in a verbal duel with President Karzai over
Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror, with the Afghan leader accusing it of
allowing cross-border operations by Taleban from tribal areas. The two leaders
held a contentious meeting over dinner hosted by President Bush at the White
House last night. They did not shake hands.
Interviewed at his hotel in New York, General Musharraf said he believed that
bin Laden was in Afghanistan, and suggested a possible link with Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar, the Afghan warlord. Brandishing a UN report highlighted with coloured
markers, the President read out its finding that the insurgency in Afghanistan
“is being conducted mostly by Afghans operating inside Afghanistan’s borders”.
The report, issued by the Secretary-General this month, identifies five
“distinct leadership centres” of the insurgency, which “appear to act in loose
co-ordination with each other and a number benefit from financial and
operational links with drug-trafficking networks”. It says that Kunar province
is the base of operations of Hekmatyar’s wing of the Hezb-i-Islami party.
Hekmatyar and bin Laden fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in
the 1980s. In the 1992-96 civil war that followed the Soviet pullout, Hekmatyar,
an ethnic Pashtun, who was the Prime Minister, turned his forces against those
of President Rabbani, an ethnic Tajik.
When the Taleban came to power in Kabul, Hekmatyar went into exile in Iran while
bin Laden found safe haven with the hardline Islamic regime. But Hekmatyar
returned to Afghanistan when the Taleban were toppled by the American invasion
and has since issued statements urging Afghans to support al-Qaeda and wage
jihad against US-led forces.
“In Kunar province it is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who is operating,” General
Musharraf said, adding: “There must be some linkages.” He shrugged off a leaked
French intelligence report suggesting that bin Laden may have died from typhoid
fever sometime between August 23 and September 4 while hiding in Pakistan. “I
don’t know. Unless I am sure I never say anything,” he said. “If they have some
source they should tell us. At least our intelligence does not know anything.”
General Musharraf, whose memoir, In the Line of Fire, has been serialised in The
Times this week, defended Pakistan’s much-criticised intelligence effort to
locate al-Qaeda operatives in its autonomous tribal areas along the Afghan
border.
“I believe the biggest element of [their] success is the people are abetting and
supporting in hiding the terrorists and al- Qaeda. This is what has been
happening,” he said. “They have been hiding because some people support them. If
they are hiding in a compound with four walls and they are doing everything from
within that compound, not moving out, and the people are supporting, how would
anyone know?”
He repeated his claim that the US had paid bounties for Pakistan’s capture of
wanted al-Qaeda figures. But he said that the money went to individuals. “No
money has been given at the government level to the Government of Pakistan.
These people carry ‘head money . . .’ ” he said. “This money was given through
organisations to the people who were involved.”
General Musharraf acknowledged that Islamic militants of Pakistani descent in
Britain might seek the blessing of figures in Pakistan for terrorist attacks.
But he said that he did not personally know the detailed movements of the two
July 7 London suicide bombers — Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammad Sidique Khan — who
visited Pakistan in the months before the attacks.
The general complained that Western countries had sometimes been slow to share
intelligence because they “think we are some kind of backward people”. But he
said that intelligence sharing was getting better. “You thought everything is
happening in Pakistan and Afghanistan. You should not bother. Now, after 7/7,
people realise that no, sir, things are happening in your country,” he said.
“We are together to fight extremists and terrorism but . . . if you are in the
blame game, that everything is happening in Pakistan, nothing is happening here
[in Britain], we will not succeed.”
President pulls off TV comedy encounter
IT IS not every night that the president of an Islamic republic appears on a US
comedy show to joke about Osama bin Laden.
President Musharraf of Pakistan did just that on Tuesday, all in the name of
book sales, after using a press conference with President Bush last week to plug
his memoir.
Looking relaxed and sporting a brown suit and orange tie, General Musharraf
proved an unusual hit on the late-night Daily Show with Jon Stewart, managing to
get through his 15 minutes of comedy fame without looking too uncomfortable.
Teasing the general over two attempts on his life on the same bridge in the
Pakistani city of Rawalpindi in 2003, Mr Stewart joked: “I’d come up with a new
way to go to work.”
The jibes at Mr Bush were not far behind. Mr Stewart asked General Musharraf
about his meeting with President Bush in Washington last week. “Does he seem
open, or paying attention, or does he, let’s say, have the TV on?”
“He was listening carefully,” the general replied, before being interrupted
with: “Because he sleeps with his eyes open.”
In a crowd-pleasing finale, when asked who would win a popular vote in Pakistan,
bin Laden or Mr Bush, a chortling General Musharraf replied: “They’d both lose
miserably.” (AFP)
Bin Laden is alive
and hiding in Afghanistan, insists Musharraf, Ts, 28.9.2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2378688,00.html
Victims of 7/7 bombs
were not given enough help,
ministers admit
· Delay in identifying dead distressed families
· Curbs on mobile phones increased confusion
Saturday September 23, 2006
Guardian
Alan Travis, home affairs editor
The victims of the July bombings in London last year were
let down by the authorities, with many left feeling forgotten or unimportant on
the day and in the weeks that followed the attacks, ministers admitted yesterday
in the official report on the emergency response to 7/7.
The Home Office report, Lessons Learned, based on
interviews with 1,500 survivors and bereaved families, says that much more could
have been done to help those injured in the bombings.
"There is a clear message that more could have been done to support all those
who were caught up in the attacks - in our preparation and response on the day
and in the days and weeks that followed," says the joint foreword by the home
secretary, John Reid, and the culture secretary, Tessa Jowell. "A crucial lesson
we have drawn is that the quality of help received in the first few hours and
days can determine for years to come people's reaction to a terrible event of
this sort."
Fifty-six people, including the bombers, died in the attacks, with more than 700
injured. The police casualty bureau phone line received more than 43,000 calls
an hour and took details of 7,823 people believed missing.
The report's main findings highlight the bravery, humanity and heroism of the
emergency services, transport workers, and individual members of the public. But
they also identify failings in information sharing, communications, compensation
for victims, and the system for caring for the survivors of the blasts.
Rachel North, who was trapped on the Piccadilly line, and set up a survivors'
self-help group, said a public inquiry was still needed: "They have missed the
opportunity to look at the causes of July 7 and have a more wide-ranging
investigation. It is the bare minimum to have the facts of that day
independently verified and investigated and they have not done that."
The Home Office report found that:
· The casualty bureau was overwhelmed with calls from people looking for
information about loved ones or transport arrangements that it could not
provide.
· Reception centres for victims or worried families and friends were not set up
in the hours following the attacks. Details were not collected from some of
those caught up in the explosions so that they could be put in touch with
counselling.
· Many bereaved families reported distress at the length of time it took to
identify dead relatives. Survivors found the process of applying for
compensation "bureaucratic, slow and distressing".
· The decision to "manage" demand on the mobile phone network led to
considerable worry and distress as family and friends had difficulty contacting
one another. A City of London police request to deny access to all but
privileged users around Aldgate for four hours left the London Ambulance Service
with no mobile phone access.
Magda Gluck, whose 29-year-old twin sister, Karolina, was killed at Russell
Square, said the aftermath was a "big mess. It took us more than a week to find
out that she was killed. It was too long to find out that kind of information."
The family received compensation of £11,000.
A second report published yesterday by the London Resilience Forum, representing
the emergency authorities, concluded that not a single life was lost because of
poor planning. Underground staff had behaved in an exemplary manner and the NHS
made sure 1,200 beds were available within three hours.
Victims of 7/7
bombs were not given enough help, ministers admit, G, 23.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1879315,00.html
Home Office says
7/7 victims let down by poor planning
September 22, 2006
Times Online
Victims of the July 7 London bombings were let down by the
authorities before, on the day and in the weeks that followed the attacks, a
Government inquiry reported today.
The Home Office's Lessons Learned report said that there were flaws in
information sharing, communications, the compensation system and the care
offered to survivors. Ministers stressed that they were now working to address
these shortcomings.
The report praises many aspects of the response by the emergency services,
including their bravery and professionalism, but identifies a number of problems
in the way the disaster was handled.
It reveals that survivors from the blasts found the process of applying for
compensation "bureaucratic, slow and distressing". It also says that
communications were a problem, and elderly radio and telecoms systems "probably
degraded the emergency services’ command and control capabilities".
Casualty bureau phone lines were swamped by the high volume of calls from
worried friends and relatives, while many of the walking wounded had to find
their own way home without receiving help or having the chance to give their
details to the authorities.
In addition, a police decision to ask for use of mobile phone networks to be
restricted to priority users around the Aldgate bomb scene led to the London
Ambulance Service losing use of their mobiles, the report finds.
John Reid, the Home Secretary, and Tessa Jowell, the Culture Secretary, said
that there was a clear message that more could have been done to support all
those who were caught up in the attacks.
The ministers wrote: "A crucial lesson we have drawn is that the quality of help
received in the first few hours and days can determine for years to come
people’s reaction to a terrible event of this sort."
Ms Jowell added: "I have been humbled by the courage and dignity of the bereaved
families and those who survived the attacks. I am very grateful to them for
sharing their experiences, and absolutely determined that we will apply the
lessons learned so that we can do better in the future."
Mr Reid said: "This report concludes that the response to the bombings was fast,
professional and effective. However, where shortcomings have been identified, we
have set out the work in hand to address them.
"In times of crisis, information and support must be readily available and easy
to access for those who need it. Getting the right help in place is of critical
importance and we are working hard to strengthen our emergency response."
The report restates the Government’s opposition to a public inquiry into the 7/7
attacks, which it said would divert manpower away from the police and security
agencies at a time when they were both investigating the atrocity and trying to
detect and prevent future attacks.
The report, which is based on interviews with survivors and bereaved families,
is one of two published today into the July 7 attacks last year on three London
Underground trains and a bus that killed 56 people, including the four bombers.
A separate inquiry by the London Resilience Forum said the response by the
emergency services was "exemplary" and that not a single life was lost because
of poor planning.
The forum was set up in the wake of the September 11 2001 attacks on the US, and
includes representatives from emergency services and the London Assembly as well
as national government.
Its findings cover issues specifically relating to the capital, while the Home
Office report is intended to help prepare the country as a whole for an attack.
The forum recommended that a mobile digital radio infrastructure should be
rolled out across the capital. It is estimated that the Airwave system should be
fully in place in police services by October 2007, ambulance services by early
2008 and fire services by mid-2009.
"Special link vehicles" will be able to extend the Airwave radio system
underground. And better medical supplies will be placed at the major hubs of the
transport network after a lack of supplies was apparent on the day.
The Home Office report is the latest official report to be critical of the
British authorities. In May, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)
disclosed that at least two of the bombers had come to the attention of the
security services beforehand.
Its report concluded that extra resources could have prevented the bombings and
that there were a number of "lessons to be learned".
Then in June, a damning report by the London Assembly exposed a catalogue of
failings in the chaotic aftermath of the attacks.
Massive communication problems, a lack of basic medical supplies and a
"completely unacceptable" failure to care properly for thousands of survivors
were just some of the serious deficiencies it identified in the rescue
operation.
Home Office says
7/7 victims let down by poor planning, Ts, 22.9.2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,22989-2370527,00.html
12.15pm update
July 7 victims let down, report says
Friday September 22, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
Staff and agencies
Victims of the July 7 London bombings were let down by inadequate preparations
for dealing with a terrorist attack, an official report said today.
The Home Office inquiry highlighted flaws in information sharing,
communications, the compensation process and systems for looking after
survivors.
The report (pdf), entitled Lessons Learned, said many felt "forgotten or
unimportant" because of the failure to set up reception centres near the scenes
of the 2005 suicide attacks on three tube trains and a bus.
Victims said only those most badly hurt seemed to receive adequate help.
Hundreds of survivors made their own way home without receiving medical care or
having their names taken so they could be given information and support.
Some relatives had to suffer the trauma of going from hospital to hospital with
photographs of missing people, and the report acknowledged it had taken "too
long" to identify victims.
The document said an "overzealous and ... overcautious" approach to rules about
the privacy of victims' data had got in the way of communication between
emergency agencies, hindering victims' access to help.
It revealed that the police casualty bureau hotline had received an
unprecedented level of calls on July 7 and was "overwhelmed" and dogged by
technical problems.
The document admitted survivors had found the process of applying for
compensation "bureaucratic, slow and distressing".
However, it praised aspects of the response to the blasts, in which 52 commuters
died, and said there was "no doubt that lives were saved".
The government hopes the report will help draw a line under the response to the
attacks, but has refused continuing demands by some victims for a public
inquiry.
Today's document claimed a public inquiry would "divert resources, in terms of
personnel, away from the police and security agencies" at a time when they were
investigating July 7 and trying to detect and prevent further attacks.
In a foreword, the home secretary, John Reid, and the culture secretary, Tessa
Jowell, said: "There is a clear message that more could have been done to
support all those who were caught up in the attacks - in our preparation and
response on the day and in the days and weeks that followed.
"A crucial lesson we have drawn is that the quality of help received in the
first few hours and days can determine, for years to come, people's reaction to
a terrible event of this sort."
The ministers lauded the emergency workers, transport staff and other people who
had helped on what they said was "also a day of heroism".
Ms Jowell admitted the anger felt by victims towards the emergency response was
"justified", telling last week's Sunday Telegraph that while failures in such an
extreme situation were "understandable", excuses "cut no ice".
Among its other findings, Lessons Learned concluded:
· A police decision to ask for the use of mobile phone networks to be restricted
to priority users around the Aldgate bomb scene had led to the London Ambulance
Service losing use of their mobiles.
· Survivors who were not from London felt excluded.
· Victims had problems getting specialist psychological help.
The report said the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act - introduced in response to the
September 11 attacks on the US - provided "a long-term foundation for building
resilience across the UK", and its value had been demonstrated on July 7.
However, it concluded that securing national preparedness for possible future
attacks should be a "continuous and essential activity" involving the public,
private and voluntary sectors at all levels across the UK, and the community at
large.
Ms Reid and Ms Jowell said the report was "not the end of the story", and the
government would "go on looking for ways to improve our response".
The Tory home affairs spokesman, David Davis, said there should be a "single,
independent inquiry ... so we can truly learn the lessons of this attack and
improve our preparedness".
Today's report highlighted the "weaknesses in government planning and
co-ordination", he said.
Speaking earlier this week, Rachel North, who was on one of the bombed tube
trains, said a broad inquiry was needed. "There has been a series of meetings
held and documents produced, none of which can be seen as a single public
collation of all matters ... the public were attacked and are still at risk,"
she added.
Scotland Yard defended its response to the bombings; assistant commissioner
Tarique Ghaffur said: "I believe it is important that we do not lose sight of
the truly magnificent response that we delivered on that terrible morning."
A separate inquiry report (pdf) by the London Resilience Forum was also released
today.
