History > 2006 > USA > War > Iraq (I)
Maj. Greg Paul of the Army
in a complete set of armor
Wednesday after a Senate briefing on protecting troops.
Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
NYT January 12, 2006
Army Sending Added Armor to Iraq Units
NYT 12.1.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/12/national/12armor.html
US forces kill 2 Iraqi women "by mistake":
report
Wed May 31, 2006 11:17 AM ET
Reuters
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A joint Iraqi-U.S.
security body said on Wednesday U.S. forces had killed "by mistake" two women
who were en route to a maternity hospital north of Baghdad.
News of the deaths came a day after Iraq's prime minister told Reuters his
patience was wearing thin with "excuses" from U.S. troops that they kill
civilians by "mistake".
The U.S. military is also under pressure over revelations that U.S. Marines may
have killed 24 civilians in the town of Haditha during an unprovoked attack last
November.
An incident report by the joint body of the Iraqi army and U.S. forces in
Salahaddin province said the two women were shot and killed in the small town of
al-Mutasim on Tuesday.
A brief statement from the Joint Coordination Center named them as Saleha
Mohammed, 55, and Nabiha Nasif, 35.
"U.S. forces killed two women by mistake ... when they were heading to a
maternity hospital in a taxi," it said, without specifying if either of the
women was pregnant.
A police source said the driver of the car was wounded.
The U.S. military said a car had entered a "clearly marked prohibited area" near
an observation post.
"As the vehicle neared the observation post and failed to stop despite repeated
visual and auditory signals, shots were fired to disable the vehicle,"
Lieutenant Colonel Ed Loomis told Reuters in an e-mail in response to a
question.
"The vehicle stopped, changed directions and quickly departed the area."
He said the military later received Iraqi police reports that two women had died
from gunshot wounds at the hospital in the town of Samarra, 100 km (60 miles)
north of Baghdad.
"The loss of life is regrettable and coalition forces go to great lengths to
prevent them," he said. "The incident is under investigation."
The U.S. military, targeted in numerous suicide bombings since the 2003 invasion
to topple Saddam Hussein, says people often drive too fast and ignore clear
warning signs.
Ordinary Iraqis complain that U.S. soldiers manning checkpoints are too quick to
open fire at approaching vehicles, at times leading to the loss of innocent
civilians.
US
forces kill 2 Iraqi women "by mistake": report, R, 31.5.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyid=2006-05-31T151652Z_01_DAH138765_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&WTmodLoc=NewsArt-L1-RelatedNews-5
In another town, Iraqis say US killed
civilians
Wed May 31, 2006 11:00 AM ET
Reuters
SAMARRA, Iraq (Reuters) - U.S. forces denied
on Wednesday a new accusation, from Iraqi officers, that American troops killed
unarmed civilians in their home this month.
Amid mounting public interest in the United States in an inquiry into a
suspected massacre at Haditha, the allegations about the deaths of three people
at Samarra are among many that Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said this
week were trying his patience with the U.S. military's "excuses" over
"mistakes".
Iraqi army and police officers and several people who said they were witnesses
and relatives of the dead said U.S. soldiers killed two women, aged 60 and 20,
and a mentally handicapped man in their home on May 4 after insurgents fired on
the troops.
Spokesmen for the 101st Airborne Division, which controls Samarra and Salahaddin
province north of Baghdad, said soldiers from its 3rd Brigade Combat Team killed
two unnamed men and a woman in a house who had "planned to attack the soldiers".
In an initial statement on May 5, the unit had said troops killed three people
who had already fired on them from a roof.
A senior Iraqi police officer from the province's Joint Coordination Center
(JCC), a unit that liaises between the U.S. and Iraqi security forces, said:
"There was shooting outside the house. Samarra police told us that American
soldiers went inside and shot three people, including a mentally handicapped
man.
"They were not armed and there were no gunmen in the house," said the officer,
who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of being targeted by insurgents who
routinely kill policemen.
There are frequent disputes over incidents between U.S. military and Iraqi
officials in Salahaddin, where the Sunni Arab revolt against occupation and the
Shi'ite-led government has been strong. U.S. officers have complained of
"disinformation" from police as part of an insurgent campaign to discredit them.
RELATIVES' STATEMENTS
On May 6, Army Colonel Fadhil Muhammed, assistant manager of the JCC, said in a
statement: "Multinational forces raided the house of a citizen and killed three
people and wounded two from one family at 7 p.m. on May 4." He described the
dead as "martyrs", indicating the authorities believed them innocent.
In his family home in the Sikaak district of Samarra, 100 km (60 miles) north of
Baghdad, Zedan Khalaf Habib told a Reuters reporter that the soldiers killed his
60-year-old wife, Khairiya Nisiyif Jassim, his son Khaled Zedan Khalaf, 40, who
was mentally handicapped, and daughter Anaam Zedan Khalaf, 20.
Habib, 66, said he was hit in the arm when soldiers fired from a doorway into a
room where 15 people had taken refuge in his house after a gunfight broke out
nearby. Another daughter said soldiers placed a rifle next to her brother's body
and took photographs to suggest he had been armed when killed.
"I was sitting next to my house when clashes erupted between gunmen and U.S.
forces," said Habib, sitting in his home three weeks later. "I went indoors with
my family to a safe room."
U.S. soldiers then broke down the door, he said: "Four soldiers stood at the
door of the room where we were hiding. There were 15 of us. They started firing.
I was shot in the arm and then one of the soldiers dragged me out.
"The firing went on against my family. I was lying face down in another room and
they dragged one of my relatives over me."
Habib said he woke from a faint as someone called his name: "It was a policeman.
He was crying. The room was full of blood. A few minutes later he showed me the
bodies of my relatives.
"They were in black body bags," he said, providing a home video showing the room
streaked with blood.
"STAGED EVIDENCE"
Shireen, his 36-year-old daughter, said: "After they killed my brother Khaled
they shot him three more times in the chest and they put a rifle between his
legs to show he was armed and they took a photograph of him."
Asked to comment on the allegation, Master Sergeant Terry Webster of the 101st
Airborne said the soldiers came under fire from a rooftop after arresting three
people nearby who were suspected of planting roadside bombs:
"The troops suppressed the rooftop fire, entered and cleared the home. Three
people in the home, one woman and two men, were killed in the ensuing firefight.
A second woman was injured and transported to a nearby hospital," Webster wrote
in an e-mail.
"The injured woman confessed that the three people killed had planned to attack
the soldiers as they drove by the house.
"No Coalition forces were injured during the engagement."
The unit's initial statement on May 5 said that the three dead were those who
had opened fire from the roof: "As the soldiers began to leave the area with the
detainees, they came under attack with small arms fire from a nearby rooftop.
"The troops suppressed the rooftop fire and entered and killed the three
attackers from the rooftop. An Iraqi citizen was injured during the firefight,
but still provided the soldiers with information about the rooftop firers."
The White House pledged on Tuesday to provide full details once investigations
are complete into whether Marines killed up to 24 unarmed civilians in Haditha,
a Sunni city in the west, and whether they tried to cover it up.
(Additional reporting by Michael Georgy and Alastair Macdonald in Baghdad)
In
another town, Iraqis say US killed civilians, R, 31.5.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsarticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyid=2006-05-31T145905Z_01_MAC149206_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&WTmodLoc=NewsArt-L1-RelatedNews-4
Investigation
Military Inquiry Is Said to Oppose Account
of Raid
May 31, 2006
The New York Times
By ERIC SCHMITT and DAVID S. CLOUD
WASHINGTON, May 30 — A military investigator
uncovered evidence in February and March that contradicted repeated claims by
marines that Iraqi civilians killed in Haditha last November were victims of a
roadside bomb, according to a senior military official in Iraq.
Among the pieces of evidence that conflicted with the marines' story were death
certificates that showed all the Iraqi victims had gunshot wounds, mostly to the
head and chest, the official said.
The investigation, which was led by Col. Gregory Watt, an Army officer in
Baghdad, also raised questions about whether the marines followed established
rules for identifying hostile threats when they assaulted houses near the site
of a bomb attack, which killed a fellow marine.
The three-week inquiry was the first official investigation into an episode that
was first uncovered by Time magazine in January and that American military
officials now say appears to have been an unprovoked attack by the marines that
killed 24 Iraqi civilians. The results of Colonel Watt's investigation, which
began on Feb. 14, have not previously been disclosed.
"There were enough inconsistencies that things didn't add up," said the senior
official, who was briefed on the conclusions of Colonel Watt's preliminary
investigation.
The official agreed to discuss the findings only after being promised anonymity.
The findings have not been made public, and the Pentagon and the Marines have
refused to discuss the details of inquiries now underway, saying that to do so
could compromise the investigation.
When Colonel Watt described the findings to Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the senior
ground commander in Iraq, on March 9, they raised enough questions about the
marines' veracity that General Chiarelli referred the matter to the senior
Marine commander in Iraq, who ordered a criminal investigation that officials
say could result in murder charges being brought against members of the unit.
Colonel Watt's findings also prompted General Chiarelli to order a parallel
investigation into whether senior Marine officers and enlisted personnel had
attempted to cover up what happened.
Colonel Watt's inquiry included interviews with marines believed to have been
involved in the killings, as well as with senior officers in the unit, the Third
Battalion of the First Marine Regiment.
Among them were Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich, whom officials had said was one of
the senior noncommissioned officers on the patrol, and Lt. Col. Jeffrey R.
Chessani, the battalion commander, the senior official said. Colonel Chessani
was relieved of his command in April, after the unit returned from Iraq.
In their accounts to Colonel Watt, the marines said they took gunfire from the
first of five residences they entered near the bomb site, according to the
senior military official.
The official said the marines had recalled hearing "a weapon being prepared to
be used against them."
Colonel Watt also reviewed payments totaling $38,000 in cash made within weeks
of the shootings to families of victims.
In an interview Tuesday, Maj. Dana Hyatt, the officer who made the payments,
said he was told by superiors to compensate the relatives of 15 victims, but was
told that rest of those killed had been deemed to have committed hostile acts,
leaving their families ineligible for compensation.
After the initial payments were made, however, those families demanded similar
payments, insisting their relatives had not attacked the marines, Major Hyatt
said.
Major Hyatt said he was authorized by Colonel Chessani and more senior officers
at the marines' regimental headquarters to make the payments to relatives of 15
victims.
Colonel Chessani "was part of the chain of command that gives the approval,"
Major Hyatt said.
"Even when he signs off on it," the major added, "it still has to go up to" the
unit's regimental headquarters.
Colonel Chessani declined to comment on Tuesday when visited at his home at Camp
Pendleton, Calif.
The list of 15 victims deemed to be noncombatants was put together by
intelligence personnel attached to the battalion, Major Hyatt said. Those
victims were related to a Haditha city council member, he said. The American
military sometimes pays compensation to relatives of civilian victims.
The relatives of each victim were paid a total of $2,500, the maximum allowed
under Marine rules, along with $250 payments for two children who were wounded.
Major Hyatt said he also compensated the families for damage to two houses.
"I didn't say we had made a mistake," Major Hyatt said, describing what he had
told the city council member who was representing the victims. "I said I'm being
told I can make payments for these 15 because they were deemed not to be
involved in combat."
The military began its examination of the killings only after Time magazine
presented the full findings of its investigation to a military spokesman in
Baghdad in early February.
General Chiarelli, an Army officer who took command of American ground forces in
Iraq in January, learned soon after the spokesman was notified that the Marines
had not investigated the incident, according to the senior military official.
On Tuesday, the White House spokesman, Tony Snow, said President Bush first
became aware of the episode after the Time magazine inquiry, when he was briefed
by Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser. "When this comes out, all the
details will be made available to the public, so we'll have a picture of what
happened," Mr. Snow said.
Military Inquiry Is Said to Oppose Account of Raid, NYT, 31.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/31/world/middleeast/31haditha.html?hp&ex=1149134400&en=ba9330564ff54260&ei=5094&partner=homepage
On a Marine Base, Disbelief Over Charges
May 30, 2006
The New York Times
By CAROLYN MARSHALL
CAMP PENDLETON, Calif., May 29 — In this
"company town" where everything and everyone caters to the well-being of the
Marine Corps, there is no shortage of people, both military and civilian, who
are willing to give the benefit of the doubt to the troops accused of
unjustified killings last November in Haditha, Iraq.
Denial and utter disbelief are the overwhelming reaction to reports of the
killings involving marines based here. If there is any truth to the accusations,
some say, then the troops must have been acting on direct orders, responding as
they were trained to do.
Lawrence Harper, 36, now retired, served in the Marine Corps for more than 15
years, and was in the Persian Gulf war.
"Many times you see a situation the next day and wonder, how did my brain think
this was dangerous?" Mr. Harper said, while shopping for gear at G.I. Joe's, a
military supply shop in Oceanside.
Mr. Harper expressed doubt that the marines knowingly committed crimes in
Haditha, saying that they undoubtedly acted on instinct, as trained, in the heat
of battle.
"When a bullet comes at you and you turn around and half your buddy's head is
blown off, it changes the way you think forever," he said.
Jerry Alexander, the owner of G.I. Joe's and a Navy man who served with the
Marines for a dozen years, had much the same perspective, saying, "If I saw my
buddy laying there dead, there is no such thing as too much retaliation."
While Mr. Alexander said "unacceptable kills" should not be covered up, he
worried about the unfairness of judging those who were in Haditha.
"In the heat of combat, you cannot hesitate; he who hesitates is lost," he said.
"I would not prosecute these young men because they were just doing their jobs."
On this Memorial Day, in this military community, people will concede that any
marine who committed illegal acts must be punished and that the Pentagon must
take responsibility.
But conversation quickly returns to emotional and earnest explanations of the
need for understanding for what one former marine described as "these
19-year-old kids who get paid 900 bucks a month to put their lives on the line."
The marines and several senior officers assigned to the Third Battalion of the
First Marine Division are the focus of criminal investigations looking into the
deaths of 24 people who lived in the Subhani district of Haditha, an insurgent
stronghold in Iraq.
A preliminary inquiry indicated that the civilians were killed during a four- to
five-hour sweep, led by a handful of marines angry over the death of Lance Cpl.
Miguel Terrazas, 20, of El Paso, Tex., who was killed as his patrol drove
through the area.
Appearing Monday on the CNN program "American Morning," Gen. Peter Pace,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, "We want to find out what happened
and we'll make it public."
He added, "If the allegations, as they are being portrayed in the newspaper,
turn out to be valid, then of course there will be charges. But we don't know
yet what the outcome will be."
The family of Corporal Terrazas was interviewed Monday morning on "Morning
Edition" on National Public Radio. His uncle, Andy Terrazas, a former marine who
is now a border patrol agent, said, "I hope this is over soon so they can just
let him rest in peace. I hope these marines come out clean, but I guess it's not
looking too good, right?"
None of the active and former marines interviewed for this story knew Corporal
Terrazas or the members of the unit at the center of the probe. But most of them
had seen combat, recently or in the Gulf war.
"In Iraq, everything you do has to be cleared with a commanding officer," said
Cpl. Michael Miller, 25, who has served two tours of duty and fought in Falluja
and Ramadi. "You just can't go clearing houses without the permission of
higher-ups."
Corporal Miller said he believed that the marines would be vindicated in the
inquiry. "I just think the marines did what they had to do," he said. "I don't
know why innocent people are dead, but someone must have seen a gun." Several
retired senior officers agreed. Col. Ben Mittman of the Air Force, interviewed
as he got his regular military buzz cut at the Beachcomber Barber Shop in
Oceanside, worried that the young servicemen were being made scapegoats.
"If this thing really happened, they had to radio communication and get the
go-ahead," he said. "The frontline grunts these days do not do anything without
the commanders knowing, especially something like that."
The Los Angeles Times reported Friday that photographs taken by a Marine
intelligence team sent into Haditha showed execution-style killings, including
gunshots to the head. As more details about the Haditha deaths incident surface,
it has conjured disturbing memories of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam for many
former marines and in other circles of war veterans. "I would draw the same
parallel," Mr. Alexander said. "The young guys took the heat for the higher-ups
there too."
Most of those "young guys," the active-duty marines who are the peers of those
under scrutiny in the Haditha deaths, were off base this weekend on a five-day
holiday leave.
It is those marines and their leaders who were the focus of other remarks by
General Pace in his interview on "Morning Edition."
"We should, in fact, as leaders take on the responsibility to get out and talk
to our troops and make sure that they understand that what 99.9 percent of them
are doing, which is fighting with honor and courage, is exactly what we expect
of them," he said, adding, "Because regardless of where this investigations
goes, we want to ensure that our troops understand what's expected of them."
On a
Marine Base, Disbelief Over Charges, NYT, 30.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/world/middleeast/30voices.html
Revving Their Engines, Remembering a War's
Toll
May 29, 2006
The New York Times
By ALAN FEUER
Lt. Michael L. Licalzi's funeral cortege moved
through Nassau County, slowly and a hundred cars strong.
It moved through Garden City, where purple ribbons adorned the trees of Poplar
Street, which was his street. It moved up the Southern State Parkway, where many
of the drivers kept from the road seemed annoyed to have been stopped by a
hearse.
At the head of the procession were those who suffered most — friends and family
— though riding point out front was a group of strangers who, if they had not
suffered personally, had at least decided they would not forget.
To forget is to die, as someone said, and if there had been death that day, the
strangers saw to it that on May 20, when Lieutenant Licalzi was lowered in the
earth, there would be no forgetting. They were bikers — most in beards, most on
Harley-Davidsons and most flying the flag. It is not easy to forget half a
hundred bikers, in leather and straddling their engines — which seemed to be the
point.
For the last six months, these bikers, called the Patriot Guard Riders, have
attended funerals from Florida to Alaska, waging a chrome-lined war against the
ebb of memory that often follows death.
"When we show up with a couple hundred bikes as complete strangers and stand
there and show respect, it's incredible," said Kurt Mayer, who rides a 1989
Yamaha Venture Royale and is one of the founding members of the group. "We show
families in grieving communities that America still cares."
The Patriot Guard was formed last fall in response to protests staged by the
Westboro Baptist Church, a Christian splinter group from Topeka, Kan., whose 75
parishioners have been turning up at military funerals across the country with
placards reading "Thank God for Dead Soldiers" and tattered American flags. They
use death to promote their message — that the nation and its armed forces
condone homosexuals, who are invariably described with a shorter, crueler term.
Mr. Mayer said that with free speech being what it is, the Westboro Church has
all the right in the world to protest when and where it wants. Of course, the
Patriot Guard, too, has the right to call upon its own faithful and to smother
hateful slogans in a Harley engine's word-obscuring roar, he said.
"You got to give credit to the Westboro Baptist Church," said Jeff Brown (Suzuki
Intruder 1500 LC), a software salesman and former Air Force sergeant from
Oklahoma, and another founding member of the club. "Give the devil his due, so
to speak."
It was, after all, Mr. Brown who first thought to bring together disparate
groups like Rolling Thunder (which rides on behalf of soldiers missing in action
and prisoners of war), the Blue Knights (law enforcement officers), the Combat
Veterans Motorcycle Association, the In Country Vets Motorcycle Club, the
Christian Motorcyclists Association and the American Legion Riders into one
Web-connected crew.
At the group's Internet site, patriotguard.org, members of the guard can check
on "missions" both confirmed and completed (about 200 so far), and each time the
Pentagon announces a death, the name is added to the "Watch List." Mr. Mayer
said that state captains worked through a military officer to reach out to the
family and seek permission to ride.
The Web site also has archived letters written to the guard from grieving
mothers and gracious servicemen. The following was written by Sgt. First Class
Karl B. Henderson, of the 82nd Airborne Division, who on April 21 served as a
military escort at the funeral of Cpl. Shawn Ross Creighton in North Carolina:
"One thing I'll never forget is riding up that rural country road with the
family and seeing six barefoot little girls run out of their farmhouse right up
to the edge of that highway just to render a salute as the soldier passed their
house. I suppose the rumble of all of those V-twin engines leading the
procession gave them ample notification that something big was about to pass
their farm."
Something big passed the Licalzi house, too, nine days ago: 50 bikers in a
rolling phalanx with roars escaping from their Thunderhead pipes. Lieutenant
Licalzi, 24, died May 11, when his Marine Corps M1A1 tank rolled off a bridge
into a canal in Anbar Province in Iraq.
There were no protesters at his funeral Mass, nor at Long Island National
Cemetery, in Farmingdale, where he was buried — though, if there had been, the
Patriot Guard would have been ready. Scott Deale, the New York state captain,
rallied his troops a few hours after dawn in the parking lot of Best Buy off the
Belt Parkway in Brooklyn.
"They filed for a permit for a funeral a few weeks ago in Queens," said Mr.
Deale (1994 Yamaha Virago), a former marine who wears a red, white and blue
bandanna and whose cellphone rings with the Marine Corps Hymn. The Patriot Guard
came to the funeral in Queens for Sgt. Jose Gomez of the Army, but the Westboro
group was nowhere in sight.
"Sometimes they don't even bother showing up if they know the guard's going to
be there in numbers," Mr. Deale said.
From Best Buy, the riders rode to a second rally point, to join more
motorcyclists, then on to St. Joseph's Roman Catholic Church in Garden City.
There, they lined up in formation at the curb, talking of traffic jams and bad
storms until the Mass was finished.
For some, the chance to ride for the dead puts to sleep old ghosts.
"In my era, you came back from the war and you didn't talk about it," said Roger
Jacobsen (2005 Harley Ultra Classic), a reinsurance salesman who served with the
Fourth Infantry Division in the Central Highlands of Vietnam in 1967 and 1968.
"We're here to show respect and thank the families. To do for these people what
wasn't done for us."
Like leading 100 cars down Poplar Street, where a gardener working on a lawn put
aside his mower and stood at attention as the cortege passed. Or leading it past
Sprung Monuments and Ye Olde Friendly Flower Shoppe ("Last Florist Before
Cemetery") and through the iron gates.
Green grass, blue sky, white headstones — and the Patriot Guard, in line, in
leather, holding up their flags. A color guard. A salute from Marine Corps
rifles. Taps.
"Who are you masked men?" asked an old-timer in the red garrison cap of the
Marine Corps League.
"Patriot Guard Riders," Mr. Deale explained.
"Well, it's impressive," the old-timer said. "Very impressive."
Then the dead man's mother walked the line of riders and, with her son's flag
tucked beneath her arm, shook each and every hand.
Revving Their Engines, Remembering a War's Toll, NYT, 29.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/29/nyregion/29patriot.html
Mariah May made a frame for two photographs of her father,
Don.
Nicole Bengiveno/The New York Times
May 28, 2006
After Loss of a Parent to War, a Shared
Grieving NYT
29.5.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/29/us/29grief.html?hp&ex=
1148961600&en=1ef0addffca5dd01&ei=5094&partner=homepage
After Loss of a Parent to War, a Shared
Grieving
May 29, 2006
The New York Times
By LIZETTE ALVAREZ
ARLINGTON, Va., May 28 — Jacob Hobbs, 10, did
not mince words about the death of his father.
"He was in a Humvee, driving at night on patrol, and a homemade bomb blew up on
him so bad it killed his brain," Jacob said of his father, Staff Sgt. Brian
Hobbs, 31, of the Army. "But he wasn't scratched up that much. And that's how he
died."
Sitting across from Jacob in a circle at a grief camp over Memorial Day weekend,
Taylor Downing, a 10-year-old with wavy red hair and a mouthful of braces,
offered up her own detailed description. "My dad died four days after my
birthday, on Oct. 28, 2004," Taylor said quietly of Specialist Stephen Paul
Downing II. "He got shot by a sniper. It came in through here," she added,
pointing to the front of her head, "and went out there," shifting her finger to
the back of her head.
"Before he left," Taylor said, "he sat me on his knee and he told me why he had
to go: because people in Iraq didn't have what we did. They didn't have enough
money. They couldn't go to school. And they didn't have homes."
An estimated 1,600 children have lost a parent, almost all of them fathers, to
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Over the Memorial Day weekend, nearly 150 of these children gathered at a hotel
here in this Washington suburb for a yearly grief camp run by the Tragedy
Assistance Program for Survivors, a nonprofit group founded in 1994 that helps
military families and friends cope with death and talk about their loss.
Burying a parent is never easy for a child, but losing a father in a violent
way, in a far-off war, is fraught with a complexity all its own.
The children receive hugs from strangers who thank them for their father's
courage; they fight to hold back tears in front of whole communities gathered to
commemorate their fathers; they sometimes cringe when they hear loud noises,
fret over knocks at the door and appear well-versed in the treachery of bombs.
And often the children say goodbye not just to their fathers but to their
schools and homes, since families who live on a military base must move into the
civilian world after a service member dies.
At the camp, their drawings of their fathers are never mundane, they are mythic:
a father as hero, in uniform, with medals trailing across his chest and an
American flag floating high above.
"Before my dad left, he said he wasn't afraid to die," Jacob said of Sergeant
Hobbs, who was killed in a bomb blast in Afghanistan on Oct. 14, 2004. His
father was awarded a Bronze Star and a Purple Heart, Jacob explained. "He saved
his commander from an exploding tank," he said.
Many of these children are old enough to remember their fathers, but now the
images are slipping away in fragments.
One memory few will ever forget is the moment they learned that their fathers
would not come home. Paul R. Syverson IV, a 10-year-old with a blond crew cut
and his father's face, saw a soldier at the door. "My mom saw him and started
crying," said Paul, trying hard to stifle tears as he recounted how he was sent
next door to play.
His father, Maj. Paul R. Syverson III, 32, a Green Beret, had been killed by a
mortar round inside Camp Balad, Iraq — or as Paul put it, "He was eating
breakfast, and he was shot by Iraqis."
Later, "I cried," he said. "I played with my soldiers. And then I went to the
basement because my dad was a collector of 'Star Wars' stuff. I took those out,
and I played with them."
Brooke Nyren, 9, whose father, Staff Sgt. Nathaniel J. Nyren, died in a vehicle
accident in Iraq on Dec. 28, 2004, told her story in a writing assignment at the
camp. When two Army men showed up at the door, "I was really scared," Brooke
wrote. "The two Army men asked my mom, please can you put your daughter in a
different room. So I went in my room. The only thing I was doing was praying."
"My hart was broken," she wrote.
Paul, the blond 10-year-old, recounted how his father was injured by a bomb in
Afghanistan in 2001. The blast broke his father's back, Paul said, but not his
eagerness to fight again. Paul's drawing features his father, with his green
beret, and the words, "Men will jump and die."
And Jacob, who wants to be a soldier, remembers his father saying that he had to
go off and fight. "But he didn't like my mom crying," Jacob said. "She always
cried when he left because she didn't want him to die."
The violence of their fathers' deaths, and its public nature, can be especially
troublesome for children. "'It's a traumatic grief that is highly publicized,"
said Linda Goldman, a grief specialist. "Dad was murdered in a public way. This
heightens the sense of trauma because it never goes away."
The children's mothers say the deaths have had expected repercussions, like
plummeting grades and mood swings. But they have also seen unexpected reactions.
Madison Swisher, 8, who sleeps in her father's T-shirt, is afraid of loud
noises; her dad died in Iraq from an improvised bomb. She and her younger
brother talk a lot about bombs in general. They call the Iraqis the "bad guys"
and are afraid the bad guys will arrive any minute.
Several mothers said they worried that their children's hero worship, a healthy
balm in the beginning, could turn problematic if they tried to follow in their
fathers' footsteps.
Teenagers, in particular, have trouble adjusting. Scott Rentschler, 14, was
living on a military base in Germany when his father, Staff Sgt. George
Rentschler, was killed in Iraq in 2004 by a rocket-propelled grenade. His life,
Scott said, "is a roller coaster." Scott's grandmother, Lillian Rentschler, said
that moving off a military base was difficult for him, and that society and
schools make few allowances for children in their second year of grief.
"People think he should be all fixed up," Ms. Rentschler said.
The outpouring that families receive after a death is mostly comforting to them.
But in time, it can verge on stifling, some parents said. Jenny Hobbs, 32,
Jacob's mother, said that in their hometown, Mesa, Ariz., her three children
were "embraced as heroes. It was cool to know them."
But there was a downside, Ms. Hobbs said, and ultimately she moved the family to
Ohio. "The death is in the public eye," she said. "It is hard to let go. The war
is still going on, and you are reminded of it. One reason I had to move is that
it was hard to be normal."
Ms. Hobbs continued: "He was no longer ours and human. We needed him to be
ours."
Parents and mentors say they try to help the children stay connected to their
fathers and grieve in intimate ways, far from the public eye. They post
photographs all over the house, make teddy bears out of their dads' shirts and
encourage them to write letters.
Eddie Murphy, 10, whose father, Maj. Edward Murphy, 36, died in a helicopter
crash in Afghanistan in April 2005, did just that one day at grief camp. "Summer
is coming up," he wrote to his father. "It won't be the same without you. You
won't believe it but I'm in Washington."
He signed off: "I love you. Hi to Heaven."
After
Loss of a Parent to War, a Shared Grieving, NYT, 29.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/29/us/29grief.html?hp&ex=1148961600&en=1ef0addffca5dd01&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Iraqis' Accounts Link Marines to the Mass
Killing of Civilians
May 29, 2006
The New York Times
By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. and MONA MAHMOUD
BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 28 — Hiba Abdullah survived
the killings by American troops in Haditha last Nov. 19, but said seven others
at her father-in-law's home did not. She said American troops shot and killed
her husband, Rashid Abdul Hamid. They killed her father-in-law, Abdul Hamid
Hassan Ali, a 77-year-old in a wheelchair, shooting him in the chest and
abdomen, she said.
Her sister-in-law, Asma, "collapsed when her husband was killed in front of her
eyes," Ms. Abdullah said. As Asma fell, she dropped her 5-month-old infant. Ms.
Abdullah said she picked up the baby girl and sprinted out of the house, and
when she returned, Asma was dead.
Four people who survived the killings in Haditha, including some who had never
spoken publicly, described the killings to an Iraqi writer and historian who was
recruited by The New York Times to travel to Haditha and interview survivors and
witnesses of what military officials have said appear to be unjustified killings
of two dozen Iraqis by marines. Some in Congress fear the killings could do
greater harm to the image of the United States military around the world than
the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.
The four survivors' accounts could not be independently corroborated, and it was
unclear in some cases whether they actually saw the killings. But much of what
they said was consistent with broad outlines of the events of that day provided
by military and government officials who have been briefed on the military's
investigations into the killings, which the officials have said are likely to
lead to charges that may include murder and a cover-up of what really happened.
The name of the Iraqi who conducted the interviews for The Times is being
withheld for his own safety, because insurgents often make a target of Iraqis
deemed collaborators.
Haditha, a sand-swept farming town flecked with date palms on the upper
Euphrates River, is in one of Iraq's most dangerous areas, ridden with
insurgents in the heart of Sunni-dominated Anbar Province.
Three months earlier, 20 Marines from a different unit were killed around
Haditha over a three-day span. Fourteen were killed by a bomb that destroyed
their troop carrier. Six others, all snipers, were ambushed and killed on a foot
patrol. Insurgents appeared later to rejoice and boast about the sniper ambush,
releasing a video over the Internet that appeared to show the attack and the
mangled and burned body of a dead American serviceman.
Haditha is under the control of insurgents that include Tawhid and Jihad, a name
that has been used by the terrorist organization of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, said
Miysar al-Dulaimi, a human rights lawyer who has relatives in Haditha and who
returned there two days after the killings and spoke to witnesses and neighbors.
Mr. Dulaimi said that outside their bases, the Americans control almost nothing.
"People are so scared," he said. "They have lost confidence in the Americans. If
the Americans show up in the neighborhood the insurgents will come and take away
people they accuse of being stooges of the Americans."
But just over six months ago, 24 people in the Subhani district of Haditha faced
a different death, witnesses and survivors say.
The killings began after 7:15 a.m., as the neighborhood was stirring awake, when
insurgents detonated a roadside bomb in Subhani that killed Lance Cpl. Miguel
Terrazas of El Paso, Tex., as his patrol drove through the area.
According to one United States defense official, who declined to be named
because details of the investigation are not supposed to be revealed, most of
the subsequent killings are believed to have been committed by a handful of
Marines led by a staff sergeant who was their squad leader, although other
Marines are also under investigation.
In the home Ms. Abdullah escaped from, she said American troops also shot in the
chest and killed a 4-year-old nephew named Abdullah Walid. She said her
mother-in-law, Khumaysa Tuma Ali, 66, died after being shot in the back. Two
brothers-in-law, Jahid Abdul Hamid Hassan and Walid Abdul Hamid Hassan, were
also killed, she said.
In addition to Ms. Abdullah and Asma's baby, two others survived: One,
9-year-old Iman Walid Abdul Hamid, said she ran quickly, still clad in her
pajamas, to hide under the bed covers with her younger brother, Abdul Rahman
Walid Abdul Hamid, when she saw what was happening.
. "We were scared and could not move for two hours. I tried to hide under the
bed," she said, but both her and her brother, Abdul Rahman, were hit with
shrapnel.
Abdul Rahman, 7, said very little about that day. "When they killed my father
Walid, I hid in bed," he said.
Hiba Abdullah assumed the two children had died, but she said they were later
found at a local hospital.
One Haditha victim was an elderly man, close to 80 years old, killed in his
wheelchair as he appeared to be holding a Koran, according to the United States
defense official, who described information collected during the investigation.
An elderly woman was also killed, as were a mother and a child who were "in what
appeared to be a prayer position," the official said. Some victims had single
gunshot wounds to the head, and at least one home where people were shot to
death had no bullet marks on the walls, inconsistent with a clearing operation
that would typically leave bullet holes, the official added. Senator John W.
Warner, a Virginia Republican who heads the Armed Services Committee, pledged
Sunday to hold hearings on the Haditha killings as soon as the military
investigation is concluded.
"I'll do exactly what we did with Abu Ghraib," he said on ABC's "This Week,"
referring to hearings. He added that there were serious questions of "what was
the immediate reaction of the senior officers in the Marine Corps."
Rep. John Murtha, a Pennsylvania Democrat and former marine who has become a
fierce critic of the Iraq war, said he has no doubt marines killed innocent
civilians in Haditha and tried to cover up the deaths. Marine Corps officials,
he said on the same TV program, have told him that troops shot one woman "in
cold blood" who was bending over her child begging for mercy.
In all, 19 people were killed in three separate homes in Haditha, and 5 were
killed after they approached the scene in a taxi, survivors and people in the
neighborhood said.
Hiba Abdullah said that after the killings in her father-in-law's home the
American troops moved to the house of a neighbor, Younis Salim Nisaif. She said
he was killed along with is wife, Aida, and Aida's sister, Huda. She said five
children were also killed at that home, all between ages of 10 and 3.
There was one survivor, Safa Younis Salim, 13, who in an interview said she
lived by faking her death. "I pretended that I was dead when my brother's body
fell on me and he was bleeding like a faucet," she said. She said she saw
American troops kick her family members and that one American shouted in the
face of one relative before he was killed.
Military officials declined Sunday to comment on details of the killings
described by survivors. "The investigations are ongoing, therefore any comment
at this time would be inappropriate and could undermine the investigatory and
possible legal process," said Lt. Col. Sean Gibson, a Marine spokesman.
David P. Sheldon, a defense lawyer advising a marine under investigation in the
case, said what is publicly known about the case "raises a disturbing picture,
but I think the situation was very confusing." He added that "the insurgent
pressure in that part of Iraq has been particularly virulent" which caused "a
very stressful environment."
Three days before a roadside bomb attack that preceded the Nov. 19 killings,
another marine from the same unit had been killed when a bomb detonated under
his vehicle in Haditha. It was the first combat death that the unit, the First
Marine Regiment's Third Battalion, had suffered on that deployment to Iraq.
Neighbors said that in the third home assaulted on Nov. 19, four brothers were
killed by American troops. The wife of one of the brothers, who would only
identify herself as the widow of a brother named Jamal, said the four victims
were all between the ages of 20 and 38.
The troops forced women in the home to leave at gunpoint, the widow said.
Afterward, she said the women heard gunshots coming from the home, but the
troops forbade them from returning. Eventually, she said, they went inside and
found the bodies of Jamal and three brothers, Marwan, Jassib and Kahatan.
Mr. Dulaimi, the human rights lawyer who traveled to Haditha two days after the
killings, said neighbors told him the father of the four victims and owner of
the home was Ayad Ahmed al-Gharria, who does odd jobs and has a shop in Haditha.
The neighbors, Mr. Dulaimi said, told him the troops killed Marwan first. The
three other brothers were killed after they came to see what was happening, he
said.
Five more Iraqi men died that day after they approached the American troops in a
taxi, according to people in the neighborhood. Four of the men were students and
the fifth was the driver of the taxi, and all were between the ages of 18 and
25, they said.
After the killings, Mr. Dulaimi said Haditha clerics and elders led a protest
march on the American base near a dam on the Euphrates. From the city's mosques,
Mr. Dulaimi said, clerics condemned the killings and said the Americans "promise
they will bring peace and security to this country, but what has happened is
they are spreading panic, fear and terror among the people."
One person from the neighborhood, Salim Abdullah, said relatives from two of the
families had taken compensation payments of as much as $2,500 per victim from
American officials who later visited. Relatives of other victims have not taken
payments, he said.
The United States defense official said the payments were also a focus of
investigators trying to determine whether the killings were improperly covered
up. On "This Week," Representative Murtha suggested that the decision to make
payments was strong evidence that Marine officers up the chain of command had
knowledge of the events. "That doesn't happen at the lowest level," he said.
"That happens at the highest level before they make a decision to make payments
to the families."
The Marines also face an inquiry into the killing of an Iraqi man on April 26
near Hamandiyah, west of Baghdad. A preliminary inquiry found "sufficient
information" for a criminal investigation, the Marines said. Representative
Murtha said a marine fired an AK-47 rifle so there would be spent cartridges
near the body, making it look as if the victim had been firing a weapon.
A spokesman for the First Marine Division, Lt. Lawton King, said several marines
suspected of involvement in the incident have been put in the brig at Camp
Pendleton, Calif., or restricted to the base.
An Iraqi employee of The New York Times contributed reporting from Haditha
for this article, and David S. Cloud and Mark Mazzetti from Washington.
Iraqis' Accounts Link Marines to the Mass Killing of Civilians, NYT, 29.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/29/world/middleeast/29haditha.html?_r=1&hp&ex=1148875200&en=76854c985dc60d9e&ei=5094&partner=homepage&oref=slogin
Official: Evidence in criminal probe of
Iraqi deaths points toward murder by Marines
Updated 5/27/2006 2:57 AM ET
USA Today
WASHINGTON (AP) — Military investigators
probing the deaths last November of about two dozen Iraqi civilians have
evidence that points toward unprovoked murders by Marines, a senior defense
official said Friday.
The Marine Corps initially reported 15 deaths
and said they were caused by a roadside bomb and an ensuing firefight with
insurgents. A separate investigation is aimed at determining if Marines lied to
cover up the events, which included the deaths of women and children.
If confirmed as unjustified killings, the
episode could be the most serious case of criminal misconduct by U.S. troops
during three years of combat in Iraq. Until now the most infamous occurrence was
the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse involving Army soldiers, which came to light in
April 2004 and which President Bush said Thursday he considered to be the worst
U.S. mistake of the entire war.
The defense official discussed the matter Friday only on condition of anonymity
because he was not authorized to talk publicly about the investigation. He said
the evidence found thus far strongly indicated the killings in the
insurgent-plagued city of Haditha in the western province of Anbar were
unjustified. He cautioned that the probe was not finished.
Once the investigation is completed, perhaps in June, it will be up to a senior
Marine commander in Iraq to decide whether to press charges of murder or other
violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Three officers from the unit involved — 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st
Marine Division, based at Camp Pendleton, Calif. — have been relieved of duty,
although officials have not explicitly linked them to the criminal
investigation.