It described the response to the attacks as "very successful", and said nobody
had died because of any failure of planning.
The report said that, on the day of the explosions, 1,200 hospital beds had been
ready in three hours, while the initial response by London Underground staff had
been "exemplary".
It said digital mobile radio systems would be rolled out across police, fire and
ambulance services, and "special link vehicles" would extend communications
below ground.
July 7 victims let
down, report says, G, 22.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1878644,00.html
12.30pm
At a glance: July 7 report
Friday September 22, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
Staff and agencies
The key findings of the Home Office report (pdf) on the
July 7 bombings.
· There were flaws in information sharing, communications, the compensation
process and the systems for caring for survivors.
· Many survivors were left feeling "forgotten or unimportant" as a result of the
failure to set up reception centres near the scenes of the four suicide
bombings.
· Victims - many of whom made their own way home and did not receive care or
have their names taken so they could get future support - said only the most
badly injured seemed to receive adequate help.
· It took "too long" to identify victims. Some relatives had to go from hospital
to hospital with photographs of the missing.
· There was "no doubt that lives were saved" by the efforts of emergency
services, transport staff and the general public who helped. Ministers said July
7 was also "a day of heroism".
· The police casualty bureau hotline for the public on July 7 received an
unprecedented level of calls and was "overwhelmed" and dogged by technical
problems.
· A police decision to ask for the use of mobile phone networks to be restricted
to priority users around the Aldgate bomb scene led to the London Ambulance
Service losing use of their mobiles.
· An "overzealous and ... overcautious" approach to rules on the privacy of
victims' data got in the way of communication between emergency agencies and
hindered victims' access to support.
· Survivors found the process of applying for compensation "bureaucratic, slow
and distressing".
· Victims had problems getting specialist psychological help.
· Survivors from outside London felt excluded.
· The 2004 Civil Contingencies Act, introduced in response to the September 11
attacks on the US, provided "a long-term foundation for building resilience
across the UK", and its value was shown on July 7.
· Securing national preparedness for possible future attacks should be a
"continuous and essential activity" involving the public, private and voluntary
sectors and the community at large.
· A public inquiry into July 7 would "divert resources, in terms of personnel,
away from the police and security agencies" at a time when they were
investigating the bombings and attempting to prevent future attacks.
A separate report (pdf) by the London Resilience Forum was also released today.
It described the response to the attacks as "very successful".
At a glance: July
7 report, G, 22.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1878912,00.html
Shake-up for anti-terror policing
Proposal for one police chief to oversee up to 10 regional
squads
Friday September 15, 2006
Guardian
Vikram Dodd
A national terrorism tsar overseeing up to 10 new regional
squads is to be created under proposals being drawn up by the government's
policing watchdog, the Guardian has learned. The new post is a principal
recommendation of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), which is
compiling a report on the country's counter-terrorist efforts.
The reform, one of the biggest changes in counter-terrorism
policing in a generation, is likely to be adopted because of recognition in the
government and police that the system is struggling to cope with the growing
threat of jihadi violence.
There has also been tension between Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist branch and
regional forces.
"The way British policing is set up, there's no chief constable to bang heads
together," said a source. "In the heat of battle, it's not a very satisfactory
way to do things."
The report, which is in a draft stage and could be completed within a month, has
been written by Denis O'Connor, a former chief constable of Surrey and assistant
commissioner at Scotland Yard. It will say a new post of national
counter-terrorism coordinator should be created with power over eight to 10 new
regional terrorism squads based in England and Wales.
Some squads may be staffed by between 30 and 50 officers, and be expected to
work closely with the domestic intelligence service MI5.
As well as assisting in investigations, the new regional squads would work with
local forces to increase the flow of intelligence about extremism gained by
community policing. The report will be sent to the home secretary, John Reid.
The current leader of counter-terrorism policing is SO13, the squad of 1,000
officers based at Scotland Yard but with a national responsibility. Outside
London only the Greater Manchester force has its own counter-terrorism branch.
Several senior sources told the Guardian the need for restructuring was widely
recognised and that there was a greater need for gathering intelligence and for
investigations in the regions. Furthermore Scotland Yard repeatedly needs to
seek help from other forces, and the arrangements for this process are vague.
"There's a constant dispute about how much each force will contribute," said one
officer. "Forces have to juggle this effort with everything else they do."
Another, who also asked not to be named, said of the proposed new post: "It's
where coordination ends and control begins. Peter Clarke [head of Scotland
Yard's anti-terrorism branch] does not have control. The way we do things now
probably does not make sense. The requirement at any time is beyond the
capability of any [one] force.
The new role could go to Andy Hayman, who heads special operations including
counter-terrorism for Scotland Yard. But he has also built links across the
police service in his role as chair of the terrorism committee of the
Association of Chief Police Officers.
The shake-up is being viewed with a degree of nervousness in the Met. One senior
source said the force was "wary" because they fear such plans "represent a loss
of our influence". The Met had to remain in the lead: because "the majority of
the targets and investigation is in London", the source added.
The HMIC review also calls for greater emphasis on community policing, seen as
crucial for generating more intelligence about extremism.
Shake-up for
anti-terror policing, G, 15.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1873033,00.html
British defendant in terror plot trial tells of gradual
conversion to militant jihadist
· Attitude hardened after visit to training camp
· 'Soft, kind and humble' Taliban impressed him
Friday September 15, 2006
Guardian
David Pallister
A 24-year-old British Muslim told the Old Bailey yesterday
about his ideological journey from schoolboy to militant jihadist. Omar Khyam, a
defendant in the fertiliser bomb terror trial, described how he became
radicalised after a visit to a Pakistani training camp for militants fighting in
Kashmir and a trip to Afghanistan to meet the Taliban.
At the time no one around him talked of attacks in Britain,
he said. "I was born here and felt allegiance," he said. He supported England at
football. But after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003,
he said that attitudes among some of his friends hardened: "For the first time I
began hearing that Britain should be attacked."
Mr Khyam was arrested in 2004 after fertiliser explosive was found in a storage
depot in west London. The prosecution allege he was a member of a British terror
cell linked to al-Qaida, which discussed bombing nightclubs and other targets in
the UK.
Mr Khyam, his brother Shujah Mahmood, 19, Waheed Mahmood, 34, and Jawad Akbar,
23, all from Crawley, West Sussex, Salahuddin Amin, 31, from Luton, Anthony
Garcia, 24, of Ilford, east London, and Nabeel Hussain, 21, of Horley, Surrey,
deny conspiring to cause explosions likely to endanger life between January 1,
2003 and March 31, 2004.
Mr Khyam, Mr Garcia and Mr Hussain also deny a charge under the Terrorism Act of
possessing 600kg (1,300lb) of ammonium nitrate fertiliser for terrorism.
As the defence case began, Mr Khyam told the jury that his grandfather had
served in the British army and came to the UK in the 1970s. Many of his family
were in the Pakistani military or ISI, the intelligence service. He said he went
to a predominantly white school, was captain of the cricket team and did well in
his GCSEs.
He became more interested in religion as a teenager at college in Surrey,
attending meetings of the radical group al- Muhajiroun, where violent videos of
the wars in Chechnya and Bosnia were shown. He also started to learn about
fighting in Kashmir between India and Pakistan with the ISI recruiting and
training irregular mujahideen.
On a family visit to Pakistan in 1999 he sought out and talked to groups active
in Kashmir, he said. Back in Britain, he wanted to dedicate himself "to helping
Kashmiri Muslims, and go to Pakistan for military training".
In January 2000, aged 18 and studying for his A-levels, he ran away to Pakistan
and joined an ISI-run training camp for militants in the mountains above
Rawalpindi. He had told his mother he was going to France to study but arranged
for a letter explaining his real movements to be sent home.
"They told me everything I needed to know for fighting guerrilla warfare in
Kashmir," he said. This included training with AK47 rifles, rocket-propelled
grenades and machine guns as well as reconnaisance and sniper techniques. He
left only after his family used their contacts in the ISI to find him and he was
summoned from the mountains for an emotional reunion with his grandfather.
Although concerned for his safety, most of his family, except his mother, were
happy with his actions.
In June 2001, having enrolled at the Metropolitan University in north London for
a computer course, he returned to Pakistan for a friend's wedding. In one of the
militant group's offices he saw bags of fertiliser which he took to be part of
their "arsenal". He then visited Kabul and was impressed by the Taliban. "They
were soft, kind and humble, but harsh with their enemies."
The attacks on the US on September 11 2001 triggered intense discussions among
British Muslims. Mr Khyam's reaction was: "I was happy. America was, and still
is, the greatest enemy of Islam. They put up puppet regimes in Muslim countries
like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt ... but obviously 3,000 people died so there
were mixed feelings."
The Qur'an forbids the killing of women and children but some eminent Muslim
scholars decreed that the attacks were permissible, he said.
After a few months of debate, and seeing the defeat of the Taliban, he said he
had come to the conclusion that it had been tactically unwise. "I think we would
be working better in our own [Muslim] countries, trying to establish an Islamic
state," he said.
Asked about Osama bin Laden, he said. "In Afghanistan he won people's hearts and
minds. People love him all over the region. There are pictures of him all over
the place in Pakistan."
During 2002 and 2003, Mr Khyam became actively engaged in collecting "money and
equipment" in the UK to be sent to Pakistan for the mujahideen. He also made
further trips to the country. "I wanted to help out in the cause," he said.
Mr Khyam said he did not think that two men he dealt with in Pakistan were
members of al-Qaida, as alleged by the American supergrass Mohammed Junaid
Babar. Asked by his counsel, Joel Bennathan, whether one of the men had ever
advised him, or told him, to carry out an attack on the UK, Mr Khyam replied:
"No".
The hearing continues.
British defendant
in terror plot trial tells of gradual conversion to militant jihadist, G,
15.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1872942,00.html
3.15pm
Terror plot accused was 'happy' about 9/11
Thursday September 14, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
Staff and agencies
A man accused of buying fertiliser for an alleged bombing
campaign against trains and nightclubs told the Old Bailey today of his
conventional British childhood and his pleasure at the September 11 attacks.
Omar Khyam, 24, described how he was raised by a secular
family and captained the cricket team in his predominantly white school in
Crawley, West Sussex before being turned on to radical Islam by the banned group
al-Muhajiroun.
He also described running away from home to join a militant training camp in
Pakistan in 2000, only to have the experience cut short after his family tracked
him down thanks to contacts in Pakistan's military intelligence services.
Mr Khyam and six other suspects deny a range of conspiracy and terrorism charges
relating to a police raid in 2004 that uncovered 600kg of ammonium nitrate
fertiliser in a storage depot in west London. The fertiliser can be used to
build a crude but potentially damaging bomb.
He said that his grandfather had served in the British army and his family had
come to the UK in the 1970s. His nominally Muslim family "did not pay much
attention to religion", he told the court.
In his teenage years he started attending meetings of al-Muhajiroun, the radical
group led by exiled cleric Omar Bakri Muhammad before it was disbanded in 2004.
He met up with groups fighting in Kashmir during a visit to Pakistan in 1999 and
returned to a militant training camp in the country the following year, aged
just 17, having told his mother that he was going to study French in France.
"They taught me everything for warfare," he said, including practice in firing
weapons and reconnaissance.
He was brought back from the camp after three months when he received a radio
message telling him to go down from the mountain where the camp was sited. He
found his grandfather waiting for him.
"They were very quickly able to find out where I was," he said. "He was pleased
but just wanted to tell me where I had gone. They were worried about me being
killed."
He said that most of his family had been happy about him joining the training
camp, and claimed that he returned the following year and crossed to Afghanistan
to meet the Taliban.
Asked what he thought about the September 11 attacks, he replied: "I was happy.
"America was, and still is, the greatest enemy of Islam. They put up puppet
regimes in Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt.
"I was happy that America had been hit because of what it represented against
the Muslims, but obviously 3,000 people died so there were mixed feelings."
He described Osama Bin Laden as a hero but said that he had later decided the
September 11 attacks had been a bad tactical move, and that Islamist efforts
were better dedicated to establishing an Islamic state across Muslim countries.
The trial continues.
Terror plot
accused was 'happy' about 9/11, G, 14.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1872548,00.html
3.30pm
Falconer condemns 'shocking' Guantánamo
Wednesday September 13, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
David Fickling
Guantánamo Bay is a "shocking affront to the principles of
democracy" and a violation of the rule of law, the lord chancellor, Lord
Falconer, said today.
The criticism from the highest-ranking official in the
British legal system represents the most direct government attack yet on the US
military detention camp.
Despite suggestions in recent months that Guantánamo could be closed soon, the
US president, George Bush, last week signalled that the camp, in Cuba, would
remain open for the long term.
Mr Bush announced that 14 terror suspects had been transferred to Guantánamo
from the CIA's network of secret prisons.
In a speech in Australia, Lord Falconer also attacked the use of torture. The US
government has admitted using "alternative techniques" on some terror suspects,
although it does not consider its interrogation methods to be torture.
The techniques - described in an ABC news report last November and never denied
by the US government - include enforced standing for days at a time, the
confinement of naked prisoners in cold and damp cells and simulated drownings.
Lord Falconer said Washington was "deliberately seeking to put the Guantánamo
detainees beyond the reach of law" and that "use of torture by a state is
contrary to fundamental human rights law".
"Democracies can only survive where judges have the power to protect the rights
of the individual," he said.
New laws being put before the US Congress by Mr Bush would ensure Guantánamo
inmates are tried in military courts without access to independent judges. There
are understood to be around 470 inmates at the camp.
Lord Falconer's speech was revised overnight to include a passage underlining
that his criticisms did not change the UK's status as a "close and staunch ally"
of Washington.
Members of the British government have previously called for Guantánamo to be
closed.
Earlier this year, Lord Falconer gave a speech in which he said the camp was a
"recruiting agent" for al-Qaida, but other UK criticisms have been much more
guarded than today's. Tony Blair has never gone beyond describing it as an
"anomaly".
However, in an interview with the BBC this morning, Lord Falconer refused to
give help to at least eight British residents currently imprisoned at
Guantánamo.
Appealing for the release of the detainees - who have lived in the UK but are
not British citizens - was the responsibility of their respective governments,
he said.
Zachary Katznelson, a senior counsel at the prisoners' charity Reprieve, said
the detainees would be released as soon as the British government agreed to
accept them.
"If the UK government says they will take the men back, they will be straight on
a plane," he said. "The US state department says it wants the UK residents to
come back to Britain."
Falconer condemns
'shocking' Guantánamo, G, 13.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,,1871628,00.html
The age of horrorism
On the eve of the fifth anniversary of 9/11, one of
Britain's most celebrated and original writers analyses - and abhors - the rise
of extreme Islamism. In a penetrating and wide-ranging essay he offers a
trenchant critique of the grotesque creed and questions the West's faltering
response to this eruption of evil.
Sunday September 10, 2006
The Observer
Martin Amis
It was mid-October 2001, and night was closing in on the border city of
Peshawar, in Pakistan, as my friend - a reporter and political man of letters -
approached a market stall and began to haggle over a batch of T-shirts bearing
the likeness of Osama bin Laden. It is forbidden, in Sunni Islam, to depict the
human form, lest it lead to idolatry; but here was Osama's lordly visage, on
display and on sale right outside the mosque. The mosque now emptied, after
evening prayers, and my friend was very suddenly and very thoroughly surrounded
by a shoving, jabbing, jeering brotherhood: the young men of Peshawar.
At this time of day, their equivalents, in the great
conurbations of Europe and America, could expect to ease their not very sharp
frustrations by downing a lot of alcohol, by eating large meals with no dietary
restrictions, by racing around to one another's apartments in powerful and
expensive machines, by downing a lot more alcohol as well as additional
stimulants and relaxants, by jumping up and down for several hours on
strobe-lashed dancefloors, and (in a fair number of cases) by having galvanic
sex with near-perfect strangers. These diversions were not available to the
young men of Peshawar.
More proximately, just over the frontier, the West was in the early stages of
invading Afghanistan and slaughtering Pakistan's pious clients and
brainchildren, the Taliban, and flattening the Hindu Kush with its power and its
rage. More proximately still, the ears of these young men were still fizzing
with the battlecries of molten mullahs, and their eyes were smarting anew to the
chalk-thick smoke from the hundreds of thousands of wood fires - fires kindled
by the multitudes of exiles and refugees from Afghanistan, camped out all around
the city. There was perhaps a consciousness, too, that the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, over the past month, had reversed years of policy and decided to
sacrifice the lives of its Muslim clients and brainchildren, over the border, in
exchange for American cash. So when the crowd scowled out its question, the
answer needed to be a good one.
'Why you want these? You like Osama?'
I can almost hear the tone of the reply I would have given - reedy, wavering,
wholly defeatist. As for the substance, it would have been the reply of the
cornered trimmer, and intended, really, just to give myself time to seek the
foetal position and fold my hands over my face. Something like: 'Well I quite
like him, but I think he overdid it a bit in New York.' No, that would not have
served. What was needed was boldness and brilliance. The exchange continued:
'You like Osama?'
'Of course. He is my brother.'
'He is your brother?'
'All men are my brothers.'
All men are my brothers. I would have liked to have said it then, and I would
like to say it now: all men are my brothers. But all men are not my brothers.
Why? Because all women are my sisters. And the brother who denies the rights of
his sister: that brother is not my brother. At the very best, he is my
half-brother - by definition. Osama is not my brother.
Religion is sensitive ground, as well it might be. Here we walk on eggshells.
Because religion is itself an eggshell. Today, in the West, there are no good
excuses for religious belief - unless we think that ignorance, reaction and
sentimentality are good excuses. This is of course not so in the East, where, we
acknowledge, almost every living citizen in many huge and populous countries is
intimately defined by religious belief. The excuses, here, are very persuasive;
and we duly accept that 'faith' - recently and almost endearingly defined as
'the desire for the approval of supernatural beings' - is a world-historical
force and a world-historical actor. All religions, unsurprisingly, have their
terrorists, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, even Buddhist. But we are not hearing from
those religions. We are hearing from Islam.
Let us make the position clear. We can begin by saying, not only that we respect
Muhammad, but that no serious person could fail to respect Muhammad - a unique
and luminous historical being. Judged by the continuities he was able to set in
motion, he remains a titanic figure, and, for Muslims, all-answering: a
revolutionary, a warrior, and a sovereign, a Christ and a Caesar, 'with a Koran
in one hand', as Bagehot imagined him, 'and a sword in the other'. Muhammad has
strong claims to being the most extraordinary man who ever lived. And always a
man, as he always maintained, and not a god. Naturally we respect Muhammad. But
we do not respect Muhammad Atta.
Until recently it was being said that what we are confronted with, here, is 'a
civil war' within Islam. That's what all this was supposed to be: not a clash of
civilisations or anything like that, but a civil war within Islam. Well, the
civil war appears to be over. And Islamism won it. The loser, moderate Islam, is
always deceptively well-represented on the level of the op-ed page and the
public debate; elsewhere, it is supine and inaudible. We are not hearing from
moderate Islam. Whereas Islamism, as a mover and shaper of world events, is
pretty well all there is.
So, to repeat, we respect Islam - the donor of countless benefits to mankind,
and the possessor of a thrilling history. But Islamism? No, we can hardly be
asked to respect a creedal wave that calls for our own elimination. More, we
regard the Great Leap Backwards as a tragic development in Islam's story, and
now in ours. Naturally we respect Islam. But we do not respect Islamism, just as
we respect Muhammad and do not respect Muhammad Atta.
I will soon come to Donald Rumsfeld, the architect and guarantor of the hideous
cataclysm in Iraq. But first I must turn from great things to small, for a
paragraph, and talk about writing, and the strange thing that happened to me at
my desk in this, the Age of Vanished Normalcy.
All writers of fiction will at some point find themselves abandoning a piece of
work - or find themselves putting it aside, as we gently say. The original idea,
the initiating 'throb' (Nabokov), encounters certain 'points of resistance'
(Updike); and these points of resistance, on occasion, are simply too obdurate,
numerous, and pervasive. You come to write the next page, and it's dead - as if
your subconscious, the part of you quietly responsible for so much daily labour,
has been neutralised, or switched off. Norman Mailer has said that one of the
few real sorrows of 'the spooky art' is that it requires you to spend too many
days among dead things. Recently, and for the first time in my life, I
abandoned, not a dead thing, but a thriving novella; and I did so for reasons
that were wholly extraneous. I am aware that this is hardly a tectonic event;
but for me the episode was existential. In the West, writers are acclimatised to
freedom - to limitless and gluttonous freedom. And I discovered something.
Writing is freedom; and as soon as that freedom is in shadow, the writer can no
longer proceed. The shadow, in this case, was not a fear of repercussion. It was
as if, most reluctantly, I was receiving a new vibration or frequency from the
planetary shimmer. The novella was a satire called The Unknown Known
Secretary Rumsfeld was unfairly ridiculed, some thought, for his haiku-like
taxonomy of the terrorist threat:
'The message is: there are known "knowns". There are things that we know that we
know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we
don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know
we don't know.'
Like his habit of talking in 'the third person passive once removed', this is
'very Rumsfeldian'. And Rumsfeld can be even more Rumsfeldian than that.
According to Bob Woodward's Plan of Attack, at a closed-door senatorial briefing
in September 2002 (the idea was to sell regime-change in Iraq), Rumsfeld
exasperated everyone present with a torrent of Rumsfeldisms, including the
following strophe: 'We know what we know, we know there are things we do not
know, and we know there are things we know we don't know we don't know.' Anyway,
the three categories remain quite helpful as analytical tools. And they
certainly appealed very powerfully to the narrator of The Unknown Known - Ayed,
a diminutive Islamist terrorist who plies his trade in Waziristan, the rugged
northern borderland where Osama bin Laden is still rumoured to lurk.
Ayed's outfit, which is called 'the "Prism"', used to consist of three sectors
named, not very imaginatively, Sector One, Sector Two and Sector Three. But Ayed
and his colleagues are attentive readers of the Western press, and the sectors
now have new titles. Known Knowns (sector one) concerns itself with daily
logistics: bombs, mines, shells, and various improvised explosive devices. The
work of Known Unknowns (sector two) is more peripatetic and long-term; it
involves, for example, trolling around North Korea in the hope of procuring the
fabled 25 kilograms of enriched uranium, or going from factory to factory in
Uzbekistan on a quest for better toxins and asphyxiants. In Known Knowns, the
brothers are plagued by fires and gas-leaks and almost daily explosions; the
brothers in Known Unknowns are racked by headaches and sore throats, and their
breath, tellingly, is rich with the aroma of potent coughdrops, moving about as
they do among vats of acids and bathtubs of raw pesticides. Everyone wants to
work where Ayed works, which is in sector three, or Unknown Unknowns. Sector
three is devoted to conceptual breakthroughs - to shifts in the paradigm.
Shifts in the paradigm like the attack of 11 September 2001. Paradigm shifts
open a window; and, once opened, the window will close. Ayed observes that 11
September was instantly unrepeatable; indeed, the tactic was obsolete by 10am
the same morning. Its efficacy lasted for 71 minutes, from 8.46, when American
11 hit the North Tower, to 9.57, and the start of the rebellion on United 93. On
United 93, the passengers were told about the new reality by their mobile
phones, and they didn't linger long in the old paradigm - the four-day siege on
the equatorial tarmac, the diminishing supplies of food and water, the festering
toilets, the conditions and demands, the phased release of the children and the
women; then the surrender, or the clambering commandos. No, they knew that they
weren't on a commercial aircraft, not any longer; they were on a missile. So
they rose up. And at 10.03 United 93 came down on its back at 580mph, in
Shanksville, Pennsylvania, 20 minutes from the Capitol.
I found it reassuringly difficult, dreaming up paradigm shifts. And Ayed and his
friends in sector three find it difficult too. Synergy, maximalisation - these
are the kinds of concept that are tossed from cushion to floormat in Unknown
Unknowns. Here, a comrade argues for the dynamiting of the San Andreas Fault;
there, another envisages the large-scale introduction of rabies (admixed with
smallpox, methamphetamine and steroids) to the fauna of Central Park. A pensive
silence follows. And very often these silences last for days on end. All you can
hear, in Unknown Unknowns, is the occasional swatting palm-clap, or the crackle
of a beetle being ground underfoot. Ayed feels, or used to feel, superior to his
colleagues, because he has already had his eureka moment. He had it in the
spring of 2001, and his project - his 'baby', if you will - was launched in the
summer of that year, and is still in progress. It has a codename: UU: CRs/G,C.
Ayed's conceptual breakthrough did not go down at all well in Sector Three, as
it was then called; in fact, it was widely mocked. But Ayed used a family
connection, and gained an audience with Mullah Omar, the one-eyed Islamist
cleric who briefly ruled Afghanistan - an imposing figure, in his dishdash and
flipflops. Ayed submitted his presentation, and, to his astonishment, Mullah
Omar smiled on his plan. This was a necessary condition, because Ayed's paradigm
shift could only be realised with the full resources of a nation state. UU:
CRs/G,C went ahead. The idea was, as Ayed would say, deceptively simple. The
idea was to scour all the prisons and madhouses for every compulsive rapist in
the country, and then unleash them on Greeley, Colorado.
As the story opens, the CRs have been en route to G,C for almost five years,
crossing central Africa, in minibuses and on foot, and suffering many a
sanguinary reverse (a host of some 30,000 Janjaweed in Sudan, a 'child militia',
armed with pangas, in Congo). On top of all this, as if he didn't have enough to
worry about, Ayed is not getting on very well with his wives.
Those who know the field will be undismayed by the singling out of Greeley,
Colorado. For it was in Greeley, Colorado, in 1949, that Islamism, as we now
know it, was decisively shaped. The story is grotesque and incredible - but then
so are its consequences. And let us keep on telling ourselves how grotesque and
incredible it is, our current reality, so unforeseeable, so altogether
unknowable, even from the vantage of the late Nineties. At that time, if you
recall, America had so much leisure on its hands, politically and culturally,
that it could dedicate an entire year to Monica Lewinsky. Even Monica, it now
seems, even Bill, were living in innocent times.
Since then the world has undergone a moral crash - the spiritual equivalent, in
its global depth and reach, of the Great Depression of the Thirties. On our
side, extraordinary rendition, coercive psychological procedures, enhanced
interrogation techniques, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, Haditha, Mahmudiya, two wars,
and tens of thousands of dead bodies. All this should of course be soberly
compared to the feats of the opposed ideology, an ideology which, in its most
millennial form, conjures up the image of an abattoir within a madhouse. I will
spell this out, because it has not been broadly assimilated. The most extreme
Islamists want to kill everyone on earth except the most extreme Islamists; but
every jihadi sees the need for eliminating all non-Muslims, either by conversion
or by execution. And we now know what happens when Islamism gets its hands on an
army (Algeria) or on something resembling a nation state (Sudan). In the first
case, the result was fratricide, with 100,000 dead; in the second, following the
Islamist coup in 1989, the result has been a kind of rolling genocide, and the
figure is perhaps two million. And it all goes back to Greeley, Colorado, and to
Sayyid Qutb.
Things started to go wrong for poor Sayyid during the Atlantic crossing from
Alexandria, when, allegedly, 'a drunken, semi-naked woman' tried to storm his
cabin. But before we come to that, some background. Sayyid Qutb, in 1949, had
just turned 43. His childhood was provincial and devout. When, as a young man,
he went to study in Cairo, his leanings became literary and Europhone and even
mildly cosmopolitan. Despite an early - and routinely baffling - admiration for
naturism, he was already finding Cairene women 'dishonourable', and confessed to
unhappiness about 'their current level of freedom'. A short story recorded his
first disappointment in matters of the heart; its title, plangently, was Thorns.
Well, we've all had that; and most of us then adhere to the arc described in
Peter Porter's poem, 'Once Bitten, Twice Bitten'.But Sayyid didn't need much
discouragement. Promptly giving up all hope of coming across a woman of
'sufficient' moral cleanliness, he resolved to stick to virginity.
Established in a modest way as a writer, Sayyid took a job at the Ministry of
Education. This radicalised him. He felt oppressed by the vestiges of the
British protectorate in Egypt, and was alarmist about the growing weight of the
Jewish presence in Palestine - another British crime, in Sayyid's view. He
became an activist, and ran some risk of imprisonment (at the hands of the
saturnalian King Farouk), before the ministry packed him off to America to do a
couple of years of educational research. Prison, by the way, would claim him
soon after his return. He was one of the dozens of Muslim Brothers jailed (and
tortured) after the failed attempt on the life of the moderniser and secularist,
Nasser, in October 1954. There was a short reprieve in 1964, but Sayyid was soon
rearrested - and retortured. Steelily dismissing a clemency deal brokered by
none other than the young Anwar Sadat, he was hanged in August 1966; and this
was a strategic martyrdom that now lies deep in the Islamist soul. His most
influential book, like the book with which it is often compared, was written
behind bars. Milestones is known as the Mein Kampf of Islamism.