In an indication of how concerned the Marines are about the implications of the
Haditha case, their top officer, Gen. Michael W. Hagee, flew to Iraq on
Thursday. He was to reinforce what the military said was a need to adhere to
Marine values and standards of behavior and to avoid the use of excess force.
"Many of our Marines have been involved in life or death combat or have
witnessed the loss of their fellow Marines, and the effects of these events can
be numbing," Hagee said a statement announcing his trip. "There is the risk of
becoming indifferent to the loss of a human life, as well as bringing dishonor
upon ourselves."
A spokesman at Marine Corps headquarters in the Pentagon, Lt. Col. Scott
Fazekas, declined to comment on the status of the Haditha investigation. He said
no information would be provided until the probe was completed.
According to a congressional aide, lawmakers were told in a briefing Thursday
that it appears as many as two dozen civilians were killed in the episode at
Haditha. And they were told that the investigation will find that "it will be
clear that this was not the result of an accident or a normal combat situation."
Another congressional official said lawmakers were told it would be about 30
days before a report would be issued by the investigating agency, the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service.
Both the House and Senate armed services committees plan to hold hearings on the
matter.
The New York Times reported on Friday that the civilians killed at Haditha
included five men who had been traveling in a taxi and others in two nearby
houses. The newspaper quoted an unidentified official as saying it was a
sustained operation over as long as five hours.
Hagee met with top lawmakers from those panels this week to bring them up to
date on the investigation.
"I can say that there are established facts that incidents of a very serious
nature did take place," Sen. John Warner, chairman of the Senate panel, said
Thursday. He would not provide details or confirm reports that about 24
civilians were killed. He told reporters he had "no basis to believe" the
military engaged in a cover-up.
Separately, the Marines announced this week that a criminal investigation was
underway in connection with an alleged killing on April 26 of an Iraqi civilian
by Marines in Hamandiyah, west of Baghdad. No details about that case have been
made public.
In the Haditha case, videotape aired by an Arab television station showed images
purportedly taken in the aftermath of the encounter: a bloody bedroom floor,
walls with bullet holes and bodies of women and children. An Iraqi human rights
group called for an investigation of what it described as a deadly mistake that
had harmed civilians.
On May 17, Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., a former Marine, said Corps officials told
him the toll in the Haditha attack was far worse than originally reported and
that U.S. troops killed innocent women and children "in cold blood." He said
that nearly twice as many people were killed as first reported and maintained
that U.S. forces were "overstretched and overstressed" by the war in Iraq.
Pentagon spokesman Eric Ruff said Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was being
kept apprised. Ruff said he did not expect any announcements in the next few
days.
Official: Evidence in criminal probe of Iraqi deaths points toward murder by
Marines, UT, 27.5.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-26-marine-probe_x.htm
The military is looking into civilian deaths
in Haditha, Iraq.
Lucian Read/WorldPictureNetwork
NYT May 25, 2006
Military Expected to Report Marines Killed
Iraqi Civilians NYT
26.5.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/world/middleeast/26haditha.html?hp&ex=
1148702400&en=b7363380ed080aa4&ei=5094&partner=homepage
The Investigation
Military Expected to Report Marines Killed
Iraqi Civilians
May 26, 2006
The New York Times
By THOM SHANKER, ERIC SCHMITT and RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
This article is by Thom Shanker, Eric Schmitt and
Richard A. Oppel Jr.
WASHINGTON, May 25 — A military investigation
into the deaths of two dozen Iraqis last November is expected to find that a
small number of marines in western Iraq carried out extensive, unprovoked
killings of civilians, Congressional, military and Pentagon officials said
Thursday.
Two lawyers involved in discussions about individual marines' defenses said they
thought the investigation could result in charges of murder, a capital offense.
That possibility and the emerging details of the killings have raised fears that
the incident could be the gravest case involving misconduct by American ground
forces in Iraq.
Officials briefed on preliminary results of the inquiry said the civilians
killed at Haditha, a lawless, insurgent-plagued city deep in Sunni-dominated
Anbar Province, did not die from a makeshift bomb, as the military first
reported, or in cross-fire between marines and attackers, as was later
announced. A separate inquiry has begun to find whether the events were
deliberately covered up.
Evidence indicates that the civilians were killed during a sustained sweep by a
small group of marines that lasted three to five hours and included shootings of
five men standing near a taxi at a checkpoint, and killings inside at least two
homes that included women and children, officials said.
That evidence, described by Congressional, Pentagon and military officials
briefed on the inquiry, suggested to one Congressional official that the
killings were "methodical in nature."
Congressional and military officials say the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service inquiry is focusing on the actions of a Marine Corps staff sergeant
serving as squad leader at the time, but that Marine officials have told members
of Congress that up to a dozen other marines in the unit are also under
investigation. Officials briefed on the inquiry said that most of the bullets
that killed the civilians were now thought to have been "fired by a couple of
rifles," as one of them put it.
The killings were first reported by Time magazine in March, based on accounts
from survivors and human rights groups, and members of Congress have spoken
publicly about the episode in recent days. But the new accounts from
Congressional, military and Pentagon officials added significant new details to
the picture. All of those who discussed the case had to be granted anonymity
before they would talk about the findings emerging from the investigation.
A second, parallel inquiry was ordered by the second-ranking general in Iraq to
examine whether any marines on the ground at Haditha, or any of their superior
officers, tried to cover up the killings by filing false reports up the chain of
command. That inquiry, conducted by an Army officer assigned to the
Multinational Corps headquarters in Iraq, is expected to report its findings in
coming days.
In an unusual sign of high-level concern, the commandant of the Marine Corps,
Gen. Michael W. Hagee, flew from Washington to Iraq on Thursday to give a series
of speeches to his forces re-emphasizing compliance with international laws of
armed conflict, the Geneva Conventions and the American military's own rules of
engagement.
"Recent serious allegations concerning actions of marines in combat have caused
me concern," General Hagee said in a statement issued upon his departure. The
statement did not mention any specific incident.
The first official report from the military, issued on Nov. 20, said that "a
U.S. marine and 15 Iraqi civilians were killed yesterday from the blast of a
roadside bomb" and that "immediately following the bombing, gunmen attacked the
convoy with small-arms fire."
Military investigators have since uncovered a far different set of facts from
what was first reported, partly aided by marines who are cooperating with the
inquiry and partly guided by reports filed by a separate unit that arrived to
gather intelligence and document the attack; those reports contradicted the
original version of the marines, Pentagon officials said.
One senior Defense Department official who has been briefed on the initial
findings, when asked how many of the 24 dead Iraqis were killed by the
improvised bomb as initially reported, paused and said, "Zero."
While Haditha was rife with violence and gunfire that day, the marines, who were
assigned to the Third Battalion, First Marines, and are now back at Camp
Pendleton, Calif., "never took what would constitute hostile fire of a seriously
threatening nature," one Pentagon official said.
Women and children were among those killed, as well as five men who had been
traveling in a taxi near the bomb, which killed Lance Cpl. Miguel Terrazas of El
Paso.
Although investigators are still piecing together the string of deaths,
Congressional and Pentagon officials said the five men in the taxi either were
pulled out or got out at a Marine checkpoint and were shot.
The deaths of those in the taxi, and inside two nearby houses, were not the
result of a quick and violent firefight, according to officials who had been
briefed on the inquiry.
"This was not a burst of fire, but a sustained operation over several hours,
maybe five hours," one official said. Forensic evidence gathered from the houses
where Iraqi civilians died is also said to contradict reports that the marines
had to overcome hostile fire to storm the homes.
Members of the House and Senate briefed on the Haditha shootings by senior
Marine officers, including General Hagee and Brig. Gen. John F. Kelly, the
Marine legislative liaison, voiced concerns Thursday about the seriousness of
the accusations.
Representative John Kline, a Minnesota Republican who is a retired Marine
colonel, said that the allegations indicated that "this was not an accident.
This was direct fire by marines at civilians." He added, "This was not an
immediate response to an attack. This would be an atrocity."
The deaths, and the role of the marines in those deaths, is being viewed with
such alarm that senior Marine Corps officers briefed members of Congress last
week and again on Wednesday and Thursday.
The briefings were in part an effort to prevent the kind of angry explosion from
Capitol Hill that followed news of detainee abuse by American military jailers
at Abu Ghraib prison, which had been quietly under investigation for months
before the details of the abuse were leaked to the news media. "If the accounts
as they have been alleged are true, the Haditha incident is likely the most
serious war crime that has been reported in Iraq since the beginning of the
war," said John Sifton, of Human Rights Watch. "Here we have two dozen civilians
being killed — apparently intentionally. This isn't a gray area. This is a
massacre."
Three Marine officers — the battalion commander and two company commanders in
Haditha at the time — have been relieved of duty, although official statements
have declined to link that action to the investigation.
Senator John W. Warner, a Virginia Republican who heads the Armed Services
Committee, said he expected senators would review investigators' evidence,
including photographs by military photographers that Mr. Warner said were "taken
as a matter of routine in Iraq on operations of this nature when there's loss of
life."
Lawyers who have been in conversations with the marines under investigation
stressed the chaotic situation in Haditha at the time of the killings. And they
expect that the defense will stress that insurgents often hide among civilians,
that Haditha on the day of the shootings was suffering a wave of fluid insurgent
attacks and that the marines responded to high levels of hostile action aimed at
them.
Much of the area around Haditha is controlled by Sunni Arab insurgents who have
made the city one of the deadliest in Iraq for American troops. On Aug. 1, three
months before the massacre, insurgents ambushed and killed six Marine snipers
moving through Haditha on foot. Insurgents released a video after the ambush
that appeared to show the attack, and the mangled and burned body of a dead
serviceman. Then, two days later, 14 marines were killed when their armored
vehicle was destroyed by a roadside bomb near the southern edge of the city.
The Marines also disclosed this week that a preliminary inquiry had found
"sufficient information" to recommend a criminal probe into the killing of an
Iraqi civilian on April 26 near Hamandiyah, a village west of Baghdad.
Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt reported from Washington for this article, and
Richard A. Oppel Jr. from Baghdad, Iraq.
Military Expected to Report Marines Killed Iraqi Civilians, NYT, 26.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/world/middleeast/26haditha.html?hp&ex=1148702400&en=b7363380ed080aa4&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Schrank
The Independent on Sunday
Comment 28.5.2006
Politics
Bush and Blair Concede Errors, but Defend
War
May 26, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID E. SANGER and JIM RUTENBERG
WASHINGTON, May 25 — President Bush and Prime
Minister Tony Blair of Britain, two leaders badly weakened by the continuing
violence in Iraq, acknowledged major misjudgments in the execution of the Iraq
war on Thursday night even while insisting that the election of a constitutional
government in Baghdad justified their decision to go to war three years ago.
Speaking in subdued, almost chastened, tones at a joint news conference in the
East Room, the two leaders steadfastly refused to talk about a schedule for
pulling troops out of Iraq — a pressure both men are feeling intently. They
stuck to a common formulation that they would pull troops out only as properly
trained Iraqi troops progressively took control over more and more territory in
the country.
But in an unusual admission of a personal mistake, Mr. Bush said he regretted
challenging insurgents in Iraq to "bring it on" in 2003, and said the same about
his statement that he wanted Osama bin Laden "dead or alive." Those two
statements quickly came to reinforce his image around the world as a cowboy
commander in chief. "Kind of tough talk, you know, that sent the wrong signal to
people," Mr. Bush said. "I learned some lessons about expressing myself maybe in
a little more sophisticated manner." He went on to say that the American
military's biggest mistake was the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison,
where photographs of detainees showed them in degrading and abusive conditions.
"We've been paying for that for a long period of time," Mr. Bush said, his voice
heavy with regret.
Mr. Blair, whose approval levels have sunk even lower than Mr. Bush's, said he
particularly regretted the broad decision to strip most members of Saddam
Hussein's Baath Party of their positions in government and civic life in 2003,
leaving most institutions in Iraq shorn of expertise and leadership.
The news conference, in the formal setting of the East Room, was notable for the
contrite tone of both leaders. Mr. Bush acknowledged "a sense of consternation"
among the American people, driven by the steady drumbeat of American casualties.
The meeting came at a low moment in Mr. Bush's presidency and Mr. Blair's prime
ministership, at a time when the decisions that they made to invade Iraq and
that they have defended ever since have proved a political albatross for both.
Just as they joined in the drive to war in 2003, the two leaders on Thursday
evening seemed joined by a common interest in arguing that things had finally
turned around in Iraq. Mr. Blair, who was in Iraq earlier this week, ventured
the closest to a prediction about a timetable for disengagement, saying that he
thought it was possible that Iraq's new prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki,
was accurate in his prediction that Iraqi forces could control security in all
of the country's provinces within 18 months.
But Mr. Bush quickly fell back to his familiar insistence that he would not
begin a drawdown until his commanders said it was possible, and he noted that
troops were recently called up from Kuwait to help stabilize Baghdad. He said
that in the end he would insist on victory over both insurgents and terrorists
linked to Al Qaeda, and he dismissed as "press speculation" reports of tentative
Pentagon plans to bring American troop levels to about 100,000 by the end of
this year. "A loss in Iraq would make this world an incredibly dangerous place,"
Mr. Bush said.
Mr. Bush said he and Mr. Blair had spent "a great deal of time" discussing their
next challenge: how to put together the right mix of penalties and incentives to
force Iran to suspend the production of uranium and give up a program that both
men had said clearly pointed to a desire to build a nuclear bomb.
Mr. Bush bristled at a question about whether he had "ignored back-channel
overtures" from the Iranians over possible talks about their nuclear program.
Mr. Bush said that "the Iranians walked away from the table" in discussions with
three European nations, and that a letter sent to him by Iran's president
"didn't address the issue of whether or not they're going to continue to press
for a nuclear weapon." Some in the State Department and even some of Mr. Bush's
outside foreign policy advisers have said that Mr. Bush missed a diplomatic
opening by deciding not to respond to the letter, though others say it is still
not too late.
But the overwhelming sense from the news conference was of two battered leaders
who, once confident in their judgments on Iraq, now understood that misjudgments
had not only affected their approval ratings, but perhaps their legacies. The
British news magazine The Economist pictured the two on a recent cover under the
headline "Axis of Feeble."
And while both men sidestepped questions about how their approval ratings were
linked to Iraq, at one point Mr. Bush seemed to try to buck up his most loyal
ally, who is expected to leave office soon and may be in the midst of his last
official visit to Washington, by telling a British reporter, "Don't count him
out."
Outside the White House gates, a smattering of protesters gathered, blowing
whistles and chanting, "Troops out now."
Mr. Bush called the terrorists in Iraq "totalitarians" and "Islamic fascists," a
phrase he has used periodically to give the current struggle a tinge of the last
great American-British alliance, during World War II. But he acknowledged that
the war in Iraq had taken a significant toll in public opinion. "I mean, when
you turn on your TV screen and see innocent people die day in and day out, it
affects the mentality of our country," Mr. Bush said.
Mr. Blair tried to focus on the current moment, saying that he had heard the
complaint that "you went in with this Western concept of democracy, and you
didn't understand that their whole culture was different." With a weak smile, he
suggested to Mr. Bush that those who voted in Iraq had amounted to "a higher
turnout, I have to say — I'm afraid to say I think — than either your election
or mine."
Mr. Bush did not budge from his long-stated position that conditions in Iraq and
the ability of Iraqi security forces to assume greater responsibilities would
dictate whether the United States reduced the 133,000 American forces there. He
said he would rely on the recommendations of Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top
commander in Iraq. In an effort to cajole the new government even while he was
praising it, Mr. Bush twice mentioned that it had yet to appoint a defense
minister with whom to discuss troop cuts, one of the glaring gaps in the Iraqi
cabinet that is symbolic of the continuing struggle over power. "We'll keep the
force level there necessary to win," Mr. Bush said.
Mr. Blair acknowledged that some of the 260,000 Iraqi security forces,
especially the police, suffered from corruption and the influence of militias.
But he said a new Iraqi government would be more able than allied officials to
cope with these problems.
For those who trace Mr. Bush's own reluctance to acknowledge errors in Iraq, his
statements on Thursday night seemed to mark a crossing of a major threshold. In
an interview with The New York Times in August 2004, Mr. Bush said that his
biggest mistake in Iraq had been underestimating the speed of initial victory
over Mr. Hussein's forces, which allowed Iraqi troops to melt back into the
cities and towns. When pressed, he said he could think of no other errors.
Over the winter, as public support for the war eroded, he acknowledged other
mistakes — failing to plan sufficiently for the occupation and rebuilding of the
country, or to execute the plans that had been made. But he described these as
tactical mistakes that had been fixed.
His answer on Thursday evening, though, harked back to the two statements —
"bring them on" and "dead or alive" — that his wife, Laura, had been
particularly critical about. While he had apologized before for the treatment of
detainees at Abu Ghraib, his statement on Thursday was his starkest admission to
date of the damage that the episode did to the image of the United States.
But Mr. Bush emphasized that American soldiers had been punished for the abuses.
"Unlike Iraq, however, under Saddam, the people who committed those acts were
brought to justice," he said. Mr. Bush's critics have noted that the
prosecutions have focused on low-level soldiers and have not held senior
officers accountable.
Mr. Blair, while saying that the coalition had misjudged the de-Baathification
process, added: "It's easy to go back over mistakes that we may have made. But
the biggest reason why Iraq has been difficult is the determination of our
opponents to defeat us. And I don't think we should be surprised at that."
Bush
and Blair Concede Errors, but Defend War, NYT, 26.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/world/middleeast/26prexy.html
The White House
Covering a Friend's Back: Leaders Reverse
the Roles
May 26, 2006
The New York Times
By ALESSANDRA STANLEY
Tony Blair has always served as the world's
Bush-whisperer, but at their joint news conference last night, it was almost the
reverse. Mr. Blair, the normally silver-tongued prime minister, seemed stiff and
defensive, and it was Mr. Bush who tried to smooth things over and help Mr.
Blair out.
British political analysts have repeatedly predicted that Mr. Blair, a lame duck
whose popularity in Britain has never been lower, will be out of office as early
as next year. But when a British reporter actually suggested that this was his
last official Washington visit, he looked dismayed and tongue-tied.
Mr. Bush jumped in, saying with a laugh, "Don't count him out, let me tell it to
you that way." He also asked the British to give his friend another chance. "I
want him to be here so long as I'm the president."
That role reversal was as good a sign as any of how the two friends' political
standing has eroded since they made the case together for war in Iraq. Last week
even The Economist, a British magazine that has been more favorable to Mr. Blair
than most, called his partnership with Mr. Bush the "Axis of Feeble."
In the past, Mr. Blair always raced to Washington to buck up Mr. Bush with his
eloquence and aplomb, spending his own political capital to enhance that of the
American. Mr. Bush was obviously grateful for his ally's support, yet last night
he hinted that if he had to go it alone, he could take it from here — even in
the realm of the English language.
Asked what he most regretted, Mr. Bush replied that he was sorry he had used
terms like "bring it on" and "dead or alive," and that he had learned to express
himself in a "little more sophisticated manner."
It was never an even-steven friendship; Mr. Blair risked his popularity in
Britain when he stood by Mr. Bush and supported the war. In return he received
gratitude, but little else.
One reason Mr. Blair's reputation is so tattered is his critics dismiss him as a
poodle, doing his master's bidding. It did not help that before the war, Mr.
Blair was unable to persuade his American friend to seek a second United Nations
resolution authorizing military action.
He did not have much luck with other issues important to Europeans, from an
effort to double aid to Africa to the need to take steps to avert global
warming. (It probably did not help Mr. Blair's morale that "Stuff Happens," a
play by David Hare that focuses on the imbalance of power between the White
House and 10 Downing St., is on the New York stage.)
No one has been a better bedfellow for George Bush than Tony Blair, but last
night the steadfast British prime minister tugged the covers to his side, adding
his own, broader agenda to the subject at hand.
He spoke of "the importance of trying to unite the international community
behind an agenda that means, for example, action on global poverty in Africa,
and issues like Sudan; it means a good outcome to the world trade round, which
is vital for the whole of the civilized world, vital for developing countries,
but also vital for countries such as ourselves; for progress in the Middle East;
and for ensuring that the global values that people are actually struggling for
today in Iraq are global values we take everywhere and fight for everywhere that
we can in our world today."
Mr. Blair came to Washington to help the president, but this time, perhaps for
the first time, he looked like he needed the president's help.
Covering a Friend's Back: Leaders Reverse the Roles, NYT, 26.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/world/middleeast/26tvwatch.html
White House downplays troop withdrawals
Posted 5/24/2006 12:43 PM ET
AP
USA Today
WASHINGTON (AP) — The White House said
Wednesday the establishment of Iraq's new government was an opportunity to
reassess the need for American military forces but that it was premature to talk
about troop withdrawals.
The violence in Iraq and the need for
coalition forces will be a primary topic when President Bush and British Prime
Minister Tony Blair meet at the White House on Thursday. Both leaders have
dropped sharply in the polls and are under pressure to make troop cutbacks. Bush
and Blair will hold a news conference at 7:30 p.m. ET Thursday.
"I do not believe that you're going to hear the president or the prime minister
say we're going to be out in one year, two years, four years — I just don't
think you're going to get any specific prediction of troops withdrawals,"
presidential spokesman Tony Snow said. "I think you're going to get a
restatement of the general principles under which coalition troops stay or go."
In Baghdad, the new prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, said Iraqi forces are
capable of taking control of security in all of Iraq within 18 months, but still
need more recruits, training and equipment.
Snow, at a White House briefing, said al-Maliki was "an energetic prime minister
who has said he wants Iraqi troops to be in the forefront as soon as possible."
He said U.S. troops are in Iraq at the invitation of the government. "If he says
he doesn't need us, we're not going to stick around," Snow said.
Bush said at a news conference Tuesday evening that the swearing in of Iraq's
new government has opened a door for change. The new Iraqi leaders will assess
the country's security needs and forces, then work with U.S. commanders, he
said.
"We haven't gotten to the point yet where the new government is sitting down
with our commanders to come up with a joint way forward," the president said
Tuesday. "However, having said that, this is a new chapter in our relationship.
In other words, we're now able to take a new assessment about the needs
necessary for the Iraqis."
Bush spoke in response to a question about whether he is confident he can start
withdrawing troops at the end of the year. He did not give a direct answer to
the question, raised at a press conference with visiting Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert, but signaled that change is coming.
He used similar language in Chicago on Monday, when he gave his first speech
since the new government was sworn in over the weekend.
"As the new Iraqi government grows in confidence and capability, America will
play an increasingly supporting role," Bush said during that address.
Pressed Tuesday on how he can expect Iraqis to bring down the violence when the
most powerful military in the world has not been able to, Bush suggested that
reducing the suicide bombings that have terrorized the country will not be the
main factor for bringing U.S. troops home.
"It is a difficult task to stop suicide bombers," Bush said.
"So I view progress as: Is there a political process going forward that's
convincing disaffected Sunnis, for example, to participate?" the president
asked. "Is there a unity government that says it's best for all of us to work
together to achieve a common objective, which is democracy? Are we able to meet
the needs of the 12 million people that defied the car bombers? To me, that's
success."
And he made it clear that stopping many of the suicide bombers ultimately will
be a problem for Iraqis, although the United States still is helping and "we're
doing a pretty good job of it, on occasion."
"What the Iraqis are going to have to eventually do is convince those who are
conducting suiciders who are not inspired by al-Qaeda, for example, to realize
there is a peaceful tomorrow," Bush said. "And those who are being inspired by
al-Qaeda, we're just going to have to stay on the hunt and bring al-Qaeda to
justice. And our army can do that and is doing that right now."
Iraq hangs heavily over Bush's presidency. More than 2,450 members of the U.S.
military have died since Bush ordered an invasion of Iraq more than three years
ago. The war is a major factor in Bush's slump in the polls to the lowest point
of his presidency. There are 132,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.
White
House downplays troop withdrawals, UT, 24.5.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-24-bush-iraq_x.htm
INQUIRY
U.S. Urged to Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters
May 24, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID S. CLOUD
WASHINGTON, May 23 — A Defense Department
investigation of Pentagon-financed propaganda efforts in Iraq warns that paying
Iraqi journalists to produce positive stories could damage American credibility
and calls for an end to military payments to a group of Iraqi journalists in
Baghdad, according to a summary of the investigation.
The review, by Rear Adm. Scott Van Buskirk, was ordered after the disclosure
last November that the military had paid the Lincoln Group, a Washington-based
Pentagon contractor, to plant articles written by American soldiers in Iraqi
publications, without disclosing the source of the articles. The contractor's
work also included paying Iraqi journalists for favorable treatment.
Though the document does not mention the Lincoln Group, Admiral Van Buskirk
concluded that the military should scrutinize contractors involved in the
propaganda effort more closely "to ensure proper oversight is in place." He also
faulted the military for failing to examine whether paying for placement for
articles would "undermine the concept of a free press," in Iraq, according to
the summary.
It was not clear on Tuesday whether the report would have any immediate effect
on the military's actions in Iraq. In interviews this week, several Pentagon
officials said the Lincoln Group and other contractors were still involved in
placing propaganda messages in Iraqi publications and on television. Lt. Col.
Barry Johnson, a senior military spokesman in Iraq, said Tuesday that he could
not comment on the report. William Dixon, a spokesman for the Lincoln Group,
also declined to comment on Tuesday.
Pentagon officials have said that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is
considering ordering a further policy review to clarify existing policy and
rules on military communications and information operations.
Over all, the report concludes that American commanders in Iraq did not violate
military regulations when they undertook a multipronged propaganda campaign
beginning in 2004 aimed at increasing support for the fledgling Iraqi
government, the three-page summary says. That conclusion has been previously
reported, but the portions of the report that raise questions about the effort
or that are critical have not been previously disclosed.
The most critical portion of the report concerns the military's creation in 2004
of an entity called the Baghdad Press Club, in which Iraqi journalists were paid
if they covered and produced stories about American reconstruction efforts, such
as openings of schools and sewage plants.
The military's "direct oversight of an apparently independent news organization
and remuneration for articles that are published will undoubtedly raise
questions focused on 'truth and credibility,' that will be difficult to deflect,
regardless of the intensions and purpose of the remuneration," the report says.
Disclosures last November that the Lincoln Group had received tens of millions
of dollars from the Pentagon to place news articles and produce television
advertisements prompted an outcry in Washington, where members of Congress said
the practice undermined American credibility, and military and White House
officials disavowed knowledge of it. President Bush was described by Stephen J.
Hadley, his national security adviser, as "very troubled" about the matter.
But since then, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior American commander in Iraq,
appointed Admiral Van Buskirk to look into the practice. He has also made clear
in public statements that he favored aggressive use of Iraq's media to influence
public opinion there, and that he would continue unless told by more senior
officials to stop. Paying for publication of positive stories is a delicate
issue among some Pentagon officials, especially the military's public affairs
officers, who worry that their efforts to supply the public with facts will be
tainted by the military's practice of paying to place stories.
But defenders of the practice say that in a environment like Iraq, that is the
only way to get information out to Iraqis who would dismiss statements from
American military sources.
Several senior Pentagon officials complained that General Casey's staff in Iraq
delayed public disclosure of the findings for months. While Admiral Van Buskirk
found the practice of hiding the American military's responsibility for the
articles "appropriate," he also recommended new guidelines for propaganda
operations that would "determine when attribution may be appropriate."
Officers involved in the propaganda effort were often confused about the
boundaries between public affairs work, which is supposed to be strictly
factual, and what the military calls "information operations," which can employ
practices like deception and the paying of journalists to defeat an enemy, the
review found.
The report is not the only recent one to criticize the military's propaganda
operation in Iraq. An unreleased study for the Pentagon completed in February by
the RAND Corporation, a research organization in Santa Monica, Calif., says such
operations have been conducted "in fits and starts without a sustained, coherent
process."
The study adds, "The key to the suppression of the insurgency and a successful
transition to Iraqi governance is changing the mindset of ordinary Iraqis to
include 'paid-for-hire' insurgents and potential foreign recruits through a much
more aggressive" information operations campaign.
U.S.
Urged to Stop Paying Iraqi Reporters, NYT, 24.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/24/world/middleeast/24propaganda.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Law and Disorder
Misjudgments Marred U.S. Plans for Iraqi
Police
May 21, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHAEL MOSS and DAVID ROHDE
As chaos swept Iraq after the American
invasion in 2003, the Pentagon began its effort to rebuild the Iraqi police with
a mere dozen advisers. Overmatched from the start, one was sent to train a
4,000-officer unit to guard power plants and other utilities. A second to advise
500 commanders in Baghdad. Another to organize a border patrol for the entire
country.
Three years later, the police are a battered and dysfunctional force that has
helped bring Iraq to the brink of civil war. Police units stand accused of
operating death squads for powerful political groups or simple profit. Citizens,
deeply distrustful of the force, are setting up their own neighborhood security
squads. Killings of police officers are rampant, with at least 547 slain this
year, roughly as many as Iraqi and American soldiers combined, records show.
The police, initially envisioned by the Bush administration as a cornerstone in
a new democracy, have instead become part of Iraq's grim constellation of
shadowy commandos, ruthless political militias and other armed groups. Iraq's
new prime minister and senior American officials now say the country's future —
and the ability of America to withdraw its troops — rests in large measure on
whether the police can be reformed and rogue groups reined in.
Like so much that has defined the course of the war, the realities on the ground
in Iraq did not match the planning in Washington. An examination of the American
effort to train a police force in Iraq, drawn from interviews with several dozen
American and Iraqi officials, internal police reports and visits to Iraqi police
stations and training camps, shows a cascading series of misjudgments by White
House and Pentagon officials, who repeatedly underestimated the role the United
States would need to play in rebuilding the police and generally maintaining
order.
Before the war, the Bush administration dismissed as unnecessary a plan backed
by the Justice Department to rebuild the police force by deploying thousands of
American civilian trainers. Current and former administration officials said
they were relying on a Central Intelligence Agency assessment that said the
Iraqi police were well trained. The C.I.A. said its assessment conveyed nothing
of the sort.
After Baghdad fell, when a majority of Iraqi police officers abandoned their
posts, a second proposal by a Justice Department team calling for 6,600 police
trainers was reduced to 1,500, and then never carried out. During the first
eight months of the occupation — as crime soared and the insurgency took hold —
the United States deployed 50 police advisers in Iraq.
Against the objections of Colin L. Powell, then the secretary of state, the
long-range plan was eventually reduced to 500 trainers. One result was a police
captain from North Carolina having 40 Americans to train 20,000 Iraqi police
across four provinces in southern Iraq.
Throughout Iraq, Americans were faced with the realization that in trying to
rebuild the Iraqi force they were up against the legacy of Saddam Hussein. Not
only was the force inept and rife with petty corruption, but in the wake of the
invasion the fractious tribal, sectarian and criminal groups were competing to
control the police. Yet for much of last year, American trainers were able to
regularly monitor fewer than half of the 1,000 police stations in Iraq, where
even officers free of corrupting influences lacked basic policing skills like
how to fire a weapon or investigate a crime.
While even a viable police force alone could not have stopped the insurgency and
lawlessness that eventually engulfed Iraq, officials involved acknowledge that
the early, halting effort to rebuild the force was a missed opportunity.
Frank Miller, a former National Security Council official who coordinated the
American effort to govern Iraq from 2003 to 2005, conceded in an interview that
the administration did not put enough focus on the police.
"More attention should have been paid to the police after the fall of Baghdad,"
said Mr. Miller, one of the officials who objected to the original proposal to
deploy thousands of advisers. "That is obvious. Iraq needed law and order
established."
What attempts there were to train the police were marred by poor coordination,
civilian and military officials said. During the first two years of the war,
three different government groups developed three different plans to train
Iraq's police, all without knowing of the existence of the other.
Bernard B. Kerik, the former New York City police commissioner sent to Iraq in
2003 to lead the police mission, said Pentagon officials gave him just 10 days
notice and little guidance.
"Looking back, I really don't know what their plan was," Mr. Kerik said. With no
experience in Iraq, and little time to get ready, he said he prepared for his
job in part by watching A&E Network documentaries on Saddam Hussein.
Field training of the Iraqi police, the most critical element of the effort, was
left to DynCorp International, a company based in Irving, Tex., that received
$750 million in contracts. The advisers, many of them retired officers from
small towns, said they arrived in Iraq and quickly found themselves caught
between poorly staffed American government agencies, company officials focused
on the bottom line and thousands of Iraqi officers clamoring for help.
When it became clear that the civilian effort by DynCorp was faltering, American
military officials took over police training in 2004, relying on heavily armed
commando units that had been established by the Iraqis. Within a year, members
of the Sunni Muslim population said some units had been infiltrated by Shiite
Muslim militias and were kidnapping, torturing and executing scores of Sunni
Muslims.
In interviews, White House and Pentagon officials defended their decisions,
saying that it would have been impossible to find thousands of qualified
trainers willing to go to Iraq and that deploying large numbers of foreign
officers would have angered Iraqis and bred passivity.
"Where it was possible to have a light footprint, that was preferable to a
heavy-handed approach," the National Security Council said in a written response
to questions. "The strategy was to support the Iraqis in every way possible and
to enable them to do their jobs, not to take over their jobs."
Administration officials say that the insurgency, more than any other factor,
has slowed their progress. While field training has been limited, they point out
that most of the 152,000 police officers have attended nine new training
academies, some for as long as 10 weeks.
This spring, three years after administration officials rejected the large
American-led field training effort, American military commanders are adopting
that very approach. Declaring 2006 the year of the police, the Pentagon is
dispatching a total of 3,000 American soldiers and DynCorp contractors to train
and mentor police recruits and officers across Iraq.
American commanders now see the force, which is to increase to 190,000, as the
linchpin of a new strategy to protect the population, secure reconstruction
projects and help facilitate the withdrawal of American troops.
But moving ahead is complicated by Iraqi politics. The battle over who would run
the Interior Ministry, which commands the country's police, stalled the creation
of the new Iraqi government for weeks. Even yesterday, the new government was
announced without the post being filled. Iraqi officials said they were
determined that the new interior minister be politically independent, free of
the taint of death squads, someone who could reassure Iraq's Sunnis that the
police are not their enemy.
And conditions on the ground make progress even more difficult.
Col. Muhammad Raghab Fahmy, a police commander in Baghdad, said the police
struggled to perform the most basic duties. "They need weapons," he said, and
they need to learn "how to use their vehicles, how to operate a checkpoint,
writing skills and how to react when being attacked."
The Prewar Plan
In March 2003, three weeks before American forces invaded Iraq, Lt. Gen. Jay
Garner, who retired from the Army in 1997, met with senior National Security
Council officials to brief them on his plans to manage the country after the
overthrow of Mr. Hussein.
Plucked from his civilian job at a defense contracting company six weeks
earlier, General Garner, a blunt 64-year-old who led relief operations in
northern Iraq after the Persian Gulf war in 1991, was scrambling to put together
a staff and a plan to control a fractious nation the size of California.
General Garner and his aides said they believed that a large number of American
and European police officers would be needed to train a new Iraqi force and help
it police a country they feared could quickly slip into lawlessness.
In the March meeting, General Garner raised an ambitious plan by Richard Mayer,
a Justice Department police-training expert on his staff, to send 5,000 American
and foreign advisers to Iraq. Mr. Mayer said his detailed, inch-and-a-half-thick
plan included organizational tables, budgets and schedules.
The proposal was sweeping but not unprecedented. In Kosovo, one-tenth the size
of Iraq, the United Nations fielded about 4,800 police officers. In Bosnia,
2,000 international police officers trained and monitored local forces.
Two lessons had emerged from the Balkans, Mr. Mayer said. "Law and order first,"
a warning that failing to create an effective police force and judicial system
could stall postwar reconstruction efforts. Second, blanketing local police
stations with foreign trainers also helped ensure that cadets applied their
academy training in the field and helped deter brutality, corruption and
infiltration by militias, he said.
General Garner said he and others on his staff also warned administration
officials that the Iraqi police, after decades of neglect and corruption, would
collapse after the invasion. The police were "at the bottom of the security food
chain," General Garner said in an interview. "They didn't train. They didn't
patrol."
In February, Robert M. Perito, a policing expert and a former official at the
National Security Council and the State and Justice Departments, recommended to
the Defense Policy Board that 6,000 American and foreign police officers be
dispatched to Iraq. The board advises Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.
But at the meeting with N.S.C. officials, General Garner's proposal was met with
skepticism by council staff members, who contended that such a large training
effort was not needed. One vocal opponent was Mr. Miller.
"He didn't think it was necessary," General Garner said in an interview.
Mr. Miller, who left the government last year, confirmed his opposition. He said
the assessment by the C.I.A. led administration officials to believe that Iraq's
police were capable of maintaining order. Douglas J. Feith, then the Defense
Department's under secretary for policy, said in an interview that the C.I.A.'s
prewar assessment deemed Iraq's police professional, an appraisal that events
proved "fundamentally wrong."
But Paul Gimigliano, a spokesman for the C.I.A., said the agency's assessment
warned otherwise. "We had no reliable information on individual officers or
police units," he said. The "C.I.A.'s written assessment did not judge that the
Iraqi police could keep order after the war. In fact, the assessment talked in
terms of creating a new force."
A copy of the document, which is classified, could not be obtained.
John E. McLaughlin, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2000
to 2004, said intelligence officials made it clear in prewar planning sessions
that the police were troubled.
"I left these meetings with a clear understanding that this police force was not
one that we could rely on in the sense that we think of a Western police force,"
Mr. McLaughlin said. "I don't remember the agency, or intelligence more broadly,
reassuring people about the police force."
Administration officials also contended that the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo
had shown that finding enough trainers would be difficult, Mr. Miller said.
Moreover, the officials said they wanted to minimize the American presence and
empower Iraqis. "The strategic thought that we had is that we are going to get
into very big trouble in Iraq if we are viewed as our enemies would have us
viewed," Mr. Feith said. "As imperialists, as heavy-handed and stealing their
resources."
Even before General Garner presented his case, Pentagon officials were
criticizing reconstruction efforts known as nation building. In a speech on Feb.
14, 2003, Mr. Rumsfeld warned that international peacekeeping operations could
create "a culture of dependence" and that a long-term foreign presence in a
country "can be unnatural."
At the White House meeting, Condoleezza Rice, then the national security
adviser, said the administration would revisit the issue after Mr. Hussein was
removed from power, General Garner said. The meeting then moved on to other
issues.
"We settled for, 'Don't make the decision not to do this yet,' " General Garner
recalled. "Let us get there and then make the decision on what was needed."
Ms. Rice did not respond to a request for comment.
On March 10, 2003, Mr. Bush approved guidelines for how the United States would
govern postwar Iraq, Mr. Miller said. One of them was that only a limited number
of American advisers would be sent. They would not have the power to enforce the
law. That would be left to the Iraqi police.
A Security Vacuum
As American forces advanced across Iraq in late March and early April of 2003,
Iraqi police officers abandoned their posts by the tens of thousands. In the
resulting security vacuum, mobs looted and burned police stations and government
ministries.
American troops stood by, having received no orders to stop the looting. When
General Garner and other American officials arrived in Baghdad, 16 of 23 major
government ministries were stripped shells.
General Garner, though, would never have the chance to raise his police training
proposal again. Three weeks after arriving in Baghdad, he was replaced by L.
Paul Bremer III, a retired career diplomat and counterterrorism expert. Mr.
Bremer said he participated in no prewar planning and was never told of General
Garner's plan.
"I had only two weeks to get ready for the job," Mr. Bremer said. "I don't
remember being specifically briefed on the police."
Two days after Mr. Bremer's appointment, Mr. Kerik, who had never trained police
officers outside the United States, received his assignment from the Pentagon.
He also said he was never told of General Garner's plan.