Sayyid was presumably still sorely shaken by the birth of Israel (after the
defeat of Egypt and five other Arab armies), but at first, on the Atlantic
crossing, he felt a spiritual expansion. His encyclopedic commentary, In the
Shade of the Koran, would fondly and ramblingly recall the renewal of his sense
of purpose and destiny. Early on, he got into a minor sectarian battle with a
proselytising Christian; Sayyid retaliated by doing a bit of proselytising
himself, and made some progress with a contingent of Nubian sailors. Then came
the traumatic incident with the drunken, semi-naked woman. Sayyid thought she
was an American agent hired to seduce him, or so he later told his biographer,
who wrote that 'the encounter successfully tested his resolve to resist
experiences damaging to his identity as an Egyptian and a Muslim'. God knows
what the episode actually amounted to. It seems probable that the liquored-up
Mata Hari, the dipsomaniacal nudist, was simply a woman in a cocktail dress who,
perhaps, had recently drunk a cocktail. Still, we can continue to imagine Sayyid
barricading himself into his cabin while, beyond the door, the siren sings her
song.
He didn't like New York: materialistic, mechanistic, trivial, idolatrous,
wanton, depraved, and so on and so forth. Washington was a little better. But
here, sickly Sayyid (lungs) was hospitalised, introducing him to another dire
hazard that he wouldn't have faced at home: female nurses. One of them, tricked
out with 'thirsty lips, bulging breasts, smooth legs' and a coquettish manner
('the calling eye, the provocative laugh'), regaled him with her wish-list of
endowments for the ideal lover. But 'the father of Islamism', as he is often
called, remained calm, later developing the incident into a diatribe against
Arab men who succumb to the allure of American women. In an extraordinary burst
of mendacity or delusion, Sayyid claimed that the medical staff heartlessly
exulted at the news of the assassination, back in Egypt, of Hasan al-Banna. We
may wonder how likely it is that any American would have heard of al-Banna, or
indeed of the Muslim Brotherhood, which he founded. When Sayyid was discharged
from George Washington University Hospital, he probably thought the worst was
behind him. But now he proceeded to the cauldron - to the pullulating hellhouse
- of Greeley, Colorado.
During his six months at the Colorado State College of Education (and thereafter
in California), Sayyid's hungry disapproval found a variety of targets. American
lawns (a distressing example of selfishness and atomism), American conversation
('money, movie stars and models of cars'), American jazz ('a type of music
invented by Blacks to please their primitive tendencies - their desire for noise
and their appetite for sexual arousal'), and, of course, American women: here
another one pops up, telling Sayyid that sex is merely a physical function,
untrammelled by morality. American places of worship he also detests (they are
like cinemas or amusement arcades), but by now he is pining for Cairo, and for
company, and he does something rash. Qutb joins a club - where an epiphany
awaits him. 'The dance is inflamed by the notes of the gramophone,' he wrote;
'the dance-hall becomes a whirl of heels and thighs, arms enfold hips, lips and
breasts meet, and the air is full of lust.' You'd think that the father of
Islamism had exposed himself to an early version of Studio 54 or even Plato's
Retreat. But no: the club he joined was run by the church, and what he is
describing, here, is a chapel hop in Greeley, Colorado. And Greeley, Colorado,
in 1949, was dry
'And the air is full of lust.' 'Lust' is Bernard Lewis's translation, but
several other writers prefer the word 'love'. And while lust has greater
immediate impact, love may in the end be more resonant. Why should Qutb mind if
the air is full of love? We are forced to wonder whether love can be said to
exist, as we understand it, in the ferocious patriarchy of Islamism. If death
and hate are the twin opposites of love, then it may not be merely whimsical and
mawkish to suggest that the terrorist, the bringer of death and hate, the
death-hate cultist, is in essence the enemy of love. Qutb:
'A girl looks at you, appearing as if she were an enchanting nymph or an escaped
mermaid, but as she approaches, you sense only the screaming instinct inside
her, and you can smell her burning body, not the scent of perfume but flesh,
only flesh.'
In his excellent book, Terror and Liberalism, Paul Berman has many sharp things
to say about the corpus of Sayyid Qutb; but he manages to goad himself into
receptivity, and ends up, in my view, sounding almost absurdly respectful -
'rich, nuanced, deep, soulful, and heartfelt'. Qutb, who would go on to write a
30-volume gloss on it, spent his childhood memorising the Koran. He was 10 by
the time he was done. Now, given that, it seems idle to expect much sense from
him; and so it proves. On the last of the 46 pages he devotes to Qutb, Berman
wraps things up with a long quotation. This is its repetitive first paragraph:
'The Surah [the sayings of the Prophet] tells the Muslims that, in the fight to
uphold God's universal Truth, lives will have to be sacrificed. Those who risk
their lives and go out to fight, and who are prepared to lay down their lives
for the cause of God, are honourable people, pure of heart and blessed of soul.
But the great surprise is that those among them who are killed in the struggle
must not be considered or described as dead. They continue to live, as God
Himself clearly states.'
Savouring that last phrase, we realise that any voyage taken with Sayyid Qutb is
doomed to a leaden-witted circularity. The emptiness, the mere iteration, at the
heart of his philosophy is steadily colonised by a vast entanglement of
bitternesses; and here, too, we detect the presence of that peculiarly Islamist
triumvirate (codified early on by Christopher Hitchens) of self-righteousness,
self-pity, and self-hatred - the self-righteousness dating from the seventh
century, the self-pity from the 13th (when the 'last' Caliph was kicked to death
in Baghdad by the Mongol warlord Hulagu), and the self-hatred from the 20th. And
most astounding of all, in Qutb, is the level of self-awareness, which is less
than zero. It is as if the very act of self-examination were something unmanly
or profane: something unrighteous, in a word.
Still, one way or the other, Qutb is the father of Islamism. Here are the chief
tenets he inspired: that America, and its clients, are jahiliyya (the word
classically applied to pre-Muhammadan Arabia - barbarous and benighted); that
America is controlled by Jews; that Americans are infidels, that they are
animals, and, worse, arrogant animals, and are unworthy of life; that America
promotes pride and promiscuity in the service of human degradation; that America
seeks to 'exterminate' Islam - and that it will accomplish this not by conquest,
not by colonial annexation, but by example. As Bernard Lewis puts it in The
Crisis of Islam
'This is what is meant by the term the Great Satan, applied to the United States
by the late Ayatollah Khomeini. Satan as depicted in the Qur'an is neither an
imperialist nor an exploiter. He is a seducer, 'the insidious tempter who
whispers in the hearts of men' (Qur'an, CXIV, 4, 5).
Lewis might have added that these are the closing words of the Koran. So they
echo.
The West isn't being seductive, of course; all the West is being is attractive.
But the Islamist's paranoia extends to a kind of thwarted narcissism. We think
again of Qutb's buxom, smooth-legged nurse, supposedly smacking her thirsty lips
at the news of the death of Hasan al-Banna. Far from wanting or trying to
exterminate it, the West had no views whatever about Islam per se before 11
September 2001. Of course, views were then formulated, and very soon the
bestseller list was a column of primers on Islam. Some things take longer to
sink in than others, true; but now we know. In the West we had brought into
being a society whose main purpose, whose raison d'etre, was the tantalisation
of good Muslims.
The theme of the 'tempter' can be taken a little further, in the case of Qutb.
When the tempter is a temptress, and really wants you to sin, she needs to be
both available and willing. And it is almost inconceivable that poor Sayyid, the
frail, humourless civil servant, and turgid anti-semite (salting his talk with
quotes from that long-exploded fabrication, The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion), ever encountered anything that resembled an offer. It is more pitiful
than that. Seduction did not come his way, but it was coming the way of others,
he sensed, and a part of him wanted it too. That desire made him very afraid,
and also shamed him and dishonoured him, and turned his thoughts to murder. Then
the thinkers of Islam took his books and did what they did to them; and Sayyid
Qutb is now a part of our daily reality. We should understand that the
Islamists' hatred of America is as much abstract as historical, and irrationally
abstract, too; none of the usual things can be expected to appease it. The
hatred contains much historical emotion, but it is their history, and not ours,
that haunts them.
Qutb has perhaps a single parallel in world history. Another shambling invert,
another sexual truant (not a virgin but a career cuckold), another marginal
quack and dabbler (talentless but not philistine), he too wrote a book, in
prison, that fell into the worst possible hands. His name was Nikolai
Chernyshevsky; and his novel (What Is To Be Done?) was read five times by
Vladimir Lenin in the course of a single summer. It was Chernyshevsky who
determined, not the content, but the emotional dynamic of the Soviet experiment.
The centennial of his birth was celebrated with much pomp in the USSR. That was
in 1928. But Russia was too sad, and too busy, to do much about the centennial
of his death, which passed quietly in 1989.
In The Unknown Known my diminutive terrorist, Ayed, is not
a virgin (or a Joseph, as Christians say), unlike Sayyid, on whom he is
tangentially based. He is, rather, a polygamist, confining himself to the
sanctioned maximum of four. On top of this, he indulges himself, whenever he has
enough spare cash, with a succession of 'temporary wives'. The practice is
called mutah. In her justly celebrated book, Reading Lolita in Tehran, Azar
Nafisi tells us that a temporary marriage can endure for 99 years; it can also
be over in half an hour. The Islamic Republic is very attentive to what it calls
'men's needs'. Before the Revolution, a girl could get married at the age of 18.
After 1979 the age requirement was halved.
In Beyond Belief: Islamic Excursions Among the Converted
Peoples, VS Naipaul looks at some of the social results of polygamy, in
Pakistan, and notes that the marriages tend to be serial. The man moves on,
'religiously tomcatting away'; and the consequence is a society of
'half-orphans'. Divorce is in any case unarduous: 'a man who wanted to get rid
of his wife could accuse her of adultery and have her imprisoned'. It is
difficult to exaggerate the sexualisation of Islamist governance, even among the
figures we think of as moderate. Type in 'sex' and 'al-Sistani', and prepare
yourself for a cataract of pedantry and smut.
As the narrative opens, Ayed is very concerned about the state of his marriages.
But there's a reason for that. When Ayed was a little boy, in the early
Eighties, his dad, a talented poppy-farmer, left Waziristan with his family and
settled in Greeley, Colorado. This results in a domestic blow to Ayed's
self-esteem. Back home in Waziristan, a boy of his age would be feeling a lovely
warm glow of pride, around now, as he realises that his sisters, in one
important respect, are just like his mother: they can't read or write either. In
America, though, the girls are obliged to go to school. Before Ayed knows it,
the women have shed their veils, and his sisters are being called on by
gum-chewing kaffirs. Now puberty looms.
There is almost an entire literary genre given over to sensibilities such as
Sayyid Qutb's. It is the genre of the unreliable narrator - or, more exactly,
the transparent narrator, with his helpless giveaways. Typically, a patina of
haughty fastidiousness strives confidently but in vain to conceal an underworld
of incurable murk. In The Unknown Known I added to this genre, and with
enthusiasm. I had Ayed stand for hours in a thicket of nettles and poison ivy,
beneath an elevated walkway, so that he could rail against the airiness of the
summer frocks worn by American women and the shameless brevity of their
underpants. I had him go out in all weathers for evening strolls, strolls
gruellingly prolonged until, with the help of a buttress or a drainpipe, he
comes across a woman 'quite openly' undressing for bed. Meanwhile, his sisters
are all dating. The father and the brothers discuss various courses of action,
such as killing them all; but America, bereft of any sense of honour, would
punish them for that. The family bifurcates; Ayed returns to the rugged
borderland, joins 'the "Prism"', and courts his quartet of nine-year-old
sweethearts.
As Ayed keeps telling all his temporary wives, 'My wives don't understand me.'
And they don't; indeed, they all want divorces, and for the same embarrassing
reason. With his paradigm-shift attack on America now in ruins, and facing
professional and social disgrace, Ayed suddenly sees how, in one swoop, he can
redeem himself - and secure his place in history with an unknown unknown which
is sure to succeed. For this he will be needing a belt
Two years ago I came across a striking photograph in a news magazine: it looked
like a crudely cross-sectioned watermelon, but you could make out one or two
humanoid features half-submerged in the crimson pulp. It was in fact the bravely
circularised photograph of the face of a Saudi newscaster who had been beaten by
her husband. In an attempted murder, it seems: at the time of his arrest he had
her in the trunk of his car, and was evidently taking her into the desert for
interment. What had she done to bring this on herself? In the marital home, that
night, the telephone rang and the newscaster, a prosperous celebrity in her own
right, answered it. She had answered the telephone. Male Westerners will be
struck, here, by a dramatic cultural contrast. I know that I, for one, would be
far more likely to beat my wife to death if she hadn't answered the telephone.
But customs and mores vary from country to country, and you cannot reasonably
claim that one ethos is 'better' than any other.
In 1949 Greeley was dry... It has been seriously suggested, by serious
commentators, that suicide-mass murderers are searching for the simplest means
of getting a girlfriend. It may be, too, that some of them are searching for the
simplest means of getting a drink. Although alcohol, like extramarital sex, may
be strictly forbidden in life, there is, in death, no shortage of either. As
well as the Koranic virgins, 'as chaste', for the time being, 'as the sheltered
eggs of ostriches', there is also a 'gushing fountain' of white wine (wine 'that
will neither pain their heads nor take away their reason'). The suicide-mass
murderer can now raise his brimming 'goblet' to an additional reward: he has the
power, post mortem, to secure paradisal immortality for a host of relations (the
number is a round 70, two fewer, curiously, than the traditional allotment of
houris). Nor is this his only service to the clan, which, until recently, could
expect an honorarium of $20,000 from Iraq, plus $5,000 from Saudi Arabia - as
well as the vast prestige automatically accorded to the family of a martyr. And
then there is the enticement, or incitement, of peer-group prestige.
Suicide-mass murder is astonishingly alien, so alien, in fact, that Western
opinion has been unable to formulate a rational response to it. A rational
response would be something like an unvarying factory siren of unanimous
disgust. But we haven't managed that. What we have managed, on the whole, is a
murmur of dissonant evasion. Paul Berman's best chapter, in Terror and
Liberalism, is mildly entitled 'Wishful Thinking' - and Berman is in general a
mild-mannered man. But this is a very tough and persistent analysis of our
extraordinary uncertainty. It is impossible to read it without cold fascination
and a consciousness of disgrace. I felt disgrace, during its early pages,
because I had done it too, and in print, early on. Contemplating intense
violence, you very rationally ask yourself, what are the reasons for this? And
compassionately frowning newscasters are still asking that same question. It is
time to move on. We are not dealing in reasons because we are not dealing in
reason.
After the failure of Oslo, and the attendant consolidation of Hamas, the second
intifada ('earthquake') got under way in 2001, not with stonings and stabbings,
like the first, but with a steady campaign of suicide-mass murder. 'All over the
world,' writes Berman, 'the popularity of the Palestinian cause did not
collapse. It increased.' The parallel process was the intensive demonisation of
Israel (academic ostracism, and so on); every act of suicide-mass murder
'testified' to the extremity of the oppression, so that 'Palestinian terror, in
this view, was the measure of Israeli guilt'. And when Sharon replaced Barak,
and the expected crackdown began, and the Israeli army, with 23 casualties of
its own, killed 52 Palestinians in the West Bank city of Jenin, the attack 'was
seen as a veritable Holocaust, an Auschwitz, or, in an alternative image, as the
Middle Eastern equivalent of the Wehrmacht's assault on the Warsaw Ghetto. These
tropes were massively accepted, around the world. Typing in the combined names
of "Jenin" and "Auschwitz"... I came up with 2,890 references; and, typing in
"Jenin" and "Nazi", I came up with 8,100 references. There were 63,100
references to the combined names of "Sharon" and "Hitler".' Once the redoubled
suppression had taken hold, the human bombings decreased; and world opinion
quietened down. The Palestinians were now worse off than ever, their societal
gains of the Nineties 'flattened by Israeli tanks'. But the protests 'rose and
fell in tandem with the suicide bomb attacks, and not in tandem with the
suffering of the Palestinian people'.
This was because suicide-mass murder presented the West with a philosophical
crisis. The quickest way out of it was to pretend that the tactic was
reasonable, indeed logical and even admirable: an extreme case of 'rationalist
naivete', in Berman's phrase. Rationalist naivete was easier than the
assimilation of the alternative: that is to say, the existence of a pathological
cult. Berman assembles many voices. And if we are going to hear the rhetoric of
delusion and self-hypnosis, then we might as well hear it from a Stockholm
Laureate - the Portuguese novelist Jose Saramago. Again erring on the side of
indulgence, Berman is unnecessarily daunted by the pedigree of Saramago's prose,
which is in fact the purest and snootiest bombast (you might call it Nobelese).
Here he focuses his lofty gaze on the phenomenon of suicide-mass murder:
'Ah, yes, the horrendous massacres of civilians caused by the so-called suicide
terrorists... Horrendous, yes, doubtless; condemnable, yes, doubtless, but
Israel still has a lot to learn if it is not capable of understanding the
reasons that can bring a human being to turn himself into a bomb.'
Palestinian society has channelled a good deal of thought and energy into the
solemnisation of suicide-mass murder, a process which begins in kindergarten.
Naturally, one would be reluctant to question the cloudless piety of the
Palestinian mother who, having raised one suicide-mass murderer, expressed the
wish that his younger brother would become a suicide-mass murderer too. But the
time has come to cease to respect the quality of her 'rage' - to cease to marvel
at the unhingeing rigour of Israeli oppression, and to start to marvel at the
power of an entrenched and emulous ideology, and a cult of death. And if
oppression is what we're interested in, then we should think of the oppression,
not to mention the life-expectancy (and, God, what a life), of the younger
brother. There will be much stopping and starting to do. It is painful to stop
believing in the purity, and the sanity, of the underdog. It is painful to start
believing in a cult of death, and in an enemy that wants its war to last for
ever.
Suicide-mass murder is more than terrorism: it is horrorism. It is a maximum
malevolence. The suicide-mass murderer asks his prospective victims to
contemplate their fellow human being with a completely new order of execration.
It is not like looking down the barrel of a gun. We can tell this is so, because
we see what happens, sometimes, when the suicide-mass murderer isn't even there
- as in the amazingly summary injustice meted out to the Brazilian Jean Charles
de Menezes in London. An even more startling example was the rumour-ignited
bridge stampede in Baghdad (31 August 2005). This is the superterror inspired by
suicide-mass murder: just whisper the words, and you fatally trample a thousand
people. And it remains an accurate measure of the Islamists' contortion: they
hold that an act of lethal self-bespatterment, in the interests of an
unachievable 'cause', brings with it the keys to paradise. Sam Harris, in The
End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason, stresses just how
thoroughly and expeditiously the suicide-mass murderer is 'saved'. Which would
you prefer, given belief?
'... martyrdom is the only way that a Muslim can bypass the painful litigation
that awaits us all on the Day of Judgment and proceed directly to heaven. Rather
than spend centuries mouldering in the earth in anticipation of being
resurrected and subsequently interrogated by wrathful angels, the martyr is
immediately transported to Allah's garden...'
Osama bin Laden's table talk, at Tarnak Farms in Afghanistan, where he trained
his operatives before September 2001, must have included many rolling paragraphs
on Western vitiation, corruption, perversion, prostitution, and all the rest.
And in 1998, as season after season unfolded around the president's weakness for
fellatio, he seemed to have good grounds for his most serious miscalculation:
the belief that America was a softer antagonist than the USSR (in whose defeat,
incidentally, the 'Arab Afghans' played a negligible part). Still, a sympathiser
like the famously obtuse 'American Taliban' John Walker Lindh, if he'd been
there, and if he'd been a little brighter, might have framed the following
argument.
Now would be a good time to strike, John would tell Osama, because the West is
enfeebled, not just by sex and alcohol, but also by 30 years of multicultural
relativism. They'll think suicide bombing is just an exotic foible, like
shame-and-honour killings or female circumcision. Besides, it's religious, and
they're always slow to question anything that calls itself that. Within days of
our opening outrage, the British royals will go on the road for Islam, and stay
on it. And you'll be amazed by how long the word Islamophobia, as an
unanswerable indictment, will cover Islamism too. It'll take them years to come
up with the word they want - and Islamismophobia clearly isn't any good. Even if
the Planes Operation succeeds, and thousands die, the Left will yawn and wonder
why we waited so long. Strike now. Their ideology will make them reluctant to
see what it is they confront. And it will make them slow learners.
By the summer of 2005, suicide-mass murder had evolved. In Iraq, foreign
jihadis, pilgrims of war, were filing across the borders to be strapped up with
explosives and nails and nuts and bolts, often by godless Baathists with
entirely secular aims - to be primed like pieces of ordnance and then sent out
the same day to slaughter their fellow Muslims. Suicide-mass murder, in other
words, had passed through a phase of decadence and was now on the point of
debauchery. In a single month (May), there were more human bombings in Iraq than
during the entire intifada. And this, on 25 July, was the considered response of
the Mayor of London to the events of 7 July:
'Given that they don't have jet planes, don't have tanks, they only have their
bodies to use as weapons. In an unfair balance, that's what people use.'
I remember a miserable little drip of a poem, c2002, that made exactly the same
case. No, they don't have F-16s. Question: would the Mayor like them to have
F-16s? And, no, their bodies are not what 'people' use. They are what Islamists
use. And we should weigh, too, the spiritual paltriness of such martyrdoms.
'Martyr' means witness. The suicide-mass murderer witnesses nothing - and
sacrifices nothing. He dies for vulgar and delusive gain. And on another level,
too, the rationale for 'martyrdom operations' is a theological sophistry of the
blackest cynicism. Its aim is simply the procurement of delivery systems.
Our ideology, which is sometimes called Westernism, weakens us in two ways. It
weakens our powers of perception, and it weakens our moral unity and will. As
Harris puts it:
'Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden's favourite philosopher, felt that pragmatism
would spell the death of American civilisation... Pragmatism, when civilisations
come clashing, does not appear likely to be very pragmatic. To lose the
conviction that you can actually be right - about anything - seems a recipe for
the End of Days chaos envisioned by Yeats: when "the best lack all conviction,
while the worst are full of passionate intensity".'
The opening argument we reach for now, in explaining any conflict, is the
argument of moral equivalence. No value can be allowed to stand in stone; so we
begin to question our ability to identify even what is malum per se. Prison
beatings, too, are evil in themselves, and so is the delegation of torture, and
murder, to less high-minded and (it has to be said) less hypocritical regimes.
In the kind of war that we are now engaged in, an episode like Abu Ghraib is
more than a shameful deviation - it is the equivalent of a lost battle. Our
moral advantage, still vast and obvious, is not a liability, and we should
strengthen and expand it. Like our dependence on reason, it is a strategic
strength, and it shores up our legitimacy.
There is another symbiotic overlap between Islamist praxis and our own, and it
is a strange and pitiable one. I mean the drastic elevation of the nonentity. In
our popularity-contest culture, with its VIP ciphers and meteoric mediocrities,
we understand the attractions of baseless fame - indeed, of instant and unearned
immortality. To feel that you are a geohistorical player is a tremendous lure to
those condemned, as they see it, to exclusion and anonymity. In its quieter way,
this was perhaps the key component of the attraction of Western intellectuals to
Soviet Communism: 'join', and you are suddenly a contributor to planetary
events. As Muhammad Atta steered the 767 towards its destination, he was
confident, at least, that his fellow town-planners, in Aleppo, would remember
his name, along with everybody else on earth. Similarly, the ghost of Shehzad
Tanweer, as it watched the salvage teams scraping up human remains in the
rat-infested crucible beneath the streets of London, could be sure that he had
decisively outsoared the fish-and-shop back in Leeds. And that other great
nothingness, Osama bin Laden - he is ever-living.
In July 2005 I flew from Montevideo to New York - and from winter to summer -
with my six-year-old daughter and her eight-year-old sister. I drank a beer as I
stood in the check-in queue, a practice not frowned on at Carrasco (though it
would certainly raise eyebrows at, say, the dedicated Hajj terminal in Tehran's
Mehrabad); then we proceeded to Security. Now I know some six-year-old girls can
look pretty suspicious; but my youngest daughter isn't like that. She is a
slight little blonde with big brown eyes and a quavery voice. Nevertheless, I
stood for half an hour at the counter while the official methodically and
solemnly searched her carry-on rucksack - staring shrewdly at each story-tape
and crayon, palpating the length of all four limbs of her fluffy duck.
There ought to be a better word than boredom for the trance of inanition that
weaved its way through me. I wanted to say something like, 'Even Islamists have
not yet started to blow up their own families on aeroplanes. So please desist
until they do. Oh yeah: and stick to people who look like they're from the
Middle East.' The revelations of 10 August 2006 were 13 months away. And despite
the exposure and prevention of their remarkably ambitious bloodbath of the
innocent (the majority of them women and children), the (alleged) Walthamstow
jihadis did not quite strive in vain. The failed to promote terror, but they won
a great symbolic victory for boredom: the banning of books on the seven-hour
flight from England to America.
My daughters and I arrived safely in New York. In New York, at certain subway
stations, the police were searching all the passengers, to thwart terrorism -
thus obliging any terrorist to walk the couple of blocks to a subway station
where the police weren't searching all the passengers. And I couldn't defend
myself from a vision of the future; in this future, riding a city bus will be
like flying El Al. In the guilty safety of Long Island I watched the TV coverage
from my home town, where my other three children live, where I will soon again
be living with all five. There were the Londoners, on 8 July, going to work on
foot, looking stiff and watchful, and taking no pleasure in anything they saw.
Eric Hobsbawm got it right in the mid-Nineties, when he said that terrorism was
part of the atmospheric 'pollution' of Western cities. It is a cost-efficient
programme. Bomb New York and you pollute Madrid; bomb Madrid and you pollute
London; bomb London and you pollute Paris and Rome, and repollute New York. But
there was the solace given us by the Mayor. No, we should not be surprised by
the use of this sempiternal ruse de guerre. Using their bodies is what people
do.
The age of terror, I suspect, will also be remembered as the age of boredom. Not
the kind of boredom that afflicts the blasé and the effete, but a superboredom,
rounding out and complementing the superterror of suicide-mass murder. And
although we will eventually prevail in the war against terror, or will reduce
it, as Mailer says, to 'a tolerable level' (this phrase will stick, and will be
used by politicians, with quiet pride), we haven't got a chance in the war
against boredom. Because boredom is something that the enemy doesn't feel. To be
clear: the opposite of religious belief is not atheism or secularism or
humanism. It is not an 'ism'. It is independence of mind - that's all. When I
refer to the age of boredom, I am not thinking of airport queues and subway
searches. I mean the global confrontation with the dependent mind.
One way of ending the war on terror would be to capitulate and convert. The
transitional period would be an unsmiling one, no doubt, with much stern work to
be completed in the city squares, the town centres, and the village greens.
Nevertheless, as the Caliphate is restored in Baghdad, to much joy, the
surviving neophytes would soon get used to the voluminous penal code enforced by
the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice. It would
be a world of perfect terror and perfect boredom, and of nothing else - a world
with no games, no arts, and no women, a world where the only entertainment is
the public execution. My middle daughter, now aged nine, still believes in
imaginary beings (Father Christmas, the Tooth Fairy); so she would have that in
common, at least, with her new husband.
Like fundamentalist Judaism and medieval Christianity,
Islam is totalist. That is to say, it makes a total claim on the individual.
Indeed, there is no individual; there is only the umma - the community of
believers. Ayatollah Khomeini, in his copious writings, often returns to this
theme. He unindulgently notes that believers in most religions appear to think
that, so long as they observe all the formal pieties, then for the rest of the
time they can do more or less as they please. 'Islam', as he frequently reminds
us, 'isn't like that.' Islam follows you everywhere, into the kitchen, into the
bedroom, into the bathroom, and beyond death into eternity. Islam means
'submission' - the surrender of independence of mind. That surrender now bears
the weight of well over 60 generations, and 14 centuries.
The stout self-sufficiency or, if you prefer, the extreme
incuriosity of Islamic culture has been much remarked. Present-day Spain
translates as many books into Spanish, annually, as the Arab world has
translated into Arabic in the past 1,100 years. And the late-medieval Islamic
powers barely noticed the existence of the West until it started losing battles
to it. The tradition of intellectual autarky was so robust that Islam remained
indifferent even to readily available and obviously useful innovations,
including, incredibly, the wheel. The wheel, as we know, makes things easier to
roll; Bernard Lewis, in What Went Wrong?, sagely notes that it also makes things
easier to steal.
By the beginning of the 20th century the entire Muslim world, with partial
exceptions, had been subjugated by the European empires. And at that point the
doors of perception were opened to foreign influence: that of Germany. This
allegiance cost Islam its last imperium, the Ottoman, for decades a 'helpless
hulk' (Hobsbawm), which was duly dismantled and shared out after the First World
War - a war that was made in Berlin. Undeterred, Islam continued to look to
Germany for sponsorship and inspiration. When the Nazi experiment ended, in
1945, sympathy for its ideals lingered on for years, but Islam was now forced to
look elsewhere. It had no choice; geopolitically, there was nowhere else to
turn. And the flame passed from Germany to the USSR.
So Islam, in the end, proved responsive to European influence: the influence of
Hitler and Stalin. And one hardly needs to labour the similarities between
Islamism and the totalitarian cults of the last century. Anti-semitic, anti-
liberal, anti-individualist, anti-democratic, and, most crucially,
anti-rational, they too were cults of death, death-driven and death-fuelled. The
main distinction is that the paradise which the Nazis (pagan) and the Bolsheviks
(atheist) sought to bring about was an earthly one, raised from the mulch of
millions of corpses. For them, death was creative, right enough, but death was
still death. For the Islamists, death is a consummation and a sacrament; death
is a beginning. Sam Harris is right:
'Islamism is not merely the latest flavour of totalitarian nihilism. There is a
difference between nihilism and a desire for supernatural reward. Islamists
could smash the world to atoms and still not be guilty of nihilism, because
everything in their world has been transfigured by the light of paradise...'