When Mr. Bremer landed in Baghdad on May 12, 2003, a month after the city fell,
government offices were still burning and looting had not stopped. That night,
Mr. Bremer gave his first speech to his staff.
"I put the very first priority on police and law and order," he recalled. "I
said we should shoot the looters."
After Mr. Bremer's speech leaked to the press, American military officials
promised him an additional 4,000 military policemen in Baghdad.
Three days later, a 25-member Department of Justice assessment team arrived in
Baghdad to draw up a plan to rebuild Iraq's police and its court and prison
systems.
One team member, Gerald Burke, a 57-year-old retired Massachusetts State Police
major, drove onto the grounds of the Baghdad police academy. Thousands of
people, some civilian crime victims in search of aid, others police officers in
search of orders, besieged a small group of American military policemen.
"We had people drive in with bodies lashed to the hood and lashed to the trunk,"
Mr. Burke said. "It was the only police facility that was open. People didn't
know what to do."
Nationwide, 80 percent of Iraq's police had not returned to duty, the team
estimated. Iraqis hailed Mr. Hussein's ouster but bitterly complained that the
United States was not doing enough about spiraling crime. A population that had
lived in a police state with virtually no street crime for 25 years was dismayed
as murder, kidnapping and rape soared.
On May 18, Mr. Kerik arrived in Baghdad and found "nothing, absolutely nothing"
in place. "Twelve guys on the ground plus me," he recalled. "That was the new
Ministry of Interior."
Mr. Mayer, the author of General Garner's police training plan who worked in the
Department of Justice, had fallen ill in the United States, and the Justice
Department team was apparently unaware of his prewar plan. Working from scratch,
the team pulled together a new plan to train 50,000 to 80,000 members of an
Iraqi police force.
"If you took all of the postconflicts from the 1990's and combined them
together, it would not equal what you're up against in Iraq," recalled R. Carr
Trevillian IV, the senior Justice Department official on the team. "Even if it
were a benign environment."
At first, members suggested that Iraqi police recruits receive six months of
academy training, the amount trainers settled on in Kosovo. Mr. Kerik said he
"started laughing," and calculated that it would take nine years to train the
force.
The team reduced academy training to 16 weeks, and eventually 8 weeks. Later, a
2005 State Department audit found that translating classes from English to
Arabic ate up 50 percent of training time. With translation, Iraqi recruits
received the equivalent of four weeks of training.
To make up for the shortened classes, the Justice Department team proposed a
sweeping field training program similar to Mr. Mayer's. The team calculated that
more than 20,000 advisers would be needed to create the same ratio of police
trainers to recruits in Iraq as existed in Kosovo.
Deeming that figure unrealistic, they recommended placing 6,600 American and
foreign trainers in police stations across the country to train Iraqis and, if
necessary, enforce the law.
DynCorp, the Texas company that was to provide the trainers, had already located
1,150 active and retired police officers who had expressed interest about
serving in Iraq.
Two weeks after the Justice Department team arrived in Baghdad, they submitted
their proposal to Mr. Bremer. The administration now had a second plan for
training the Iraqi police. On June 2, Mr. Bremer approved it, he and Mr. Kerik
said.
A Plan Begins to Unravel
The 6,600 police trainers never showed up.
Over the next six months, just 50 police advisers arrived in Iraq, officials
said, even as the widening insurgency was presenting an additional, and much
more lethal, set of problems.
Officials at the State and Defense Departments blame one another for the police
plan unraveling.
"We and DynCorp were ready to go by June," said a senior State Department
official involved in the police training effort who requested anonymity because
he was not authorized to comment. "But no money was provided for this purpose."
Mr. Miller, the former National Security Council official, said Mr. Bremer never
made the need for field trainers a major issue in Washington.
"If at any point Mr. Bremer had said, 'I just saw a report and I need 6,600,'
that would have made this a front burner issue," Mr. Miller said. "I don't
recall that as an issue."
Mr. Bremer said he repeatedly pushed for more trainers during the summer of 2003
but was told that no foreign countries were willing to send large numbers of
police officers, and that DynCorp was unable to find Americans.
"DynCorp was not producing anybody," Mr. Bremer said. "We were doing the best we
could with what we had."
Mr. Kerik and two dozen retired American police officers and other workers,
meanwhile, tried to reopen academies and stations, screen thousands of Iraqis
claiming to be policemen and choose new police chiefs. Across Baghdad, 2,600
military policemen carried out joint patrols with Iraqis and tried to secure a
city twice the size of Chicago.
Outside Baghdad, American military commanders desperate for police support
declared local tribal leaders new police chiefs or welcomed repentant former
supporters of Mr. Hussein back on the job. Enterprising American soldiers began
ad hoc police training programs that varied from three days to three weeks.
Working frantically as insurgent attacks intensified, advisers managed to bring
back 40,000 Iraqi police officers nationwide and reopen 35 police stations in
Baghdad. But as time passed it became clear that large problems existed with the
fledgling Iraqi police force. Insurgents and former criminals were successfully
posing as policemen, corruption was rampant and some officials chosen on the fly
to be police chiefs were mistrusted by large parts of the population.
By August, the field training plan had shrunk. Mr. Bremer said his staff,
frustrated by the inability to get enough manpower, dropped the target number to
3,500 trainers from 6,600. By September, it fell to 1,500.
By the end of the year, the State Department opened a sprawling center in Jordan
that would train 25,000 police recruits in the next 12 months, but few field
trainers would be in place to monitor them once they took up their posts.
At the same time, no American officials publicly sounded the alarm about the
troubled situation. After spending three and a half months in Iraq, Mr. Kerik
returned to the United States and praised the police during a news conference
with President Bush on the South Lawn of the White House.
"They have made tremendous progress," Mr. Kerik said. "The police are working."
American military officials in Iraq, meanwhile, became frustrated with the slow
pace of the civilian-led police effort. In October, American military officials
announced that their training programs had produced 54,000 police officers
around the country and that they planned to train another 30,000 in 30 days.
Mr. Bremer said he repeatedly complained in National Security Council meetings
chaired by Ms. Rice and attended by cabinet secretaries that the quality of
police training was poor and focused on producing high numbers.
"They were just pulling kids off the streets and handing them badges and
AK-47's," Mr. Bremer said.
As 2003 came to a close, criminals running rampant in Baghdad diminished popular
support for the American-led occupation, Mr. Bremer said.
"We were the government of Iraq, and the most fundamental role of any government
is law and order," Mr. Bremer said. "The fact that we didn't crack down on it
from the very beginning had sent a message to the Iraqis and the insurgents that
we were not prepared to enforce law and order."
Mr. Burke, the retired Massachusetts State Police major, said he was impressed
by the eagerness of Iraqi police officers to build a professional new force but
appalled by the American effort.
"We had such a golden opportunity in the first few months," he said. "These
people were so willing. Even the Sunni policemen wanted change."
By January 2004, Mr. Bremer himself viewed the field training program as
impractical. With the insurgency in full force, American military officials did
not have enough troops to guard civilian trainers posted in isolated police
stations, particularly in the volatile Sunni Triangle, he said.
Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesmen, said it would have been irresponsible to
deploy lightly armed American police officers with little combat experience in
Iraq.
Mr. Bremer and his staff backed a plan to reduce the number of field trainers to
500 from 1,500, and use the remaining funds to intensively train senior Iraqi
police officials.
Mr. Powell and Richard L. Armitage, then the deputy secretary of state, said in
e-mail and phone interviews that they both fought the reduction. They argued
that the police trainers could still operate in safer areas outside the Sunni
Triangle.
They lost the fight in Washington in March 2004. The field training of a new
Iraqi police force — at this point some 90,000 officers — was now left to 500
American contractors from DynCorp.
A Contractor Takes Over
When DynCorp trainers landed in Iraq in 2004, they had hopes of being "part of
an emerging democracy, part of history," as one of them said.
Those hopes were quickly doused.
A year and a half after the invasion, the police barely functioned. American
trainers had to attend to the most elementary needs, like designing forms for
crime reports. Reed Schmidt, a police chief from Atwater, Minn., said he was
teaching the police in Najaf his two-cop method for pulling a driver over when
they told him they preferred their own method — the one that involved two pickup
trucks with seven officers in each to surround the car with 14 guns.
When Mr. Schmidt realized that if any of the Iraqi police opened fire they would
shoot one another, he said he asked, "Aren't you worried about hitting another
officer?"
Mr. Schmidt recalls them replying, "Sometimes that happens."
In northern Iraq, Ann Vernatt, a sheriff's investigator from Eastpointe, Mich.,
said she and five other trainers checked on 55 stations each month. The hourlong
visits left her impressed by the officers' motivation, but dismayed by the bleak
conditions.
"They had rusted Kalashnikovs, which they cleaned with gasoline. Most of their
weapons did not work. And they got paid very little," she said. "They'd sell
their bullets to feed their families."
Several DynCorp employees said their greatest frustration was simply having too
many police officers to train.
Jon Villanova, a North Carolina deputy sheriff hired by DynCorp, said he was
promoted to manage other trainers in southern Iraq four months into his yearlong
stint. Under the plan drawn up by the Justice Department team, he would have
commanded a battalion of at least 500 trainers.
What he got instead was a squad of 40 men to train 20,000 Iraqi policemen spread
through four provinces. He said he could not even dream of giving them the kind
of one-on-one mentoring that American police cadets received. His team struggled
merely to visit their stations once a month.
"That hurt," he said in a recent interview at his home in Mebane, N.C. "You need
a lot of time to develop relationships and rapport so they trust you and are
receptive to what you are trying to teach them."
David Dobrotka, the top civilian overseeing the DynCorp workers, said he did not
seek to hire more trainers, even though there were only 500 in Iraq, because
some were not even getting out of their camps because of security concerns.
"Early in the mission, 500 were too many," he said. "Some were just sitting."
DynCorp executives also said that they knew the federal program only allowed for
500 trainers.
In some ways, officials and trainers said, the entire training operation was
short on manpower. That was true as well for the officials assigned to oversee
DynCorp.
Two government employees and one contractor in Baghdad monitored the performance
of the 500 DynCorp police advisers in Iraq, State Department officials said.
Government investigators are examining reports of criminal fraud by DynCorp
employees, including the sale of ammunition earmarked for the Iraqi police, said
a senior government official who requested anonymity because the investigation
is continuing. After one of its subcontractors working at the police training
academy in Jordan stole fuel worth $600,000 in 2003, the company failed to
install proposed fraud controls, federal auditors said.
Anne W. Patterson, the State Department official who assumed oversight of
DynCorp's work in December, said she ordered a "top to bottom" review of all of
DynCorp's contracts with the State Department.
DynCorp officials said they fired the employees involved in the fuel theft and
reimbursed the government, and put the controls in place. They said the company
kept close watch on ammunition.
"We'd be very surprised if any of the U.S. officers we hired to train Iraqis are
involved in anything like this," said Greg Lagana, a company spokesman. "If
there is an investigation, we'll cooperate vigorously."
Richard Cashon, a DynCorp vice president, said the company billed the government
about $50 million a month for its police trainers, including their
$134,000-a-year salaries as well as security and other operating costs.
DynCorp officials, who noted that they never received field reports from their
trainers, said they were not to blame for the inadequacies in police training.
"We are not judged on the success or failure of the program as they established
it," Mr. Cashon said. "We are judged on our ability to provide qualified
personnel."
Whatever impact the police training program was having on law enforcement was
being weakened by the toll the insurgency was taking on the police.
Increasingly, police officers and recruits were targets of violence. From
September 2004 through April this year, 2,842 police officers were killed and
5,812 were injured, according to American records, which are not available for
the first 17 months of the war. Twenty DynCorp employees involved in police
training have also been killed.
By December 2004, there were also signs that the police were being drawn into
the evolving sectarian battles. Senior officers in the police department in the
southern city of Basra were implicated in the killings of 10 members of the
Baath Party, and of a mother and daughter accused of prostitution, according to
a State Department report.
By then there was a growing sense among American officials that the civilian
training program was not working, and the United States military came up with
its own plan. It was the Americans' third strategy for training the Iraqi
police, and it would run into the worst problems of all. Basra was just the
beginning.
Max Becherer contributed reporting from Baghdad, Iraq, for this article, and
Christopher Drew from New York.
Misjudgments Marred U.S. Plans for Iraqi Police, NYT, 21.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/21/world/middleeast/21security.html?hp&ex=1148270400&en=c361b73f04b294a5&ei=5094&partner=homepage
As Death Stalks Iraq, Middle-Class Exodus
Begins
May 19, 2006
The New York Times
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 18 — Deaths run like water
through the life of the Bahjat family. Four neighbors. A barber. Three grocers.
Two men who ran a currency exchange shop.
But when six armed men stormed into their sons' primary school this month, shot
a guard dead, and left fliers ordering it to close, Assad Bahjat knew it was
time to leave.
"The main thing now is to just get out of Iraq," said Mr. Bahjat, standing in a
room heaped with suitcases and bedroom furniture in eastern Baghdad.
In the latest indication of the crushing hardships weighing on the lives of
Iraqis, increasing portions of the middle class seem to be doing everything they
can to leave the country. In the last 10 months, the state has issued new
passports to 1.85 million Iraqis, 7 percent of the population and a quarter of
the country's estimated middle class.
The school system offers another clue: Since 2004, the Ministry of Education has
issued 39,554 letters permitting parents to take their children's academic
records abroad. The number of such letters issued in 2005 was double that in
2004, according to the director of the ministry's examination department. Iraqi
officials and international organizations put the number of Iraqis in Jordan at
close to a million. Syrian cities also have growing Iraqi populations.
Since the bombing of a shrine in Samarra in February touched off a sectarian
rampage, crime and killing have spread further through Iraqi society, paralyzing
neighborhoods and smashing families. Now, on the brink of a new, permanent
government, Iraqis are expressing the darkest view of their future in three
years. "We're like sheep at a slaughter farm," said a businessman, who is
arranging a move to Jordan. "We are just waiting for our time." The Samarra
bombing produced a new kind of sectarian violence. Gangs of Shiites in Baghdad
pulled Sunni Arabs out of houses and mosques and killed them in a spree that
prompted retaliatory attacks and displaced 14,500 families in three months,
according to the Ministry for Migration.
Most frightening, many middle-class Iraqis say, was how little the government
did to stop the violence. That failure boded ominously for the future, leaving
them feeling that the government was incapable of protecting them and more
darkly, that perhaps it helped in the killing. Shiite-dominated government
forces have been accused of carrying out sectarian killings.
"Now I am isolated," said Monkath Abdul Razzaq, a middle-class Sunni Arab, who
decided to leave after the bombing. "I have no government. I have no protection
from the government. Anyone can come to my house, take me, kill me and throw me
in the trash."
Traces of the leaving are sprinkled throughout daily life. Mr. Abdul Razzaq, who
will move his family to Syria next month, where he has already rented an
apartment, said a fistfight broke out while he waited for five hours in a packed
passport office to fill out applications for his two young sons. In Salheyah, a
commercial district in central Baghdad, bus companies that specialize in Syria
and Jordan say ticket sales have surged.
Karim al-Ani, the owner of one of the firms, Tiger Company, said a busy day last
year used to be three buses, but in recent months it comes close to 10. "Before
it was more tourists," he said. "Now we are taking everything, even furniture."
The impact can be seen in neighborhoods here. While much of the city bustles
during daytime hours, the more war-torn areas, like in the south and in Ameriya,
Ghazaliya, and Khadra in the west, are eerily empty at midday. On Mr. Bahjat's
block in Dawra, only about 5 houses out of 40 remain occupied. Empty houses in
the area are scrawled with the words "Omar Brigade," a Sunni group that kills
Shiites.
Residents have been known to protest, at least on paper. In an act of helpless
fury this winter, a large banner hung across a house in Dawra that read, "Do God
and Islam agree that I should leave my house to live in a camp with my five
children and wife?"
"Shadows," said Eileen Bahjat, Mr. Bahjat's wife, standing with her two sons and
describing what is left in the neighborhood. "Shadows and killing."
In Dawra, one of the worst areas in all of Baghdad, public life has ground to a
halt. Four teachers have been killed in the past 10 days in Mr. Bahjat's area
alone, and the Ahmed al-Waily primary school where the Bahjat boys, ages 12 and
8, studied, may not be able to hold final exams because of the killings. And
three teachers from the Batoul secondary school were shot in late April.
Trash is collected only sporadically. On April 3, insurgents shot seven garbage
collectors to death near their truck, and their bodies lay in the area for eight
hours before the authorities could collect them, said Naeem al-Kaabi, deputy
mayor for municipal affairs in Baghdad. In all, 312 trash workers have been
killed in Baghdad in the past six months.
"Sunnis, Shiites, Christians," said Mr. Bahjat, a Christian who this month moved
his family to New Baghdad, an eastern suburb, to live with a relative, before
leaving for Syria. "They just want to empty this place of all people."
"We must start from zero," he said. "Maybe under zero. But there is no other
choice. Even with more time, the security will not improve."
It is more than just the killing that has sapped hope for the future. Iraqis
have waited for five months for a permanent government, after voting in a
national election in December, and though political leaders are on the brink of
announcing it, some Iraqis say the amount of haggling it took to form it makes
them skeptical that it will be able to solve bigger problems.
Abd al-Kareem al-Mahamedawy, a tribal sheik from Amara in southern Iraq who
fought for years against Saddam Hussein, compared the process to "giving birth
to a deformed child."
As if to underscore the point, a scene of sorrow unfolded just outside Mr.
Mahamedawy's gate, where an extended family gathered, full of nervous movement,
and absorbed the news of the strangling death of their 13-year-old boy by
kidnappers. A woman brought her hands to her head in the timeworn motion of
mourning.
Even with the resolve to leave, many departing Iraqis said they consider the
move only temporary and hope to return if Iraq's fractious groups are united and
stem the tide of the killings.
Cars and furniture are sold, but those who can afford it, like the Abdul Razzaq
family, hang on to their properties. In Khadra in western Baghdad, Nesma Abdul
Razzaq, Mr. Abdul Razzaq's wife, has spent the past months carefully wrapping
their photographs, vases and furniture in cloth and packing them in boxes. She
spoke of the sadness of the empty rooms and the pain of having to build a new
life in a strange place.
"I have a rage inside myself," Mrs. Abdul Razzaq said by telephone, as her area,
since last autumn, has become unsafe for a Western reporter to visit. "I feel
desperate."
"I don't want to leave Iraq. But I have to for the kids. They have seen enough."
In a quiet block in Mansour, a wealthy neighborhood in central Baghdad, where
stately, gated homes are lined with pruned hedges, the Kubba family spends most
of its time indoors. They have hung onto their lifestyle: three of their
children study violin, flute, and ballet in an arts school outside the
neighborhood despite encroaching violence.
Last fall, a foul smell led neighbors to the bodies of seven family members in a
house several doors down from the Kubbas. They had been robbed. Fehed Kubba, 15,
went to buy bread last year and saw a crowd near the bakery that he assumed was
watching a backgammon game. When he pushed in to look, he saw a man who had just
been shot to death.
But it was the increasingly sectarian nature of the violence, deeply painful to
Iraqis who are proud of their intermarried heritage, that tipped the scales as
Falah Kubba and his wife, Samira, considered leaving with Fehed, Roula, 13, and
Heya, 12.
"The past few months convinced us," said Mr. Kubba, a businessman whose wife is
Sunni. "Now they are killing by ID's. The killing around Americans was something
different, but the ID's, you can't move around on the streets."
"At the beginning we said, 'Let's wait, maybe it will be better tomorrow,' " Mr.
Kubba said.
"Now I know it is time to go."
Mona Mahmoud, Sahar Nageeb and Qais Mizher contributed reporting for this
article.
As
Death Stalks Iraq, Middle-Class Exodus Begins, NYT, 19.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/19/world/middleeast/19migration.html?hp&ex=1148097600&en=27cafcfc5a99f506&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Inquiry Implies Civilian Deaths in Iraq
Topped Initial Report
May 19, 2006
The New York Times
By THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, May 18 — An official military
investigation into allegations that American marines killed innocent Iraqis last
November has uncovered evidence that the number of dead civilians is higher than
the 15 originally reported, Congressional and Defense Department officials said.
The inquiry, which Pentagon officials said was still weeks from completion, has
already raised fundamental questions about the propriety of actions by the
troops, one Defense Department official said. But the official said that a
characterization this week by a member of Congress that the Iraqis had been
killed "in cold blood" was an extreme description of the incident.
In the incident, marines patrolling Haditha, in western Iraq, in November opened
fire after being hit by a roadside bomb and coming under small-arms fire from a
nearby house, the military says. One marine was reported killed by the bomb.
But details of the incident went unreported until March, when Time magazine said
Iraqi human rights advocates had accused the marines of killing civilians and
after the military had opened an inquiry and admitted that 15 Iraqi civilians
had been killed in the cross-fire.
Another Pentagon official said Thursday that the marines had come under fire but
that evidence gathered so far indicated the hostile fire had not come from the
house where the civilians were killed. Defense Department officials had to be
promised anonymity to discuss the case because of the continuing inquiry.
On Wednesday, Representative John P. Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania, talked
about the investigation at a news conference on Capitol Hill. "Our troops
overreacted because of the pressure on them, and they killed innocent civilians
in cold blood," he said. "And that's what the report is going to tell."
He said he had not read the official findings of the inquiry, but had been told
about them by officers he identified as commanders.
Mr. Murtha said the number of Iraqi civilians killed was about twice the initial
report of 15. Defense Department officials said Thursday that evidence indicated
that more than 15 had been killed, but that the inquiry had not confirmed his
estimate of double that number.
A leading Congressional critic of the Iraq war, Mr. Murtha served in Vietnam in
the Marine Corps and was known as a hawk on military issues before becoming a
leader of Democratic Party efforts to withdraw American troops from Iraq.
"Now, you can imagine the impact this is going to have on those troops for the
rest of their lives and for the United States in our war and our effort in
trying to win the hearts and minds," Mr. Murtha said. "We can't sustain this
operation."
A spokesman for Marine forces in the Middle East, Lt. Col. Sean D. Gibson, said
Wednesday that he could not comment on the substance of Mr. Murtha's statements
because the inquiry was not complete.
Inquiry Implies Civilian Deaths in Iraq Topped Initial Report, NYT, 19.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/19/world/middleeast/19haditha.html
Despite Political Pressure to Scale Back,
Logistics Are Pinning Down U.S. in Iraq
May 14, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID S. CLOUD and THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, May 13 — Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld regularly says he wants major troop withdrawals from Iraq, if
possible this year. But he rarely mentions the daunting challenges beyond the
volatile security situation that are preventing a rapid withdrawal.
Discussions of when, how fast and how far to draw down American troops in Iraq
will no doubt be influenced by the domestic political mood, with Congressional
elections approaching in November. Yet those pushing for significant withdrawals
will run into an undeniable law of military operations: the American combat
troops who remain in Iraq, and the growing number of Iraqi security forces, will
still require substantial numbers of supporting American forces to remain, too,
to supply food, fuel and ammunition and otherwise support combat operations.
As the Bush administration considers how and when to draw down the nearly
133,000 American troops still in Iraq, those logistical factors, among many
other pressures and counterpressures, will weigh heavily toward keeping a
sizable force there, delivering supplies, gathering and analyzing intelligence
and providing air support to Iraqi security forces.
President Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld have always insisted that decisions on
withdrawals will be based on the security situation in Iraq and the readiness of
the new Iraqi Army, and that they will be made only after recommendations from
senior commanders, including General George W. Casey Jr., the top commander in
Iraq, and General John P. Abizaid, the overall American commander in the region.
Senior officers are aware of the growing political pressure on the Bush
administration to carry out withdrawals. Many are sympathetic with the goal,
worried that the demands of keeping many more than 100,000 troops in Iraq for
several more years could do long-term harm to the military and holding out hope
that a permanent Iraqi government would do much to stabilize the country.
But despite the political pressures, and despite the argument by senior
officials like Mr. Rumsfeld and General Abizaid that a large American presence
may actually be fueling the insurgency, commanders are discussing whether the
volatile security situation would allow any significant withdrawals at all in
the short term, according to interviews with Pentagon officials and officers in
Iraq in recent weeks.
Indeed, a trend of American troops pulling back to their bases and letting Iraqi
troops take the lead has had to be scaled back, and the Americans have had to
resume more active operations to help stop the widespread sectarian violence
that has killed hundreds of Iraqi civilians in the past few months, a senior
officer said. At the same time, attacks on American troops in March and April
were at their highest point since last fall.
"General Casey is feeling the pressure. He knows how hard this is on the Army,
but he's getting pulled in two directions," said a general who recently served
in Iraq. Like some other officers and officials interviewed for this article, he
was granted anonymity because he said he had been ordered not to discuss troop
levels. Lt. Gen. Robert Fry, a British Royal Marine and the deputy ground
commander in Iraq, said that insurgents have increased their attacks in an
attempt to disrupt formation of a permanent Iraqi government for fear it could
attract widespread support among Iraqis.
"We are about to enter a phase here which is likely to be decisive in terms of
the political transformation of this country," he told Pentagon reporters in a
video briefing from Iraq on Friday. "The opposition knows this just as well as
we do."
For that reason, the next few months is the wrong time for a reduction in
American combat troops, some officers say.
Despite that evaluation, political pressures appear to have had some effect on
the number of troops available to fight the insurgency, commanders say.
The Pentagon recently announced that an armored brigade would not, at least not
immediately, deploy to Iraq, a decision that one senior officer said was
unpopular with some commanders below General Casey's level.
"Not enough troops on the ground keeps us pinned down in one place, only holding
terrain or jumping from fire to fire," the officer said. "But with midterm
elections coming up no one wants it to seem like we're amassing soldiers when
everyone has been told we're drawing down troops."
The decision to delay deployment of a brigade means fewer troops will be
available to plug holes in places like Ramadi, a violence-ridden city west of
Baghdad. There, American and Iraqi troops are in almost daily combat, and
insurgents have been carrying out a "very effective murder and intimidation
campaign" against residents who help American or Iraqi authorities, said Maj.
Gen. Richard C. Zilmer of the Marines.
One of General Zilmer's infantry brigades, now stationed in Ramadi, is scheduled
to rotate home next month, but he said he still had not been assigned another
unit to replace the roughly 3,500 departing soldiers.
Such decisions are usually made months in advance, but with the Pentagon
announcement that the brigade scheduled to arrive next month had been halted,
American troops in the country will likely have to be shifted from another
region in Iraq. Another brigade, equipped with Stryker armored vehicles, that is
scheduled to arrive in late summer could also be sent early, two Army officers
said.
The 15 combat brigades now in Iraq total roughly 60,000 combat troops. The rest
of the American soldiers there deliver supplies, gather intelligence, staff
headquarters, fly helicopters and other jobs. Thousands also assist in training
and supplying Iraqi units, though all can find themselves in combat because of
the unconventional nature of the conflict.
It takes anywhere from three to five soldiers to support every combat soldier,
and some of the support mission for American troops in Iraq is based elsewhere
in the Persian Gulf region. But a senior Army planner at the Pentagon said that
in Iraq, even a sharp initial reduction in combat units would not immediately
bring a corresponding reduction in support troops.
Soldiers who remain will still require all the services that the larger force
did, and Iraqi troops will rely on Americans for many tasks for the foreseeable
future, like air support. "Even though the brigade combat teams may roll back in
number, the obligation to support U.S. and Iraqi forces remains, and that's a
bill that most people don't really focus on," the senior Army planner said.
In the longer term, reducing the American presence too quickly could threaten
Iraq's ability to build a military capable of standing up to the insurgency and
keeping its soldiers supplied and paid, officers said.
One of the most detailed assessments available in the public domain came in a
report filed by Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, a retired Army commander, who teaches
international affairs at West Point and spent a week in the region last month
interviewing senior American and Iraqi officers.
"We need at least two to five more years of U.S. partnership and combat backup
to get the Iraqi Army ready to stand on its own," General McCaffrey wrote in a
seven-page memorandum that circulated widely within the military after his
return.
"The Iraqi Army is real, growing, and willing to fight," he said. But he
cautioned that "they are very badly equipped, with only a few light vehicles,
small arms, most with body armor and one or two uniforms. They have almost no
mortars, heavy machine guns, decent communications equipment, artillery, armor"
or any air cargo transport, helicopter troop carriers or strike aircraft in
their own inventory.
As for the ability of the Iraqi security forces to provide indigenous combat
support or service support, he wrote, "Their logistics capability is only now
beginning to appear."
Maj. Gen. Thomas R. Turner II, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, is the
senior American commander for security across the northern part of the country,
an area where Iraqi security forces have made steady gains.
In assessing the ability of the Iraqi military to take over the security
mission, he said, "The major inhibitor to independent operations is lack of
equipment, manpower, their inability to sustain themselves and a lack of systems
or policies in place to manage the organization."
Despite Political Pressure to Scale Back, Logistics Are Pinning Down U.S. in
Iraq, NYT, 14.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/world/middleeast/14troops.html
At Falwell's University, McCain Defends
Iraq War
May 14, 2006
The New York Times
By ADAM NAGOURNEY
LYNCHBURG, Va., May 13 — With the Rev. Jerry
Falwell at his side, Senator John McCain offered a spirited defense of the Iraq
war on Saturday, telling graduating students at Liberty University that victory
there was crucial to world security. But Mr. McCain urged opponents of the war
to vigorously "state their opposition" in the interest of critical debate on
this increasingly unpopular conflict.
"If an American feels the decision was unwise, then they should state their
opposition and argue for another course — it is your right and obligation," Mr.
McCain said, adding, "But I ask that you consider the possibility that I, too,
am trying to meet my responsibilities, to follow my conscience, to do my duty as
best as I can, as God has given me light to see that duty."
Mr. McCain, an Arizona Republican and a likely presidential candidate in 2008,
made his remarks to 2,500 graduates in a high-profile appearance at the
university, which was founded by Mr. Falwell, a conservative religious leader
whom he once described as an agent of "intolerance" and a threat to the
Republican Party.
The appearance came as Mr. McCain — trying to establish an early dominance in
the Republican presidential nomination battle — has sought to ease tensions with
Republican conservatives who have long been suspicious of his commitment to
conservative ideals, a perception that was stirred by his difficult history with
Mr. Falwell.
Though the two men shared a stage here on Saturday, greeting each other warmly
and drawing applause from the festive audience, Mr. McCain made only a brief
mention of Mr. Falwell in his 28-minute speech. And Mr. McCain, who is normally
eager to talk to reporters, left immediately after finishing his speech and
before Mr. Falwell offered his greeting to graduates. Mr. McCain's aides said
that he had to catch a plane for a speech later Saturday to the Utah Republican
Party.
Nearly 50 reporters came here to cover Mr. McCain's remarks, a showing that
university officials described as huge for a commencement address in this remote
central Virginia town.
Mr. McCain is also the scheduled speaker at the graduation on Friday at the New
School in New York. He intends to deliver the same remarks, his aides said, with
the expectation that they may draw a less-than-enthusiastic reaction there,
given that school's liberal nature. His planned appearance has caused an uproar
among students and faculty because of his conservative positions on issues like
Iraq.
At a time when polls show public support for the war falling, and with calls on
Capitol Hill for the United States to figure out a way to withdraw, Mr. McCain
argued for staying in Iraq, even as he acknowledged the toll it had taken on the
nation.
"Americans should argue about this war," he said. "It has cost the lives of
nearly 2,500 of the best of us. It has taken innocent life. It has imposed an
enormous financial burden on our economy."
But he said he had not varied in his own support.
"I stand that ground not to chase vainglorious dreams of empire; not for a
noxious sense of racial superiority over a subject people; not for cheap oil,"
he said. "I stand that ground because I believed, rightly or wrongly, that my
country's interests and values required it."
Notably, Mr. McCain made no mention of his conservative positions on social
issues like abortion and same-sex marriage.
Mr. McCain's speech offered pleas for civility to an increasingly divided
nation.
"Ours is a noisy, contentious society, and always has been, for we love our
liberties much," he said. "And among those liberties we love most, particularly
so when we are young, is our right to self-expression. That passion for
self-expression sometimes overwhelms our civility, and our presumption that
those with whom we have strong disagreements, wrong as they might be, believe
that they, too, are answering the demands of their conscience."
Referring to his own brash political ways as a younger man, he said: "It's a
pity there wasn't a blogosphere then. I would have felt much at home in the
medium."
At
Falwell's University, McCain Defends Iraq War, NYT, 14.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/washington/14mccain.html
Army Concerned About HBO War Film
May 14, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WYATT
Senior Army officials have scaled back their
planned participation in an advance screening of a documentary about an Army
Combat Support Hospital in Baghdad out of concern that its grim medical scenes
could demoralize soldiers and their families and negatively affect public
opinion about the war, Army officials said Friday.
Two senior Army officers, who were granted anonymity to publicly discuss the
private deliberations of Army leaders, said the secretary of the Army, Francis
J. Harvey, had declined to attend the screening by HBO, scheduled for Monday
night at the National Museum of American History in Washington.
High-ranking military officers, including Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, who is the
Army chief of staff, and Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley, the surgeon general of the
Army, had been expected to attend the screening but now will not, people
involved in preparations for the event said.
The documentary, titled "Baghdad ER," chronicles two months at the 86th Combat
Support Hospital, where filmmakers were given broad access to follow doctors,
nurses, medics and others as they treated soldiers wounded by roadside bombs and
in combat. As one nurse, Specialist Saidet Lanier, says in the film: "This is
hard-core, raw, uncut trauma. Day after day, every day."
The Army officials said that concerns about the documentary — which includes
footage of an amputation and of wounded soldiers undergoing surgery and, in some
cases, dying — were also raised by the wives of top Army officers who had seen
the film.
"Given the subject matter, it's not something you're going to cheer at the end,"
said one senior Army official.
Richard L. Plepler, an executive vice president at HBO, said the screening would
take place as planned on Monday, but he said he expected far fewer people to
attend than the 300 or so that Army officials told him to expect after an
initial screening at the Pentagon.
"We had discussed a larger degree of participation from senior members of the
Army when we first visited the Pentagon in March," Mr. Plepler said. "One
retired general who was there told us the film 'captured the soul of the United
States Army.' Therefore, we're a little surprised by the change in plans."
Paul Boyce, a public affairs specialist at the Pentagon, said the screening on
Monday was planned as a tribute to the medical personnel featured in the film
and did not require the participation of senior Army officials.
Several doctors featured in the film are planning to attend the screening, Mr.
Boyce said.
A screening has also been scheduled at Fort Campbell, Ky., where the 86th Combat
Support Hospital is based, and the documentary has been sent to medical teams at
about 20 other bases for screenings.
The film, directed by Jon Alpert and Matthew O'Neill, will be shown May 21 on
HBO.
HBO has been promoting the documentary as a tribute to the heroism of the
soldiers and medical personnel who are shown working under severe stress. But
the producers acknowledge that its harrowing scenes could be interpreted
differently.
"Anything showing the grim realities of war is, in a sense, antiwar," said
Sheila Nevins, president of HBO's documentary and family unit. "In that way, the
film is a sort of Rorschach test. You see in it what you bring to it."
David S. Cloud and Eric Schmitt contributed reporting for this article.
Army
Concerned About HBO War Film, NYT, 14.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/us/14hbo.html
In a Dispute, Army Cancels Rebuilding
Contract in Iraq
May 13, 2006
The New York Times
By JAMES GLANZ and DAVID ROHDE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 12 — The Army Corps of
Engineers said Friday that it had canceled the work remaining on a $70 million
project to refurbish 20 hospitals in Iraq, deepening a dispute with one of the
largest American contractors operating here and seriously threatening an
ambitious United States-led effort to improve Iraqi health care.
Brig. Gen. William H. McCoy Jr., commander of the corps division that
administers the projects, said the cancellation would affect mainly work on
eight hospitals that he said the contractor, Parsons, had not completed on time,
adding that Iraqi companies would be used to finish those jobs. He said Parsons
had finished most or all of the work on 12 of the hospitals.
The move follows by less than two weeks a federal audit of work by Parsons on a
$243 million program to build health care clinics around Iraq that found that
just 20 of the original 150 clinics would be completed without new financing.
Together, the programs constitute the most important American effort to improve
Iraq's dilapidated health care system, and are widely regarded as crucial to
showing ordinary Iraqis that the invasion has improved their lives.
General McCoy had disputed many of the findings in the audit, which laid much of
the blame for poor workmanship and cost overruns on the clinics to lax oversight
by the corps.
On Friday, the general said in an interview that while he did not think all the
problems with the hospitals were the fault of the contractor, Parsons, he had no
choice but to act. "I'm not trying to deflect blame here; I'm responsible for
construction in Iraq," he said. "But this contractor was not performing, and we
took aggressive action."
The abrupt cancellation of the hospital project appeared to stun company
officials, who said the corps had done nothing after receiving repeated warnings
that money was running low and that serious missteps by corps managers had
undermined certain projects. The audit on the clinics, which was carried out by
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, found that the corps had
made similar mistakes in that case.
The Parsons officials cited one case in April when, they said, frustrated
doctors wanted to move into a new residence hall that Parsons had completed next
to a maternity hospital in Najaf, but could not open it until corps inspectors
approved the work. When inspectors did not arrive, the doctors finally stormed
the building, breaking locks and overrunning guards, the officials said, showing
pictures of what they said was the incident.
Among the other challenges that the company faced, it said, was a strangely
structured agreement with the corps that paid construction costs from one
contract and administrative costs — things like living quarters, security and
the salaries of Parsons managers in Iraq — from a separate contract.
For the full range of the Parsons work on clinics, hospitals and a few related
things like Iraqi ministry buildings, the costs on the administrative contract
alone have risen above $100 million, the company said. With the delays in
completing the hospitals, the corps says, those costs have risen too far.
For its part, the company says that it was clear about what the job would cost,
but that the corps did not provide the necessary support to finish the work.
"There have been many reasons for delay," said Earnest Robbins, a senior vice
president at Parsons, citing a proliferation of government contracting entities
in Iraq, rapid turnover in the corps staff and difficulties in dealing with
Iraqi ministry officials. But among the main problems, Mr. Robbins said, was
that "we were never funded to provide the level of management, of oversight,
that we told the government it would take to complete those projects."
The residence hall was not the only work scheduled at the Najaf maternity
hospital, which is one of the eight that will not be completed under the Parsons
contract. Two other maternity hospitals in the south, in Nasiriya and Hilla,
also will not be finished, along with three hospitals in Baghdad, one north of
the capital and one in Ramadi.
Among them, those hospitals contain 2,125 beds, the company said. Although
Parsons and the corps disagree on how much of the work has already been
completed in those hospitals, both say that all of them are at least 60 percent
finished.
The construction work has been carried out with Iraqi subcontractors, several of
which Parsons said had been difficult to manage. But the corps said it planned
to take the extraordinary step of finishing the job by hiring many of the same
subcontractors that Parsons had been working with already — in effect, cutting
out the middleman.
"In all cases, from our point of view, these contractors have the capacity to do
the job," General McCoy said.
Many of the projects in the hospitals involve interior renovations and some new
construction. But the original contract for all 20 hospitals also called for 57
elevators, 19 water purifiers and 19 incinerators for burning medical waste.
Most of the equipment installation has been completed, the company said.
To date, there has been no comprehensive audit of the hospital program, as there
has been of the clinics.
But last year an Iraqi reporter and producer, Ali Fadhil, visited one of the
original 20 hospitals in Diwaniya, in the south, as the refurbishment was
nearing completion and shot film of the site. Some of it was used in "Iraq's
Missing Billions," a British documentary, and shows things like an open manhole
leaking sewage in the garden of the hospital and sewage backed up in the
hospital kitchen.
Mr. Fadhil said in an interview that he could smell raw sewage in the changing
room for one operating room.
Mr. Fadhil said he saw shoddy work in other parts of the hospital, including new
light fittings that had melted and pipes that had not been connected. Inside
another operating room, floor tiles had not been properly glued down and ants
were crawling around.
Parsons officials conceded difficulties with the project, which was later
completed, but said the problems stemmed mainly from delays by corps inspectors
and interference by the Iraqi Ministry of Health, which constantly demanded new
work. During the delays, Iraqis began using the hospital and clogged the sewage
system by using it to dispose of solid trash, like bags of used syringes, that
it was not meant to carry, the officials said. "The sewage system was not
designed as a garbage dump," a Parsons official said.
Mr. Fadhil said that the Iraqi subcontractor working with Parsons made similar
claims, but that it appeared that most of the problems had been caused by the
use of poor quality materials. "I had a hope that the American presence, that
they would do something good for us," he said. "The opposite happened."
This week Parsons officials produced photographs of waiting rooms and other
areas that seemed to be clear of damage.
As word of the cancellation of the hospital contract began making its way around
Baghdad's fortified Green Zone, Stuart W. Bowen Jr., who heads the office of the
Special Inspector General, said that the Parsons work had caught his attention.
"The more I look and hear about different issues, the more I'm interested in
taking a wider look at their activities," he said.
James Glanz reported from Baghdad for this article, and David Rohde from New
York.
In a
Dispute, Army Cancels Rebuilding Contract in Iraq, NYT, 13.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/13/world/middleeast/13reconstruct.html
Grief Compels Marine's Dad to Support War
May 13, 2006
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 4:02 a.m. ET
The New York Times
FAIRFIELD, Ohio (AP) -- A soft-spoken suburban
real-estate broker, John Prazynski didn't consider himself political and never
expected to become a public figure, much less a pro-war activist. But in the
year since his son Taylor, a Marine, died in Iraq, Prazynski has devoted much of
his time to supporting the troops through fundraisers, two trips to Camp
Lejeune, N.C., and interviews backing the war effort.
''I could easily have gone the other way,'' Prazynski said. He says his activism
is a tribute to his son, trying to ''make something positive happen out of
something so negative. That's what Taylor would want us to do.''
Marine Lance Cpl. Taylor Prazynski, 20, died May 9, 2005, of shrapnel wounds
from a mortar shell that exploded near him during combat in Anbar Province. In
his last phone calls, the fun-loving, popular man who had spent much of his
senior year of high school helping special-needs students told his father he
wanted to become a special education teacher.
Since his son's death, Prazynski, 43, has been interviewed repeatedly about the
war while organizing a series of 5-kilometer runs and motorcycle rides to raise
money for scholarships for students who attend his son's high school.
''I do this to keep Taylor's memory alive,'' Prazynski said.
On opening day of the baseball season in Cincinnati, he joined President Bush
and two wounded soldiers on the field in pregame ceremonies. Prazynski said he
wanted to thank Bush for his support ''and give him two thumbs up with his
positive stance on security, military and veterans' issues.''
The former Air Force tech school instructor shares the pain -- but not the
viewpoint -- of Cindy Sheehan, who became a high-profile war protester after her
son Casey was killed in Iraq in April 2004.
''She's grieving, as we are,'' Prazynski said. ''She's chosen to direct her
energies in a different direction. I say God bless her.
''My son died for the Constitution that allows her to do what she's doing. Her
son died, and God bless him, too, to support and defend the Constitution that
gives her the right to speak freely, and I'm all for that right.
''I just don't think that I clearly understand what her agenda is.''
Sheehan, who helped found Gold Star Families for Peace, has called for the
impeachment of Bush, whom she says duped America into invading Iraq.
Prazynski understands the constant hurt of losing a child, and why such a loss
has turned some grieving parents against the war. Even now, he said, ''Every day
is painful.''
The father searched the Internet and found several groups he felt he could
support, but chose Impact Player Partners because it was based in nearby
Cincinnati. The nonprofit group, an advocate for wounded and disabled veterans,
invited Prazynski to take part in the opening day presentation with Bush.
Prazynski also works with the Washington-based Tragedy Assistance Program for
Survivors and hopes to raise donations for its activities by running in the
Marine Corps Marathon in October.
''We're so grateful for his participation,'' said TAPS founder Bonnie Carroll.
''It's an incredible opportunity to honor and help all those who are grieving
the loss of a loved one.''
Prazynski's last trip to Camp Lejeune -- some 700 miles on a motorcycle -- was
another step.
''That's part of the healing process, to meet parents of other Marines and
soldiers who died and just be able to talk to them,'' he said.
On his way home, Prazynski made a spur-of-the-moment 300-mile side trip.
''I went up to Arlington (National Cemetery) and visited Taylor's grave, and the
other Cincinnati fallen heroes and the other men he served with. That's part, I
guess, of how I deal with things,'' he said.
''I spent most of Saturday afternoon in Arlington. It's just peaceful; I could
probably sit there for days, seriously.''
------
On the Net:
Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors:
http://www.taps.org
Impact Player Partners:
http://www.impactahero.org
Gold Star Families for Peace: http://www.gsfp.org
Grief
Compels Marine's Dad to Support War, YT, 13.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/us/AP-Marines-Dad.html
Sympathy Flows at Soldier's Funeral in
Queens
May 11, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHELLE O'DONNELL
At Our Lady of Sorrows Roman Catholic Church
in Corona, Queens, Mary, the mother of God, weeps at the feet of her son in the
mural over the altar. Yesterday, Maria, the mother of Sgt. Jose Gomez of the
United States Army, wept from her seat in the first pew.
"You, more than anyone, understand the pain of the mother of Christ," the Rev.
Thomas Healy said in Spanish to Maria Gomez, whose slender shoulders slumped
into the Army officer seated to her right as her husband, Felix Jimenez, wrapped
an arm around her. "We are all with you in your pain."
But she was really alone and she seemed to know it, weeping and staring blankly
at her son's coffin in the center aisle. She had brought him to the United
States from the Dominican Republic when he was 3. Twenty years later, on April
20, he was killed by a roadside bomb in Iraq, during a second tour of duty
there.
His death came 31 months after his fiancée, Analaura Esparza-Gutierrez, 21, an
Army private from Houston, was also killed by a roadside bombing in Tikrit,
Iraq. Three springs ago, Sergeant Gomez had proposed to her. Now both were gone.
Yesterday, church and state rose up, each in its ritualistic glory, to honor the
brief life and sudden death of Sergeant Gomez. Father Healy tenderly anointed
his coffin with incense, and gave the young man his final blessings. The ladies
of Corona — some in veils — filled the pews. Army officers flanked the right
side of the church, and a two-star general presented Mrs. Gomez with the purple
star and bronze star that President Bush had authorized her son to receive.
Yet it all seemed to do little to lessen the grief of Mrs. Gomez, who appeared
to grow smaller as those by her side supported her.
The loss of Sergeant Gomez hit her especially hard because he had always strived
to take care of his mother. He was saving to buy her a house. He had called home
on April 19, the day before he died, to have flowers sent to her for Mother's
Day.
And he had invented a tale that he was working and studying in Texas to hide the
fact that he had been ordered to serve a second tour in Iraq, where the danger
had been driven home by Private Esparza-Gutierrez's death.
Father Healy told Sergeant Gomez's family to persevere. His new fiancée, Marie
Canario, dabbed her eyes with a sodden tissue.
"Remember Jesus' words," Father Healy said in Spanish and English. "There is no
greater love than to give your life for your friends."
Maj. Gen. Bill Grisoli spoke. He called Sergeant Gomez a hero. He read a letter
from an officer who wrote how, on April 20, after another Army vehicle was
damaged by a roadside bomb in Baghdad, Sergeant Gomez and Staff Sgt. Bryant A.
Herlem, 37, had moved their vehicle forward.
"It was in the act of protecting their friends that the second blast occurred,"
General Grisoli said.
Mrs. Gomez bore it all quietly. All Jose had wanted, she said in an interview
last week, was to study mathematics and become an accountant. Raised in Corona,
amid a warren of brick and clapboard delis, barbershops and bodegas, Jose
quickly learned one uncompromising sum: his family's bank accounts could never
support his schooling.
"We're poor," Mrs. Gomez had said. She works packaging air fresheners in a
factory, and her husband, Mr. Jimenez, is a truck driver. "And if you go in the
Army to get your degree, well that used to work out."
For most of the funeral, Mrs. Gomez kept her head bowed.
The funeral ended, and Sergeant Gomez's final trip through Queens began. His
hearse slipped past the El Nuevo Amanecer restaurant, the Valdez Deli, the mural
of the unfurled American flag painted on the side of a building.
Then it was into East Elmhurst, where children played at recess on a rooftop
along Astoria Boulevard, and a small jet wobbled its descent to La Guardia
Airport. At St. Michael's Cemetery along the Grand Central Parkway, a leader led
mourners down the wrong path. They scurried around the cemetery until they found
Sergeant Gomez's coffin.
It lay on a small hill covered with green burlap. Mrs. Gomez and Ms. Canario sat
weeping as a man in an orange shirt led a prayer. Mr. Jimenez wiped his face.
The twin wails of mother and fiancée rose above the din of traffic in an
inconsolable dirge.
Mrs. Gomez was supported to the side of the coffin.
"Mi Jose! Mi Jose! Mi hijo!" she wailed. "O Dios!"
She sobbed, and added, moaning in Spanish, "Why did it have to be my son?"
At the church, Father Healy said he was concerned about Mrs. Gomez. He stood
near the altar, below a statue of the Virgin of Sorrow.
"Twenty-five hundred of these around the country," he said. "Can you imagine?"
Sympathy Flows at Soldier's Funeral in Queens, NYT, 11.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/11/nyregion/11funeral.html
US holds back troops, mulls broader Iraq
force cut
Mon May 8, 2006 6:58 PM ET
Reuters
By Will Dunham
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Pentagon announced
on Monday it was putting off next month's scheduled deployment of a
Germany-based Army brigade to Iraq, as officials pondered a broader cut in the
U.S. force in the second half of the year.
The decision to keep the roughly 3,500 soldiers of the 2nd Brigade of the Army's
1st Infantry Division at their base in Schweinfurt, Germany, comes as Pentagon
leaders work toward a decision in a few weeks on a blueprint for U.S. troop
levels, defense officials said.
Bryan Whitman, a senior Pentagon spokesman, cautioned against interpreting this
as a harbinger of larger force cuts.
"This is a very narrow decision to hold one brigade and to give the commanders
on the ground additional time to continue their assessments," Whitman said.
"Obviously, there's been a degree of political progress that's been made in the
last couple of weeks," Whitman added, noting that Iraq's prime minister
designate, Nuri al-Maliki, appeared close to naming a cabinet.
The combat brigade had been slated this week to start loading its equipment for
transport to Iraq, and the soldiers had been scheduled to arrive in Iraq in June
and assume their operational responsibilities in July, officials said.
The United States has about 133,000 troops in Iraq. The decision to hold back
this brigade does not immediately cut the U.S. force, but a reduction would come
in July if this unit does not arrive to replace another one scheduled to rotate
home at that time.
'READY TO GO'
Officials said it was possible this brigade will not deploy or might simply
deploy later than planned.
"This unit is very much ready to go, obviously. So I don't know that I would
make the assumption that they're not going to go. In fact, they may go in lieu
of somebody else, later on," said a defense official who asked not to be named
because of the sensitivity of decision-making on troop levels.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has said the United States should be able to
reduce its troop presence in Iraq -- there are about 30,000 fewer now than in
December -- as U.S.-trained Iraqi government security forces assume
responsibility for more territory.
A decision on troop cuts might come in five or six weeks, the defense official
said, also allowing more time to gauge security conditions amid an insurgency
raging more than three years into the war.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair said earlier on Monday that Britain expects to
make an announcement about cutting the size of its force in Iraq within the next
few weeks. It has about 8,000 troops in Iraq, mainly in the more peaceful south.
Rumsfeld said last week he expected recommendations from Army Gen. George Casey,
the top U.S. commander in Iraq, on future force levels sometime after Iraq's
cabinet is named, a development expected in the coming weeks. Rumsfeld also said
U.S. officials will consult with Maliki's government.
Defense officials previously have mentioned the possibility of dropping to about
100,000 troops later this year but said other possibilities included a smaller
cut or none at all.
The deployment of another U.S. Army brigade already designated to rotate into
Iraq in the coming months also could be put on hold pending the larger decision
on troop levels, officials said.
Units designated to deploy include: the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division
at Fort Lewis, Washington; the 3rd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina; the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division at
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and the 2nd Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division at
Fort Drum, New York.
US
holds back troops, mulls broader Iraq force cut, R, 8.5.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=newsOne&storyID=2006-05-08T201814Z_01_SP130614_RTRUKOC_0_US-SECURITY-PAKISTAN-USA.xml&WTmodLoc=NewsArt-L3-Top+NewsNews-9
A wounded Iraqi was taken away in Basra on
Saturday after British troops fired shots near a crashed helicopter.
Nabil al-Jurani/Associated Press
NYT May 7, 2006
Clashes Roil Basra After Deadly British
Copter Crash NYT
17.5.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/world/middleeast/07iraq.html
Clashes Roil Basra After Deadly British
Copter Crash
May 7, 2006
The New York Times
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 6 — A British military
helicopter crashed in the southern city of Basra on Saturday, apparently after
being hit by a rocket, drawing crowds of cheering local residents who threw
stones and Molotov cocktails, Iraqi officials said. As many as five service
members were killed, and at least four Iraqis died in the ensuing chaos,
witnesses and hospital officials said.
An official in the Basra governor's office said the helicopter had been struck
by an antiaircraft rocket and crashed into three residential buildings in the
Saee neighborhood about 1:50 p.m. Witnesses, including an owner of one of the
houses, reported seeing five bodies, though Maj. Sebastian Muntz, a spokesman
for the British military in Basra, did not confirm the number of casualties or
say how many people were on board. Defense Secretary Des Browne of Britain later
confirmed that "a number of British service personnel" had been killed in the
crash.
News of the crash comes at an already tense time for Prime Minister Tony Blair
and his Labor government, who have been hurt by the war's unpopularity in
Britain and just went through a poor election showing and cabinet shuffling.
The crash in Basra drew crowds of young men and boys, who cheered and waved
shirts in a celebratory spectacle as smoke rose from behind several houses,
where the helicopter had gone down. In scenes broadcast on Al Jazeera
television, men were seen lobbing stones at the crash site and at British
soldiers who had rushed to it.
Witnesses said soldiers crouched behind several sport utility vehicles until two
armored personnel carriers arrived with reinforcements. The crowd then turned on
the vehicles, throwing Molotov cocktails at them and setting at least one on
fire.
The Basra official said that at least two mortar shells were fired into the
area, but it was unclear whether they hurt anyone.
At Basra Hospital, an official said that at least four Iraqis, including two
children, were killed and more than 19 wounded in the violence after the crash.
Major Muntz said a small number of live rounds were fired by British troops in
self-defense, but he said he did not know whether they caused any casualties.
The Basra provincial official said that British troops won control of the crash
site by 4 p.m. An 8 p.m. curfew was imposed to keep people off the street, a
British military spokesman said.
Basra, the largest city in Iraq's Shiite south, had long been one of the
quietest areas for coalition forces, but over the past year has become more
deadly as the city's many Shiite militias have vied for power.
Many of the chanting Iraqis were from the Tweisa neighborhood, where support for
the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr runs high. Mr. Sadr has frequently
channeled the anger of impoverished Shiites against American and British forces.
Last September, for instance, British forces fought gun battles with Mr. Sadr's
militia after two undercover British soldiers were seized.
The owner of one of the houses near the crash site said he had seen the bodies
of five people whom he believed were crew members. "One of them belonged to a
major, I could see his rank," said the man, who agreed to speak on the condition
that he be identified only by his Iraqi nickname, Abu Zaid. "I saw the remains
of the others."
Sunni Arab insurgents struck Saturday as well. A suicide bomber dressed as an
Iraqi Army officer walked into a base in western Tikrit, a city north of
Baghdad, and blew himself up around 8 a.m., officials said, killing three army
officers and wounding one.
The bomber was allowed inside after telling a guard at the gate that he was an
officer who had been moved to the base, said an official in the governor's
office of Salahuddin Province. He was wearing the uniform of a captain or major,
the official said, when he walked up to several officers standing outside a
building that is part of a battalion headquarters of the Fourth Iraqi Army
Division.
The dead included a lieutenant colonel, a major and a lieutenant, the official
said. The battalion commander, Staff Brig. Dakhel al-Jibouri, was wounded in the
blast.
Public confidence in Iraq's security forces has plummeted, as reports mount of
militias and criminal gangs conducting raids dressed in police and army
uniforms. At a news conference on Saturday, Gen. Mahdi Sabih al-Gharawi, the
commander of the country's Public Order Brigade, part of its paramilitary
forces, said the national police would receive new uniforms in June to help
fight the problem.
In other violence, three Ministry of Interior commandos were kidnapped in
Mahawel, south of Baghdad, while they were on their way to work at 6:30 a.m., an
official in the ministry said. In another incident of kidnapping by men dressed
as police officers, two truck drivers were taken in Boshear, also south of
Baghdad.
Two children were killed and one was wounded in Shuala, the Shiite slum in
northern Baghdad, when a rocket struck the area around 9:30 a.m., the ministry
official said.
An American soldier was killed in Baghdad on Friday when his vehicle hit a
roadside bomb, the American military said Saturday.
Reporting for this article was contributed by Ali Adeeb, Khalid al-Ansary
and Qais Mizherfrom Baghdad, an Iraqi employee of The New York Times from Basra
and Alan Cowell from London.
Clashes Roil Basra After Deadly British Copter Crash, NYT, 17.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/07/world/middleeast/07iraq.html
Not All See Video Mockery of Zarqawi as
Good Strategy
May 6, 2006
The New York Times
By C. J. CHIVERS
An effort by the American military to
discredit the terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi by showing video outtakes of
him fumbling with a machine gun — suggesting that he lacks real fighting skill —
was questioned yesterday by retired and active American military officers.
The video clips, released on Thursday to news organizations in Baghdad, show the
terrorist leader confused about how to handle an M-249 squad automatic weapon,
known as the S.A.W., which is part of the American inventory of infantry
weapons.
The American military, which said it captured the videotapes in a recent raid,
released selected outtakes in an effort to undermine Mr. Zarqawi's image as
leader of the Council of Holy Warriors, formerly Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, and
suggested that his fighting talents and experience were less than his propaganda
portrays. But several veterans of wars in Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as
active-duty officers, said in telephone interviews yesterday that the clips of
Mr. Zarqawi's supposed martial incompetence were unconvincing.
The weapon in question is complicated to master, and American soldiers and
marines undergo many days of training to achieve the most basic competence with
it. Moreover, the weapon in Mr. Zarqawi's hands was an older variant, which
makes its malfunctioning unsurprising. The veterans said Mr. Zarqawi, who had
spent his years as a terrorist surrounded by simpler weapons of Soviet design,
could hardly have been expected to know how to handle it.
"They are making a big deal out of nothing," said Mario Costagliola, who retired
as an Army colonel last month after serving as the operations officer for the
42nd Infantry Division in Tikrit, Iraq.
An active-duty Special Forces colonel who served in Iraq also said that what the
video showed actually had little relationship to Mr. Zarqawi's level of
terrorist skill. "Looking at the video, I enjoy it; I like that he looks kind of
goofy," said the Special Forces officer, who was granted anonymity because he
was not authorized to speak publicly on military matters. "But as a military
guy, I shrug my shoulders and say: 'Of course he doesn't know how to use it.
It's our gun.' He doesn't look as stupid as they said he looks."
The release of the captured video reflected the dueling public relations efforts
between the American-led forces fighting in Iraq and the terrorists and
insurgents. It also reflected increasing interest by the military and civilian
strategists in trying to ridicule Mr. Zarqawi.
"In Arab and Muslim societies, pride and shame are felt much more profoundly
than they are in Western culture," said J. Michael Waller, a professor at the
Institute of World Politics, a graduate school in Washington. "To find video
like this that can cut him down to size and discredit him is a real way of
fighting terrorism." A paper written by Professor Waller advocating the use of
ridicule against the insurgents has been circulating at the Pentagon and among
military commanders with experience in Iraq recently, according to several
military officers.
But the retired and active officers said the public presentation of the tape did
not address elements that were disturbing, not amusing: the weapon was probably
captured from American soldiers, indicating a tactical victory for the
insurgents. And Mr. Zarqawi looked clean and plump.
"I see a guy who is getting a lot of groceries and local support," said Nick
Pratt, a Marine Corps veteran and professor of terrorism studies at the George
C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Germany. "You cannot say he
is a bad operator." He added, "People should be careful who they poke fun at."
David S. Cloud contributed reporting from Washington for this article.
Not
All See Video Mockery of Zarqawi as Good Strategy, NYT, 6.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/06/world/06zarqawi.html
U.S. Uses Iraq Insurgent's Own Video to
Mock Him
May 5, 2006
The New York Times
By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr. and DAVID S. CLOUD
BAGHDAD, Iraq, May 4 — The videotape released
last week by the terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi showed him firing long
bursts from a machine gun, his forearms sprouting from beneath black fatigues,
as he exuded the very picture of a strong jihadist leader.
But in clips the American military released on Thursday and described as
captured outtakes from the same video, Mr. Zarqawi, head of the Council of Holy
Warriors, cut a different figure.
In one scene, Mr. Zarqawi, the most wanted terrorist in Iraq, appears flummoxed
by how to discharge the machine gun in fully automatic mode. Off camera, one
aide is heard ordering another, "Go help the sheik." A man walks over and
fiddles with the weapon so Mr. Zarqawi can fire it in bursts.
Another sequence shows Mr. Zarqawi handing the weapon off to other aides and
striding away, revealing white jogging shoes beneath his black guerrilla attire.
One insurgent later appears to grab the machine gun absent-mindedly by its
scalding-hot barrel and drop it.
In an effort to turn Mr. Zarqawi's own propaganda against him by mocking him as
an uninspiring poseur, the American military released the selected outtakes at a
news briefing in Baghdad. A senior military spokesman said that American troops
had discovered the tape among a trove of information captured last month in
Yusufiya, a town just south of Baghdad regarded as sympathetic to the
insurgency.
Documents found in that raid also laid out a plan to "cleanse" Shiites from
Sunni-dominated areas in Iraq and to provoke sectarian warfare, according to the
American military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch.
Intelligence and military officials in Washington said that Mr. Zarqawi, who was
once thought to be roaming across western and northern Iraq, was tracked to
Yusufiya after tips indicated that his men had been behind the downing of an
Apache helicopter near there in early April.
During an early morning raid on a suspected safe house in the town just south of
Baghdad on April 16, soldiers killed five occupants and captured five more in a
fierce gunfight. The officials said they were later told by Iraqis captured in
the raid that Mr. Zarqawi was only blocks away at the time.
General Lynch added that in several raids in the area, soldiers killed at least
31 foreign fighters, possibly destined to become suicide bombers.
The video outtakes and the plans to drive out Shiites, among other documents,
were found in the house, General Lynch said, confirming an account first
reported in Army Times.
Mr. Zarqawi, a Sunni, long ago declared war on Shiites, whom he considers
apostates. The captured documents disclosed at the carefully orchestrated news
briefing described a plan to "reduce the attacks on Sunni areas" and instead "be
dedicated to cleansing them, calmly, of spies and Shias," according to the
American military's translation.
The goal, they said, is to "move the battle to the Shia depths and cut off the
paths from them by any means necessary to put pressure on them to leave their
areas."
The captured documents further suggested a strategy, perhaps temporary, of
shifting the terrorist group's firepower away from attacks on American forces in
Sunni regions to attacks in the capital.
"We will leave or reduce our operations against them in our areas for the near
future, and will perform our work against them in the areas of Baghdad itself,
as well as the surrounding areas," the military's translation said.
General Lynch said that even as Mr. Zarqawi was "zooming in on Baghdad, we're
zooming in on Zarqawi, and it's focused now in Yusufiya, in the areas around
Baghdad."
"Zarqawi's center of gravity for his operations are in Baghdad," the general
said. "We believe it's only a matter of time until Zarqawi is taken down. It's
not if, but when."
But the military has made such predictions before, only to have Mr. Zarqawi slip
away from them. Moreover, officials' view of Mr. Zarqawi as the main architect
of violence in Iraq is more convenient than the possibility that much of the
mayhem is committed not by foreign jihadists but by Iraqi-born Sunni Arabs — who
can easily find shelter in the cities and villages along the Euphrates.
Questioned on Thursday about how much insurgent activity is actually directed by
Mr. Zarqawi, General Lynch acknowledged that "there's no pure science here."
"So for me to give you some mathematical formula that says this many belong to
Zarqawi, and this many belong to the Iraqi rejectionists, and this many belong
to the Saddamists, I can't do," he said.
The torture and killing of young men believed to be the latest victims of
sectarian violence have continued unabated in the capital.
On Thursday, at least 9 Iraqis were killed and 44 wounded when a suicide bomber
attacked a crowd of people outside a courthouse in Baghdad. The attack followed
the discovery a day earlier of the bodies of about three dozen men dumped around
Baghdad. All had been tortured and shot in the head.
Several reports also said several civilians were killed in Ramadi by American
forces on Thursday. The military said it killed eight insurgents there after
marines were attacked by rocket-propelled grenades and machine-gun fire. Two
American soldiers were also killed Thursday morning by a roadside bomb in south
central Baghdad.
Mr. Zarqawi and his organization have taken responsibility for scores of car
bombings, beheadings and other atrocities, many of which have been videotaped,
posted on the Internet and shown on Arab satellite television channels.
The selected outtakes released late Thursday were not shown on the most popular
Arab channels, Al Jazeera and Arabiya, although Arabiya mentioned them in a
newscast later. But they were broadcast on state-run Iraqi television.
In releasing the outtakes, the American military sought to show that Mr. Zarqawi
is a phony who cannot even fire a basic infantry weapon without help and who
walks around the desert in comfortable Western jogging shoes.
"What you saw on the Internet was what he wanted the world to see," General
Lynch said. "Look at me, I'm a capable leader of a capable organization, and we
are indeed declaring war against democracy inside of Iraq, and we're going to
establish an Islamic caliphate."
"What he didn't show you were the clips that I showed, wearing New Balance
sneakers with his uniform, surrounded by supposedly competent subordinates who
grab the hot barrel of a just-fired machine gun," he said.
"We have a warrior leader, Zarqawi, who doesn't understand how to operate his
weapon system and has to rely on his subordinates to clear a weapon stoppage,"
the general said. "It makes you wonder."
Richard A. Oppel Jr. reported from Baghdad for this article and David S.
Cloud from Washington.
U.S.
Uses Iraq Insurgent's Own Video to Mock Him, NYT, 5.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html?hp&ex=1146888000&en=34e0bdc40194e682&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Program to rebuild Iraq troubled
Posted 5/1/2006 12:53 AM ET
USA TODAY
By Rick Jervis
BAGHDAD — The $21 billion U.S. rebuilding
campaign in Iraq has made "substantial progress" but will leave a legacy of
unbuilt projects and unfulfilled promises, says a report issued today by the
U.S. reconstruction watchdog.
The report by the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction details the repair or construction of schools, police
stations, electrical facilities, hospitals, roads and other infrastructure.
The document is the most sweeping look at President Bush's ambitious rebuilding
drive, the largest endeavor of its kind since the post-World War II Marshall
Plan to rebuild a shattered Europe.
In his review, Special Inspector General Stuart Bowen says the Iraq rebuilding
effort is in its "close-out phase." He describes a substantial gap between
projects promised by U.S. officials and those likely to be completed before U.S.
funds are exhausted.
The reconstruction campaign has made clean drinking water available to an
additional 3.1 million Iraqis and sewer service to 5.1 million more, the report
says. "Most completed projects have delivered positive results," it concludes.
Even so, projects in some of the most critical areas — water, electricity, and
oil and gas — are less than half complete and would take two more years to
finish.
In most cases, Iraq will have to pay its own way soon: all U.S. rebuilding funds
have been allocated; more than 60% of the money has been spent, the report says.
Bowen cites several instances where key initiatives were derailed by security
issues, corruption and mismanagement. Among them:
•U.S. officials spent millions on medical equipment for health clinics in Iraq
that are unlikely to ever be built. Reconstruction officials purchased $70
million in medical equipment — X-ray machines, dental equipment and other gear —
for 150 planned clinics.
Despite spending $186 million to build clinics, only six have been completed; 14
others will be finished, the report says.
•Task Force Shield, the $147 million program to train Iraqi security units to
protect key oil and electrical sites, failed to meet its goals, the report says.
A fraud investigation is underway. "The lack of records and equipment
accountability raised significant concerns about possible fraud, waste and abuse
... by U.S. and Iraqi officials," the report says.
•Hundreds of civilian contractors — 516 since March 2003 — have been killed on
the job. Last year, 235 contractors died in reconstruction-related activities;
62 fatalities were U.S. citizens, the report says. In the first three months of
this year, 49 have been killed; 17 were U.S. citizens.
Program to rebuild Iraq troubled, UT, 1.5.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-05-01-iraq-rebuilding_x.htm
Mock Iraqi Villages in Mojave Prepare
Troops for Battle
May 1, 2006
The New York Times
By DEXTER FILKINS and JOHN F. BURNS
FORT IRWIN, Calif. — Three years into the
conflict in Iraq, the front line in the American drive to prepare troops for
insurgent warfare runs through a cluster of mock Iraqi villages deep in the
Mojave Desert, nearly 10,000 miles from the realities awaiting the soldiers
outside Baghdad and Mosul and Falluja.
Out here, 150 miles northeast of Los Angeles, units of the 10th Mountain
Division from Fort Drum, N.Y., are among the latest war-bound troops who have
gone through three weeks of training that introduce them to the harsh episodes
that characterize the American experience in Iraq.
In a 1,000-square-mile region on the edge of Death Valley, Arab-Americans, many
of them from the Iraqi expatriate community in San Diego, populate a group of
mock villages resembling their counterparts in Iraq. American soldiers at
forward operating bases nearby face insurgent uprisings, suicide bombings and
even staged beheadings in underground tunnels. Recently, the soldiers here, like
their counterparts in Iraq, have been confronted with Sunni-Shiite riots. At one
village, a secret guerrilla revolt is in the works.
With actors and stuntmen on loan from Hollywood, American generals have recast
the training ground at Fort Irwin so effectively as a simulation of conditions
in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 20 months that some soldiers have left
with battle fatigue and others have had their orders for deployment to the war
zones canceled. In at least one case, a soldier's career was ended for
unnecessarily "killing" civilians.
"We would rather you got killed here than in Iraq," said Maj. John Clearwater, a
veteran of the Special Forces who works at the training center.
The troops who come here are at the heart of a vast shift in American
war-fighting strategy, a multibillion-dollar effort to remodel the Army on the
fly. Here, the Army is relearning how to fight, shifting from its historic
emphasis on big army-to-army battles to the more subtle tactics of defeating a
guerrilla insurgency.
The changes in the Army's emphasis are among the most far-reaching since World
War II, all being carried out at top speed, while the Iraqi insurgency continues
undiminished and political support for the war ebbs at home.
American commanders say publicly that they still believe they can win the war,
especially now with a more coherent strategy to combat the insurgency and train
their soldiers to fight it.
The lack of such planning — indeed, the refusal in the first months after the
invasion to acknowledge the presence of the insurgency — is at the heart of the
criticism leveled recently at Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld by six
former generals.
Beneath the public veneer, some American officers say they believe that public
support for the war will probably run out before the changes will begin to make
a major difference. The more probable chain of events, they say, is a steady
drawdown of American forces from Iraq, long before the insurgency is defeated.
Education in Counterinsurgency
For the first time in more than 20 years, military planners are revising the
Army's counterinsurgency manual, adding emphasis on nation-building and
peacekeeping — subjects once belittled by the Bush administration.
At the Army's Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kan.,
officers are being required for the first time to complete a course in
counterinsurgency. In Iraq, American officers entering the country are now
required to spend their first week at the sprawling military base at Taji, on
the northwestern edge of Baghdad, attending a crash course in counterinsurgency.
Junior officers are being encouraged to take greater initiative to adjust to
local circumstances. An old military tradition of chronicling the lessons
learned on the front and passing them on to other units has found a vital new
outlet in password-protected Internet sites where platoon commanders and more
senior officers can exchange combat experiences.
The aim is to see that any new techniques adopted by the insurgents, especially
in mounting the roadside bombing attacks that accounted for more than half of
all American casualties in Iraq, are made known to all units as quickly as
possible, often within 24 hours.
One third of the American troops now stationed in Iraq have been through the
course here, and entire brigades — each with 4,000 soldiers, sometimes more —
are processed through here every month. But it is still unclear how much effect
the new training is having in the field.
Indeed, even as the new training strategy moves forward, American units are
substantially withdrawing from Iraq's streets. With the country sliding closer
to civil war, Iraqi military units, many of them of uncertain quality, are now
taking the leading combat role in nearly half of Iraq's territory.
Plans are in the works to reduce the American troop commitment, to possibly
fewer than 100,000 by the end of the year from around 130,000 now.
On some bases, far from trying out a new strategy, American soldiers are staying
back more than ever, and grumbling, in some cases, that they spend more time
watching videos and eating at base canteens than fighting.
"There is a paradox in the approach," said Kalev Sepp, a former Special Forces
officer and one of the most vocal proponents for changing the Army. "The
training in the United States and in Iraq is teaching all the right things —
decentralization of authority and responsibility to the lowest levels,
engagement with the Iraqi population, cultural awareness and political
sensitivity — the full broad range of measures needed to defeat the insurgency."
"But on the ground," Mr. Sepp said in an interview, "the troops are being moved
onto these large consolidated bases and being drawn away from the population
just at point that they have been trained to engage them." Nowhere are the
changes in the Army's thinking more visible than at the National Training Center
in Fort Irwin.
Established as a gunnery range during World War II, Fort Irwin served for half a
century as the setting for mock warfare that replicated the most threatening
scenarios of the cold war.
The Krasnovians, a giant invading force modeled after the Soviet Army, advanced
across the valley floor here, simulating an offensive through the Fulda Gap in
central Europe.
Riding in American-made Sheridan tanks done up to resemble T-72's, they seized
swathes of territory and sparked tank battles so large that they shook the
ground for miles.
Today, in a desert region nearly the size of Rhode Island, the network of 12
virtual Iraqi villages are eerie in their likeness to the real things. That is
the idea, of course: that American soldiers will find the environment so real
that they will make their mistakes here first, so they do not make them in Iraq.
One of the villages is Medina Jabal, a hamlet of wooden huts and gravel roads at
the base of a ravine about 35 miles from Death Valley.
It is a marriage of military technology and Hollywood fakery; some 350
Arabic-speaking Iraqi-Americans and plainclothes Nevada National Guardsman live
here almost year-round to offer American trainees what one officer described as
"a vortex of chaos." The insurgents even get acting lessons, coached by Carl
Weathers, best known for his portrayal of the boxer Apollo Creed in the "Rocky"
films.
A single afternoon in Medina Jabal crystallizes all the confusions and
ambiguities of fighting in Iraq. None of the villagers of Medina Jabal are
allowed to speak English, and all encounters must be carried out with an
interpreter.
Insurgents lurk inside the town, but as in Iraq, they are invisible. The
guerrillas maintain a underground tunnel network, smuggle in weapons, and plot
nearly continuous attacks on American forces.
The closest American base, where most of the trainees sleep, is only a few
hundred yards away, and the insurgents shoot mortar shells at it every night —
just as they do in places like Ramadi.
They plant roadside bombs, booby-trap dead dogs, kidnap soldiers who get
separated from their patrols, and drive suicide bombs into American checkpoints.
The simulations are so real that they have impressed even those who have seen
the real thing up close.
"This is good training for guys who haven't been there yet," said Sgt. Matthew
Boone, 25, from Anderson, Ind., while standing atop a desert peak inside the
training ground. "I never got anything like this before I went to Afghanistan."
When fighting breaks out, Army trainers who act as referees immediately decide
who will be recorded as wounded or killed.
But scoring kills is not the main objective at Medina Jabal; gaining the trust
of the locals is. When an American soldier loses his cool and kills Iraqi
civilians, a simulated television crew from "Al Jazeera" scurries out to
videotape the screaming and grieving Iraqis. The inflammatory video is then
broadcast over and over on the villages' television network, just as in Iraq.
"It's very realistic here," said Sgt. Shawn Stillabower of the 10th Division, a
Houston native who is going back for his third tour in Iraq after he finishes
the training course. "Sometimes, it's really got me thinking, 'Am I in Iraq?' "
In Medina Jabal, nothing is entirely clear, and that is the point.
The Deadly Mr. Hakim
The most prolific killer of American trainees, for instance, is Mansour Hakim,
the Iraqi pseudonym for Staff Sgt. Timothy Wilson, 42, a probation officer from
Sparks, Nev. In Medina Jabal, Sergeant Wilson, in an Arab dishdasha robe and
checkered kaffiyeh headdress, plays the part of a village hot dog salesman who
sells his provisions from a stand called "Kamel Dogs Cafe."
To the amazement of American trainers, Sergeant Wilson has found that nearly
every American unit entering the training course falls for his tricks — usually
leading to catastrophic results. He figures he has "killed" hundreds of American
servicemen in his time here. The trap works like this: When the American
soldiers first enter Medina Jabal, they usually head straight for the Kamel Dogs
stand for a snack. Chatting up the soldiers, "Mr. Hakim" asks if the Americans
might let him sell his hot dogs inside the nearby American camp, called Forward
Operating Base Denver, to make some extra money for his family. The soldiers
inevitably agree, and before long, Mr. Hakim is ferrying huge loads of hot dogs
and charcoal briquettes onto the American base.
In the first few days of the venture, everything proceeds safely; the American
soldiers, suspicious of Mr. Hakim, search his truck thoroughly. But after four
or five days, having decided that he is one of the "good Iraqis," the soldiers
begin to wave him and his truck through their checkpoints.
And that is when he strikes. One day, he replaces the charcoal briquettes with
Hollywood-grade pyrotechnics, drives the truck deep into the American base and
blows it up.
One of the referees appears on the scene with a "God gun" to determine the
radius of the blast. The last time Sergeant Wilson got through, in February, the
referees determined that 18 Americans were killed and dozens more wounded. The
subterfuge has worked seven times. "I'm a bad guy," Sergeant Wilson said with a
grin. "And I'm looking for any weakness I can exploit."
On other occasions, American soldiers patrolling Medina Jabal have wandered off
alone to get a soda or a hot dog at Mr. Hakim's stand. When that happens, the
locals seize the soldier, drag him into one of their tunnels, videotape his
interrogation for "Al Jazeera" and sometimes kill him.
The lesson for American solders is clear: never trust any Iraqis, no matter how
friendly they seem. It is a lesson that, unlearned, has killed many American
soldiers on combat duty in Iraq. And if any of the soldiers insist, as they
sometimes do, that they really had been searching Mr. Hakim's hot-dog truck, it
is easy enough to check: videocameras watch over virtually every square inch of
Medina Jabal. American trainers can review every attack and every interaction
between an American and a villager to see what really happened.
Despite the elaborate fictions of the place, reality sometimes intrudes. Most of
the Iraqi-American actors have family in Iraq, and are terrified of having their
identities publicized lest those family members be killed by insurgents back
home. None would agree to be interviewed for this article.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the war games is that the insurgent force
usually exacts enormous death tolls on the Americans. As in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the insurgents at Fort Irwin know the territory better. "It's not
even close," said Fuad Bahi al-Jabouri, whose real name is Specialist Anthony
Manzanares. He is 46, a native of San Francisco and a disguised insurgent in the
villages here. "It's a massacre. We know the terrain. It's our home turf."