Pathological mass movements are sustained by 'dreams of omnipotence and sadism',
in Robert Jay Lifton's phrase. That is usually enough. Islamism adds a third
inducement to its warriors: a heavenly immortality that begins even before the
moment of death.
For close to a millennium, Islam could afford to be autarkic. Its rise is one of
the wonders of world history - a chain reaction of conquest and conversion, an
amassment not just of territory but of millions of hearts and minds. The vigour
of its ideal of justice allowed for levels of tolerance significantly higher
than those of the West. Culturally, too, Islam was the more evolved. Its
assimilations and its learning potentiated the Renaissance - of which, alas, it
did not partake. Throughout its ascendancy, Islam was buoyed by what Malise
Ruthven, in A Fury for God, calls 'the argument from manifest success'. The fact
of expansion underwrote the mandate of heaven. And now, for the past 300 or 400
years, observable reality has propounded a rebuttal: the argument from manifest
failure. As one understands it, in the Islamic cosmos there is nothing more
painful than the suspicion that something has denatured the covenant with God.
This unbearable conclusion must naturally be denied, but it is subliminally
present, and accounts, perhaps, for the apocalyptic hurt of the Islamist.
Over the past five years, what we have been witnessing, apart from a moral slump
or bust, is a death agony: the death agony of imperial Islam. Islamism is the
last wave - the last convulsion. Until 2003, one could take some comfort from
the very virulence of the Islamist deformation. Nothing so insanely dionysian,
so impossibly poisonous, could expect to hold itself together over time. In the
20th century, outside Africa, the only comparable eruptions of death-hunger, of
death-oestrus, were confined to Nazi Germany and Stalinite Kampuchea, the one
lasting 12 years, the other three and a half. Hitler, Pol Pot, Osama: such men
only ask to be the last to die. But there are some sound reasons for thinking
that the confrontation with Islamism will be testingly prolonged.
It is by now not too difficult to trace what went wrong, psychologically, with
the Iraq War. The fatal turn, the fatal forfeiture of legitimacy, came not with
the mistaken but also cynical emphasis on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction:
the intelligence agencies of every country on earth, Iraq included, believed
that he had them. The fatal turn was the American President's all too palpable
submission to the intoxicant of power. His walk, his voice, his idiom, right up
to his mortifying appearance in the flight suit on the aircraft-carrier, USS
Abraham Lincoln ('Mission Accomplished') - every dash and comma in his body
language betrayed the unscrupulous confidence of the power surge.
We should parenthetically add that Tony Blair succumbed to it too - with a
difference. In 'old' Europe, as Rumsfeld insolently called it, the idea of a
political class was predicated on the inculcation of checks and balances, of
psychic surge-breakers, to limit the corruption that personal paramountcy always
entrains. It was not a matter of mental hygiene; everyone understood that a
rotting mind will make rotten decisions. Blair knew this. He also knew that his
trump was not a high one: the need of the American people to hear approval for
the war in an English accent. Yet there he was, helplessly caught up in the
slipstream turbulence of George Bush. Rumsfeld, too, visibly succumbed to it. On
television, at this time, he looked as though he had just worked his way through
a snowball of cocaine. 'Stuff happens,' he said, when asked about the looting of
the Mesopotamian heritage in Baghdad - the remark of a man not just corrupted
but floridly vulgarised by power. As well as the body language, at this time,
there was also the language, the power language, all the way from Bush's 'I want
to kick ass' to his 'Bring it on' - a rather blithe incitement, some may now
feel, to the armed insurgency.
Contemplating this, one's aversion was very far from being confined to the
aesthetic. Much followed from it. And we now know that an atmosphere of
boosterist unanimity, of prewar triumphalism, had gathered around the President,
an atmosphere in which any counter-argument, any hint of circumspection, was
seen as a whimper of weakness or disloyalty. If she were alive, Barbara Tuchman
would be chafing to write a long addendum to The March of Folly; but not even
she could have foreseen a president who, 'going into this period', 'was praying
for strength to do the Lord's will'. A power rush blessed by God - no, not a
good ambience for precautions and doubts. At that time, the invasion of Iraq was
presented as a 'self-financing' preventive war to enforce disarmament and regime
change. Three and a half years later, it is an adventurist and proselytising
war, and its remaining goal is the promotion of democracy.
The Iraq project was foredoomed by three intrinsic historical realities. First,
the Middle East is clearly unable, for now, to sustain democratic rule - for the
simple reason that its peoples will vote against it. Did no one whisper the
words, in the Situation Room - did no one say what the scholars have been saying
for years? The 'electoral policy' of the fundamentalists, writes Lewis, 'has
been classically summarised as "One man (men only), one vote, once."' Or, in
Harris's trope, democracy will be 'little more than a gangplank to theocracy';
and that theocracy will be Islamist. Now the polls have closed, and the results
are coming in, region-wide. In Lebanon, gains for Hizbollah; in Egypt, gains for
Sayyid Qutb's fraternity, the Muslim Brothers; in Palestine, victory for Hamas;
in Iran, victory for the soapbox rabble-rouser and primitive anti-semite,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In the Iraqi election, Bush and Blair, pathetically, both
'hoped' for Allawi, whose return was 14 per cent.
Second, Iraq is not a real country. It was cobbled together, by Winston
Churchill, in the early Twenties; it consists of three separate (Ottoman)
provinces, Sunni, Shia, Kurd - a disposition which looks set to resume. Among
the words not listened to by the US Administration, we can include those of
Saddam Hussein. Even with an apparatus of terror as savage as any in history,
even with chemical weapons, helicopter gunships, and mass killings, even with a
proven readiness to cleanse, to displace, and to destroy whole ecosystems,
Hussein modestly conceded that he found Iraq a difficult country to keep in one
piece. As a Sunni military man put it, Iraqis hate Iraq - or 'Iraq', a concept
that has brought them nothing but suffering. There is no nationalist instinct;
the instinct is for atomisation.
Third, only the sack of Mecca or Medina would have caused more pain to the
Islamic heart than the taking, and befouling, of the Iraqi capital, the seat of
the Caliphate. We have not heard any discussion, at home, about the creedal
significance of Baghdad. But we have had some intimations from the jihadis'
front line. In pronouncements that vibrate with historic afflatus, they speak of
their joyful embrace of the chance to meet the infidel in the Land Between the
Rivers. And, of course, beyond - in Madrid, in Bali (again), in London. It may
be that the Coalition adventure has given the enemy a casus belli that will burn
for a generation.
There are vast pluralities all over the West that are thirsting for American
failure in Iraq - because they hate George Bush. Perhaps they do not realise
that they are co-synchronously thirsting for an Islamist victory that will
dramatically worsen the lives of their children. And this may come to pass. Let
us look at the war, not through bin Laden's eyes, but through the eyes of the
cunning of history. From that perspective, 11 September was a provocation. The
'slam dunk', the 'cakewalk' into Iraq amounted to a feint, and a trap. We now
know, from various 500-page bestsellers like Cobra II and Fiasco, that the
invasion of Iraq was truly incredibly blithe (there was no plan, no plan at all,
for the occupation); still, we should not delude ourselves that the motives
behind it were dishonourable. This is a familiar kind of tragedy. The Iraq War
represents a gigantic contract, not just for Halliburton, but also for the
paving company called Good Intentions. We must hope that something can be
salvaged from it, and that our ethical standing can be reconsolidated. Iraq was
a divagation in what is being ominously called the Long War. To our futile
losses in blood, treasure and moral prestige, we can add the loss in time; and
time, too, is blood.
An idea presents itself about a better direction to take. And funnily enough its
current champion is the daughter of the dark genius behind the disaster in Iraq:
she is called Liz Cheney. Before we come to that, though, we must briefly return
to Ayed, and his belt, and to some quiet thoughts about the art of fiction.
The 'belt' ending of The Unknown Known came to me fairly late. But the belt was
already there, and prominently. All writers will know exactly what this means.
It means that the subconscious had made a polite suggestion, a suggestion that
the conscious mind had taken a while to see. Ayed's belt, purchased by
mail-order in Greeley, Colorado, is called a 'RodeoMaMa', and consists of a
'weight strap' and the pommel of a saddle. Ayed is of that breed of men which
holds that a husband should have sex with his wives every night. And his
invariable use of the 'RodeoMaMa' is one of the reasons for the rumble of mutiny
in his marriages.
Looking in at the longhouse called Known Knowns, Ayed retools his 'RodeoMaMa'.
He goes back to the house and summons his wives - for the last time. Thus Ayed
gets his conceptual breakthrough, his unknown unknown: he is the first to bring
martyrdom operations into the setting of his own home.
I could write a piece almost as long as this one about why I abandoned The
Unknown Known. The confirmatory moment came a few weeks ago: the freshly
fortified suspicion that there exists on our planet a kind of human being who
will become a Muslim in order to pursue suicide-mass murder. For quite a time I
have felt that Islamism was trying to poison the world. Here was a sign that the
poison might take - might mutate, like bird flu. Islam, as I said, is a total
system, and like all such it is eerily amenable to satire. But with Islamism,
with total malignancy, with total terror and total boredom, irony, even militant
irony (which is what satire is), merely shrivels and dies.
In Twentieth Century the late historian JM Roberts took an unsentimental line on
the Chinese Revolution:
'More than 2,000 years of remarkable historical continuities lie behind [it],
which, for all its cost and cruelty, was a heroic endeavour, matched in scale
only by such gigantic upheavals as the spread of Islam, or Europe's assault on
the world in early modern times.'
The cost and cruelty, according to Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's recent
biography, amounted, perhaps, to 70 million lives in the Mao period alone. Yet
this has to be balanced against 'the weight of the past' - nowhere heavier than
in China:
'Deliberate attacks on family authority... were not merely attempts by a
suspicious regime to encourage informers and delation, but attacks on the most
conservative of all Chinese institutions. Similarly, the advancement of women
and propaganda to discourage early marriage had dimensions going beyond
'progressive' feminist ideas or population control; they were an assault on the
past such as no other revolution had ever made, for in China the past meant a
role for women far inferior to those of pre-revolutionary America, France or
even Russia.'
There is no momentum, in Islam, for a reformation. And there is no time, now,
for a leisurely, slow-lob enlightenment. The necessary upheaval is a revolution
- the liberation of women. This will not be the work of a decade or even a
generation. Islam is a millennium younger than China. But we should remind
ourselves that the Chinese Revolution took half a century to roll through its
villages.
In 2002 the aggregate GDP of all the Arab countries was less than the GDP of
Spain; and the Islamic states lag behind the West, and the Far East, in every
index of industrial and manufacturing output, job creation, technology,
literacy, life-expectancy, human development, and intellectual vitality. (A
recondite example: in terms of the ownership of telephone lines, the leading
Islamic nation is the UAE, listed in 33rd place, between Reunion and Macau.)
Then, too, there is the matter of tyranny, corruption, and the absence of civil
rights and civil society. We may wonder how the Islamists feel when they compare
India to Pakistan, one a burgeoning democratic superpower, the other barely
distinguishable from a failed state. What Went Wrong? asked Bernard Lewis, at
book length. The broad answer would be institutionalised irrationalism; and the
particular focus would be the obscure logic that denies the Islamic world the
talent and energy of half its people. No doubt the impulse towards rational
inquiry is by now very weak in the rank and file of the Muslim male. But we can
dwell on the memory of those images from Afghanistan: the great waves of women
hurrying to school.
The connection between manifest failure and the suppression of women is
unignorable. And you sometimes feel that the current crux, with its welter of
insecurities and nostalgias, is little more than a pre-emptive tantrum - to ward
off the evacuation of the last sanctum of power. What would happen if we spent
some of the next 300 billion dollars (this is Liz Cheney's thrust) on the
raising of consciousness in the Islamic world? The effect would be inherently
explosive, because the dominion of the male is Koranic - the unfalsifiable word
of God, as dictated to the Prophet:
'Men have authority over women because God has made the one superior to the
other, and because they spend their wealth to maintain them. Good women are
obedient. They guard their unseen parts because God has guarded them. As for
those from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them, forsake them in beds
apart, and beat them. Then if they obey you, take no further action against
them. Surely God is high, supreme' (4:34).
Can we imagine seeing men on the march in defence of their right to beat their
wives? And if we do see it, then what? Would that win hearts and minds? The
martyrs of this revolution would be sustained by two obvious truths: the binding
authority of scripture, all over the world, is very seriously questioned; and
women, by definition, are not a minority. They would know, too, that their
struggle is a heroic assault on the weight of the past - the alpweight of 14
centuries.
Attentive readers may have asked themselves what it is, this ridiculous
category, the unknown known. The unknown known is paradise, scriptural
inerrancy, God. The unknown known is religious belief.
All religions are violent; and all ideologies are violent. Even Westernism, so
impeccably bland, has violence glinting within it. This is because any belief
system involves a degree of illusion, and therefore cannot be defended by mind
alone. When challenged, or affronted, the believer's response is hormonal; and
the subsequent collision will be one between a brain and a cat's cradle of
glands. I will never forget the look on the gatekeeper's face, at the Dome of
the Rock in Jerusalem, when I suggested, perhaps rather airily, that he skip
some calendric prohibition and let me in anyway. His expression, previously
cordial and cold, became a mask; and the mask was saying that killing me, my
wife, and my children was something for which he now had warrant. I knew then
that the phrase 'deeply religious' was a grave abuse of that adverb. Something
isn't deep just because it's all that is there; it is more like a varnish on a
vacuum. Millennial Islamism is an ideology superimposed upon a religion -
illusion upon illusion. It is not merely violent in tendency. Violence is all
that is there.
In Philip Larkin's 'Aubade' (1977), the poet, on waking, contemplates 'unresting
death, a whole day nearer now':
This is a special way of being afraid
No trick dispels. Religion used to try,
That vast moth-eaten musical brocade
Created to pretend we never die...
Much earlier, in 'Church Going' (1954), examining his habit of visiting country
churches and the feelings they arouse in him (chiefly bafflement and boredom),
he was able to frame a more expansive response:
It pleases me to stand in silence here;
A serious house on serious earth it is,
In whose blent air all our compulsions meet,
Are recognised, and robed as destinies.
And that much never can be obsolete,
Since someone will forever be surprising
A hunger in himself to be more serious,
And gravitating with it to this ground,
Which, he once heard, was proper to grow wise in,
If only that so many dead lie round.
This is beautifully arrived at. It contains everything that can be decently and
rationally said.