The Looming Challenge
The Iraq war, and to a lesser extent the conflict in Afghanistan, looms over
every aspect of the revamped military training, in the classroom and on the
training ground. It is the reality against which all the lessons and all the
fictions are measured.
At a recent classroom seminar on counterinsurgency at Fort Leavenworth, about 25
Army majors discussed the conduct of the French in the Algerian War of 1954 to
1962. The French, who were trying to hold their colony, lost to the Algerian
resistance, even after some French officers endorsed the use of torture to
extract intelligence from the insurgents.
In a vigorous classroom debate, the Army majors discussed how and why the French
lost. Iraq came up often; four of the majors had already served there and a
half-dozen others were scheduled to be deployed there at the end of the academic
year. One of the lessons, for instance, is that torture does not work, because
of the resentment it generates among the civilian population. The widespread
abuse of Iraqi and Afghan prisoners, some of it apparently with official
approval, did not come up in class. "Is it applicable to Iraq?" Maj. Sean Smith,
a member of the class, said afterward. "That's why we do that in every class."
On the training ground, even though it is fiction, the results can be real and
lasting. One battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel whose unit came under
attack by insurgents in Medina Jabal, called in an Air Force bombing run on a
building from which insurgents had attacked his men. The attack, simulating the
dropping of a 500-pound bomb, killed more than 20 civilians, the referees
determined. Al Jazeera recorded the scene and broadcast it over and over on the
local station. The battalion commander, the American trainers here said, learned
his lesson, and he turned out to be one of the savviest graduates of the course.
Not so for another soldier who recently took part in the course. While on patrol
in one of the Iraqi villages, the soldier wandered off alone, and suddenly found
himself surrounded by Iraqi civilians. He panicked and opened fire, killing
several of the villagers. The soldier was given a psychological evaluation and
dismissed from the Army, for fear that he would have duplicated the behavior
with live ammunition in Iraq. "If a soldier can't be trusted in this
environment, then he can't be trusted in Iraq," said Brig. Gen. Robert Cone, who
runs the base.
Potent Lessons
Despite the trouncing that the American soldiers were taking from the fake
insurgents, there were signs that the American soldiers were catching on.
One of them came shortly after "Mr. Jabouri" — Specialist Manzanares — was
caught trying to evade an American checkpoint. Driving a battered sport utility
vehicle, Mr. Jabouri and his companion, Pvt. Lontae Bell, from Newberry, N.C.,
were impersonating geologists. But when a group of American soldiers spotted Mr.
Jabouri in his truck, they pulled him over and searched his vehicle. The
soldiers found wire, tools and a Global Positioning System that had the exact
coordinates of the American base that had been hit by mortar shells the night
before. The Americans decided to detain Mr. Jabouri — a good call, because, as
an insurgent, his real mission was to scout the area for weapons that were to be
used in an insurgent uprising in three of the villages.
To keep the exercise as real as possible, Specialist Manzanares and Private Bell
were ordered locked up and interrogated for at least two days at a nearby
American base. The soldiers put flexicuffs on Sergeant Manzanares in a makeshift
cage of razor wire on the desert floor, where he sat, looking disgusted with
himself. Asked whether he was angry that his cover had been broken so quickly,
he shook his head.
No, he said. "This means I'm going to miss the Giants game tonight."
Mock
Iraqi Villages in Mojave Prepare Troops for Battle, NYT, 1.5.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/world/americas/01insurgency.html?hp&ex=1146542400&en=f27a27b279df80b1&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Powell advised Bush to send more troops to
Iraq
Sun Apr 30, 2006 5:41 PM ET
Reuters
By Vicki Allen
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice on Sunday defended the Bush administration's Iraq war planning
after her predecessor, Colin Powell, said he had made a case to send more troops
to deal with the war's aftermath.
Rice also said she did not "remember specifically" what instance Powell was
referring to on his recommending to President George W. Bush that more troops be
sent.
In an interview with a private British television station on Sunday, Powell said
there had been debates about the size of the force and how to deal with the
aftermath.
"I don't think we had enough force there to impose order," he said on ITV's
Jonathan Dimbleby program.
"The aftermath turned out to be much more difficult than anyone had
anticipated," said Powell, adding he had favored a larger military presence to
deal with the unforeseen.
"I made the case to General (Tommy) Franks, to (Defense) Secretary (Donald)
Rumsfeld and to the president that I was not sure we had enough troops," Powell
said. But he said the military leaders felt they had the appropriate number.
Powell's comments come amid concern about the rising death toll in Iraq, which
has been a factor in driving Bush's approval ratings to the lowest of his
presidency.
Since the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, the U.S. military death toll in Iraq
has grown to nearly 2,400. Iraqi military deaths are estimated at up to 6,370
and Iraqi civilian deaths at up to 38,600.
Rice, appearing on several Sunday talk shows, was responding to the Powell's
comments that fanned the controversy over the administration's plans for the
invasion's immediate aftermath. Critics say violence and looting set the stage
for a bloody insurgency and sectarian killings over the last three years.
Asked on CNN's Late Edition if she remembered Powell's dissent, Rice said, "I
don't remember specifically what Secretary Powell may be referring to, but I'm
quite certain that there were lots of discussions about how best to fulfill the
mission when we went into Iraq."
She said Bush relied on his military advisers, and that he "asked time and time
again" whether everything needed to execute the plan was available, "and he was
told 'yes'."
Rice added that there would have been "potentially a lot of problems with a
very, very big footprint of coalition forces at the time of the liberation of
Iraq."
On CBS' Face the Nation, she said, "I'm quite certain that there are things
that, in retrospect, we would do differently. But that's the nature of any big
complicated operation."
After the invasion, Rumsfeld said U.S. military commanders believed there were
sufficient troops to contain insurgents and establish peace.
However, troop levels were later increased amid escalating violence and to
establish security in time for elections.
Bush has not set a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal, saying American soldiers
will pull out as Iraqi forces take over fighting Sunni rebels and sectarian
violence which has pushed Iraq to the brink of civil war.
Rice praised progress made by Iraq's own forces. But to start withdrawing
troops, she said on CNN, "We really do want it to be based on conditions on the
ground; so do the Iraqis. If there is anything that they recognize, it's that
they are not quite ready for these tasks. But they want to take that
responsibility, and we should want them to take it.
(Additional reporting by Madeline Chambers in London)
Powell advised Bush to send more troops to Iraq, R, 30.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyid=2006-04-30T214110Z_01_L30563994_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-POWELL.xml
Tens of thousands in NYC protest war
Updated 4/29/2006 8:50 PM ET
USA Today
NEW YORK (AP) — Tens of thousands of
protesters marched Saturday through lower Manhattan to demand an immediate
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, just hours after this month's death toll
reached 70.
Cindy Sheehan, a vociferous critic of the war
whose soldier son also died in Iraq, joined in the march, as did actress Susan
Sarandon and the Rev. Jesse Jackson.
"End this war, bring the troops home," read one sign lifted by marchers on the
sunny afternoon, three years after the war in Iraq began. The mother of a Marine
killed two years ago in Iraq held a picture of her son, born in 1984 and killed
20 years later.
One group marched under the banner "Veterans for Peace."
The demonstrators stretched for about 10 blocks as they headed down Broadway.
Organizers said 300,000 people marched, though a police spokesman declined to
give an estimate. There were no reports of arrests.
"We are here today because the war is illegal, immoral and unethical," said the
Rev. Al Sharpton. "We must bring the troops home."
Organizers said the march was also meant to oppose any military action against
Iran, which is facing international criticism over its nuclear program. The
event was organized by the group United for Peace and Justice.
"We've been lied to, and they're going to lie to us again to bring us a war in
Iran," said Marjori Ramos, 43, of New York. "I'm here because I had a lot of
anger, and I had to do something."
Steve Rand, an English teacher from Waterbury, Vt., held a poster announcing,
"Vermont Says No to War."
"I'd like to see our troops come home," he said.
The march stepped off shortly after noon from Union Square, with the
demonstrators heading for a rally between a U.S. courthouse and a federal office
building in lower Manhattan.
The death toll in Iraq for April was the highest for a single month in 2006. At
least 2,399 U.S. military members have died since the war began. An Army soldier
was the latest victim, killed Saturday in a roadside explosion in Baghdad.
That figure is well below some of the bloodiest months of the Iraq conflict, but
is a sharp increase over March, when 31 were killed. January's death toll was 62
and February's 55. In December, 68 Americans died.
Tens
of thousands in NYC protest war, UT, 29.4.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-29-protest_x.htm
Death Toll for Americans in Iraq Is Highest
in 5 Months
April 29, 2006
The New York Times
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 28 — The military
announced the death of one American soldier on Friday, bringing the death toll
so far in April to 69, the highest in five months. The monthly figure disrupted
a trend of steadily falling American fatalities that had begun in November.
The bulk of American deaths in April occurred in Baghdad and in the
insurgent-controlled western province of Anbar, according to Iraq Coalition
Casualty Count, an independent group that compiles casualty figures based on
information provided by the American military.
Deaths in April could still climb, but are not likely to top the 84 American
deaths in November. The April figure is more than double the 31 troops killed in
March, one of the lowest monthly tolls of the war, according to the group's
statistics.
Though American deaths have fluctuated since the invasion in 2003, they had been
falling since November, when the toll fell to 84 from 96 the previous month.
American deaths reached a peak in April and November of 2004, topping 100 in
both months, when the military fought operations in Najaf and Falluja.
The soldier, whose name had not yet been released, was killed at 7:15 p.m. on
Thursday in an explosion that tore into his vehicle when it hit a roadside bomb
north of Baghdad.
The military also announced the death of a man it identified as a senior Al
Qaeda leader in the city of Samarra, north of Baghdad. An assault force of
American troops killed the man, identified as Hamadi Abd al-Takhi al-Nissani, as
he tried to flee a house about nine miles north of the city on Friday, the
military said in a statement. Two other men inside the house were also killed,
it said, one as he tried to throw a grenade at American forces.
The death toll continued to rise from a coordinated series of insurgent attacks
on Thursday near Baquba, 30 miles northeast of Baghdad, which led to street
battles with Iraqi government forces.
The fighting began around 1:30 p.m., when insurgents fired mortars and
rocket-propelled grenades at five police checkpoints, a police station and an
Iraqi Army building, officials said.
The series of attacks, unusual in their intensity and duration — the American
military said in a statement that one attack involved more than 100 insurgents —
seemed aimed at gaining control over a swath of fertile land that is central to
the security of the capital.
Local residents, predominantly Sunni Arabs, have been staunchly opposed to the
American occupation, and the area has long been a haven for Sunni Arab guerrilla
fighters.
Earlier tallies put the death toll at 36, including 21 insurgents, 11 Iraqi
police officers and soldiers, and two civilians. The Associated Press on Friday
cited an Iraqi police official, Maj. Gen. Ahmed al-Awad, as saying the toll had
climbed to 58.
On Friday, the city was placed under a curfew, but fighting continued in some
areas. The Associated Press reported that witnesses saw at least two wounded
police officers being carried away.
The insurgents who staged the Baquba attacks were drawn from four groups from
Diyala Province, said a Baquba police official who declined to be identified
because he feared reprisals.
In Baghdad, authorities found the bodies of two men. In the northern city of
Kirkuk, a child was killed and two were injured when a roadside bomb aimed at
American forces exploded, said Col. Mahmoud Hussein of the Kirkuk police. In
Falluja, west of Baghdad, gunmen killed two Iraqi police officers around 9 p.m.
on Thursday.
One of Iraq's vice presidents, Adel Abdul Mahdi, offered a new count of Iraqis
who have been displaced because of sectarian violence. Speaking in the southern
city of Najaf, Mr. Mahdi said about 100,000 families had been forced to flee
their homes nationwide, Reuters reported. Previously, the Iraqi government
estimated that about 11,000 families had been forced to flee.
Omar al-Neami and Khalid al-Ansary contributed reporting for this article.
Death
Toll for Americans in Iraq Is Highest in 5 Months, NYT, 29.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/29/world/middleeast/29iraq.html
Abuse Charge Set for a U.S. Colonel
April 26, 2006
The New York Times
By ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, April 25 — The Army plans to
charge Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, the former head of the interrogation center at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, with dereliction of duty, lying to investigators and
conduct unbecoming an officer, a lawyer for the officer said on Tuesday.
Colonel Jordan would be the highest-ranking officer at Abu Ghraib to face
criminal charges in connection with the abuses at the prison. Ten low-ranking
soldiers who served at the prison outside Baghdad have been convicted.
Colonel Jordan was the last major figure from Abu Ghraib whose status remained
unresolved two years after the graphic accounts and photographs of detainees
being abused and sexually humiliated became public. Other more senior officers
have been reprimanded, fined and relieved of command.
The Army said only that charges were being considered.
The highest-ranking officer convicted in relation to the prisoner abuses in Iraq
and Afghanistan is Maj. Clarke A. Paulus of the Marine Corps, who was found
guilty in 2004 of dereliction of duty and the maltreatment of a prisoner who was
found dead at a Marine-run jail in Iraq. Major Paulus was discharged from the
military but did not serve any jail time.
Colonel Jordan led the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib
from its creation in September 2003 to December 2003, struggling to meet the
soaring demands from the Pentagon and the American military headquarters in
Baghdad for better intelligence to combat the rising Iraqi insurgency. That was
also when the worst abuses occurred at Abu Ghraib.
Samuel L. Spitzberg, a former Army lawyer who served as Colonel Jordan's lawyer
in Baghdad in 2004, said a lawyer for the Military District of Washington, Lt.
Col. John Tracy, had told him about the impending charges, but that he had not
seen the exact details. Mr. Spitzberg, an assistant district attorney in Albany,
said he expected to represent Colonel Jordan again.
"We've not had an opportunity to review the evidence, and look forward to doing
that and determining whether there is a direct link with the abuses at Abu
Ghraib," Mr. Spitzberg said in an interview.
Colonel Jordan, a reservist who has been on active duty for three years, is
stationed in the Washington area, Mr. Spitzberg said, adding that the officer
was not making any public statement. Mr. Spitzberg said the Army also planned to
accuse Colonel Jordan of fraud, a charge unrelated to detainee treatment
involving reimbursed expenses.
An Army spokesman, Maj. Wayne Marotto, said in an e-mail message, "The
disposition of alleged offenses against LTC Jordan are still under consideration
by the chain of command." An additional spokeswoman, Lt. Col. Shawn Jirik, said
if charges were filed, it could happen as early as next week.
If Colonel Jordan is charged, the next step will be the military equivalent of a
grand-jury investigation to determine whether he will face court-martial,
administrative punishment or no penalty. Maj. Gen. Guy C. Swan 3rd, the
commander of the Army's Washington district, would decide.
By his own account, Colonel Jordan was ill-equipped to oversee the
interrogations task force at Abu Ghraib. He was trained as a civil affairs
officer and was assigned to set up a database for tracking information gleaned
from the prisoners.
"I've no training on the military side of what constitutes interrogations
operations," Colonel Jordan told Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, a senior Army
investigator who led an inquiry into abuses at the prison.
A second oversight panel, led by James R. Schlesinger, former defense secretary,
concluded that Colonel Jordan was a weak leader who did not have experience in
interrogation and who ceded core responsibilities to subordinates. The panel
said he failed to provide personnel appropriate training and supervision.
A third investigation, by three high-level Army generals, recommended in August
2004 that the Army punish the top two military intelligence officers at the
prison, Colonel Jordan and his immediate supervisor, Col. Thomas M. Pappas,
saying they bore responsibility even though they were not directly involved in
abusing prisoners.
Colonel Pappas was fined $8,000 and issued a written reprimand for dereliction
of duty, but did not face criminal charges. He was recently granted immunity
from further disciplinary action or prosecution so he could testify for the
defense in the cases of two military dog handlers who were accused of using
their Belgian shepherds to terrorize detainees. An Army official said Tuesday
that it was likely Colonel Pappas would be granted the same immunity to testify
against Colonel Jordan.
In June 2004, the commander of the military police company whose members have
been charged with abusing prisoners testified at a hearing in Iraq that someone
he referred to as Jordan was present one night in November 2003 among a group of
people in a room at the prison with the bloodied body of an Iraqi prisoner,
Manadel al-Jamadi, who had died during interrogation.
It was not clear from the testimony of the commander, Capt. Donald Reese,
whether he was referring to Colonel Jordan. Captain Reese testified that the man
he identified as Jordan ordered a lower-ranking officer to "get some ice out of
the chow hall" to store the body.
The body of the detainee, pictured wrapped in plastic and packed in ice, became
one of the most infamous images in the abuse scandal.
Human rights advocates applauded the steps the Army was preparing to take
against Colonel Jordan. "It's about time that someone at a higher level is being
held accountable for the wrongdoing," said Hina Shamsi, a senior counselor for
Human Rights First in Manhattan. "This is at the heart of command
responsibility, which has been absent so far in this."
Abuse
Charge Set for a U.S. Colonel, NYT, 26.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/26/us/26abuse.html?hp&ex=1146110400&en=11edeb3c8fa42f27&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Rumsfeld and Rice Visit Baghdad
April 26, 2006
The New Tork Times
By STEVEN R. WEISMAN and DAVID CLOUD
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 26 – Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, seeking to put past
differences behind them, paid a surprise joint visit to Iraq today to mobilize
diplomatic and security forces and bolster the new government of Prime Minister
Jawad al-Maliki.
"We really want to be ready to hit the ground running with this new government
when it's ready to go," Ms. Rice told reporters on her way here from Ankara,
Turkey, early in the morning.
"The turning point here is that Iraq now has its first permanent government, and
that it is a government of national unity, and it gives Iraq a real chance to
deal with the real vexing problems that it has faced," she added.
Ms. Rice and Mr. Rumsfeld planned a day of joint appearances and briefings that
administration officials say reflected a need for the United States to send a
signal that their two departments will try harder to work together to help the
new government avert a further slide toward civil war.
There was an atmosphere in her entourage that this visit offered perhaps a last
chance to reverse some of the mistakes of the last three years in providing
security for Iraq, getting the oil and power systems back and curbing sectarian
hatreds and corruption within the Iraqi government.
The key, aides to the Secretary said, was to make sure that Mr. Maliki does not
stumble in his first weeks in office and to achieve a quick record in improving
the lives of Iraqis.
"Clearly this new Iraqi government must perform on behalf of the Iraqi people,"
said James Wilkinson, a senior adviser to the Secretary, who helped plan the
trip. "But the new government also gives us a chance to correct our mistakes and
do our part to make Iraq work."
Mr. Rumsfeld arrived early in the morning on a direct flight from Washington,
and he spent the first part of the day meeting with the senior American
commander in Iraq, Gen. George Casey and other senior commanders.
"This is a sovereign country, and they're making impressive progress," he said,
adding that the government that Mr. Maliki is trying to assemble will be
composed of "people who are competent, people who understand the importance of
running ministries, not as sectarian ministries but as ministries for the whole
country."
Ms. Rice also planned to work on getting American officials more involved in
helping Iraq's ministries deliver services, particularly in the country's 18
provinces. A system of American teams for each province has had trouble getting
off the ground and exists in only five provinces, including Baghdad.
This was Ms. Rice's fourth visit to Iraq as Secretary of State but according to
her aides, by far her most important. State Department officials have been
alarmed in recent weeks as sectarian killings have increased and the previous
Iraqi government seemed incapable of dealing with the violence.
Of particular concern to the Bush administration has been the infiltration by
Shiite militias of Iraq's security and military forces. In some cases, the
militias have carried out their own killings, in retaliation against
Sunni-sponsored attacks, setting off a cycle of Sunni-Shiite violence.
Ms. Rice and her aides followed the recommendation of Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad in Baghdad and took the unusual step earlier this year of letting it
be known that it had lost confidence in Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who
was seeking to become Iraq's first permanent prime minister.
Under American pressure, Mr. Jaafari stepped aside earlier this month and his
Shiite bloc designated Mr. Maliki, a relatively unknown and untested leader, as
the person to try to form a new government. Mr. Maliki has yet to fill the
critical posts of ministry of interior and defense, however.
Ms. Rice said she believed that Mr. Maliki and his aides understand the
importance of appointing ministers that are not allied with Shiite militias.
"The mindset that is nonsectarian will be very important," she said on the plane
flying here. "They understand and they want ministries that are not sectarian,
because that's the only way they can govern the country. "
The joint visit of the secretaries of defense and state was considered highly
significant because there have been almost constant squabbles over issues large
and small between the two departments since the beginning of planning for the
Iraq war in 2002.
Over the objections of the State Department, Mr. Rumsfeld took control of Iraqi
reconstruction and made key decisions, such as disbanding the Iraqi Army and
banning members of Saddam Hussein's former Baath Party from positions of
responsibility in the new Iraqi government.
More recently, there have been disputes between the two departments over the
setting up of so-called "provincial reconstruction teams" in Iraq. These teams
of 60 or more military and civilian personnel are to function in each province
and work with local governments to provide services.
But after a major announcement last fall that they would be set up in all 18
provinces, they were slow to get started because of a lack of agreement on who
would provide security for them. Many in the military said they were too
overstretched to provide security for teams that would have such a marginal
impact.
State Department officials say this main problem, and an array of smaller ones,
have been worked out and that Ms. Rice and Mr. Rumsfeld were pleased with the
cooperation on reconstructing Iraq.
Nevertheless, an air of tension persists between the two departments and,
despite denials, between the two secretaries. It was manifested last month when
Ms. Rice commented that the United States had made "thousands of tactical
errors" in Iraq and Mr. Rumsfeld said he did not know what she was talking
about.
Aside from about 130,000 American troops, there are about 5,300 non-military
personnel in Iraq reporting to Ambassador Khalilzad, including 1,100 members of
the foreign service, making it the largest American embassy in the world.
Asked about the latest video of the insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that
labeled Mr. Maliki's government a sham, Ms. Rice said: "I think Zarqawi knows
very well that 11 million people went out and voted for this government." She
said the government's legitimacy posed "the greatest threat to his efforts" in
Iraq.
Of the provincial reconstruction teams, Ms. Rice said that delays in setting
them up were to be expected. "We have indeed to work very hard to find the
proper staffing for them, because this is a new kind of arrangement," she said.
"We had to work out some important details. These are not easy to stand up. I'm
actually pleased with the progress we've made."
Rumsfeld and Rice Visit Baghdad, NYT, 26.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/26/world/middleeast/26cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1146110400&en=d7bfc673abb8b8ac&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Rumsfeld Makes Surprise Baghdad Visit
By REUTERS
Filed at 0:05 a.m. ET
April 26, 2006
The New York Times
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld sought to show U.S. support for Iraq's new leadership on Wednesday,
making a surprise visit to Baghdad just days after Shi'ite politician Jawad
al-Maliki was chosen as prime minister.
Rumsfeld swooped into the capital aboard a military cargo plane for his first
visit to Iraq in 2006.
In addition to Iraqi political developments, Rumsfeld's trip comes as U.S.
military commanders contemplate reducing the number of American troops in the
country in the coming months. There are about 132,000 American troops in Iraq at
present.
Rumsfeld indicated earlier this week that the Pentagon intended to stick with
plans to reduce the size of the U.S. military presence, but he gave no specific
numbers nor a timetable.
Opinion polls show U.S. public support for the three-year-old Iraq war eroding,
which is contributing to a drop in President George W. Bush's job approval
ratings.
Rumsfeld himself has weathered a storm of criticism from six retired generals
who have demanded his dismissal, accusing him of disregarding military advice,
ruling by intimidation and making strategic blunders in Iraq.
Rumsfeld Makes Surprise Baghdad Visit, NYT, 26.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/washington/politics-iraq-rumsfeld.html
Kerry: Opposing Iraq war is patriotic
Posted 4/23/2006 1:02 AM ET
USA Today
BOSTON (AP) — Those who disagree with the Bush
administration's policies in Iraq face the same scornful charges that they are
unpatriotic as Sen. John Kerry did 35 years ago when he spoke out against the
Vietnam War, the Massachusetts Democrat said Saturday.
"I have come here today to reaffirm that it
was right to dissent in 1971 from a war that was wrong. And to affirm that it is
both a right and an obligation for Americans today to disagree with a president
who is wrong, a policy that is wrong, and a war in Iraq that weakens the
nation," Kerry said to a standing ovation Saturday at Boston's historic Faneuil
Hall.
Kerry's speech came 35 years to the day after he testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to call for an end to the Vietnam war.
"How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?" Kerry said in
1971, a line that helped propel the decorated Navy combat veteran and Yale
graduate onto the national stage.
The same question applies today as Americans wrestle with the mounting death
toll in Iraq, Kerry said, speaking before about 500 supporters who punctuated
his speech at least 20 times with ovations.
"Lives have been lost to bad decisions," Kerry said. "Not decisions that could
have gone either way, but decisions that constitute basic negligence and
incompetence. And lives continue to be lost because of stubbornness and pride."
Kerry also blasted those who question the motivation of retired generals who
have recently called for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
"That is cheap and shameful," he said. "How dare those who never wore the
uniform in battle attack those who wore it all their lives."
A few scattered chants of "run" and "2008" were heard both before and after the
speech. Kerry, the 2004 Democratic nominee for president, has not announced
whether he would run in 2008.
In response to Kerry's speech Saturday, a spokeswoman for the Republican
National Committee denied the party questioned anyone's patriotism.
"While we have never questioned Democrats' patriotism, we do question John
Kerry's motives, considering his eagerness to engage in political theatrics as
he ponders a presidential run," Tracey Schmitt said.
Kerry reiterated his position that American troops should be withdrawn by the
end of the year, saying that Iraqi politicians only respond to deadlines.
Kerry said while Iraq is different from Vietnam, there are some critical
parallels.
"We are in the same place as we were when I came home from Vietnam and spoke out
against the civilian leaders who were willing to sacrifice America's best in the
interest of political self-preservation," he said.
Kerry: Opposing Iraq war is patriotic, UT, 23.4.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-04-23-kerry-iraq_x.htm
Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes
Lawmakers to Act
April 17, 2006
The New York Times
By LIZETTE ALVAREZ
NASHVILLE, April 11 — As dozens of mourners
streamed solemnly into church to bury Cpl. David A. Bass, a fresh-faced
20-year-old marine who was killed in Iraq on April 2, a small clutch of
protesters stood across the street on Tuesday, celebrating his violent death.
"Thank God for Dead Soldiers," read one of their placards. "Thank God for
I.E.D.'s," read another, a reference to the bombs used to kill service members
in the war. To drive home their point — that God is killing soldiers to punish
America for condoning homosexuality — members of the Westboro Baptist Church of
Topeka, Kan., a tiny fundamentalist splinter group, kicked around an American
flag and shouted, if someone approached, that the dead soldiers were rotting in
hell.
Since last summer, a Westboro contingent, numbering 6 to 20 people, has been
showing up at the funerals of soldiers with their telltale placards, chants and
tattered American flags. The protests, viewed by many as cruel and unpatriotic,
have set off a wave of grass-roots outrage and a flurry of laws seeking to
restrict demonstrations at funerals and burials.
"Repugnant, outrageous, despicable, do not adequately describe what I feel they
do to these families," said Representative Steve Buyer, an Indiana Republican
who is a co-sponsor of a Congressional bill to regulate demonstrations at
federal cemeteries. "They have a right to freedom of speech. But someone also
has a right to bury a loved one in peace."
In the past few months, nine states, including Oklahoma, Wisconsin and Indiana,
have approved laws that restrict demonstrations at a funeral or burial. In
addition, 23 state legislatures are getting ready to vote on similar bills, and
Congress, which has received thousands of e-mail messages on the issue, expects
to take up legislation in May dealing with demonstrations at federal cemeteries.
"I haven't seen something like this," said David L. Hudson Jr., research
attorney for the First Amendment Center, referring to the number of state
legislatures reacting to the protests. "It's just amazing. It's an emotional
issue and not something that is going to get a lot of political opposition."
Most of the state bills and laws have been worded carefully to try to avoid
concerns over the First Amendment, which guarantees freedom of speech. The laws
typically seek to keep demonstrators at a funeral or cemetery 100 to 500 feet
from the entrance, depending on the state, and to limit the protests to one hour
before and one hour after the funeral.
A few states, including Wisconsin, also seek to bar people from displaying "any
visual image that conveys fighting words" within several hundred feet or during
the hours of the funeral. The laws or bills do not try to prevent protesters
from speaking out.
Constitutional experts say there is some precedent for these kinds of laws. One
case in particular, which sought to keep anti-abortion picketers away from a
private home, was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1988.
"A funeral home seems high on the list of places where people legitimately could
be or should be protected from unwanted messages," said Michael C. Dorf, a
constitutional law professor at Columbia University Law School.
The Westboro Baptist Church, led by the Rev. Fred Phelps, is not affiliated with
the mainstream Baptist church. It first gained publicity when it picketed the
funeral of Matthew Shepard, a gay man who was beaten to death in 1998 in
Wyoming.
Over the past decade, the church, which consists almost entirely of 75 of Mr.
Phelps's relatives, made its name by demonstrating outside businesses, disaster
zones and the funerals of gay people. Late last year, though, it changed tactics
and members began showing up at the funerals of troops killed in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks hate groups, has put
it on its watch list.
Embracing a literal translation of the Bible, the church members believe that
God strikes down the wicked, chief among them gay men and lesbians and people
who fail to strongly condemn homosexuality. God is killing soldiers, they say,
because of America's unwillingness to condemn gay people and their lifestyles.
Standing on the roadside outside Corporal Bass's funeral here under a strikingly
blue sky, the six protesters, who had flown from Topeka, shook their placards as
cars drove past or pulled into the funeral. The 80-year-old wife of Mr. Phelps,
slightly stooped but spry and wearing her running shoes, carried a sign that
read "Tennessee Taliban." She is often given the task of driving the pickup
trucks that ferry church members, a stack of pillows propping her view over the
dashboard.
Next to her stood a cluster of Mr. Phelps's great-grandnephews and
great-grandnieces, smiling teenagers with sunglasses, digital cameras and
cellphones dangling from their pockets and wrists. They carried their own signs,
among them, "You're Going to Hell."
Careful not to trespass on private property, the group stood a distance down the
hill from the Woodmont Hills Church of Christ. Police cars parked nearby,
keeping watch, but mostly making sure no one attacked the protesters.
"God is punishing this nation with a grievous, smiting blow, killing our
children, sending them home dead, to help you connect the dots," said Shirley
Roper-Phelps, the spokeswoman for the group and one of Mr. Phelps's daughters.
"This is a nation that has forgotten God and leads a filthy manner of life."
At the entrance of the church, Jonathan Anstey, 21, one of Corporal Bass's best
friends, frowned as he watched the protesters from a distance. Corporal Bass,
who joined the Marine Corps after high school, died with six other service
members when his 7-ton truck rolled over in a flash flood in Iraq. His family
was reeling from grief, Mr. Anstey said.
"It's hurtful and it's taking a lot of willpower not to go down there and stomp
their heads in," Mr. Anstey said. "But I know that David is looking down and
seeing me, and he would not want to see that."
Disturbed by the protests, a small group of motorcycle riders, some of them
Vietnam War veterans, banded together in October to form the Patriot Guard
Riders. They now have 22,000 members. Their aim is to form a human shield in
front of the protesters so that mourners cannot see them, and when necessary,
rev their engines to drown out the shouts of the Westboro group.
The Bass family, desiring a low-key funeral, asked the motorcycle group not to
attend.
"It's kind of like, we didn't do it right in the '70s," said Kurt Mayer, the
group's spokesman, referring to the treatment of Vietnam veterans. "This is
something that America needs to do, step up and do the right thing."
Hundreds of well-wishers have written e-mail messages to members of the
motorcycle group, thanking them for their presence at the funerals. State
legislatures, too, are reacting swiftly to the protests, and the Westboro group
has mostly steered clear of states that have already enacted laws. While
Corporal Bass's family was getting ready to bury him, the Tennessee House was
preparing to debate a bill making it illegal for protesters to stand within 500
feet of a funeral, burial or memorial service.
The House joined the Senate in approving it unanimously on Thursday, and the
bill now awaits the signature of the governor.
"When you have someone who has given the ultimate sacrifice for their country,
with a community and the family grieving, I just don't feel it's the appropriate
time to be protesting," said State Representative Curtis Johnson, a Republican
who was a co-sponsor of the bill.
Ms. Roper-Phelps said the group was now contemplating how best to challenge the
newly passed laws. "This hypocritical nation runs around the world touting our
freedoms and is now prepared to dismantle the First Amendment," she said. "A
piece of me wants to say that is exactly what you deserve."
Outrage at Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, NYT, 17.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/17/us/17picket.html?ex=1149048000&en=424bf2e5bb48c56c&ei=5070
U.S. sees spike in Iraq deaths
Updated 4/16/2006 11:09 PM ET
USA TODAY
By Kimberly Johnson and Kathy Kiely
BAGHDAD — U.S. military deaths in Iraq have
increased sharply in April after reaching the lowest level in two years last
month. The increase was fueled largely by recent fighting in volatile Anbar
province, west of Baghdad.
The U.S. military said Sunday that four
Marines died over the weekend. In the first half of April, 48 American troops
died in Iraq, according to Pentagon statistics.
In March, 30 U.S. forces died in Iraq, the fewest in a month since February
2004.
Anbar province, which stretches from west of Baghdad to the Syrian border and
includes the former insurgent strongholds of Ramadi and Fallujah, has long been
a challenge to pacify. At least 26 of this month's U.S. deaths occurred in
Anbar.
U.S. forces and their Iraqi counterparts have been waging an aggressive fight in
the region.
"There have been ongoing operations to secure the area, and (they) have been
going on for several months," military spokesman Lt. Col Barry Johnson said.
U.S. and Iraqi forces have launched operations in recent months to interdict the
supply of insurgent fighters moving along the western Euphrates valley from
Syria into Baghdad and central Iraq.
In a February report to Congress, the Pentagon said the insurgency is confined
to a region that includes Baghdad and Anbar.
"Approximately 83% of insurgent attacks are in four of Iraq's 18 provinces,
containing less than 42% of the population," according to the report.
The recent increase in U.S. deaths also come as Iraqi politicians struggle to
create a government following Dec. 15 parliamentary elections.
In the months after elections were held, U.S. deaths declined.
The average monthly U.S. death toll during 2004 and 2005 was about 70, according
to a USA TODAY database. In the first three months of this year the average
dropped to 48.
"As long as there is no government, Iraqis tend to view the situation as one of
occupation," said military analyst Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
The United States has urged Iraqi politicians to reach agreement on forming a
new government.
"Their country is teetering on the brink of chaos, and they are still
dithering," Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind., said Sunday on ABC's This Week.
Kiely reported from McLean, Va. Contributing: Wire reports
U.S.
sees spike in Iraq deaths, UT, 16.4.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-04-16-pm-session_x.htm
In Iraqi Divide, Echoes of Bosnia for U.S.
Troops
April 16, 2006
The New York Times
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
JURF AS-SAKHR, Iraq — As Lt. Col. Patrick
Donahoe scans the horizon through the mud-splattered, inch-thick windows of his
armored Humvee, he can almost see Bosnia through the palm trees.
It is not there yet, Colonel Donahoe said, but the communal hatred he has
witnessed in this area of Iraq, the blindingly ignorant things people say, the
pulling apart of Shiite and Sunni towns that were once tightly intertwined are
all reminiscent of what he saw years ago as a young Army captain on a
peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia.
"You talk to people here and it's literally the same conversations I heard in
Bosnia," Colonel Donahoe said. "I had a police colonel tell me the other day
that all the people in Jurf," a predominantly Sunni town, "are evil, including
the children."
Jurf as-Sakhr, also known as Jurf, is 40 miles south of Baghdad. It is a
community of crumbly dirt farms and dilapidated weapons factories and boys
selling fluffy white chickens alongside the road. It sits right on a sectarian
fault line that in the past few months has cracked wide open, and Colonel
Donahoe is now back to playing peacekeeper.
The work is emblematic of a new role for the American soldier in Iraq, because
as the threat has shifted, so has the mission. Sectarian violence is killing
more people and destabilizing Iraq more than the antigovernment insurgency ever
did. In response, American commanders, especially those in mixed Sunni-Shiite
areas like Jurf, are throwing their armor, troops and money directly into the
divide, trying to keep Iraq from violently partitioning the way Bosnia did.
What complicates their new mission is that the insurgency is far from over. It
keeps mutating, finding new recruits and even new weapons; one soldier in Jurf
was recently shot in the arm by an arrow.
Commanders have to simultaneously wage war and push peace, and Colonel Donahoe,
along with other American officials, said the outcome of the entire American
enterprise might hinge on how well they pulled off this balancing act.
"This is the critical year," Colonel Donahoe said. "If we don't turn things
around, if we don't get the Shiites and Sunnis to stop killing each other, I'm
not sure there's much else we can do."
Colonel Donahoe is experimenting with a number of tactics, like microloans to
re-establish trade between Shiite and Sunni merchants; a political program to
restore Sunni participation; and joint police patrols — not joint
American-Iraqi, but joint Shiite-Sunni.
He was trained to maneuver tanks, but he spends much of his time parked on
carpets, chatting with sheiks, trying to ease suspicions one glass of tea at a
time.
His soldiers have an even harder adjustment to make. Many are on their second
tour in Iraq, and they have returned to a different war. When they were here
before, in 2004, it was all about crushing the Sunni-led insurgency. Now, it is
all about checking Shiite power.
Back then, if a lieutenant in his 20's went out to meet with a gray-bearded
elder, it was to coax him to cooperate with the Americans, not with his
neighbor.
The soldiers' quality of life, if it can be called that, may have improved.
During the previous tour, the men cooked chicken in ammunition boxes and
showered with hoses, if at all. Now they make Baskin-Robbins ice cream floats in
the mess hall and sleep in air-conditioned bliss.
But this does not necessarily translate into higher morale. Peacekeeping, no
matter what the stakes, is not war-fighting, many soldiers said. It does not
deliver the same sense of adventure or the same sort of bonds.
"I'll never forget those guys I crossed the border with," said Command Sgt. Maj.
Elijah King Jr., who is on his second tour. "It's not like that anymore."
The troops in Jurf are part of the First Battalion, 67th Armor, based at Fort
Hood, Tex. The battalion, part of the Fourth Infantry Division, has about 1,000
soldiers and first came to Iraq in 2003 as part of the invasion force before
rolling north of Baghdad for counterinsurgency patrols that continued through
early 2004.
The battalion returned to Iraq in December 2005 and is now thinly spread over
2,700 square miles between Iskandariya to the north and Karbala to the south.
Because of all the insurgent activity, the military includes this area in what
it refers to as the Triangle of Death.
One of the hottest spots is Jurf, once home to lush date plantations, a Scud
missile testing site and the Medina Division of Saddam Hussein's Republican
Guard. After the invasion, Jurf, with its concentration of former officers,
Baathists, weapons experts and leaders of the powerful Janabi tribe, predictably
festered, becoming a terrorist sanctuary.
Just south of Jurf is Hamiya, a mostly Shiite farming town that never enjoyed
Jurf's whiff of privilege. While Jurf farmers drove tractors, Hamiya farmers
swung hoes, and in an atmosphere of rising sectarian tensions, these deep-seated
class rivalries eventually exploded. South of Hamiya are the almost purely
Shiite towns of Musayyib and Sedda.
By the time the battalion arrived in December, insurgents had established an
island hideaway near Jurf on a swampy spit of land between the Euphrates River
and an irrigation canal. They stashed thousands of artillery shells there and
ran a clandestine court, where insurgent judges would try, torture and execute
collaborators, the Iraqi police said. Mutilated bodies were often found bobbing
in the swamps.
Colonel Donahoe's soldiers soon discovered wires from roadside bombs snaking
back to the island. On Jan. 10, they invaded, blowing up homes and unearthing an
enormous weapons cache, though the insurgents apparently caught wind of the
operation because by the time the tanks rumbled ashore, they had vanished. The
bomb attacks continued, and in February, soldiers in a Bradley fighting vehicle
fired on two suspects who they said tried to blow up a convoy and took off
running, right past a house.
When the soldiers arrived at the house, the colonel said, a woman was screaming
in the driveway, waving the severed leg of her daughter. The girl had been hit
by an American shell and bled to death in front of the soldiers.
The troops have also been enmeshed in strange local dynamics. A few weeks ago, a
schoolgirl came to them with an armload of books that included a chemical
weapons training manual. She led the soldiers to her father, a former Iraqi Army
colonel suspected of being an insurgent. After the soldiers detained him, they
gave the girl a chocolate bar.
They have also gone on raids with local security forces. But this, too, has its
risks.
One night last month, American troops helped police officers from Hamiya, the
working-class Shiite town, aggressively round up 10 men, all Sunnis, from Jurf.
"I left thinking, wait a sec, were we just part of some sort of sectarian
revenge?" the colonel said.
As things quieted down with the Sunnis, more problems emerged with the Shiites.
Shiite-led police forces began detaining Sunnis and refusing to release them
even after American commanders concluded they were innocent.
Yassir Naameh Naoufel, a Sunni elder in Jurf, said Sunnis could no longer visit
Musayyib, a Shiite town. "If we do, we might disappear," he said.
Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army, a force of armed men loyal to the Shiite cleric
Moktada al-Sadr, has been pushing into Musayyib, introducing a harsh brand of
Islamic law.
According to Staff Sgt. Joseph Schicker, a psychological operations soldier,
Mahdi militiamen recently threw battery acid on a woman whose ankles were
showing and dragged a man accused of being gay through the streets.
Colonel Donahoe draws on the Balkans for an easy metaphor.
"Moktada is like Milosevic," he said, referring to the former Serbian leader.
"He'll do anything to stay in power."
Colonel Donahoe, 38, calls Bosnia his "formative military experience," and it
seems that the nine months he spent there in 1996 has been as valuable for him
in Iraq as the 15 years he trained as a tank commander.
At a recent meeting he organized between Shiite and Sunni imams, the colonel
shared one of his Bosnian lessons. "Those people were intermarried just like
you," he said. "They lived together just like you. But certain leaders trying to
grab power ripped that country apart." The imams nodded, the Shiites on one side
of the room, the Sunnis on the other.
The colonel said he wanted to "reintegrate" local politics. The Musayyib
district council, which oversees all the towns in an area with a total
population of around 200,000, was a mix of Shiites and Sunnis before the war.
Now it is run by 17 Shiites, the majority of whom support Mr. Sadr, with two
nonvoting Sunni members.
To make matters worse, elders in Hamiya, which is technically part of the Jurf
subdistrict but is mostly Shiite, now want to secede from Jurf, even though
Hamiya has been part of Jurf for decades. The colonel said what he needed more
than anything was a bona fide expert on governing.
"What do I know about running a district council?" he said.
He is also trying to revive trade links by using some of the battalion's
$495,000 in reconstruction money to start a microloan program. The problem is,
many merchants in Jurf and Musayyib are too frightened to travel from one area
to the other to do the business they used to.
Tip-toeing through these issues is far more delicate than hunting insurgents,
and the colonel seems to sense the difficulties of keeping his rank and file
engaged. He tells all of his soldiers that they are now diplomats, and he uses
them to interview merchants, for example, and protect the construction site of a
new police station in Jurf. Insurgents blew up the last one, and the colonel is
waiting to rebuild before taking on the delicate task of intermingling police
forces.
"The only way this is going to work is if the patrols are 50-50, Shiite-Sunni,"
he said.
Shiite police officials have agreed, in theory, but have hired few Sunnis so
far.
The colonel cited signs of progress. Bomb attacks are down. More shops are open.
Fewer bodies are found bobbing in the swamp.
But it is not clear how receptive Shiites and Sunnis are to the reconciliation
efforts. Often, the only common ground is anti-American anger, or at least
disappointment.
Salah al-Shimeri, an Iraqi police official and a Shiite, told American soldiers
during a recent meeting, "I just wish you could put this country back to the way
you found it."
Sometimes, the colonel said, he is unsure whether that can be done. "How will it
end?" he said one night. "I don't know."
"I think it will come down to an attrition of spirit. Either they'll get tired
of fighting and quit. Or we will."
In
Iraqi Divide, Echoes of Bosnia for U.S. Troops, NYT, 16.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/16/world/middleeast/16peacekeeping.html?hp&ex=1145246400&en=4673befb6b07f1c1&ei=5094&partner=homepage
John Sherffius
St Louis, MO
Cagle 14.4.2006
http://cagle.msnbc.com/politicalcartoons/PCcartoons/sherffius.asp
George Washington
1732-1799
First President (1789-1797) of the United States
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/gw1.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington
More Retired Generals Call for Rumsfeld's
Resignation
April 14, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID S. CLOUD and ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, April 13 — The widening circle of
retired generals who have stepped forward to call for Defense Secretary Donald
H. Rumsfeld's resignation is shaping up as an unusual outcry that could pose a
significant challenge to Mr. Rumsfeld's leadership, current and former generals
said on Thursday.
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., who led troops on the ground in Iraq as
recently as 2004 as the commander of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, on
Thursday became the fifth retired senior general in recent days to call publicly
for Mr. Rumsfeld's ouster. Also Thursday, another retired Army general, Maj.
Gen. John Riggs, joined in the fray.
"We need to continue to fight the global war on terror and keep it off our
shores," General Swannack said in a telephone interview. "But I do not believe
Secretary Rumsfeld is the right person to fight that war based on his absolute
failures in managing the war against Saddam in Iraq."
Another former Army commander in Iraq, Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who led the First
Infantry Division, publicly broke ranks with Mr. Rumsfeld on Wednesday. Mr.
Rumsfeld long ago became a magnet for political attacks. But the current uproar
is significant because Mr. Rumsfeld's critics include generals who were involved
in the invasion and occupation of Iraq under the defense secretary's leadership.
There were indications on Thursday that the concern about Mr. Rumsfeld, rooted
in years of pent-up anger about his handling of the war, was sweeping aside the
reticence of retired generals who took part in the Iraq war to criticize an
enterprise in which they participated. Current and former officers said they
were unaware of any organized campaign to seek Mr. Rumsfeld's ouster, but they
described a blizzard of telephone calls and e-mail messages as retired generals
critical of Mr. Rumsfeld weighed the pros and cons of joining in the
condemnation.
Even as some of their retired colleagues spoke out publicly about Mr. Rumsfeld,
other senior officers, retired and active alike, had to be promised anonymity
before they would discuss their own views of why the criticism of him was
mounting. Some were concerned about what would happen to them if they spoke
openly, others about damage to the military that might result from amplifying
the debate, and some about talking outside of channels, which in military
circles is often viewed as inappropriate.
The White House has dismissed the criticism, saying it merely reflects tensions
over the war in Iraq. There was no indication that Mr. Rumsfeld was considering
resigning.
"The president believes Secretary Rumsfeld is doing a very fine job during a
challenging period in our nation's history," the White House spokesman, Scott
McClellan, told reporters on Thursday.
Among the retired generals who have called for Mr. Rumsfeld's ouster, some have
emphasized that they still believe it was right for the United States to invade
Iraq. But a common thread in their complaints has been an assertion that Mr.
Rumsfeld and his aides too often inserted themselves unnecessarily into military
decisionmaking, often disregarding advice from military commanders.
The outcry also appears based in part on a coalescing of concern about the toll
that the war is taking on American armed forces, with little sign, three years
after the invasion, that United States troops will be able to withdraw in large
numbers anytime soon.
Pentagon officials, while acknowledging that Mr. Rumsfeld's forceful style has
sometimes ruffled his military subordinates, played down the idea that he was
overriding the advice of his military commanders or ignoring their views.
His interaction with military commanders has "been frequent," said Lawrence Di
Rita, a top aide to Mr. Rumsfeld.
"It's been intense," Mr. Di Rita said, "but always there's been ample
opportunity for military judgment to be applied against the policies of the
United States."
Some retired officers, however, said they believed the momentum was turning
against Mr. Rumsfeld.
"Are the floodgates opening?" asked one retired Army general, who drew a
connection between the complaints and the fact that President Bush's second term
ends in less than three years. "The tide is changing, and folks are seeing the
end of this administration."
No active duty officers have joined the call for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation. In
interviews, some currently serving general officers expressed discomfort with
the campaign against Mr. Rumsfeld, which has been spearheaded by, among others,
Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who headed the United States Central Command in the late
1990's before retiring from the Marine Corps. Some of the currently serving
officers said they feared the debate risked politicizing the military and
undercutting its professional ethos.
Some say privately they disagree with aspects of the Bush administration's
handling of the war. But many currently serving officers, regardless of their
views, say respect for civilian control of the military requires that they air
differences of opinion in private and stay silent in public.
"I support my secretary of defense," Lt. General John Vines, who commands the
Army's 18th Airborne Corps, said when questioned after a speech in Washington on
Thursday about the calls for Mr. Rumsfeld to step down. "If I publicly disagree
with my civilian leadership, I think I've got to resign. My advice should be
private."
Some of the tensions between Mr. Rumsfeld and the uniformed military services
date back to his arrival at the Pentagon in early 2001. Mr. Rumsfeld's assertion
of greater civilian control over the military and his calls for a slimmer,
faster force were viewed with mistrust by many senior officers, while his
aggressive, sometimes abrasive style also earned him enmity.
Mr. Rumsfeld's critics often point to his treatment of Gen. Eric Shinseki, then
the Army chief of staff, who told Congress a month before the 2003 invasion of
Iraq that occupying the country could require "several hundred thousand troops,"
rather than the smaller force that was later provided. General Shinseki's
estimate was publicly dismissed by Pentagon officials.
"Rumsfeld has been contemptuous of the views of senior military officers since
the day he walked in as secretary of defense. It's about time they got sick and
tired," Thomas E. White, the former Army secretary, said in a telephone
interview on Thursday. Mr. White was forced out of his job by Mr. Rumsfeld in
April of 2003.
Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold of the Marine Corps, who retired in late 2002, has said
he regarded the American invasion of Iraq unnecessary. He issued his call for
replacing Mr. Rumsfeld in an essay in the current edition of Time magazine.
General Newbold said he regretted not opposing the invasion of Iraq more
vigorously, and called the invasion peripheral to the job of defeating Al Qaeda.
General Swannack, by contrast, continues to support the invasion but said that
Mr. Rumsfeld had micromanaged the war in Iraq, rather than leaving it to senior
commanders there, including Gen. George W. Casey Jr. of the Army, the top
American officer in Iraq, and Gen. John P. Abizaid of the Army, the top officer
in the Middle East. "My belief is Rumsfeld does not really understand the
dynamic of counterinsurgency warfare," General Swannack said.
The string of retired generals calling for Rumsfeld's removal has touched off a
vigorous debate within the ranks of both active-duty and retired generals and
admirals.
Some officers who have worked closely with Mr. Rumsfeld reject the idea that he
is primarily to blame for the inability of American forces to defeat the
insurgency in Iraq. One active-duty, four-star Army officer said he had not
heard among his peers widespread criticism of Mr. Rumsfeld, and said he thought
the criticism from his retired colleagues was off base. "They are entitled to
their views, but I believe them to be wrong. And it is unfortunate they have
allowed themselves to become in some respects, politicized."
Gen. Jack Keane, who was Army vice chief of staff in 2003 before retiring, said
in the planning of the Iraq invasion, senior officers as much as the Pentagon's
civilian leadership underestimated the threat of a long-term insurgency.
"There's shared responsibility here. I don't think you can blame the civilian
leadership alone," he said.
Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, a retired Army general, called for Mr. Rumsfeld's
resignation in March.
The criticism of Mr. Rumsfeld may spring from multiple motives. General Zinni,
for example, is in the middle of a tour promoting a new book critical of the
Bush administration.
General Riggs, who called for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation in an interview on
Thursday with National Public Radio, left the Pentagon in 2004 after clashing
with civilian leaders and then being investigated for potential misuse of
contractor personnel.
But there were also signs that the spate of retired generals calling for Mr.
Rumsfeld's departure was not finished. Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, who is retired
from the Marine Corps, said in an interview Thursday he had received a telephone
call from another retired general who was weighing whether to publicly join the
calls for Mr. Rumsfeld's dismissal.
"He was conflicted, and when I hung up I didn't know which way he was going to
go," General Van Riper said.
Thom Shanker contributed reporting for this article.
More
Retired Generals Call for Rumsfeld's Resignation, NYT, 14.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/14/washington/14military.html?hp&ex=1145073600&en=bdbb556e9e293705&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Bush statement on WMD in Iraq based on
intelligence that was later debunked
Posted 4/12/2006 12:42 PM ET
USA Today
WASHINGTON (AP) — President Bush's claim three
years ago that weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq was based on U.S.
intelligence that was later proved false, the White House acknowledged on
Wednesday.
Spokesman Scott McClellan vigorously denied
suggestions that Bush was making claims that already had been debunked when he
said that two small trailers seized in Iraq were mobile biological laboratories.
McClellan did not directly answer questions about whether Bush, when he made his
statement, was aware that a team of experts had already concluded the trailers
were not involved with WMD manufacturing.
"The White House is not an intelligence-gathering agency," McClellan said.
He said Bush was relying on information from the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Defense Intelligence Agency that said the trailers were used to produce
biological weapons — information that later proved false.
The Washington Post reported Wednesday that experts on a Pentagon-sponsored
mission who examined the trailers concluded that they had nothing to do with
biological weapons and sent their findings to Washington in a classified field
report on May 27, 2003.
One day later, the CIA and DIA publicly issued an assessment saying the opposite
— that U.S. officials were confident that the trailers were used to produce
biological weapons. The assessment said the mobile facilities represented "the
strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program."
The very next day, Bush declared in a Polish television interview, "We have
found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological laboratories."
McClellan said information for public reports from the CIA comes from many
sources and takes time to vet.
"It's not something that, they will tell you, turns on a dime," McClellan said.
McClellan dismissed the Post article and a report based on it that aired on ABC
News Wednesday morning as irresponsible. He specifically called on ABC to
apologize for reporting Bush knew that what he was saying was false.
The actions of the special team were described to a Washington Post reporter in
interviews with government officials and weapons experts who participated in the
mission or had direct knowledge of it. The final report remains classified.
The trailers along with aluminum tubes acquired by Iraq for what was believed to
be a nuclear weapons program — were primary pieces of evidence offered by the
Bush administration before the war to support its contention that Iraq was
making weapons of mass destruction.
Intelligence officials and the White House have repeatedly denied claims that
intelligence was exaggerated or manipulated in the months before the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The Iraq Survey Group concluded in 2004 that
there was no evidence that Iraq produced weapons of mass destruction after 1991.
Bush
statement on WMD in Iraq based on intelligence that was later debunked, UT,
12.4.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-04-12-bush-intel_x.htm
Retired US Iraq general demands Rumsfeld
resign
Wed Apr 12, 2006 2:44 PM ET
Reuters
By Will Dunham
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A recently retired
two-star general who just a year ago commanded a U.S. Army division in Iraq on
Wednesday joined a small but growing list of former senior officers to call on
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to resign.
"I believe we need a fresh start in the Pentagon. We need a leader who
understands teamwork, a leader who knows how to build teams, a leader that does
it without intimidation," Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who commanded the
Germany-based 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, said in an interview on CNN.
In recent weeks, retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, Army Maj. Gen.
Paul Eaton and Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni all spoke out against Rumsfeld.
This comes as opinion polls show eroding public support for the 3-year-old war
in which about 2,360 U.S. troops have died.
"You know, it speaks volumes that guys like me are speaking out from retirement
about the leadership climate in the Department of Defense," Batiste said.
"But when decisions are made without taking into account sound military
recommendations, sound military decision making, sound planning, then we're
bound to make mistakes."
Batiste, a West Point graduate who also served during the previous Gulf War,
retired from the Army on November 1, 2005. While in Iraq, his division,
nicknamed the Big Red One, was based in Tikrit, and it wrapped up a yearlong
deployment in May 2005.
Critics have accused Rumsfeld of bullying senior military officers and
disregarding their views. They often cite how Rumsfeld dismissed then-Army Chief
of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki's opinion a month before the 2003 invasion that
occupying Iraq could require "several hundred thousand troops," not the smaller
force Rumsfeld would send.
Many experts believe that the chaos that ensued and the insurgency that emerged
just months later vindicated Shinseki's view.
Batiste told CNN "we've got the best military in the world, hands down, period."
He did not say whether he felt the war was winnable.
'LACK OF SACRIFICE'
"Whether we agree or not with the war in Iraq, we are where we are, and we must
succeed in this endeavor. Failure is frankly not an option," Batiste said.
Batiste said he was struck by the "lack of sacrifice and commitment on the part
of the American people" to the war, with the exception of families with soldiers
fighting in Iraq.
"I think that our executive and legislative branches of government have a
responsibility to mobilize this country for war. They frankly have not done so.
We're mortgaging our future, our children, $8 to $9 billion a month," he said,
referring to the cost of the war.
He defined success in the war as "setting the Iraqi people up for self-reliance
with their form of representative government that takes into account tribal,
ethnic and religious differences that have always defined Iraqi society."
"Iraqis, frankly, in my experience, do not understand democracy. Nor do they
understand their responsibilities for a free society," Batiste said.
Newbold, the military's top operations officer before the Iraq war, said in a
Time magazine opinion piece on Sunday that he regretted having not more openly
challenged U.S. leaders who took the United States into "an unnecessary war" in
Iraq. Newbold encouraged officers still in the military to voice any doubts they
have about the war.
On Tuesday, Marine Corps Gen. Pete Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
defended Rumsfeld from the criticism.
Rumsfeld said that "there's nothing wrong with people having opinions," and that
criticism should be expected during a war as controversial as this one.
Retired US Iraq general demands Rumsfeld resign, R, 12.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyid=2006-04-12T184439Z_01_N12340006_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-USA-GENERAL.xml
Deaths of U.S. Soldiers Climb Again in Iraq
April 12, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 12 — The death toll for
American troops is rising steeply this month, with the military today announcing
the deaths of three more soldiers, bringing the number of troops killed this
month to at least 36. That figure already surpasses the American military deaths
for all of March, and could signal a renewed insurgent offensive against the
American presence here.
When 31 service members died last month, it was the second lowest monthly death
toll of the war for the Americans, and the fifth month in a row of declining
fatalities, according to statistics from the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, an
independent organization.
But deaths have begun to rise quickly. Many of the fatalities this month have
taken place in the parched Anbar Province, the heart of the Sunni Arab
insurgency. The province was rated "critical" in a confidential report written
recently by the American Embassy and the military command in Baghdad.
Though sectarian violence has recently overshadowed anti-American attacks in
much of central Iraq, there are relatively few Shiites in Anbar, so much of the
insurgency's venom is directed at the Americans there.
The capital also remains a virulently hostile place. The three soldiers who died
today were killed in two separate roadside bomb explosions — two were hit by a
blast south of Baghdad, and one to the east, the military said. Three soldiers
were killed in a roadside bomb explosion north of Baghdad on Tuesday. A soldier
died Monday from wounds sustained the previous day in combat in Anbar, and a
soldier was killed Sunday by a roadside bomb near Balad.
As the insurgency raged, political talks in the capital remained moribund. The
temporary speaker of Parliament, Adnan Pachachi, announced today that he would
convene the second session of the legislature next week, even in the absence of
a new government. The venerable Mr. Pachachi made his statement at a news
conference attended by many Iraqi reporters, even though a new meeting of
Parliament by itself would mean little. Mr. Pachachi's symbolic gesture showed
how desperate Iraqi officials are to convey a sense of movement in the stagnant
political process.
The man at the center of the storm, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari, on
Tuesday unleashed a tirade against what he called anti-Shiite remarks from the
Egyptian president. Mr. Jafaari said that Iraq would boycott a conference of
Middle East foreign ministers in Cairo being held today.At a news conference,
Mr. Jafaari said that the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, had defamed Iraq
and its majority Shiite population by saying in a television interview last
Saturday that the Shiites here are more loyal to Iran than to Iraq.
"We hope that others would remind themselves to support the Iraqi people and
never spoil the Arab identity of Iraq," Mr. Jaafari said. The Shiites in Iraq
are mostly Arabs, while those in Iran are primarily Persians. Many Iraqi Shiites
fought against Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988. A million people
died.
Even so, the Iranian government gave refuge to several prominent Shiite
political parties that were oppressed during Saddam Hussein's rule. One was Mr.
Jaafari's party, the Islamic Dawa Party. Another was Dawa's main rival, the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is now trying to
unseat Mr. Jaafari as the prime minister.
Moqtada al-Sadr, the Shiite cleric who is a key supporter of Mr. Jafaari, also
released a statement today condemning Mr. Mubarak's remarks and stressing the
loyalty of Iraqi's Shiite population.
"Iraq is going through a difficult phase," Mr. Sadr said, "and such statements
serve only the enemy and contributes in starting the fire of civil and sectarian
wars."
Iraqi Shiite officials said Tuesday that they had still not resolved the dispute
over the post of prime minister. Talks to form a new government are deadlocked
over the issue, because the Sunni Arab, Kurdish and secular blocs — as well as
some Shiites — are demanding the withdrawal of Mr. Jaafari's nomination. The
biggest bloc in the 275-member Parliament, in this case the Shiites, has the
constitutional right to nominate a prime minister, who then must be approved by
Parliament.
Mr. Jaafari won the nomination in February after a closely contested vote among
the 130-member Shiite bloc. Now, in light of opposition to Mr. Jaafari, several
Shiite groups have announced they are ready to put forward their own candidates.
These groups include the Supreme Council and the Fadhila Party.
Shiite leaders met Tuesday but did not reach any agreement on the issue, said
Redha Jowad Taki, a political officer for the Supreme Council.
One independent member of the Shiite bloc who declined to speak for attribution
said that some Dawa officials were ready to withdraw Mr. Jaafari's nomination
but that Mr. Jaafari insisted on keeping his job.
As the talks inch along, other Iraqi leaders say the country has already
spiraled down into civil war. One of them is Ayad Allawi, the former prime
minister and a White House ally. He told Reuters on Tuesday that the "new form
of terrorism" here is "ideological, political and sectarian terror."
"We must be aware and not bury our head in the soil and say the situation in
Iraq is good," he said.
This morning, a police officer and three civilians were killed in Baghdad when a
roadside bomb struck a police patrol, and another police officer was shot dead
while on his way to work, an official at the Iraqi Interior Ministry said. And
the bodies of three men who had been shot in the head were found in different
neighborhoods this morning, the official said.
A bomb hidden in a minibus exploded in the Shiite enclave of Sadr City in
Baghdad on Tuesday afternoon, killing at least three people and wounding nine,
an Interior Ministry official said.
Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedi contributed reporting for this article.
Deaths of U.S. Soldiers Climb Again in Iraq, NYT, 12.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/12/world/13cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1144900800&en=367630fb5e3cb849&ei=5094&partner=homepage
White House hotly denies report on Iraq WMD
Wed Apr 12, 2006 12:10 PM ET
Reuters
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The White House on
Wednesday angrily denied a newspaper report that suggested President George W.
Bush in 2003 declared the existence of biological weapons laboratories in Iraq
while knowing it was not true.
On May 29, 2003, Bush hailed the capture of two trailers in Iraq as mobile
biological laboratories and declared, "We have found the weapons of mass
destruction."
The report in The Washington Post said a Pentagon-sponsored fact-finding mission
had already concluded that the trailers had nothing to do with biological
weapons. The newspaper cited government officials and weapons experts who
participated in the secret mission or had direct knowledge of it.
The Post said the group's unanimous findings had been sent to the Pentagon in a
field report, two days before the president's statement.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan called the account "reckless reporting"
and said Bush made his statement based on the intelligence assessment of the CIA
and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), an arm of the Pentagon.
Bush cited the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction as the prime
justification for invading Iraq. No such weapons were found.
A U.S. intelligence official, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity,
confirmed the existence of the field report cited by the Post, but said it was a
preliminary finding that had to be evaluated.
"You don't change a report that has been coordinated in the (intelligence)
community based on a field report," the official said. "It's a preliminary
report. No matter how strongly the individual may feel about the subject
matter."
McClellan said the Post story was "nothing more than rehashing an old issue that
was resolved long ago," pointing out that an independent commission on Iraq had
already determined the intelligence on alleged Iraqi biological weapons was
wrong.
'RECKLESS REPORTING'
When an ABC reporter pressed McClellan on the subject at his morning briefing,
McClellan upbraided the network for picking up on the report.
"This is reckless reporting and for you all to go on the air this morning and
make such a charge is irresponsible, and I hope that ABC would apologize for it
and make a correction on the air," he said.
The three-page field report and a 122-page final report three weeks later were
classified and shelved, the Post reported. It added that for nearly a year after
that, the Bush administration continued to publicly assert that the trailers
were biological weapons factories.
The authors of the reports -- nine U.S. and British civilian experts -- were
sent to Baghdad by the DIA, the newspaper said.
A DIA spokesman told the paper that the team's findings were neither ignored nor
suppressed, but were incorporated in the work of the Iraqi Survey Group, which
led the official search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The team's work remains classified. But the newspaper said interviews revealed
that the team was unequivocal in its conclusion that the trailers were not
intended to manufacture biological weapons.
"There was no connection to anything biological," one expert who studied the
trailers was quoted as saying.
White House hotly denies
report on Iraq WMD, NYT, 12.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyid=2006-04-12T161027Z_01_N11262021_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-USA-LABS.xml
US shelved evidence discounting Iraq's WMD:
report
Wed Apr 12, 2006 2:15 AM ET
Reuters
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Bush administration
publicly asserted that two trailers captured by U.S. troops in Iraq in May 2003
were mobile "biological laboratories" even after U.S. intelligence officials had
evidence that it was not true, The Washington Post reported on Wednesday.
On May 29, 2003, President George W. Bush hailed the capture of the trailers,
declaring "We have found the weapons of mass destruction".
But a Pentagon-sponsored fact-finding mission had already concluded that the
trailers had nothing to do with biological weapons, the Post reported, citing
government officials and weapons experts who participated in the secret mission
or had direct knowledge of it.
The Post said the group's unanimous findings had been sent to the Pentagon in a
field report, two days before the president's statement.
Bush cited the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction as the prime
justification for invading Iraq. No such weapons ever were found.
A U.S. intelligence official, speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity
confirmed the existence of the field report but said it was a preliminary
finding that had to be evaluated.
"You don't change a report that has been coordinated in the (intelligence)
community based on a field report," the official said. "It's a preliminary
report. No matter how strongly the individual may feel about the subject
matter."
The three-page field report and a 122-page final report three weeks later were
classified and shelved, The Washington Post reported. It added that for nearly a
year after that, the Bush administration continued to public assert that the
trailers were biological weapons factories.
The authors of the reports -- nine U.S. and British civilian experts -- were
sent to Baghdad by the Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, the newspaper said.
A DIA spokesman told the paper that the team's findings were neither ignored nor
suppressed, but were incorporated in the work of the Iraqi Survey Group, which
led the official search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The team's work remains classified. But the newspaper said interviews revealed
that the team was unequivocal in its conclusion that the trailers were not
intended to manufacture biological weapons.
"There was no connection to anything biological," one expert who studied the
trailers was quoted as saying.
US
shelved evidence discounting Iraq's WMD: report, R, 12.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyid=2006-04-12T061439Z_01_N11262021_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-USA-LABS.xml
Top officer defends Rumsfeld
Wed Apr 12, 2006 1:39 AM ET
Reuters
By Will Dunham
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The top U.S. military
officer on Tuesday defended Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld against three
retired generals demanding his ouster, and denied that the United States invaded
Iraq without sufficiently weighing its plan.
Standing next to Rumsfeld at a Pentagon briefing, Marine Corps Gen. Pete Pace
said critics could legitimately question the defense secretary's judgment but
not his motives.
"People can question my judgment or his (Rumsfeld's) judgment," Pace said. "But
they should never question the dedication, the patriotism and the work ethic of
Secretary Rumsfeld."
Retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton and
Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni have recently separately called for Rumsfeld to
be replaced. This comes as opinion polls show eroding public support for the
3-year-old war in which about 2,360 U.S. troops have died.
"I don't know how many generals there have been in the last five years that have
served in the United States armed services -- hundreds and hundreds and
hundreds," said Rumsfeld, whom critics have accused of bullying senior military
officers and stifling dissent.
"And there are several who have opinions, and there's nothing wrong with people
having opinions. And I think one ought to expect that when you're involved in
something that's controversial as certainly this war is," he said.
Newbold, the military's top operations officer before the Iraq war, said he
regretted not speaking up more forcefully against what he now regards as an
unnecessary war and a diversion from "the real threat" posed by al Qaeda.
In a Time magazine opinion piece on Sunday, Newbold encouraged officers still in
the military to voice any doubts they have about the war.
"My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done
with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have
never had to execute these missions -- or bury the results," Newbold wrote.
Newbold said he went public with the private encouragement of some still in
positions of military leadership.
Pace, chairman of the military's Joint Chiefs of Staff, questioned whether
Newbold knew all the facts about the invasion plans, noting he retired in
September 2002, six months before the invasion took place.
"It's also important to go back and take a look, when you look at people
talking: When did their personal knowledge end?" Pace said, noting that the war
plan changed many times after Newbold's departure.
'NOT SHY'
Pace said the war plan was thoroughly vetted before the operation was launched.
"We had discussions in the department, we had discussions in the National
Security Council, we had discussions with the president. And they were extensive
discussions. An awful lot of people around were not shy about giving their
views," he said.
Pace said when now-retired Central Command head Gen. Tommy Franks presented the
final invasion plan "we were satisfied that he had a good, executable plan, and
we so told the secretary of defense and the president of the United States."
Rumsfeld said he was unaware that Newbold had publicly or privately questioned
the war plan.
Eaton, in charge of training the Iraqi military from 2003-2004, wrote in a New
York Times opinion piece last month that Rumsfeld had put the Pentagon at the
mercy of his ego.
"In sum, he has shown himself incompetent strategically, operationally and
tactically, and is far more than anyone else responsible for what has happened
to our important mission in Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld must step down," he wrote.
Pace said he did not know whether Eaton ever voiced his concerns before leaving
the military.
Top
officer defends Rumsfeld, R, 12.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyID=2006-04-12T053935Z_01_N11242897_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-USA-RUMSFELD.xml
American students favor Iraq troop
reduction
Tue Apr 11, 2006 6:04 PM ET
Reuters
By Jason Szep
BOSTON (Reuters) - Three out of five American
college students support a U.S. troops reduction in Iraq and nearly three
quarters think the United Nations and other countries should take the lead in
solving future global crises, according to a poll released on Tuesday.
The findings were contained in a nationwide telephone survey of 1,200 college
students conducted March 13-27 by Harvard University's Institute of Politics.
The poll's margin of error was plus or minus 2.8 percentage points.
About 60 percent of the students said the United States should begin withdrawing
troops from Iraq, up 20 points from a survey last November. But only 12 percent
favored a complete end to the U.S. military presence there.
The survey suggested that students were slightly more negative about the war
than the general public. An ABC News/Washington Post poll released on Tuesday
found 52 percent of respondents saying the United States should begin
withdrawing forces from Iraq.
"One important finding among the students is that 39 percent identified Iraq as
their number one concern, which is higher than the country as a whole," Jeanne
Shaheen, director of Harvard's Institute of Politics, said in an interview.
In the poll, which included students from 250 colleges, nearly three out of four
wanted the United States to let the United Nations and other countries take the
lead in solving global crises and conflicts.
"There's definitely a world view among college students that appreciates the
need to act in the international community," said Shaheen.
Some 53 percent of students opposed President George W. Bush's program of
domestic eavesdropping of suspected terrorists. Other polls have shown a
majority of all Americans approve of the tactic.
Bush's personal approval rating was at a record low in the 6-year-old survey at
33 percent, having dropped 8 percentage points from the last survey in November.
In the ABC/Washington Post poll of all voters, it was 38 percent.
In a hypothetical race for the White House in 2008, Republican Sen. John McCain
of Arizona and Democratic Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York emerged as
frontrunners, each with 40 percent support among students.
About 70 percent of students said religion played an important role in their
lives but most were uncomfortable mixing religion with politics.
The poll showed 32 percent of students said the United States should prevent
Iran from developing nuclear weapons, using unilateral military force if
necessary. But 37 percent were unsure and 29 percent opposed military force in
Iran.
American students favor Iraq troop reduction, R, 11.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyid=2006-04-11T220410Z_01_N11366089_RTRUKOC_0_US-BUSH-POLL-STUDENTS.xml
Third Retired General Wants Rumsfeld Out
April 10, 2006
The New York Times
By THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, April 9 — The three-star Marine
Corps general who was the military's top operations officer before the invasion
of Iraq expressed regret, in an essay published Sunday, that he did not more
energetically question those who had ordered the nation to war. He also urged
active-duty officers to speak out now if they had doubts about the war.
Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold, who retired in late 2002, also called for replacing
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and "many others unwilling to fundamentally
change their approach." He is the third retired senior officer in recent weeks
to demand that Mr. Rumsfeld step down.
In the essay, in this week's issue of Time magazine, General Newbold wrote, "I
now regret that I did not more openly challenge those who were determined to
invade a country whose actions were peripheral to the real threat — Al Qaeda."
The decision to invade Iraq, he wrote, "was done with a casualness and swagger
that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these
missions — or bury the results."
Though some active-duty officers will say in private that they disagree with Mr.
Rumsfeld's handling of Iraq, none have spoken out publicly. They attribute their
silence to respect for civilian control of the military, as set in the
Constitution — but some also say they know it would be professional suicide to
speak up.
"The officer corps is willing to sacrifice their lives for their country, but
not their careers," said one combat veteran who says the Pentagon's civilian
leadership made serious mistakes in Iraq, but has declined to voice his concerns
for attribution.
Many officers who served in Iraq also say privately that regardless of flawed
war planning or early mistakes by civilian and military officers, the American
public would hold the current officer corps responsible for failure in Iraq.
These officers do not want to discuss doubts about the mission publicly now.
General Newbold acknowledged these issues, saying he decided to go public only
after "the encouragement of some still in positions of military leadership" and
in order to "offer a challenge to those still in uniform."
A leader's responsibility "is to give voice to those who can't — or don't have
the opportunity to — speak," General Newbold wrote. "Enlisted members of the
armed forces swear their oath to those appointed over them; an officer swears an
oath not to a person but to the Constitution. The distinction is important."
General Newbold served as director of operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
from 2000 through the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and the war in Afghanistan. He
left military service in late 2002, as the Defense Department was deep into
planning for the March 2003 invasion of Iraq.
"I retired from the military four months before the invasion, in part because of
my opposition to those who had used 9/11's tragedy to hijack our security
policy," General Newbold wrote.
His generation of officers thought it had learned from Vietnam that "we must
never again stand by quietly while those ignorant of and casual about war lead
us into another one and then mismanage the conduct of it," General Newbold
wrote.
The "consequence of the military's quiescence" in the current environment, he
wrote, "was that a fundamentally flawed plan was executed for an invented war,
while pursuing the real enemy, Al Qaeda, became a secondary effort."
A senior Pentagon official on Mr. Rumsfeld's staff said Sunday that the Pentagon
leadership provided ample opportunity for senior officers to voice concerns.
"It is hard for the secretary and the rest of the policy leadership to
understand the situation if they are not getting good, unvarnished advice from
military commanders," the civilian official said.
While General Newbold said he did not accept the rationale for invading Iraq, he
wrote that "a precipitous withdrawal would be a mistake" because it would tell
the nation's adversaries that "America can be defeated, and thus increase the
chances of future conflicts."
General Newbold's essay follows one on March 19, by another retired officer,
Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, who commanded the training of Iraqi security forces in
the year after Baghdad fell. General Eaton wrote an Op-Ed article in The New
York Times criticizing Mr. Rumsfeld's management of the war, adding, "President
Bush should accept the offer to resign that Mr. Rumsfeld says he has tendered
more than once."
When asked about that essay, President Bush rejected the call to dismiss Mr.
Rumsfeld, repeating as he often has that he was satisfied with Mr. Rumsfeld's
performance.
On April 2, Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who previously led the military's Central
Command, responsible for operations in the Middle East, said in a television
interview that Mr. Rumsfeld, among others, should be held accountable for
mistakes in Iraq and that he should step down.
General Newbold has been quoted previously describing his concerns about Iraq
planning, including in "Cobra II," a book by Michael R. Gordon, chief military
correspondent for The New York Times, and Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine
lieutenant general who is a former military correspondent for the newspaper. In
the book General Newbold is described telling fellow officers that he considered
the focus on Iraq to be a strategic blunder and a distraction from the real
counterterror effort. He is also quoted as expressing concern about Mr.
Rumsfeld's influence on war planning, in particular his emphasis on assigning
fewer troops to the invasion.
Third
Retired General Wants Rumsfeld Out, NYT, 10.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/world/middleeast/10military.html
Al Qaeda's leader in
Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is seen in this undated file photo.
The U.S. military is conducting a propaganda campaign to overstate the threat to
stability
posed by the al Qaeda leader in Iraq, The Washington Post reported on Monday.
REUTERS/Petra/File photo
US propaganda magnifies Zarqawi
threat: report R
10.4.2006
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=newsOne&storyID=
2006-04-10T091529Z_01_N10395950_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-ZARQAWI.xml
US propaganda magnifies Zarqawi threat:
report
Mon Apr 10, 2006 5:15 AM ET
Reuters
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. military is
conducting a propaganda campaign to overstate the threat to stability posed by
the al Qaeda leader in Iraq, The Washington Post reported on Monday.
Some senior military intelligence officers believe the importance of the
Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi may have been exaggerated, the newspaper
reported, citing military documents and officers familiar with the program.
According to the article, Col. Derek Harvey, who served as a military
intelligence officer in Iraq, told a U.S. Army meeting last summer: "Our own
focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will -- made him more
important than he really is, in some ways."
"The long-term threat is not Zarqawi or religious extremists, but these former
regime types and their friends," Harvey said in a transcript of the meeting at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Post reported.
Harvey said at the meeting that, while Zarqawi and other foreign insurgents in
Iraq have carried out deadly bombing attacks, they remain "a very small part of
the actual numbers," according to the newspaper.
Largely aimed at Iraqis, the Zarqawi campaign began two years ago and was
believed to be ongoing, the Post said. It has included leaflets, radio and
television broadcasts and at least one leak to an American journalist, the
newspaper said.
Another military officer familiar with the program told the newspaper that the
material was all in Arabic. But the officer said the Zarqawi campaign "probably
raised his profile in the American press's view," the report said.
Zarqawi has a $25 million U.S. bounty on his head.
Officers familiar with the propaganda program were cited as saying that one goal
was to drive a wedge into the insurgency by emphasizing Zarqawi's terrorist acts
and foreign origin.
"Villainize Zarqawi/leverage xenophobia response," a U.S. military briefing
document from 2004 stated, the Post reported.
US
propaganda magnifies Zarqawi threat: report, R, 10.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=newsOne&storyID=2006-04-10T091529Z_01_N10395950_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-ZARQAWI.xml
Iraq Findings Leaked by Cheney's Aide Were
Disputed
April 9, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID E. SANGER and DAVID BARSTOW
WASHINGTON, April 8 — President Bush's
apparent order authorizing a senior White House official to reveal to a reporter
previously classified intelligence about Saddam Hussein's efforts to obtain
uranium came as the information was already being discredited by several other
officials in the administration, interviews and documents from the time show.