We allow that, in the case of religion, or the belief in supernatural beings,
the past weighs in, not at 2,000 years, but at approximately five million. Even
so, the time has come for a measure of impatience in our dealings with those who
would take an innocent personal pronoun, which was just minding its own
business, and exalt it with a capital letter. Opposition to religion already
occupies the high ground, intellectually and morally. People of independent mind
should now start to claim the spiritual high ground, too. We should be with
Joseph Conrad:
'The world of the living contains enough marvels and mysteries as it is -
marvels and mysteries acting upon our emotions and intelligence in ways so
inexplicable that it would almost justify the conception of life as an enchanted
state. No, I am too firm in my consciousness of the marvellous to be ever
fascinated by the mere supernatural, which (take it any way you like) is but a
manufactured article, the fabrication of minds insensitive to the intimate
delicacies of our relation to the dead and to the living, in their countless
multitudes; a desecration of our tenderest memories; an outrage on our dignity.
'Whatever my native modesty may be it will never condescend to seek help for my
imagination within those vain imaginings common to all ages and that in
themselves are enough to fill all lovers of mankind with unutterable sadness.'
('Author's Note' to The Shadow-Line, 1920.)
© Martin Amis
The age of
horrorism, O, 10.9.2006, Part one
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,,1868732,00.html , Part two
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,,1868743,00.html , Part three
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,,1868746,00.html
Midday
US says 9/11 suspect planned Heathrow attack
Thursday September 7, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
James Sturcke and agencies
The terror suspect accused of masterminding the September
11 attacks also planned to crash hijacked airliners into Heathrow airport,
according to documents released by the US government.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed conceived a plot to hit Heathrow
after the attacks on America five years ago, the documents from the US office of
the director of national intelligence said.
Another alleged al-Qaida member Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, described as a "key
facilitator" in 9/11, was said to have been a "lead operative" in the UK plan,
which the US said was disrupted in 2003.
The details emerged in profiles (pdf) of 14 terror suspects, including Mohammed
and Bin al-Shibh, who, the US announced yesterday, have been transferred from
secret CIA prisons around the world to Guantánamo Bay in Cuba.
During a speech about the CIA programme, the US president, George Bush, said
information from those held had "helped stop a plot to hijack passenger planes
and fly them into Heathrow or the Canary Wharf in London".
Bin al-Shibh was said to have been a would-be 9/11 hijacker who was foiled by
his inability to obtain a US visa. He was said to have who fled Afghanistan
after the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001 and headed to Karachi.
There, he and Mohammed worked on "follow-on plots against the west, particularly
the Heathrow plot", the US document said, before his capture in 2002.
The statement continued: "He was tasked by KSM [Mohammed] to recruit operatives
in Saudi Arabia for an attack on Heathrow airport, and, as of his capture, Bin
al-Shibh had identified four operatives for the operation."
The documents claim Mohammed "is one of history's most infamous terrorists" and
that his capture three years ago "deprived al-Qaida of one of its most capable
senior operatives".
In another document (pdf), summarising the so-called "High Value Terrorist
Detainee Programme", the office of the director of national intelligence says
the "Heathrow Airport Plot" was disrupted in 2003 on the basis of information
that came from detainees.
"In 2003 the US and several partners - acting on information from several
detainees - disrupted a plot to attack Heathrow airport using hijacked
commercial airliners," it said. "KSM and his network were behind the planning
for this attack."
The US government gave similar information on an alleged Heathrow attack last
autumn, but merely said then that the planning had been by "a major 9/11
operational figure". Yemen-born Bin al-Shibh was captured in September 2002 at a
house in Karachi, Pakistan after a shootout.
Details emerged in June of a US security report that al-Qaida had planned to
hijack aircraft and crash planes into Heathrow and Canary Wharf.
The British landmarks were among a number of targets around the world being
considered by terrorist operatives, US television channel ABC News said at the
time.
Reports of a possible plot against Canary Wharf also emerged in late 2004, but
the details were murky and British officials never confirmed them.
In February 2003, military vehicles were deployed at Heathrow over supposed
terrorism fears.
The US documents said Bin al-Shibh had originally been earmarked to be one of
the pilots on 9/11, and met Mohammed together with Mohammed Atta, the alleged
ringleader of the hijackers.
Scotland Yard said last night that it was "not prepared to discuss" Mr Bush's
comments.
US says 9/11
suspect planned Heathrow attack, G, 7.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1866809,00.html
1.30pm
Suspects remanded over alleged terror plot
Monday September 4, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
Staff and agencies
Eight men were remanded in custody today, when they
appeared at the Old Bailey in connection with an alleged plot to blow up
transatlantic airliners.
The men, aged between 19 and 28, appeared before Mrs
Justice Rafferty by video link from Belmarsh prison, in south-east London,
charged with conspiracy to murder and preparing an act of terrorism.
The men - Tanvir Hussain, 25, of no fixed address; Umar Islam, 28, of east
London; Arafat Waheed Khan, 25, of Walthamstow, east London; Ahmed Abdullah Ali,
25, of Walthamstow; Ibrahim Savant, 25, of north London; Waheed Zaman, 22, of
Walthamstow; Assad Ali Sarwar, 26, of High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire; and
19-year-old Adam Khatib, of Walthamstow - were all remanded in custody for two
weeks.
No applications for bail were made and defence barristers expressed their
concerns about the length of time the men were likely to spend on remand. The
court was told that the case would not come to trial before January 2008 and
possibly not until Easter 2008.
They are each charged with one offence of conspiracy to murder contrary to
section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977.
The second charge is a new offence contrary to Section 5(1) of the Terrorism Act
2006, alleging that they were preparing to smuggle the component parts of
improvised explosive devices on to aircraft and assemble and detonate them on
board.
A total of 24 people were arrested as part of an operation launched overnight on
August 9 and 10. Of these, 14 have been charged in relation to the alleged plot
to blow up the planes. Four people have so far been released without charge.
One individual, a 17-year-old youth who cannot be identified for legal reasons,
is accused of an offence under Section 58(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000. It is
a stand-alone charge, which does not relate to the alleged conspiracy.
Five others are still being questioned by police about the alleged plot.
Suspects remanded
over alleged terror plot, G, 4.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1864668,00.html
New terror laws used to arrest men 'recruiting suicide
cell'
September 04, 2006
The Times
By Sean O'Neill
NEW powers to clamp down on the “glorification” of
terrorism have been used to smash a suspected attempt to recruit and brainwash a
cell of British suicide bombers.
Some of the 14 men arrested in London at the weekend — including a group
detained while dining in a Chinese restaurant — could become the first to be
charged with offences of encouraging terrorism and giving or receiving terrorist
training.
Police were last night given extra time to question the suspects, and an
extensive search was continuing in the 54-acre grounds of Jameah Islamiyah
school near Crowborough, East Sussex, where the suspects regularly attended
weekend camps.
Counter-terrorist sources told The Times that those detained included suspected
ringleaders and young men who were being groomed as potential recruits to the
jihad.
The group had been under surveillance by intelligence agencies for several
months.
It used the school grounds, which include a lake and an area of woodland, for
survivalist exercises. Young recruits had to listen to extremist lectures on
religion and politics.
Police are believed to have intervened after intelligence reports indicated a
discernible change in the nature of the rhetoric and language of the alleged
recruiters.
Detectives believe that while the group was still being radicalised, no targets
had been identified and any possible terrorist attack was a long way off.
One source said: “This is not a case of disrupting an imminent attack. What we
are looking at is training and recruitment and encouraging others to take part.
“This operation was aimed at the process of radicalisation, at using the new
powers we have to tackle glorification of terror and indoctrination of young
people.”
Since the July 7 bombings in London last year, senior Scotland Yard officers
have been studying the process by which young British Muslims can be
radicalised. They have identified several factors, including religious
indoctrination, propaganda, outdoor “bonding” activities and the influence of
preachers.
Police and the Crown Prosecution Service have been criticised in the past for
not acting against “preachers of hate” such as Abu Hamza al-Masri, the jailed
former imam of Finsbury Park Mosque — who in February this year was convicted of
inciting murder — and Omar Bakri Mohammed, who went into exile in Lebanon.
But the powers to act against extremist speakers and terrorist recruiters were
significantly strengthened by the Terrorism Act 2006, which received Royal
Assent in March.
Counter-terrorist agencies believe that they now have the power to thwart the
radicalisation process before there is any threat to public safety.
Scotland Yard said that the arrests in London were not connected to the ongoing
inquiry into July 7 or to the arrests last month of 24 people in connection with
the alleged plot to blow up transatlantic airliners.
Most of those held in the latest raids are believed to be British-born men of
Pakistani origin, although one is reported to be a young black man who recently
converted to Islam.
No arrests have been made at the Islamic school.
In a separate operation, police in Manchester arrested two men under
anti-terrorist legislation and searched a number of properties in the Cheetham
Hill area.
New terror laws
used to arrest men 'recruiting suicide cell', Ts, 4.9.2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2341858,00.html
Abu Hamza's successor among suspects
September 04, 2006
The Times
By Sean O'Neill
A FORMER henchman of Abu Hamza al-Masri is among the 14 men
arrested in London on suspicion of involvement in terrorist recruiting.
Abu Abdullah, 42, assumed the leadership of the Supporters of Shariah group when
Abu Hamza, the former imam of Finsbury Park mosque, was arrested in May 2004.
He is banned from almost every mosque in Britain but continues to preach an
inflammatory message in private “study circles” and has attended camps in the
grounds of the Jameah Islamiyah school.
Mr Abdullah, a father of four who is from a Turkish Cypriot family but was born
in Britain, is a former youth football coach. He was often seen by Abu Hamza’s
side when the cleric preached on the streets of Finsbury Park. Last month The
Sunday Times reported comments by Mr Abdullah in which he described the July 7
bombers as “my honourable brothers in Islam” and said that suicide bombing was
“halal”, meaning permissible under Islamic law.
He added: “The martyr that goes about his enemies is going to shield his people.
He doesn’t have weapons of mass destruction, he only has household chemicals . .
. The West is escalating their killing of Muslims. We have a right to defend
ourselves. If I had the means to go back there [Afghanistan] and kill an
American or British soldier I would love to do so.”
Mr Abdullah’s home in Bromley, South London, is among 17 addresses being
searched by police.
Abu Hamza's
successor among suspects, Ts, 4.9.2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-2341859,00.html
Common sense, stupid
September 04, 2006
The Times
by Stephen Pollard
I’M FED UP with the way that politicians ignore the
obvious. Why won’t those dunderheads use common sense?
Take crime. I don’t know the precise facts, but I know what’s common sense: many
hardened criminals are brought up in families of other hardened criminals. Their
bad habits are passed down through the generations. So abolish the family and
the problem is dealt with.
Bring on the common sense revolution. Since so many patients acquire MRSA in
hospital, the solution is equally obvious: abolish hospitals.
Then there’s that Muslim school — Jameah Islamiyah, in East Sussex. You know,
the one whose grounds the police are now crawling all over, after arresting 14
people last week. Well, it’s obvious. If it wasn’t for faith schools, the
extremists wouldn’t have a captive audience and there’d be no British Muslim
suicide bombers. Abolish faith schools.
More often than not, two other words would better replace “common sense”: non
and sequitur.
The regularly deployed arguments against Muslim faith schools are a perfect
example. The schools are, apparently, a breeding ground for extremism and,
indeed, for terrorism. Does the fact that no Jewish school has produced a Jewish
terrorist not point to a flaw in that argument?
Since when has the religion of one’s maths teacher been a cause of terrorism?
What matters is not religion, but the content of the teaching and the school’s
atmosphere. If there is extremism in a particular school, the problem lies not
with the school being Muslim, but with its governance.
When bad chemistry teaching is discovered in a secular school, it does not lead
to calls for the abolition of chemistry teaching. It leads to action being taken
to make sure that chemistry is properly taught in the school where it hasn’t
been.
It is legitimate — albeit wrong — to argue that all schools should be secular,
that no parents should have the right to educate their children in a manner
fitting their religion and that pupils should be bussed to schools to create a
social mix.
It is, however, wholly illegitimate to extrapolate from the existence of a
Muslim school that may be breeding extremism the idea that all faith schools are
a threat to the cohesion of society. That is not merely a non sequitur, it is
also stupidity.
Common sense,
stupid, Ts, 4.9.2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2341665,00.html
Training camps link to anti-terror arrests
Monday September 4, 2006
Guardian
Sandra Laville and Richard Norton-Taylor
A group of men arrested in south London by anti-terrorist
police had been under surveillance for months at alleged training camps across
the country, the Guardian has learned. One of the alleged camps is understood to
have been a site in the Lake District.
The men were among 14 arrested last Friday as part of an
investigation into an alleged network of terror training camps in Britain that
includes the lakeland spot and the grounds of the Jameah Islamiyah school in
East Sussex. They are being questioned under controversial laws that came in
this year banning glorification of acts of terrorism, amid suspicion that among
the 14 there is a mentor figure who is training young men in preparation for
terrorist acts.
The Guardian revealed last month that the security services were monitoring up
to 20 suspects, some with known terrorist connections, taking part in outdoor
training in the Lake District and elsewhere. Some of the 14 men arrested last
Friday are understood to have been part of this group and, it is claimed, were
using the vast grounds of the Jameah Islamiyah school in the village of Mark
Cross, near Crowborough, for radicalisation and training activities.
The independent school, which sits in 54 acres and, according to its last Ofsted
report, has only nine pupils, advertises in mosques around the country, saying
its grounds can be hired for camping trips offering a refuge from city life for
young Muslims. It is a registered charity and charges up to £900 a week for
groups.
Counter-terrorism sources indicated that it was not the activities of the school
itself but what might have gone on in its grounds that was the subject of the
investigation.
Ahmed Muhammad Hakim, one of the school trustees, would make no comment
yesterday about the raids.
It is known that Abu Hamza, the former imam of Finsbury Park mosque, who is
serving seven years for incitement to murder, had set up a camp in the grounds.
But he was asked to leave, according to Bilal Patel, the principal.
One of Hamza's associates, Abu Abdullah, was among those arrested last Friday
night when his house in south London was one of 17 homes raided. Abdullah, who
acted as Abu Hamza's spokesman and now heads Hamza's organisation, Supporters of
Sharia, has stated publicly that the 9/11 attacks were a "deserved punch in the
nose" for America, and that "Tony Blair, the army and the police" are targets.
He ran the Finsbury Park mosque for a short period after Hamza's arrest, but is
now banned from preaching in most UK mosques.
Several of the men were arrested while dining in the Bridge to China restaurant
in south London, but the restaurant has now been handed back to its owner and is
not the subject of any further investigation.
A search at the Jameah school was, however, continuing yesterday and Sussex
police said it could last for days, if not weeks.
The independent school, which is run on donations from Muslims around the
country, was due to open for a new term this week. It provides education for a
fee of £1,000 a year, but was heavily criticised by the Ofsted inspectors. They
reported that it failed to provide a satisfactory education for its pupils and
had significant weaknesses. "Provision for welfare, health and safety" was
"unsatisfactory" and it failed to provide a "safe environment" for students.