A review of the records and interviews conducted during and after the crucial
period in June and July of 2003 also show that what the aide, I. Lewis Libby
Jr., said he was authorized to portray as a "key judgment" by intelligence
officers had in fact been given much less prominence in the most important
assessment of Iraq's weapons capability.
Mr. Libby said he drew on that report, the October 2002 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iraq, when he spoke with the reporter. However, the conclusions
about Mr. Hussein's search for uranium appear to have been buried deeper in the
report in part because of doubts about their reliability.
The new account of the interactions among Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney and Mr. Libby was
spelled out last week in a court filing by Patrick J. Fitzgerald, the special
prosecutor in the C.I.A. leak case. It adds considerably to a picture of an
administration in some disarray as the failure to discover illicit weapons in
Iraq had undermined the central rationale for the American invasion in March
2003.
Against the backdrop of what has previously been disclosed, the court filing
sheds particular light on how Mr. Bush and some of his top deputies had begun to
pull in different directions. Even as some officials, including Colin L. Powell,
then secretary of state, started to reveal deep doubts that Mr. Hussein had
sought uranium to reconstitute his nuclear program, Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney and Mr.
Libby were seeking to disseminate information suggesting that they had acted on
credible intelligence, while not discussing their actions with other top aides.
Mr. Fitzgerald, in his filing, said that Mr. Libby had been authorized to tell
Judith Miller, then a reporter for The New York Times, on July 8, 2003, that a
key finding of the 2002 intelligence estimate on Iraq was that Baghdad had been
vigorously seeking to acquire uranium from Africa.
But a week earlier, in an interview in his State Department office, Mr. Powell
told three other reporters for The Times that intelligence agencies had
essentially rejected that contention, and were "no longer carrying it as a
credible item" by early 2003, when he was preparing to make the case against
Iraq at the United Nations.
Mr. Powell's queasiness with some of the intelligence has been well known, but
the new revelations suggest that long after he had concluded the intelligence
was faulty, Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney and Mr. Libby were still promoting it.
Much remains unknown about that period. In his filing, Mr. Fitzgerald recounted
a prosecutor's summary of Mr. Libby's testimony to the grand jury. Mr. Libby
was, in turn, describing conversations with Mr. Cheney that included the vice
president's description of discussions he had had with Mr. Bush. The White House
is not commenting on the issue, saying it is still pending in court, but it has
not disputed any of the assertions in the court filing. Mr. Libby has also not
disputed the assertions.
The events took place at a time when the administration's failure to find
illicit weapons in Iraq had raised serious questions about the credibility of
prewar intelligence. The White House was finding itself under fire from critics,
like former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV, who were suggesting that the
administration's claims about Iraq's efforts to acquire uranium, featured in Mr.
Bush's State of the Union address in 2003, had been exaggerated.
The court filing asserts that Mr. Bush authorized the disclosure of the
intelligence in part to rebut claims that Mr. Wilson was making, including those
in a television appearance and in an Op-Ed article in The New York Times on July
6, 2003. The filing revealed for the first time testimony by Mr. Libby saying
that Mr. Bush, through Mr. Cheney, had authorized Mr. Libby to tell reporters
that "a key judgment of the N.I.E. held that Iraq was 'vigorously trying to
procure' uranium."
In fact, that was not one of the "key judgments" of the document. Instead, it
was the subject of several paragraphs on Page 24 of the document, which also
acknowledged that Mr. Hussein had long possessed 500 tons of uranium that was
under seal by international inspectors, and that no intelligence agencies had
ever confirmed whether he had obtained any more of the material from Africa.
A report by the British in 2004, however, concluded that there was a reasonable
basis to conclude that Mr. Hussein had sought to obtain uranium from Africa.
Once enriched, uranium can be used for weapons fuel.
In addition to Mr. Powell, other administration officials, speaking on a
not-for-attribution basis in early July 2003, were also acknowledging that the
intelligence was widely known as seriously flawed. Ari Fleischer, then the White
House spokesman, acknowledged as much publicly in a White House briefing on July
7, 2003.
But if the new court filing is correct, the next day, Mr. Libby, on behalf of
Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney, provided an exaggerated account of the intelligence
conclusions.
The court filing by Mr. Fitzgerald does not assert exactly when the conversation
between Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney took place, or exactly when Mr. Cheney
communicated its contents to Mr. Libby, except that it was before July 8, 2003.
The context of Mr. Fitzgerald's assertions makes clear, however, that the
conversation took place in late June or early July 2003.
Mr. Libby also described the intelligence estimate to Bob Woodward of The
Washington Post earlier, on June 27, 2003.
Mr. Fitzgerald's latest filing also describes the degree to which senior White
House officials kept information from one another. Even as the president was
dispatching Mr. Libby to disclose what until then had been classified
intelligence to Ms. Miller of The Times, other White House officials, including
Stephen J. Hadley, now Mr. Bush's national security adviser, were debating
whether this same information should be formally declassified and made public,
prosecutors assert.
But Mr. Libby "consciously decided not to make Mr. Hadley aware of the fact that
defendant himself had already been disseminating the N.I.E. by leaking it to
reporters while Mr. Hadley sought to get it formally declassified," Mr.
Fitzgerald's motion states. Mr. Hadley's spokesman declined to comment on the
filing on Friday.
But a senior official close to Mr. Hadley said that "it appears that the only
three people who knew about the instant declassification were Dick Cheney,
George Bush and Scooter Libby." The official refused to be named because he was
not authorized to discuss the issue.
Why those three men were acting so quietly remains a mystery, and Mr. Bush and
Mr. Cheney have never discussed it in public. Aides to Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney
were beginning to suggest at the time that any exaggerations about Iraq's
weapons program had been the fault of the C.I.A., not the White House.
Mr. Fitzgerald argued in his filing to the court last week that by July 8, Mr.
Libby was trying to rebut the Op-Ed article in The Times, published by Mr.
Wilson. Mr. Wilson reported in that article that he had been sent to Niger by
the C.I.A. to search for evidence of the transaction, and reported back that
there was insufficient evidence that any serious effort had taken place.
"The evidence will show that the July 6, 2003, Op-Ed by Mr. Wilson was viewed in
the Office of the Vice President as a direct attack on the credibility of the
vice president (and the president) on a matter of signal importance: the
rationale for the war in Iraq," Mr. Fitzgerald argued.
But in interviews, other former and current senior officials have offered
alternative explanations.
"Remember, this was taking place in the middle of the White House-C.I.A. war,"
one former White House official who witnessed the events said this week,
refusing to be named because he was not authorized to discuss the subject.
As the controversy arose early that summer over why Mr. Bush had included
mention of Iraqi uranium in his 2003 State of the Union address, the official
recalled, White House officials were convinced that the C.I.A. was placing the
blame on the president, suggesting he had politicized the intelligence.
By releasing Mr. Libby to discuss the conclusion in the National Intelligence
Estimate, the official said, "they were dumping this back in Langley's lap,"
making it clear that Mr. Bush had relied on information provided by the
intelligence agencies. The C.I.A. headquarters are in Langley, Va.
Later that week, George J. Tenet, then the C.I.A. director, took responsibility
for the error, saying he had never read over the draft of the State of the Union
address that had been sent to him.
According to Mr. Fitzgerald's motion, Mr. Libby testified that he was directed
by Mr. Cheney and Mr. Bush to describe the uranium allegations to Ms. Miller of
The Times as a "key judgment" of the National Intelligence Estimate. Citing
intelligence as a "key judgment" in such estimates carries great weight with
policy makers, because the reports are meant to highlight the most important and
solid judgments of the government's intelligence agencies.
"Defendant understood that he was to tell Miller, among other things, that a key
judgment of the N.I.E. held that Iraq was 'vigorously trying to procure'
uranium," prosecutors wrote.
In fact, the estimate's key judgments, which were officially declassified 10
days after Mr. Libby's meeting with Ms. Miller, say nothing about the uranium
allegations. The key judgments on Iraq's nuclear program — namely, that Iraq was
again trying to build a bomb — were based instead on other intelligence, like
the assertion that Iraq was seeking high-strength aluminum tubes for nuclear
centrifuges. Ms. Miller authored no newspaper article about the leaked weapons
information.
In an interview with The Times in 2004, a senior intelligence official involved
in drafting the estimate said the uranium allegations were excluded from the key
judgments because the drafters knew there were serious doubts about their
accuracy.
As a result, the official said, the drafters cast the uranium allegations as a
minor element in the overall assessment of Iraq's nuclear capabilities. The
assertion that Iraq was "vigorously trying to procure" uranium was mentioned on
the bottom of Page 24 of the 90-page document. The drafters also noted, in an
annex attached to the end of the document, that State Department intelligence
officials considered the uranium allegation "highly dubious."
Iraq
Findings Leaked by Cheney's Aide Were Disputed, NYT, 9.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/09/washington/09leak.html?hp&ex=1144641600&en=bc85efcb03b580b2&ei=5094&partner=homepage
At Least 71 Die as Bombers Hit Mosque in
Baghdad
April 7, 2006
The New York Times
By KIRK SEMPLE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 7 — Three suicide bombers
detonated their explosives today at a crowded Shiite mosque in Baghdad as
worshippers were leaving Friday prayers, killing at least 71 people and wounding
140, Iraqi officials said.
Two of the suicide bombers, both men, managed to enter the mosque before setting
off their explosives, and the third, a woman, blew herself up at the building's
entrance, witnesses said.
The mosque is the religious bastion of the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, the country's most powerful Shiite party.
The attack came a day after a car bomb killed at least 10 people and wounded
dozens in the heart of Najaf, one of the holiest centers in Shiite Islam.
In Baghdad today, the dead were taken away in pickup trucks and on handcarts as
the city council issued an appeal for blood donations to treat the many wounded.
The imam at the mosque, Sheik Jalaladeen al-Sagheir, is a senior party leader
who last weekend became the first high-ranking Shiite to join Sunni and Kurdish
politicians in calling for Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari to step aside to end a
stalemate that has prevented the formation of a new government.
Iraqi security officials said they had tightened security around the city before
the blast after receiving intelligence that seven car bombings were planned to
coincide with Friday prayers, The Associated Press reported. A statement
released by the Interior Ministry warned citizens to "be cautious, and to avoid
gatherings or crowds while leaving markets, mosques and churches."
The statement also warned that measures would be taken against "any security
official who fails to take the necessary procedures to foil any terrorist attack
in his area," the news service said. The ministry faces accusations of militia
infiltration in its ranks.
Also today, the American military announced the deaths of two soldiers. One died
today of wounds suffered from small-arms fire while on patrol in the Baghdad
area, and the other died on Thursday after his convoy hit a roadside bomb near
Bayji in northern Iraq.
American officials, including President Bush, have described attacks on mosques
as an insurgent tactic meant to drive the country into civil war. After
insurgents blew up a revered Shiite shrine in Samarra in late February, hundreds
of people died in reprisal killings.
But Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric, today blamed the Najaf bombing
on "the occupation forces and their death squads" and called for American forces
to pull out of Iraqi cities.
Mr. Sadr has long been a thorn in the side of American officials, and the Mahdi
Army, a militia loyal to him, clashed with American forces in Najaf in 2004.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, has recently singled out the Mahdi
Army as a source of instability, and has worked to block Mr. Jafaari, who
received crucial backing from Mr. Sadr.
During weekly prayers at a mosque in Kufa, Mr. Sadr blamed coalition forces for
the rising level of violence in general and the Najaf bombing in particular.
Mr. Sadr, who in the war's earlier phases had demanded the immediate departure
of American forces, called for a phased withdrawal.
"To begin with, they should exit the cities and take positions outside the
cities and hand over security to the Iraqi forces," he said.
The bomb that exploded in Najaf on Thursday struck a crowd of pilgrims and
merchants at the entrance to the city's cemetery. The site is just a few hundred
yards from the mosque, which is one of the most important Shiite shrines in the
world. The bomb exploded on a street connecting the mosque and the cemetery, a
route along which Shiites from around the country carry relatives' bodies for
burial.
Iraqi security forces immediately sealed off the neighborhood, which is at the
center of the Shiite holy city and contains the headquarters of Mr. Sadr and
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the country's most revered Shiite leader.
After the blast, lieutenants in the Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to Mr. Sadr,
gathered in Al Hay mosque in Najaf and urged their foot soldiers to be patient
pending further guidance from their top commanders.
Car bombs are rarely detonated in Najaf, which is tightly controlled by the
Shiite religious authorities and by Shiite militias, who supplement Iraqi and
American security forces there. On Aug. 29, 2003, in one of the first car
bombings in Iraq after the invasion, an explosion outside the Imam Ali mosque
killed nearly 100 people, including Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, one of the
most prominent Shiite clerics.
In Karbala, another Shiite holy city north of Najaf, the governor, Akeel
al-Khuzai, said he was suspending relations with the American authorities to
protest the detention of two people suspected of belonging to the Mahdi Army,
Iraqi officials said.
"The governor announced that all dealings in the field of security and
construction with the American side are suspended," according to a news release
issued by the national government. The Americans suspect that the detainees blew
up a Humvee, Karbala officials said.
Also on Thursday, in the 19th session of Saddam Hussein's trial on charges of
crimes against humanity, the former chief judge of Mr. Hussein's Revolutionary
Court said he had fairly condemned 148 Shiites to death for trying to
assassinate Mr. Hussein in Dujail in 1982.
The former judge, Awad al-Bandar, who is one of Mr. Hussein's seven co-defendants,
said the Revolutionary Court had appointed only one lawyer to represent all the
Dujail defendants in that case and took 16 days to convict them. Prosecutors in
Mr. Hussein's trial are trying to show that the Revolutionary Court held a hasty,
unjust trial for the defendants. "There was proof that they had taken part in
the case," Mr. Bandar told the court. "They were all found guilty. If you had
the case in front of you, you would have had completely the same verdict."
"The defendants in our court were always treated with justice," he said.
Mr. Hussein did not appear in court on Thursday, and the trial was adjourned
until April 12. The judges might deliver a verdict and sentence in June or July,
according to an American official who spoke to journalists on Thursday on
condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak for the Iraqi
court.
Officials from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, a Kurdish political party,
announced the discovery of eight mass graves near Kirkuk that contained at least
800 bodies. The majority of the victims were Kurdish, the party said, and they
were thought to have been caught in one of Mr. Hussein's repression campaigns.
This week, the Iraqi court charged Mr. Hussein with genocide for the military
attacks in 1988 that killed at least 50,000 Kurdish civilians.
The American military said Thursday that it had captured Muhammad Hila Hammad
Obeidi, who the military says is the commander of a militant group in Babil
Province and was an aide to the chief of staff of intelligence under Mr.
Hussein. American officials believe Mr. Obeidi was involved in the kidnapping of
the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena last year, as well as other kidnappings
and assassinations. Ms. Sgrena was released after a month.
In comments to the news media on Thursday, Mr. Jaafari hinted that he might be
willing to abandon his bid to remain prime minister in the next government. For
weeks he has been defiant in the face of multipartisan demands that he make way
for a candidate who is more popular among all sectarian groups. But on Thursday,
he seemed to signal that he would be amenable to a decision on the matter by the
National Assembly.
"For me, the position means nothing at all," Mr. Jaafari said. "If they would
agree inside the Parliament on a legal way for me to step down, I would step
down. The people elected a group of blocs to represent them in the Parliament,
and whatever these blocs say, I welcome."
Iraqi employees of The New York Times in Najaf, Karbala and Kirkuk
contributed reporting for this article, and John O'Neil contributed reporting
from New York.
At
Least 71 Die as Bombers Hit Mosque in Baghdad, NYT, 7.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/world/middleeast/07cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1144468800&en=c01de98fd3393c3f&ei=5094&partner=homepage
White House Tries to Quell Anger Over Leak
Claim
April 7, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID STOUT
WASHINGTON, April 7 — The White House tried
today to quell the furor over the leaking of sensitive prewar intelligence on
Iraq, as President Bush's spokesman insisted that any release of information was
"in the public interest" rather than for political reasons.
The spokesman, Scott McClellan, said a decision was made to declassify and
release some information to rebut "irresponsible and unfounded accusations" that
the administration had manipulated or misused prewar intelligence to buttress
its case for war.
"That was flat-out false," Mr. McClellan said.
Mr. McClellan was barraged at a news briefing by questions over assertions by I.
Lewis Libby Jr., the former chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, that
President Bush authorized him, through Mr. Cheney, in July 2003 to disclose key
parts of what was until then a classified prewar intelligence estimate on Iraq.
At the time, the Pentagon had hardly finished basking in the easy military
victory when it was caught up in questions over the failure to find deadly
unconventional weapons in Iraq — the main rationale for going to war.
One of the findings in the prewar intelligence data was that Saddam Hussein was
probably seeking fuel for nuclear reactors.
Mr. McClellan said the Democrats who pounced on Mr. Libby's assertions,
contained in a court document filed on Wednesday, were "engaging in crass
politics" in refusing to recognize the distinction between legitimate disclosure
of sensitive information in the public interest and the irresponsible leaking of
intelligence for political reasons.
Meanwhile, Democrats continued to assail the administration.
"This is a serious allegation with national security consequences," Senator
Harry Reid of Nevada, the minority leader, said today on the Senate floor. "It
directly contradicts previous statements made by President Bush, it continues a
pattern of misleading by this Bush White House, and it raises somber and
troubling questions about the Bush administration's candor with the Congress and
the public."
Mr. Reid said it was time for the president to say whether, in fact, he
authorized the disclosure of the prewar intelligence, as Mr. Libby said he had.
"He must tell the American people whether the Bush Oval Office is the place
where the buck stops, or the leaks start," Mr. Reid said.
Mr. McClellan was in the somewhat odd position of not disputing that President
Bush was involved in the disclosure of hitherto classified information, while
describing any such disclosure as being in the public good.
Mr. McClellan, who has noted before that a president has the authority to
declassify intelligence, said today that he was "not getting into confirming or
denying things, because I'm not commenting at all on matters relating to an
ongoing legal proceeding."
He was alluding to the trial of Mr. Libby, the vice president's former chief of
staff, on charges that Mr. Libby committed perjury and engaged in obstruction of
justice in connection with an inquiry over who unmasked Valerie Wilson, an
undercover officer for the Central Intelligence Agency, in the summer of 2003.
The unmasking occurred shortly after Ms. Wilson's husband, the former diplomat
Joseph Wilson, wrote in The New York Times that he doubted reports that Iraq was
trying to obtain uranium from Niger.
Some Democrats accused the White House at the time of destroying Ms. Wilson's
cover to retaliate against her husband, but the White House repeatedly denied
the accusations.
Mr. McClellan was asked today whether the president's own words at the time ("If
there's a leak out of this administration, I want to know who it is") and Mr.
Libby's recent assertion demonstrated inconsistency, at best.
Not at all, Mr. McClellan said. "Declassifying information and providing it to
the public when it is in the public interest is one thing," he said. "But
leaking classified information that could compromise our national security is
something that is very serious. And there is a distinction" — a distinction
Democrats refuse to see, he said repeatedly.
White
House Tries to Quell Anger Over Leak Claim, NYT, 7.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/washington/07cnd-leak.html?hp&ex=1144468800&en=a43af062d1a708ac&ei=5094&partner=homepage
The Survivors
Families of Army's War Dead Are Hurt Again
at Notification
April 7, 2006
The New York Times
By LIZETTE ALVAREZ
After Neil Santorello heard the news that his
son, a tank commander, had been killed in Iraq, from the officer in his living
room, he walked out his front door and removed the American flag from its pole.
Then, in tears, he tore down the yellow ribbons from his tree.
Rather than see it as the act of a man unmoored by the death of his 24-year-old
son, the officer, an Army major, confronted Mr. Santorello, saying, "Don't be
disrespectful," Mr. Santorello recalled. Then, the officer, whose job it is to
inform families of their loss, quickly disappeared without offering any comfort.
Later, the Santorellos heard a piece of crushing but inaccurate news: They would
not be allowed to look inside their son's coffin. First Lt. Neil Santorello, of
Verona, Pa., had been killed by an improvised bomb. His body, the family was
told, was unviewable.
The Santorellos eventually learned that families have the right to see a loved
one's body.
"I asked them to open the casket a few inches so I could reach in and touch his
hand," recalled Mr. Santorello, who is still struggling with his son's death, in
large part because he was not allowed to see him.
"The government doesn't want you to see servicemen in a casket, but this is my
son. He is not a serviceman. You have to let his mother and I say goodbye to
him."
Scores of families whose loved ones have died fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan
have gone head-to-head with a casualty system that, in their experience, has
failed to compassionately and competently guide them through the harrowing
process that begins after a soldier's death.
When the system works smoothly, and it often does, families say they feel a
profound sense of comfort. But others have seen their hurt deepen. They have
complained about coffins placed in cargo bays alongside crates, personal
belongings that disappear, questions about how their loved ones died that go
unanswered for months or even years, and casualty assistants, assigned to help
families after they are notified of a death, who are too poorly trained to walk
them through the labyrinth of their anguish.
After three years of war in Iraq, with the number of active-duty deaths there
surpassing 2,330, the military is scrambling to improve the way it cares for
surviving relatives and honors soldiers who have been killed in battle. Even
senior officials, including the secretary of the Army, have acknowledged flaws
in the system.
Not since the Vietnam War have so many service members in dress uniforms knocked
on so many doors to deliver somber news.
The military services have different policies concerning casualties. The Marine
Corps, steeped in tradition, has received few complaints, despite having lost
nearly 680 marines since the war began. But the Army, which has suffered the
largest number of deaths, 1,589 as of March 28, has faced an enormous challenge
and has received the sharpest criticism for its treatment of surviving families
and soldiers killed in action.
Now it is rushing through new regulations to overhaul the casualty process,
which has been tinkered with, but not fully revised, since 1994. "We take it to
heart whenever something is not done properly and are painfully aware of the
additional grief it brings to the family concerned," said Col. Mary Torgersen,
the director of the Army's Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operation Center, in an
e-mail response to questions, adding that some changes have already been put in
place.
For some grieving families, the cracks in the system have deepened their
distress and many have been turned to Congress, state officials and private
lawyers for help.
Many wonder why it has taken the military so long to address their concerns. The
answer appears straightforward: The military did not expect to be fighting this
long. It also did not expect to lose this many soldiers.
Lapses in the past few years run from the heart-wrenching to the
head-scratching. Families have said that items like cameras and computers
containing treasured e-mail messages and photographs have been lost or damaged.
Gay and Fred Eisenhauer, whose son, Wyatt, an Army Ranger, was killed last May
in Iraq by an improvised bomb, are still hoping to receive their son's watch,
eyeglasses and cellphone. The phone is precious because it holds a recording of
their son's voice. A combat patch they were promised has never arrived.
"I know these are little things," Mrs. Eisenhauer said. "What makes it important
to me is that my son was good enough to go over there to fight, but he is not
important enough to get his stuff back to his family."
Colonel Torgersen said the Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operation Center
"aggressively monitors the movement" of personal effects. Mortuary specialists
inventory, photograph, clean and then ship belongings to the center via Federal
Express.
Soldiers, in their coffins, usually arrive from Dover Air Force Base in the
belly of a commercial flight. But honor guards have not always been present as
the coffins come off the plane.
The Eisenhauers had hoped to take comfort in the military rituals. Instead, the
airline placed Wyatt Eisenhauer's coffin in a cargo warehouse with crates and
boxes stacked high around it. There was no ceremony, no flag over the coffin.
Only the airport firefighters did their bit to honor him, hoisting flags on
their ladder trucks.
"I just wanted to scream," Mrs. Eisenhauer said. "My son was owed that. He was
owed that."
When Joan Neal of Gurnee, Ill., went to the airport for the body of her son,
Specialist Wesley Wells, 21, she was aghast. "To glance over and see your
child's casket on a forklift is not really the kind of thing you want to see,"
Ms. Neal said.
News of a death has also been delivered at awkward times. Ms. Neal, was at work,
when she was notified in September 2004 that her son had been killed in
Afghanistan, and Mrs. Eisenhauer's 6-year-old niece was in the room when Mrs.
Eisenhauer received the news.
As parents to a married son, the Santorellos experienced something that is
commonplace: The Army focuses on the spouse and has often left parents to fend
for themselves.
The Santorellos were not assigned a casualty officer, and were expected to pay
their own way to a memorial ceremony in Fort Riley, Kan., and to find
transportation to the burial at Arlington Cemetery.
"We were not considered next of kin," said Mr. Santorello, who with his wife,
Dianne, opposes the war. "He was my son for 25 years. He was her husband for 22
months, and I had no say."
Recognizing the distress of parents with married children, the Army in
mid-February began assigning casualty assistants to mothers and fathers.
Unanswered Questions
Some families say that the most upsetting aspect of the casualty process may be
the lack of information about how the loved ones died.
In a 2005 survey of 50 military families by The Military Times, about half of
the families said they did not know enough about their loved ones' deaths.
Parents and spouses crave details to help them cope, particularly because they
cannot visit the spot where loved ones died: Who held his hand? Did he say
anything?
"You know what my casualty assistant said? 'These are just questions you will
never get answers to,' " Ms. Eisenhauer said. "But there were men there. Why
can't I get answers?"
The Santorellos were told by the Army that their son had died instantly. A few
weeks later, they received a letter saying he had lived for four hours.
Mrs. Santorello learned the time of death by reading the autopsy report. "I
don't think anyone should be forced to read an autopsy report to find out when
their son died," she said.
Ms. Neal's casualty officer told her that her son had been killed in action by a
gunshot wound to the chest. After her son's funeral, Ms. Neal learned that he
might have been killed by his own forces.
She had been told that she would be notified in 30 days. Seven months later,
when she still had not received further news, she took a plane to Hawaii, where
her son had been stationed, to talk with his superiors, who greeted her warmly.
"They did confirm he was killed by American bullets," she said. "The autopsy was
done within a week of his death. They knew that when they did the autopsy."
A Personal Apology
Karen Meredith's son Lt. Ken Ballard, 26, a fourth-generation Army officer and a
tank commander, was killed in Iraq in May 2004.
Her experience went so awry that she received a personal letter of apology last
September from the secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey.
The problems began when her casualty officer abandoned her after 10 days, just
as the process was beginning. It also took five months to receive Lieutenant
Ballard's personal belongings. His clothes were returned washed, which might
have made some families thankful, but devastated her. But there was worse to
come.
The week her son died, Ms. Meredith was told that he had been killed by enemy
fire.
Fifteen months later, there was a knock on the door. Ms. Meredith was told by an
Army casualty official that her son's death had been accidental. Her son had
been killed when his tank backed into a tree branch, setting off an unmanned
machine gun.
"It was not a secret," said Ms. Meredith, now an outspoken critic of the war.
"It was incompetence."
"The subliminal assumption is that they take care of everything," added Ms.
Meredith, who credits the Army for responding to her complaints and working to
fix the system. "They don't. I was tenacious."
Even when soldiers are alive, it can be difficult to get answers. Laura
Youngblood, 27, was seven months pregnant with their second child in New York
last July when her husband was wounded by an improvised bomb in Iraq.
Because of the pregnancy, she said, the corpsman assisting her did not want to
tell her that her husband was "very seriously injured." When she was finally
told he was off his ventilator, she recalls saying, "Good, because you never
told me he was on one."
Six days after being wounded, he died.
A Sensitive Duty
Many casualty assistants say they recognize the sensitive nature of their task
and are assiduous about getting it right. At times, they have become the focus
of a family's anger. Sometimes they suffer emotionally, watching as wives
crumble or children hysterically cry "Daddy."
Afterward, some casualty assistants seek counseling.
"It's hard," said Sgt. First Class Julio Correa, 44, who is based at Fort Bragg,
N.C., and has notified two families of deaths and assisted two others. "You see
the kids screaming. You think, 'It could be my kids.' "
But typically the Army's notification officers, who bring news of the death, and
its casualty assistants are picked simply because they are nearby. Their
training often amounts to reading a manual and watching a video. Casualty duty
is a side jobs. The officers and assistants are told to focus on families as
long as needed, typically six weeks. Sometimes they retire or are reassigned
midstream. Eric K. Schuller is a senior policy adviser for the Illinois
lieutenant governor, Pat Quinn, whose office has dealt with distraught families,
including the Eisenhauers and Ms. Neal.
"This had to be fixed," Mr. Schuller said. "There were so many of them over a
large period of time."
Still, the casualty process has improved since the Vietnam War, when it amounted
to little more than face-to-face notification of a death.
"It is dramatically different now in terms of how they respond and the number of
survivor benefits," said Morton Ender, a West Point sociology professor. "They
really embrace the family."
The Army acknowledges that more can be done. Mr. Harvey, the Army secretary,
ordered an investigation last September to help address families' concerns.
The report, issued in January, included suggestions that the Army is planning to
implement, including upgrading training materials, creating a 24-hour hot line
and sending mobile casualty assistance training teams across the country.
The Army now requires commanders to telephone families within a week of a death
and to cross-check casualty reports.
Congress has asked for an investigation by theGovernment Accountability Office.
These instances, Colonel Torgersen said, "do cause us to reflect on our
processes."
She added, "In the end, however, this work is carried out by human beings and
however hard we may strive, none of us are invulnerable to error on occasion."
Families of Army's War Dead Are Hurt Again at Notification, NYT, 7.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/07/us/07notify.html?hp&ex=1144382400&en=250067bfd885f22d&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein argues with Chief Judge Raouf Rashid
Abdel-Rahman
in his trial held April 5, 2006, in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone.
By David Furst, Getty Images
USA Today 5.4.2006
Saddam says Shiites plotted to kill him
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-04-05-saddam-trial_x.htm
Saddam says Shi'ite-run ministry kills
thousands
Wed Apr 5, 2006 12:14 PM ET
Reuters
By Mussab al-Khairalla
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Ousted President Saddam
Hussein, on trial for crimes against humanity, accused Iraq's new Shi'ite-run
Interior Ministry of killing and torturing thousands of Iraqis when he returned
to court on Wednesday.
Sunni Arabs, who were dominant during his rule, accuse the ministry of running
death squads and Saddam said it was now the "side that kills thousands in the
street and tortures them".
Saddam, who could face death by hanging, remained defiant one day after the
court announced new charges that he ordered genocide against the ethnic Kurds in
the late 1980s.
When the judge interrupted him, Saddam said: "If you're scared of the interior
minister, he doesn't scare my dog."
The trial was adjourned until Thursday.
Saddam may be in the dock again for another trial as early as next month,
potentially leading to a drawn-out legal process in a country where most people
want closure on a bloody past and a future free of bloodshed that has raised
fears of civil war.
Iraqi politicians and court officials are already sending mixed signals on
whether he would be executed if found guilty in one trial, or be tried on new
charges in another first.
And the latest outbursts suggested chances of accelerating proceedings were
slim.
SCREAMING
Chief judge Raouf Abdel Rahman and one of Saddam's lawyers, Bushra Khalil, had
several heated exchanges which resulted in her being thrown out of court.
Guards escorted her out after she held up what appeared to be a picture of a
pile of prisoners at the U.S.-run Abu Ghraib prison, scene of a prisoner abuse
scandal in 2004.
"This is what the Americans did to Iraqis in Abu Ghraib," said the Lebanese
lawyer who was told to stop screaming.
She was visibly angered by a black and white video that showed a younger Saddam
saying: "Those who die in interrogation have no value."
Saddam, whose word was law in Iraq for decades, seemed unfazed by it all,
sitting in the dock and telling the judge: "There was no need for you to do
that."
Saddam, who still calls himself the president of Iraq, also challenged chief
prosecutor Jaafar al-Moussawi, a member of the Shi'ite Muslim community Saddam
is accused of torturing and putting in mass graves.
"If you want to put the whale into the net, which I don't think you do, you have
to tell the truth," he told Moussawi.
"Don't be upset with me. I am older than you and I have a higher rank and better
history and yet I am not upset with you."
Moussawi held up the plastic-coated identification cards of Iraqi teenage boys
he said were executed under Saddam's orders; names such as Mahdi Hussein, 14,
and Fouad al-Aswady, 15.
Saddam, who ruled Iraq for three decades, dismissed the identification cards,
saying they could easily be forged in any market.
"I can find some identity cards from Mureydi market."
Saddam refused to sign documents, saying that only an international court would
be fair, and denounced the Interior Ministry as he faced cross examination for
the first time.
Interior Minister Bayan Jabor is a hate figure among Sunnis, who accuse him of
waging a sectarian war against them and allowing Shi'ite militias to run hit
squads with impunity. He denies the accusations.
Saddam was the only defendant in the chamber, where he has prompted the judge to
censor proceedings in a country where communal violence has raised fears of
civil war.
GENOCIDE CHARGES
Saddam and seven co-accused are charged with killing 148 Shi'ite men and
teenagers after an attempt on his life in the town of Dujail in 1982.
Prosecutors hoped the Dujail case would produce a swift sentence because the
charges are less complicated than others such as genocide. But the trial has
faced many setbacks, including the chief judge's resignation and killing of two
defense lawyers.
The tribunal said on Tuesday Saddam would face charges of genocide against the
Kurds, who accuse him of killing more than 100,000 people and destroying
thousands of their villages in the late 1980s in the Anfal campaign.
Saddam engaged in verbal sparring with the judge, whose impartiality has been
questioned because he is a Kurd from the village of Halabja, where Saddam's
forces were accused of killing 5,000 people in a poison gas attack in 1988.
Saddam says Shi'ite-run ministry kills thousands, G, 5.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-04-05T161432Z_01_GEO542487_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-SADDAM.xml&archived=False
FACTBOX-Criminal cases Saddam Hussein could
face
Wed Apr 5, 2006 5:41 AM ET
Reuters
(Reuters) - Saddam Hussein returned to court
on Wednesday. The toppled leader remained defiant one day after the court
announced that he would face new charges of genocide against the ethnic Kurdish
population in the late 1980s.
Following are details of the two criminal cases for which Saddam now faces trial
and details of others for which he could ultimately be tried:
* DUJAIL MASSACRE
Saddam and seven others, including his half-brother, are charged with ordering
and overseeing the killing of 148 Shi'ite men from the town of Dujail after an
attack on the presidential motorcade as it passed through the village, 60 km (35
miles) north of Baghdad, in July 1982.
-- The retribution is alleged to have also included jailing hundreds of women
and children from the town for years in desert internment camps and destroying
the date palm groves that sustained the local economy.
* KURDISH GENOCIDE AND ETHNIC CLEANSING
Iraqi government forces launched a drive in 1987 and 1988 to reassert government
control over Kurdish areas in the north. The campaign, dubbed "Anfal" or "Spoils
of War", saw entire villages flattened, farming destroyed and inhabitants
forcibly removed.
-- Kurdish authorities say hundreds of thousands of Kurds were displaced and
tens of thousands killed. A mustard- and nerve-gas attack on the Kurdish town of
Halabja killed as many as 5,000 people in March 1988. Saddam's cousin, General
Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known as "Chemical Ali", is accused of carrying out
the worst of the atrocities. He has said the crackdown was to punish Halabja for
its failure to resist Iranian incursions during the Iran-Iraq war.
* OTHER POSSIBLE TRIALS:
* INVASION OF KUWAIT
Saddam is accused of violating international law by ordering the invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990. A U.S.-led coalition demanded Iraq's withdrawal and went
to war on January 17, 1991, after Saddam refused to comply with UN resolutions.
The Gulf War ended on February 28 after Iraq's expulsion from the emirate.
-- During the occupation Iraqi soldiers are alleged to have tortured and
summarily executed prisoners, looted Kuwait City and taken hundreds of Kuwaiti
captives back to Baghdad. Iraqi soldiers also set more than 700 oil wells ablaze
and opened pipelines to let oil pour into the Gulf and other water sources.
* MARSH ARABS
The Iraqi army, under Saddam's orders, is alleged to have systematically
destroyed the livelihood of Iraq's Marsh Arab people, who have inhabited
southeastern marshlands at the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for
nearly 5,000 years.
-- Saddam accused the Marsh Arabs of desertion and fighting against his forces
during the 1980-88 war with Iran, of harboring criminals and dissenters, and of
joining the Shi'ite uprising in 1991. Saddam targeted the Marsh Arabs early in
his rule when he ordered their habitat to be drained.
* POLITICAL KILLINGS
Saddam and his security forces have been accused of numerous politically
motivated killings and other human rights abuses, including the execution of
five Shi'ite religious leaders in 1974, the murder of thousands of members of
the Kurdish Barzani clan in 1983 and the assassinations of political activists.
* POLITICAL REPRESSION
Saddam is accused of brutally suppressing uprisings by majority Shiites in
southern Iraq and ethnic Kurds in the north.
-- Scores of mass graves south of Baghdad are said to contain the bodies of
Shiites. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds fled to Iran and Turkey. There are
Kurdish mass graves in the north and in deserted areas of the south.
FACTBOX-Criminal cases Saddam Hussein could face, R, 5.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-04-05T094104Z_01_L27486644_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&related=true
CHRONOLOGY-Saddam Hussein's trial
Wed Apr 5, 2006 5:51 AM ET
Reuters
(Reuters) - Saddam Hussein returned to court
on Wednesday. The former president remained defiant one day after the court
announced that he would face new charges of genocide against the ethnic Kurdish
population in the late 1980s.
Here is a chronology of the main events so far in his trial.
October 19, 2005 - Saddam charged with crimes against humanity for the killing
of 148 Shi'ite men in Dujail after an assassination attempt against him in 1982.
Pleads not guilty.
October 20 - Saadoun Janabi, lawyer for co-defendant, former judge Awad
al-Bander, is seized from office and killed.
November 8 - Gunmen fire on car carrying Adil al-Zubeidi, who is killed, and
Thamer Hamoud al-Khuzaie, who is wounded. Both are on team defending Saddam's
half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti and former Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan.
Khuzaie flees Iraq.
December 7 - Saddam stays away after telling tribunal to "go to hell" the night
before. Hearing continues without him.
December 21 - Saddam complains he was tortured in U.S. custody. Four days later
defense seeks inquiry into the claims.
January 10, 2006 - Chief judge Rizgar Amin submits resignation.
January 16 - Court asks Amin's deputy Sayeed al-Hamashi to step in. Two days
later, Iraq's Debaathification Commission says Hamashi is former member of Baath
party and should be barred; he denies it.
January 23 - Raouf Abdel Rahman named temporary chief judge and Hamashi moved to
another court.
January 29 - Chaos erupts when trial resumes. Barzan al-Tikriti is ejected after
refusing to keep quiet and calling the trial "a daughter of a whore". Saddam and
his team walk out in protest.
February 1 - Saddam and four co-accused refuse to attend, along with their
defense team, saying they will not return until the chief judge they accuse of
bias resigns. Rahman says he will proceed and court-appointed lawyers replace
Saddam's team.
February 13 - Saddam appears as trial resumes, rejects new lawyers appointed by
court to replace boycotting defense team.
February 14 - Saddam walks into court shouting slogans, says he and co-accused
have been on hunger strike for three days.
February 28 - Trial resumes and Saddam returns to court. His lawyers walk out
after their pleas for an expulsion of the judge and a postponement are rejected.
March 1 - Saddam acknowledges he ordered trials that led to execution of dozens
of Shiites in the 1980s but says he acted within law. "Where is the crime?" he
asks.
March 13 - Awad Hamed al-Bandar, former head of Iraq's Revolutionary Court who
oversaw the original trial of the 148, says in court he had personally issued a
death warrant for them and insisted it was legal.
March 15 - Saddam takes the stand, denounces court as a "comedy" and urges
Iraqis to fight "invaders", prompting the judge to bar reporters from the court.
April 4 - The court declares the investigations are completed in the case called
the Anfal campaign in which thousands of Kurdish women, children and men were
killed in the late 1980s.
-- The court charges that the former Iraqi leader committed genocide against the
Kurds, paving the way for a new trial. The Anfal hearings could run in parallel
to the existing trial.