Counter-terrorism sources indicated that the operation last Friday had not been
carried out to thwart any alleged bomb plot, but because of suspicions that the
suspects were running training weekends to radicalise young men. Last night
police were given warrants to hold three of the suspects until Wednesday and the
other 11 until Friday.
A spokeswoman for the home secretary, John Reid, said he had been "kept fully
informed of the developments.
Peter Clarke, head of the Anti-Terrorist Branch, said this weekend that the
police were trying to keep tabs on "thousands" of people directly or indirectly
involved in terrorism in the UK.
About 70 counter-terrorism investigations are ongoing.
Training camps
link to anti-terror arrests, G, 4.9.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1864326,00.html
Young Muslims held in terror camp crackdown
Sunday September 3, 2006
The Observer
Jamie Doward, Antony Barnett, Mark Townsend and Urmee Khan
Police are investigating a network of terror training camps
across Britain which they fear are nurturing a new wave of home-grown Islamic
extremists. The investigation is linked to raids late on Friday in which
anti-terrorism officers arrested 14 people.
Yesterday police also sealed off a school in East Sussex
run by an Islamic charity, Jameah Islamiyah, in the grounds of which The
Observer understands the jailed cleric Abu Hamza secretly ran terror camps,
training young militant Muslim men to use firearms.
No one at Jameah Islamiyah has been arrested and police stressed that its staff
had been fully cooperative in the investigation, which has seen the creation of
an exclusion area around the school as police comb its premises. A Sussex Police
spokeswoman said the searches could take 'days, possibly weeks'. The 14 men
arrested are thought to be mainly young British Muslims of Pakistani origin.
They were arrested after a lengthy surveillance operation involving Scotland
Yard's Anti-Terrorist Branch and MI5. The men are now in custody at Paddington
Green high-security police station.
Security sources said there was no evidence that any kind of terror attack was
imminent, although police have not disclosed what triggered their actions. It is
understood the raids were not linked to either the alleged plot to bring down
transatlantic aircraft or the 7/7 bombings.
A counter-terrorism official described the arrests as part of a 'new plank' of
attack against Islamic terrorists in Britain, one that targets their 'upstream'
activities. 'It is not just about disrupting specific plots,' the source said.
'It is about closing down their opportunities to plan these attacks. Those that
set up terror training camps are very much in our sights.'
The source said they were not just talking about military-style camps, but bases
where religious extremists 'bonded' and indoctrination took place preparing
young extremists to become suicide bombers.
The source refused to quantify the number of camps they were investigating, but
confirmed there were likely to be several around the UK, both in metropolitan
areas and remote rural regions.
The Observer understands camps have operated in some of Britain's most isolated
areas including Scotland, Wales and the Lake District. There has long been
speculation that Abu Hamza operated a training camp in the Brecon Beacons in
Wales and an unknown location in Scotland. At least two of the 7/7 bombers were
known to have gone on white water trips in North Wales before their lethal
attacks in London, and the use of activity-based training camps are suspected of
playing a pivotal role in preparing young extremists.
A spokeswoman for Home Secretary John Reid said he had been 'kept fully informed
of the developments about the counter-terror operation'.
Mehdi Belyani, the owner and manager of the Bridge to China restaurant where
three of the men were arrested, said a group of about 15 men and two small boys
had come in for dinner at around 9pm on Friday. The men were aged between 25 and
35 and some were wearing Islamic dress.
An hour later more than 50 police officers entered the restaurant and kept the
suspects and all the other customers inside. 'The police stayed for more than
two hours talking to the group,' Belyani said. 'The men were very calm.'
In a separate development, two men were arrested in anti-terror raids in
Manchester yesterday.
Young Muslims held
in terror camp crackdown, O, 3.9.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1863820,00.html
The Islamic school that played host to Hamza
The jailed cleric attended camps in the grounds of an Islamic school in East
Sussex searched by police in the wake of Friday night's terror arrests
Sunday September 3, 2006
The Observer
Jamie Doward, Nick Greenslade and Antony Barnett
For years people living near the former 100-room convent in
the quiet village of Mark Cross in East Sussex have wondered what goes on behind
the walls of the strange, Gothic building that was falling into disrepair.
Since 1992 it has been owned by a Muslim charity, Jameah
Islamiyah, which in 2003 turned part of the building into an independent Muslim
school for boys that did little to integrate itself with the villagers. Amid the
secrecy, wild stories among the residents of the area quickly spread, stories
likely to become ever more febrile following police searches at the school that
began at 6am yesterday and came in the wake of a series of terror raids late on
Friday night that resulted in 14 arrests in London.
Sam Hardy, 26, an assistant manager at the nearby Mark Cross Inn, said: 'There
have always been rumours about extremism at the school in the village and when I
heard about the police operation on the radio this morning I put two and two
together.'
A recent report by Ofsted inspectors sheds little light on the school, which is
set within 54 acres of countryside. They found it had only nine pupils and that
it was lacking in a number of areas. 'Jameah Islamiyah School does not provide a
satisfactory education for its pupils,' the report stated. 'It has not made
sufficient progress towards fulfilling its aims since it was established ... The
curriculum is not broad and balanced.'
According to its deeds, filed with the Charity Commission, the school's aim is
to train students in higher Islamic studies and to spread the Islamic faith.
Yesterday police stressed that there had been no arrests at the school and that
those who ran it had been fully cooperative with the investigation.
But it is clear the school's grounds have been on the intelligence services'
radar for years. Buried in the pages of testimonies given by al-Qaeda suspects
held at Guantanamo Bay are references to terror training camps held within the
school's grounds between 1997 and 1998. The camps were advertised at Finsbury
Park mosque and attended by Abu Hamza, the radical imam who was jailed for seven
years earlier this year for incitement to murder.
Last week the school's imam, Bilal Patel, confirmed Hamza had been a visitor to
the site, which also provides 'accommodation for singles wishing to live in a
strict Islamic environment at a nominal fee'. 'When [Hamza] arrived we were
immediately concerned about his strange behaviour,' Patel said. 'He and his
followers set up camp in the grounds and they kept themselves to themselves. We
had no idea what they were doing, but we were not happy about it.'
According to the Guantanamo testimonies, which have been read to The Observer,
groups of around 30 of Hamza's followers were taught to use AK47 rifles and
handguns at the camp. On one occasion they were trained to use a mock rocket
launcher.
The testimonies also detail how Hamza ran similar training camps in the Brecon
Beacons and in Scotland. In addition to weapons training, followers, usually
young Muslim men, attended debates on jihad and met for prayers. Police and
intelligence services have become increasingly worried about the prevalence of
such camps in recent months. Earlier this year Colin Cramphorn, chief constable
of West Yorkshire, said he was aware of camps in the Yorkshire Dales, the
Western Highlands and the Lakes. 'They're actually pure indoctrination camps,'
Cramphorn said in comments that were later clarified. 'He was not talking about
camps as physical locations,' a spokesman for the Yorkshire force said. Mohammed
Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer were photographed attending a rafting trip in
Bala in north Wales with a number of other young men shortly before they carried
out the 7 July London bombings.
It is not just the remote parts of Britain that are becoming training grounds
for home-grown terrorists. A US indictment filed in 2004 accused Hamza of
attempting to set up a terror training camp in Oregon between 1999 and 2000 to
'fight jihad' in Afghanistan. The cleric will be extradited to the US after he
has served his UK prison term for inciting murder and race hate.
Many of those attending the camps are thought to belong to radical Muslim
societies based on university campuses. Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th
hijacker who was jailed in the US for his membership of the terror cell that
carried out the 9/11 atrocities, attended London's South Bank University. Three
of those who were arrested yesterday were dining at a Chinese restaurant popular
with students from the university. It is thought several students from the
university made regular trips to Jameah Islamiyah to carry out renovations on
the decrepit building as part of a group bonding exercise.
The Islamic school
that played host to Hamza, O, 3.9.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1863813,00.html
British police arrest 16 in anti-terrorism raids
Sat Sep 2, 2006 12:21 PM ET
Reuters
By Adrian Croft
LONDON (Reuters) - British police said on Saturday they had
arrested 16 men in two separate anti-terrorism operations just three weeks after
uncovering a suspected plot to bring down U.S.-bound airliners over the
Atlantic.
Fourteen of the men were held in London in an overnight operation that a police
source said focused on suspected training and recruitment of terrorists.
Anti-terrorist police in Manchester arrested two men early on Saturday and were
carrying out three searches but this was not linked to the London arrests,
police there said.
The arrests came after the head of London police's anti-terrorist branch, Peter
Clarke, said on Friday that police were keeping tabs on thousands of British
Muslims who they suspect may be involved in or support terrorism -- higher than
previous official estimates.
The BBC said 12 arrests were made at a Chinese restaurant in south London that
police in riot gear raided on Friday night. It said the probe may be linked to
alleged terrorist training camps in Britain.
Police said in February they had uncovered evidence of such camps while other
reports have spoken of militants going for adventure training to forge closer
ties.
Two of the four Muslim suicide bombers who killed 52 people on London transport
in July last year are believed to have gone on a team-building white-water
rafting holiday in Wales weeks before the attacks.
SCHOOL SEARCH
Police said they were searching a school in East Sussex, southern England, in
connection with the London arrests. The rambling independent school for Muslim
boys, once a Victorian orphanage, is set in extensive grounds surrounded by
woodland.
A report by government school inspectors last December said the school, which
had nine pupils at the time, did not provide a satisfactory education.
Police said the 14 men held in London overnight were arrested in a "pre-planned,
intelligence-led operation" that followed months of surveillance by police and
security services.
The men, suspected of "the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism", were being held at a central London police station, they said.
They said the operation was not related to the arrests of more than 20 people on
August 9-10 over an alleged plot by a group of British Muslims to blow up
U.S.-bound airliners using liquid explosives. Nor were they related to last
year's London attacks.
The BBC said the Chinese restaurant was full of people, including children, when
police arrived on Friday night.
The restaurant's owner, Madi Blyani, told the BBC up to 60 officers entered the
restaurant, which is popular with Muslims.
"They suddenly came inside because they were suspicious of some of the
customers. ... They talked to them (for) more than one hour, two hours, and they
arrested some of them. So it was obviously surprising for me, my staff, for
everyone," he said.
Eleven British Muslims have been charged with conspiracy to murder over the
suspected plot to blow up airliners.
Four people are accused of lesser offences and five others are still being
questioned but have not been charged.
(Additional reporting by Peter Griffiths)
British police
arrest 16 in anti-terrorism raids, R, 2.9.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-09-02T162054Z_01_L01103315_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY-BRITAIN.xml&WTmodLoc=Home-C5-worldNews-2
Yard is watching thousands of terror suspects
Filed: 02/09/2006
The Daily Telegraph
By Philip Johnston, Home Affairs Editor
Thousands of British Muslims are being watched by police
and MI5 under suspicion of possible terrorist involvement, a Scotland Yard chief
has disclosed.
Peter Clarke, the head of the Metropolitan Police anti-terrorist branch, said
they were being looked at in the belief that they might be involved directly or
indirectly in supporting terrorism.
His estimate was given in an interview for a BBC2 documentary, al-Qa'eda: Time
to Talk, which investigates British Muslim connections with the terrorist
network and will to be shown tomorrow.
advertisementMr Clarke said: "What we've learnt since 9/11 is that the threat is
not something that's simply coming from overseas into the United Kingdom. What
we've learnt, and what we've seen all too graphically and all too murderously,
is that we have a threat which is being generated here within the United
Kingdom."
When asked roughly how many Muslims were being looked at, Mr Clarke said: "I
don't want to go down the numbers game, I don't think it's helpful … all I can
say is that our knowledge is increasing and certainly in terms of broad
description, the numbers of people who we have to be interested in, are into the
thousands."
He added: ''That includes a whole range of people, not just terrorists, not just
attackers, but the people who might be tempted to support or encourage or to
assist."
The counter-terrorist agencies are especially concerned about the links being
forged between British citizens of Pakistani descent and al-Qa'eda militants in
the land of their parents or grandparents.
Many young Britons with Pakistani backgrounds travel to Pakistan to visit
relatives or to attend religious ''camps", where they may be targeted and
recruited by jihadists.
Two of the London suicide bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shezad Tanweer,
visited camps in Pakistan where they are believed to have come into contact with
al-Qa'eda activists.
After initial scepticism, MI5 is now increasingly convinced that most of the
plots hatched in Britain have been run by al-Qa'eda from Pakistan.
The security service had kept an open mind about al-Qa'eda involvement in
activity largely being carried out by "home grown" fanatics.
But the sophistication of the alleged conspiracy to destroy airliners over the
Atlantic has persuaded intelligence officers that Osama bin Laden's organisation
was directly implicated in both this and probably in the July 7 outrage in
London that killed 52 commuters and four suicide bombers.
The investigators also uncovered a route for suicide bombers from Britain to
Iraq. They followed the trail of a French Algerian jihadist, Idris Bazis, who
lived in Manchester and is believed to have died in a suicide attack in Iraq.
Asked if there was a ''pipeline" to carry young British Muslims into Iraq, Mr
Clarke said: "What we do see is individuals who, with connections, managed to
facilitate people's travel.
There's probably a collection of individuals who are happy to try to organise
the travel of others." He added: "We know who some of them are. We investigate,
we carry out surveillance on a lot of people, but I'm not going to say exactly
who."
Mr Clarke's figure of "thousands" of British Muslims either under surveillance,
or at least causing concern, is certain to reignite indignation in the Islamic
community about what they consider to be unfair targeting.
This was especially pronounced after the raid in Forest Gate, east London, in
which a Muslim man was shot but no charges were brought.
However, there has been less hostility since charges were brought over the
alleged plot to blow up airliners and the counter-terrorist agencies have been
unapologetic about acting on intelligence, pointing to possible conspiracies
that threaten the public.
Of the 24 people arrested, 15 have been charged and remanded in custody, five
are being questioned and four have been released without charge. Since the
alleged plot was smashed, MI5 has investigated other suspected plots, many just
as alarming.
The counter-terrorist effort now under way, with some 70 investigations against
suspected Islamic extremists, is unprecedented and unmatched even at the height
of the IRA's mainland campaign.
Last month, John Reid, the Home Secretary, said the police and security services
were aware of about 24 "major conspiracies", with another 50 peripheral
inquiries also being conducted relating to fundraising.
A significant focus of the surveillance involves internet communication between
groups, often Muslim men at colleges and universities.
Yard is watching
thousands of terror suspects, DTel, 2.9.2006,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=KEXEXHCKILGLTQFIQMFSFFOAVCBQ0IV0?xml=/news/2006/09/02/nterr02.xml
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