April 5 - Saddam returns to court and immediately accuses the Shi'ite-run Iraqi
Interior Ministry of killing and torturing thousands of Iraqis.
CHRONOLOGY-Saddam
Hussein's trial, R, 5.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-04-05T095113Z_01_L13766115_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&related=true
Hussein Charged With Genocide in 50,000
Deaths
April 5, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 4 — The Iraqi court
trying Saddam Hussein announced Tuesday that it had charged him with genocide,
saying he sought to annihilate the Kurdish people in 1988, when the military
killed at least 50,000 Kurdish civilians and destroyed 2,000 villages.
The case is the first against Mr. Hussein to address the large-scale human
rights violations committed during his decades in power, the same acts the Bush
administration has publicized in explaining the American invasion of Iraq. Six
other defendants also face charges. Mr. Hussein is already being tried for the
torture and killings of 148 men and boys in the Shiite village of Dujail.
Since the United Nations adopted the genocide convention in 1948, very few
courts have charged defendants with genocide, the attempt to annihilate an
ethnic, religious, national or political group in whole or in part.
Convictions have been handed down in the tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia.
This is the first time that a Middle Eastern ruler has been charged with it.
"It was during this campaign that thousands of women, children and men were
buried in mass graves in many locations," Raid Juhi, the chief judge of the
Iraqi High Tribunal's investigative court, said at a news conference.
Judge Juhi said it would be up to other judges to decide when the genocide trial
against Mr. Hussein would start, and whether it would overlap with the Dujail
case. Defense lawyers must be given 45 days to review the case files.
The court defines the bloody Anfal campaign, whose name means "the spoils" from
a favorite Koranic verse of Mr. Hussein's, as eight military operations in 1988
in the mountainous Kurdish homeland of northern Iraq. Families who escaped death
squads or were allowed to live were forced to relocate into the hinterlands or
in neighboring countries.
The Kurds, who make up a fifth of Iraq's people, tried to fight back, but Mr.
Hussein used chemical weapons, including mustard gas and nerve agents.
Judge Juhi said the court had gathered enough evidence, like documents and mass
graves, to prosecute the defendants in the deaths of at least 50,000 civilians.
Kurdish officials and human rights advocates said the death toll had been much
higher. They also said the Anfal campaign began years earlier, with other
massacres and forced migrations.
The parties agree that at the very least, hundreds of thousands were arrested,
tortured, relocated or killed.
All seven defendants are charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes
related to an internal armed conflict. Mr. Hussein and one other defendant, Ali
Hassan al-Majid, known as Chemical Ali, also have been charged with genocide,
which legal experts say is difficult to prove. Mr. Majid was one of Mr.
Hussein's most feared aides and oversaw the north during the Anfal campaign.
The other defendants include military commanders and senior intelligence
officials.
"These charges should not be addressed to President Saddam," Khalil al-Dulaimi,
Mr. Hussein's chief lawyer, said in a telephone interview. "They should be
addressed to the American and British forces, because they are killing the Iraqi
people and using weapons of mass destruction against the Iraqi people."
President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who for years led militiamen in northern Iraq,
praised the court's decision to bring the Anfal charges, and promised that he
and other government officials would not try to influence the trial.
It has taken years to assemble the evidence for the Anfal case. American
officials say the Dujail crimes were selected as the first ones to try Mr.
Hussein on because that case was not nearly as complicated as some others. It is
also easier in the Dujail case to establish a clear chain of command between Mr.
Hussein and those who carried out the executions, the officials say.
But they say that the Anfal massacres and the suppression of the Shiite uprising
of 1991, which resulted in up to 150,000 deaths, are the two cases that go much
more directly to the heart of Mr. Hussein's murderous rule, and could prove more
cathartic for a vast majority of Iraqis.
The Dujail trial, expected to resume Wednesday with a cross-examination of Mr.
Hussein, is entering its final phase, in which the court will review formal
charges and hear arguments from the defense lawyers.
If a death sentence is handed down to Mr. Hussein, it is unclear whether the
court would carry out the execution before other cases begin or are concluded.
Any death sentence is automatically appealed.
There is no deadline for a decision, but if the appeal is denied, then the
statutes of the tribunal mandate that the defendant must be executed within 30
days. Even the president's office, which is supposed to approve all death
sentences, would be able to do little to delay that, said American legal experts
advising the tribunal.
Many Iraqis who despise Mr. Hussein, especially Shiites and Kurds, have
denounced the tribunal and called for Mr. Hussein's immediate execution, while
some officials, like President Talabani, have said they want Mr. Hussein to stay
alive long enough to face trial on all possible charges.
There are about a dozen investigations under way, all of which may result in
individual sets of charges. The operations of the tribunal and its oversight of
the Dujail case have been tumultuous, plagued by the assassinations of a judge
and lawyers, political pressure from the Iraqi government and power struggles
among the judges.
Questions have been raised about why the tribunal was never set up in an
international venue, where security would not be as great a concern. American
and Iraqi officials have struggled to endow the trial with legitimacy, but many
foreign governments and human rights advocates have continued to view it as a
show court.
The bringing of charges in Anfal brings a new set of problems, they say. If the
trial were to proceed concurrent with the trial on the Dujail killings, then Mr.
Hussein's defense team could be placed at an unfair disadvantage, unless Mr.
Hussein hired more lawyers. The prosecutors and judges do not have that problem;
a separate prosecutor and five-judge panel will oversee Anfal.
With Mr. Hussein needing to focus on final arguments in Dujail, a concern is
"how he could do all that and then simultaneously prepare for a larger and more
complex litigation — it goes to issues of fairness," said Marieke Wierda, a
senior associate at the International Center for Transitional Justice, a New
York-based advocacy group.
The other seven defendants in the Dujail trial are all different than those in
the Anfal case.
Kurdish officials often say that 180,000 people were killed in the Anfal
campaign, but the actual number is closer to 80,000, according to Joost
Hiltermann, the Middle East director of the International Crisis Group, an
advocacy group.
The scope of the trial is generally limited to the eight military operations
from February to August 1988, but the court will also examine evidence starting
from March 1987, when Mr. Hussein chose Mr. Majid as the top official in
northern Iraq.
In the years preceding Anfal, Kurds in Iraqi villages near Iran were forced to
abandon their homes. Those areas were labeled "prohibited," and anyone living
there was deemed to be an Iranian agent or saboteur. The Anfal campaign was
undertaken to deal with those who had moved back or had not moved.
The other defendants in the Anfal case are Sultan Hashem Ahmed, the military
commander of the campaign and the defense minister starting in 2001; Sabir
Abdul-Aziz al-Duri, the director of military intelligence; Hussein Rashid
al-Tikriti, the deputy of operations for the Iraqi forces; Tahir Tawfiq al-Ani,
a governor of Mosul; and Farhan Mutlak al-Jubouri, the head of military
intelligence in the north.
Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedi and Kirk Semple contributed reporting for this
article.
Hussein Charged With Genocide in 50,000 Deaths, NYT, 5.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/world/middleeast/05iraq.html
The Insurgency
Americans in Iraq Face Their Deadliest Day
in Months
April 4, 2006
The New York Times
By KIRK SEMPLE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 3 — In the deadliest day
for American forces since the beginning of the year, at least nine members of
the military were killed in the insurgent stronghold of Anbar Province,
including four in a rebel attack and at least five when their truck accidentally
flipped over, the American military command said Monday.
Three marines and one sailor were killed on Sunday in the rebel assault, the
military reported, offering no further information. It was the largest number of
American deaths in a single attack in more than a month.
In another part of Anbar on Sunday, a flash flood toppled a seven-ton truck,
killing five marines riding inside it and wounding one, the military said. Two
marines and one Navy corpsman in the truck were missing, officials said.
Wrapping up a quick visit here, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Jack
Straw, the British foreign secretary, pressed Iraqi leaders for a second day on
Monday to form a coalition government as quickly as possible, in order to end a
power vacuum in which insurgent attacks, sectarian violence and general
lawlessness have flourished.
Underscoring their concerns, three car bombs exploded in predominantly Shiite
neighborhoods of Baghdad, killing 13 people and wounding at least 19. One car
bomb exploded near a Shiite mosque in the Shaab neighborhood, killing 10 people
and wounding 13, an official at the Interior Ministry said. Another detonated in
Talibiya, killing one civilian and wounding six, the official said.
And a third exploded in Sadr City, killing two people including a 9-year-old
boy, the Associated Press reported.
The American command said the truck that rolled over in Anbar had been part of a
logistics convoy. Two of the missing marines were assigned to the First Marine
Logistics Group and the third was assigned to Regimental Combat Team 7, the
military authorities said.
The death toll was the highest since Jan. 5, when 11 Americans were killed in
several different attacks. At least 13 members of the American military have
died so far this month, setting a pace that could interrupt a trend of steadily
declining casualties over the past five months. The monthly tally of at least 31
deaths in March was the second lowest since the invasion of Iraq three years
ago.
The declining American casualties have coincided with a sharp increase in Iraqi
civilian deaths, reflecting a significant shift in the nature of the conflict as
insurgent groups and sectarian death squads have focused primarily on civilian
targets. The American military reported last week that from Feb. 22 to March 22,
1,313 civilians were killed, many in sectarian violence, while 173 civilians
died in car bombings, a hallmark of the insurgency.
But the sudden spike in deaths among American troops in the past few days was a
stark reminder that the American-led forces still remain a primary target. This
situation is particularly true in the predominantly Sunni Arab region of Anbar,
where the conflict is almost entirely a fight between the Sunni-led insurgency
and American forces.
The latest American deaths were reported as representatives of Prime Minister
Ibrahim al-Jaafari frantically lobbied other political leaders in an attempt to
salvage his bid to retain his post in the next government.
But opposition to his candidacy continued to mount Monday as his political
adversaries reaffirmed their stance against him, including members of the
dominant Shiite bloc, who on Sunday publicly demanded that he resign, and
Kurdish and Sunni Arab leaders, who for weeks have been pushing for another
candidate.
In their scramble to shore up support for Mr. Jaafari, representatives of his
Islamic Dawa Party met with Kurdish leaders in a futile effort to persuade them
to back the embattled prime minister, according to Hiwa Osman, a spokesman for
President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd. "They exchanged views on the gridlock that's
going on now," Mr. Osman said. "The Kurdish side explained their side, which
hasn't changed."
The Kurds, and particularly President Talabani, have been at the forefront of an
effort to oust Mr. Jaafari. Mr. Talabani was incensed after Mr. Jaafari visited
Turkey in late February; Turkish leaders have repeatedly threatened to invade
Iraqi Kurdistan if the Kurds tried to secede.
During a news conference on Monday morning, at the end of their unusual joint
visit, Mr. Straw and Ms. Rice repeatedly deflected questions about their views
of Mr. Jaafari.
Though Ms. Rice and Mr. Straw said they did not intend to intervene in the
dispute, the Bush administration has been quietly pressuring Shiite leaders to
drop Mr. Jaafari and choose another candidate. The two diplomats appeared tense
during a photo session with the prime minister on Sunday, but relaxed and
enthusiastic at other meetings.
The fracturing of the Shiite bloc became clear on Sunday when the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the country's most powerful Shiite
party, publicly announced it would put forward another candidate. Vice President
Adel Abdul Mahdi, a Supreme Council member, lost to Mr. Jaafari by one vote in a
secret ballot for the bloc's nomination in February.
On Monday, Ms. Rice and Mr. Straw had breakfast with Mr. Mahdi and Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim, leader of the Shiite bloc and head of the Supreme Council. It was the
second time Ms. Rice and Mr. Straw had met with Mr. Mahdi during their trip and
the third time they had met with Mr. Hakim. In contrast, they only met once with
Mr. Jaafari.
To some Iraqi leaders, the visiting diplomats conveyed their message clearly.
"I don't know if I consider it an arm twisting or a kissing on the cheeks — it's
politics — but I think the results are the same," said Hassan al-Bazzaz, a
leader of the Iraqi Consensus Front, a Sunni Arab bloc opposed to Mr. Jaafari's
nomination. "Basically they came to convince Jaafari of the idea of stepping
away."
Numerous efforts to reach representatives of Mr. Jaafari and his party for
comment on Monday were unsuccessful.
In Baghdad, an investigative judge referred a new case against Saddam Hussein to
the chief prosecutor of the Iraqi High Tribunal in connection with the massacre
of about 80,000 Kurds in the late 1980's, according to the prosecutor, Jaafar
al-Mousawi.
Joel Brinkley and Abdul Razzaq al-Saiedi contributed reporting for this
article.
Americans in Iraq Face Their Deadliest Day in Months, NYT, 4.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/04/world/middleeast/04iraq.html
Civilians in Iraq Flee Mixed Areas as
Killings Rise
April 2, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG and KIRK SEMPLE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, April 1 — The war in Iraq has
entered a bloodier phase, with American casualties steadily declining over the
past five months while the killings of Iraqi civilians have risen tremendously
in sectarian violence, spurring tens of thousands of Iraqis to flee from mixed
Shiite-Sunni areas.
The new pattern, detailed in casualty and migration statistics and in interviews
with American commanders and Iraqi officials, has led to further separation of
Shiite and Sunni Arabs, moving the country toward a de facto partitioning along
sectarian and ethnic lines — an outcome that the Bush administration has
doggedly worked to avoid over the past three years.
The nature of the Iraq war has been changing since at least late autumn, when
political friction between Sunni Arabs and the majority Shiites rose even as
American troops began to carry out a long-term plan to decrease their street
presence. But the killing accelerated most sharply after the bombing on Feb. 22
of a revered Shiite shrine, which unleashed a wave of sectarian bloodletting.
About 900 Iraqi civilians were killed in March, up from about 700 the month
before, according to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, an independent
organization that tracks deaths. Meanwhile, at least 29 American troops were
killed in March, the second-lowest monthly total since the war began.
The White House says that little violence occurs in most of Iraq's 18 provinces.
But those four or five provinces where most of the killings and migrations take
place are Iraq's major population and economic centers, generally mixed regions
that include the capital, Baghdad, and contain much of the nation's
infrastructure — crucial factors in Iraq's prospects for stability.
The Iraqi public's reaction to the violence has been substantial. Since the
shrine bombing, 30,000 to 36,000 Iraqis have fled their homes because of
sectarian violence or fear of reprisals, say officials at the International
Organization for Migration in Geneva. The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and
Migration estimated at least 5,500 families had moved, with the biggest group,
1,250 families, settling in the Shiite holy city of Najaf after leaving Baghdad
and Sunni-dominated towns in central Iraq.
The families are living with relatives or in abandoned buildings, and a crisis
of food and water shortages is starting to build, officials say.
"We lived in Latifiya for 30 years," said Abu Hussein al-Ramahi, a Shiite farmer
with a family of seven, referring to a village south of Baghdad that is a
stronghold of the Sunni Arab insurgency. "But a month ago, two armed people with
masks on their faces said if I stayed in this area, my family and I would no
longer remain alive. They shot bullets near my feet. I went back home
immediately and we left the area early next morning for Najaf."
Mr. Ramahi's family and other migrants are now squatting in a derelict hotel in
the holy city.
"It's almost a creeping polarization of Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines,"
said Anthony H. Cordesman, a military specialist at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington.
In the chaos, he said, "we see a slow, steady loss of confidence, a growing
process of distrust which you see day by day as people at the political level
bicker. Everything has become sectarian and ethnic."
The shifting violence and new migration patterns are fueling discussion about
whether Iraq is devolving into civil war. Although that determination may be
impossible to make in the short term, the debate itself could increase the
pressure President Bush is facing at home to draw down the force of 133,000
American troops here. Even if American deaths keep falling, polls show the
American public has little appetite for engagement in an Iraqi civil war.
Commanders in Iraq say the insurgent groups in the country, particularly Al
Qaeda in Mesopotamia, have shifted the focus of their attacks in an effort to
foment civil war and undermine negotiations to form a four-year government.
"What we are seeing him do now is shift his target from the coalition forces to
Iraqi civilians and Iraqi security forces," said Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, a senior
spokesman for the American command. "The enemy is trying to stop the formation
of this national unity government; he's trying to inflame sectarian violence."
Dozens of bodies, garroted or executed with gunshots to the head, are turning up
almost daily in Baghdad alone. The gruesome work is usually attributed to death
squads or Shiite militias, some in Iraqi police or army uniforms. Meanwhile,
powerful bombings, a favorite tactic of the Sunni Arab-led insurgency, continue
to devastate civilian areas and Iraqi bases or recruitment centers.
The number of kidnappings of Iraqis is surging because of an explosion of
criminal gangs working for their own gain or with armed political groups. Scores
of civilians are abducted every week, usually for ransoms of $20,000 to $30,000.
In recent weeks, masked men have stormed offices in Baghdad and hauled away all
the workers.
At the same time, American commanders have decreased the number of their patrols
and have tried to push the Iraqi security forces into a more visible role.
That shift, along with improved armor and bomb detection, may partly explain the
drop in deaths. Last October, 96 American troops died. That number has decreased
every month since, but fell most sharply between February and March — to 29 in
March from 55 in February.
Iraqi civilian deaths generally increased in the same period, from 465 in
October, according to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, which tallies deaths
from a range of news reports, a method believed to give rough though excessively
low estimates.
The broad trend is also supported by statistics on the number of attacks. A
senior Pentagon official said that attacks on Americans, Iraqi forces and Iraqi
civilians remained around 600 per week since last September but that the focus
of the attacks had changed. In September, 82 percent of attacks were against
American-led forces and 18 percent against Iraqis; in February, 65 percent were
against the foreigners and 35 percent against Iraqis.
Top American officials are concerned that despite the growing number of trained
and equipped Iraqi security forces being fielded, and the large number of
insurgents killed or captured in the past six months, the number of overall
attacks has not declined, the Defense Department official said.
"It should be worrisome to us that it's still at the same level," said the
official, who was not authorized to speak publicly on the trend. "With the
number of operations that are occurring and the number of people we are
detaining growing, and truly with the number of tactical successes that we're
having, you would expect to see a reduction in the trend."
American officials say the solution to the sectarian bloodshed lies in the
Iraqis' quickly forming a national unity government, with representatives of all
major groups checking one another through compromise.
But with each political milestone — the transfer of sovereignty in 2004, two
sets of elections in 2005, the referendum on the constitution — the Americans
have asserted that the country would stabilize. Instead, the violence has
continued unabated, sometimes changing in nature, as it is doing now, but never
declining. And as the resulting migration continues, Iraq's political groups
could have even less incentive to compromise with one another, as they separate
into their enclaves.
Many Iraqis say they are fleeing out of fear of increasingly partisan Iraqi
security forces.
The police and commando forces are infested with militia recruits, mostly from
Shiite political parties, and are accused by Sunni Arabs of carrying out
sectarian executions. One Sunni-run TV network warned viewers last week not to
allow Iraqi policemen or soldiers into their homes unless the forces were
accompanied by American troops.
"The militias are in charge now," said Aliyah al-Bakr, 42, a Sunni Arab
schoolteacher who had two male relatives abducted and executed by black-clad
gunmen in Baghdad on Feb. 22. "I'm more afraid of Iraqi militias than of the
Americans. But the American presence is still the cornerstone of all the
problems."
Some of the migration is happening within Baghdad, with families moving from one
block to the next, from neighborhood to neighborhood, increasingly segregating
the capital.
Others are fleeing across wide swaths of desert. At least 761 families have
settled in Baghdad after moving from Anbar Province and other Sunni-dominated
areas to the west, according to Iraqi government statistics. The same is
happening on the Sunni Arab end — there are reports of 50 families moving from
Baghdad to the Sunni city of Falluja.
Aid groups have been handing out mattresses, blankets, cooking sets and other
gear to families throughout central and southern Iraq.
Jemini Pandya, a spokeswoman for the International Organization for Migration,
says it is a short-term response to what could be a more lasting issue. "We've
been doing emergency work," she said. "The situation for those displaced won't
be resolved anytime soon."
Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Washington for this article, Khalid
W. Hassan from Baghdad, and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times from Najaf.
Civilians in Iraq Flee Mixed Areas as Killings Rise, NYT, 2.4.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/02/world/middleeast/02iraq.html?hp&ex=1144040400&en=10ddebce43b7a3fd&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Freed reporter says forced into anti-US
video
Sat Apr 1, 2006 8:01 PM ET
Reuters
By Jason Szep
BOSTON (Reuters) - Describing her captivity in
Iraq as horrific, freed American hostage Jill Carroll disavowed on Saturday
critical statements she made about the United States, saying she had been forced
to make a propaganda video.
In the video made before her release and posted on a jihadist Web site that also
showed beheadings and attacks on American forces, Carroll denounced the U.S.
presence in Iraq and praised the militants fighting American forces there.
"Things that I was forced to say while captive are now being taken by some as an
accurate reflection of my personal views. They are not," she said in a statement
read in Boston by Richard Bergenheim, editor of The Christian Science Monitor,
the Boston-based employer of the 28-year-old journalist.
Carroll, who was abducted in Baghdad on January 7 and released 82 days later on
Thursday, said in her first public statement since leaving Iraq that her captors
forced her to make the video during her last night of captivity.
"They told me they would let me go if I cooperated. I was living in a
threatening environment, under their control, and wanted to go home alive. I
agreed," she said in the statement made while she is in Germany.
Wearing a traditional Islamic head scarf, Carroll looked relaxed in the
broadcast that has drawn criticism from some conservative commentators,
describing U.S. policy in Iraq as built on a "mountain of lies" and saying U.S.
President George W. Bush "doesn't care about his own people".
"CRIMINALS AT BEST"
In her statement on Saturday, she said she been threatened repeatedly and
described her captors as "criminals at best." She also recanted statements she
made in an interview given to the Iraqi Islamic Party shortly after her release.
"The party had promised me the interview would never be aired on television, and
broke their word. At any rate, fearing retribution from my captors, I did not
speak freely. Out of fear I said I wasn't threatened," she said.
"In fact, I was threatened many times."
She said at least two false statements about her had been widely aired: that she
refused to travel and cooperate with the U.S. military and that she refused to
discuss her captivity with U.S. officials. "Again, neither is true," she said.
"I want to be judged as a journalist, not as a hostage."
"Let me be clear: I abhor all who kidnap and murder civilians, and my captors
are clearly guilty of both crimes."
Carroll was due to fly into Boston on Sunday morning from Germany, where she
arrived on Saturday at Ramstein U.S. air base aboard a U.S. military transport
plane from Iraq.
Television showed Carroll stepping off the plane wearing jeans, a camouflage
jacket and without the Islamic head scarf she had worn in several videos while
held hostage in a darkened, soundproofed room she has described as like a cave.
"I'm happy to be here," she said in Germany.
In the statement, Carroll described her captivity as "horrific" for her and her
family, and thanked her supporters around the world for rallying on her behalf
after she was kidnapped by the militants who also killed her Iraqi interpreter.
"Now, I ask for the time to heal," she said. "This has been a taxing 12 weeks
for me and my family. Please allow us some quiet time alone, together."
Freed
reporter says forced into anti-US video, NYT, 1.4.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=newsOne&storyID=2006-04-02T000105Z_01_N01377726_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-CARROLL.xml
Rice Concedes Errors in Iraq, Elsewhere
March 31, 2006
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 11:36 a.m. ET
The New York Times
BLACKBURN, England (AP) -- Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice conceded Friday that the United States probably has made
thousands of ''tactical errors'' in Iraq and elsewhere, but said it will be
judged by its larger aims of peace and democracy in the Middle East.
The U.S. diplomat met loud anti-war protests in the streets and skeptical
questions about U.S. involvement in Iraq at a foreign policy salon Friday,
including one about whether Washington had learned from its ''mistakes over the
past three years.''
Rice replied that leaders would be ''brain-dead'' if they did not absorb the
lessons of their times.
''I know we've made tactical errors, thousands of them I'm sure,'' Rice told an
audience gathered by the British foreign policy think tank Chatham House. ''But
when you look back in history, what will be judged will be, did you make the
right strategic decisions.''
She said she remains firmly convinced that it was the right strategic decision
to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq three years ago, and that it
required an invasion to do it.
Saddam ''wasn't going anywhere without military intervention,'' she said.
Demonstrators organized marches to call America's top diplomat a war criminal
and human rights abuser as she joined British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on a
tour of his adopted northern England working-class home.
Rice said she was not surprised by the depth of opposition in Britain, President
Bush's strongest ally in Iraq, to the war and other American policies.
''I've seen it in every city I've visited in the United States,'' Rice said
earlier Friday. ''People have strong views.''
''People have the right to protest, that's what democracy is all about,'' Rice
told reporters at a British aerospace plant. ''I would say to those who wish to
protest, by all means.''
Rice also said the United States was ready to send humanitarian assistance to
Iran following deadly earthquakes there on Friday, but she made it clear there
would be no accompanying U.S. diplomatic overture to Tehran.
Straw, Rice's host for her two-day visit, said Britain would send a condolence
letter to the Tehran government.
The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran.
At a high school visited by Rice and Straw, about 200 protesters stood across
the street with banners and signs, chanting ''Condoleezza Rice, Go Home!'' One
demonstrator held a yellow hand-lettered sign that read ''How Many Lives Per
Gallon?''
Rice toured a high school math class and visited Ewood Park, the home stadium of
Straw's favored soccer team, Blackburn Rovers.
About 50 of Pleckgate School's students ''skived off'' their classes Friday to
protest Rice's visit, said student Jabbar Khan, 16, who shook Rice's hand as she
entered.
The protests awaiting Rice on Friday were the reverse of the warm reception she
received last fall when Straw accompanied her on a down-home tour of her native
Alabama. Then, elderly white women lined up to shake the hand of a black native
daughter made good, football fans cheered and the tantalizing possibility of a
run for president -- something she discounts -- surrounded Rice.
''It's one thing to say this is a cultural visit, but others see it as a council
of war,'' said Carmel Brown, an anti-war protester in Liverpool.
Rice's planned visit to a mosque in Blackburn was canceled Thursday after
anti-war protesters planned to heckle her during prayer time, a mosque leader
said. A prominent poet and actress pulled out of planned appearances at a
Liverpool Philharmonic concert Rice was attending Friday in protest of U.S.
policies.
Straw's Blackburn district has the country's third highest Muslim population.
Rice also is to meet Muslim leaders and the town's mayor, Ugandan immigrant
Yusuf Jan-Virmani, on Saturday.
Straw's visit to Alabama was intended to show a different side of America to a
visiting foreign leader and friend. Many people he met in Alabama, and a few who
introduced him at events, had never heard of the British diplomat.
Rice is far better known, as the two days of protests planned over U.S. policies
in Iraq, Iran and the war on terrorism attest.
Opponents of the Iraq war set up a Web site, condiwatch.co.uk, that listed times
and locations for marches and gatherings. Protesters planned to distribute
T-shirts that read, ''Fab Four, Not War,'' in reference to Liverpool's most
famous export, The Beatles.
Rice
Concedes Errors in Iraq, Elsewhere, NYT, 31.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Rice.html
Iraq conflict grows ever more confusing
Fri Mar 31, 2006 9:30 AM ET
Reuters
By Michael Georgy, - ANALYSIS
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Gunmen in police uniform
kill and kidnap at electronics shops. A mosque raid draws government charges
that U.S. troops run Iraqi forces beyond its control. Bodies turn up on streets
as militia death squads roam freely.
This week's violence in Iraq suggests the conflict has entered an ominous new
stage where crime gangs, Sunni Arab insurgents and pro-government Shi'ite
militias overlap as violence pushes the country closer to sectarian civil war.
What began with a murky Sunni revolt against occupation and then the U.S.-backed
interim government has exploded into a communal and criminal battlefield where
determining who is killing whom -- let alone why -- is getting harder every day.
"The Sunni insurgency is now complemented by the Shi'ite militias who are
getting very powerful and are able to wreak havoc on the Sunnis," said Martin
Navias, at the Center for Defense Studies at King's College in London.
"The various groups are killing each other and kidnapping but not openly doing
it. It is a type of ethnic cleansing. But it is not an open civil war."
Iraqi leaders are struggling to form a unity government more than three months
after elections, raising concerns that a widening political vacuum will foster
ever more violence.
Analysts say that while the new trends were alarming, there were no signs that
the violence is about to spill over into open warfare with street battles
between Iraq's main Shi'ite, Arab Sunni and ethnic Kurdish groups.
A fall in American casualties since last summer suggests that U.S. troops, with
growing numbers of Iraqi allies, have made gains over insurgents. March should
show one of the lowest monthly U.S. death tolls of the war, possibly the lowest
in two years.
But measuring success in those terms on that conventional military front is
easier than gauging progress in the battle against a complex network of
criminals, militias and insurgents -- all of whom can show up in police or army
uniforms.
UNCLEAR ENEMIES
Gunmen dressed as police commandos -- precise accounts of the uniforms varied --
killed nine people in an attack on an electronics store in Baghdad on Wednesday,
one of a series of raids against lucrative businesses in the capital this week.
Workers, including women, were rounded up and then killed.
On Monday and Tuesday, a total of 35 people were abducted in four attacks,
including two on electronics dealers and one on a money-changer where the
attackers also stole $50,000.
Determining whether they were criminals or insurgents seeking funds seems
impossible in Iraq's chaos.
Police officers in the area where the raids were carried out said they had no
idea who was responsible.
"Many security groups work in Iraq and nobody knows who they are or what they
are doing," said one police lieutenant colonel, who would give his name only as
the familiar Abu Mohammed for fear of reprisals from his shadowy adversaries.
"There are now many organised crime groups working under formal cover, as
militias or security companies. It's hard to figure out who they are, let alone
who is behind them."
One businessman who said he was familiar with some of the businesses targeted
said several belonged to one man, suggesting attacks by racketeers. That could
not be confirmed, however.
Hazim al-Naimi, a politics professor at Baghdad's Mustansiriya University, said
the raids were another disturbing sign that the conflict has been escalating
since the bombing of a Shi'ite shrine last month touched off bloody reprisals.
Since then, hundreds of bodies have turned up in the streets, many shot or
strangled with signs of torture.
"The crisis has become very complicated now. We are seeing raids on electronics
shops that make no sense. It could be a campaign to wreck the economy so Iraqis
don't set up businesses. It's hard to tell," said Naimi.
Al Qaeda's Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the man who has been most predictable in Iraq's
conflict, has been keeping a low profile.
His suicide bombers have eased off, leading Interior Minister Bayan Jabor to
conclude Zarqawi is no longer a threat.
But U.S. officers say he is shifting attacks away from American soldiers and
Shi'ite civilians to Iraqi security forces and more targeted killing, raising
fears of new violence as the authorities try to grapple with deepening mayhem.
Long-term stability ultimately depends on whether Iraqi forces can take on
militants and insurgents on their own.
U.S. commanders have been praising Iraqi special forces for a raid on a Baghdad
mosque compound on Sunday night which left what they said were 16 "terrorists"
dead.
But as government-run state television showed lengthy footage of the
bullet-ridden bodies, Shi'ite leaders accused the Americans of a massacre of
unarmed worshippers and directing Iraqi forces without a green light from the
Iraqi government.
Police and local residents said the compound was a base for the Mehdi Army, a
Shi'ite militia. But the U.S. military says it still has no idea who the 16 were
despite extensive intelligence work ahead of the raid and the rescue of a
tortured hostage.
"People ought to be focused on the fact that 50 members of the Iraqi special
operations forces planned and conducted this. And it was flawless. Flawless,"
U.S. Major General Rick Lynch told a news conference on Thursday.
But of the identity of the militants he said: "Right now, if I were to tell you
something, I'd be hazarding a guess."
(Additional reporting by Omar al-Ibadi)
Iraq
conflict grows ever more confusing, R, 31.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-03-31T143033Z_01_GEO146870_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&related=true&src=cms
Iraq Shi'ite ayatollah wants US envoy
sacked
Fri Mar 31, 2006 12:39 PM ET
Reuters
By Mariam Karouny
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - A leading Iraqi Shi'ite
cleric on Friday demanded the United States sack its envoy and accused him of
siding with fellow Sunni Muslims in the country's growing sectarian conflict.
The call by Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi came as political leaders, urged on by
the U.S. ambassador, held their latest round of negotiations to form a new
government after parliamentary elections in December.
Yacoubi said in a sermon read out at mosques for Friday prayers Washington had
underestimated the conflict between Shi'ites and the once dominant Sunni Arab
minority, which many fear could trigger a civil war.
"They are either misled by reports which lack objectivity and credibility
submitted to the United States by their sectarian ambassador to Iraq ... or they
are denying this fact," Yacoubi said in the message, later issued as a
statement.
"It (the United States) should not yield to terrorist blackmail and should not
be deluded or misled by spiteful sectarians. It should replace its ambassador to
Iraq if it wants to protect itself from further failures."
After the imam of Baghdad's Rahman mosque read that line, worshippers chanted
"Allahu Akbar" -- God is Greatest, in an apparent declaration of agreement.
MOUNTING PRESSURE
Iraq's political leaders held Friday's talks under mounting pressure at home and
from the United States to form a government of national unity embracing Shi'ites
Sunnis and Kurds to end sectarian violence and avert civil war.
Afghan-born ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the highest ranking Muslim in the U.S.
administration, has been in Iraq ten months and has spearheaded urgent U.S.
efforts to press politicians to form a government.
The Shi'ite-Sunni bloodshed has worsened dramatically since a major Shi'ite
shrine in the city of Samarra was bombed on February 22, sparking a wave of
violence and poisoning the political atmosphere during the negotiations.
Hundreds have died since and more than 30,000 people have fled their homes as
Shi'ite and Sunni militias seek to cleanse their neighborhoods.
Yacoubi is the spiritual guide for the Fadhila party, one of the smaller but
still influential components of the dominant Islamist Alliance bloc. He is not
part of the senior clerical council around Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in
Najaf.
Nonetheless, Shi'ite politicians said his comments reflected widespread
disenchantment among them with the ambassador.
"It's a very good statement," one senior official in the Alliance, not from
Fadhila, said of Yacoubi's sermon.
Khalilzad has been criticized by Shi'ite leaders who say they resent his
championing of efforts to tempt Sunnis away from armed revolt into a coalition
government.
Yacoubi said: "The American ambassador and the tyrants of the Arab states are
giving political support to those parties who provide political cover for the
terrorists."
TACTICAL ERRORS
Alliance leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim accused Khalilzad last month of provoking
the Samarra bombing by making remarks critical of "sectarian" tendencies among
the Shi'ite leadership.
Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari has also criticised U.S. "interference" this
week in Iraq's political process. Jaafari's nomination to a second term by the
Alliance is a major sticking point in talks with Sunnis and ethnic Kurds on a
government.
Shi'ite politicians say Khalilzad has delivered messages from U.S. President
George W. Bush to both Hakim and Sistani in the past week urging them to drop
Jaafari, whose nomination was secured with the support of Iranian-backed cleric
and militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr. U.S. diplomats deny taking sides.
But analysts say it is a major issue.
"The fact that the Americans, Khalilzad and Bush, expressed their concerns over
Jaafari and the Americans so visibly injected themselves into an Iraqi issue
suggested their level of concern was high," said Martin Navias, of the Center of
Defense Studies at King's College in London.
Khalilzad is now planning talks with Iran, Washington's old enemy in the region,
to try to ease the crisis in Iraq. The United States accuses Shi'ite Iran of
fomenting violence.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice accepted on Friday the United States
had probably made thousands of errors in Iraq but defended the overall strategy
of removing Saddam Hussein.
"Yes, I know we have made tactical errors, thousands of them," she said in
Blackburn, England, in answer to a question over whether lessons had been
learned since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Friday's political talks appeared to make no major progress.
There is haggling over a Sunni demand for a security veto and the issue of who
gets what job remains wide open.
Further highlighting the growing divide between U.S. forces and some Shi'ite
leaders, a Sadr aide demanded soldiers involved in a joint Iraqi-U.S. raid on a
Baghdad mosque compound be prosecuted and the more than a dozen people arrested
be freed.
"We want those who joined the occupation forces in the raid to be sent to courts
and to be tried fast," Hazim Al-Araji told a news conference.
At least 16 people died in the raid. The U.S. military says it targeted
militants but Shi'ite leaders say unarmed worshippers were killed.
(Additional reporting by Hiba Moussa, Seif Fouad, Terry Friel and Alastair
Macdonald)
Iraq
Shi'ite ayatollah wants US envoy sacked, R, 31.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-03-31T173906Z_01_L30585020_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ.xml
American Reporter Kidnapped in Baghdad Is
Released
March 30, 2006
The New York Times
By KIRK SEMPLE and JOHN O'NEIL
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 30 — Jill Carroll, the
American reporter who was kidnapped in Baghdad nearly three months ago, was
released today.
Ms. Carroll, whose abduction generated international attention, said in an
interview shown on Baghdad television that her captors "never hit me and never
even threatened to hit me."
Asked what message she wanted to send to the United States, she said firmly, "I
was treated very well, it's important for people to know that.
Wearing gray Arabic robes, tucking her hair up under a gray and green headdress,
Ms. Carroll said that she was told this morning that she was going to be free
"and that is what happened."
"They didn't tell me what was going on," she said.
She appeared strong and confident and waited patiently for the interviewer to
ask his questions before answering, sometimes asking for clarification. She said
that she did not know where she had been held, adding that her room had a window
but that it was obscured, and that she had been allowed to walk to a shower
nearby. She had been able to watch television once and had seen a newspaper
once, she said, but was not aware if there were any negotiations.
"All I can say right now is I am very happy," Ms. Carroll said. "I am happy to
be free and I want to be with my family."
Ms. Carroll was dropped off today at the headquarters of the Iraqi Islamic
Party, a predominantly Sunni group, in western Baghdad.
Dr. Tariq Al-Hashemi, the party's general secretary, said in a news conference
that Ms. Carroll walked in to the office dressed in Islamic garb and handed
officials there a paper written in Arabic.
"The message said, 'This is the kidnapped American journalist and we ask you to
take her to an official party,' " Mr. Al-Hashemi said.
Mr. Al-Hashemi said that Ms. Carroll had interviewed party leaders before, but
that he had no idea why she was delivered to their office. He said his group had
joined in the condemnation of the kidnapping.
Party officials contacted American authorities, who whisked her to the heavily
fortified Green Zone.
Richard Bergenheim, the editor of The Christian Science Monitor, for which Ms.
Carroll was reporting at the time of her kidnapping, said that there had been
"absolutely no negotiations for her release" and had never been any contact with
her captors.
David Cook, an editor in the Washington bureau of The Christian Science Monitor,
said that Ms. Carroll had called her father this morning to tell him she was
safe.
Ms. Carroll, 28, was abducted Jan. 7 in western Baghdad. Her intepreter, Allan
Enwiyah, 32, was shot dead at the scene.
In the weeks afterward, her captors released three videotapes, which showed her
in increasing distress. The kidnappers, who called themselves the Vengeance
Brigade, issued a statement through a Kuwaiti television station in February
demanding that the Americans and Iraqis release all imprisoned women by Feb. 26
or she would be killed. While several female prisoners were released shortly
before then, Iraqi and American officials insisted that it was not because of
the demand, and a few other female prisoners remained in jail.
That kidnapper's deadline passed, and there was no further word of Ms. Carroll.
On Feb. 28, Iraq's interior minister told ABC News that Ms. Carroll was still
alive, that he knew who had kidnapped her and that he believed she would be
released soon.
Ms. Carroll was kidnapped less than 300 yards from the office of Adnan Dulaimi,
a prominent Sunni Arab politician, whom Ms. Carroll had been intending to
interview that morning. In an interview with The New York Times on Wednesday,
Mr. Dulaimi repeatedly expressed concerns about Ms. Carroll. In recent months,
he made public appeals for her release.
Many other Iraqi politicians, along with as well as Ms. Carroll's family members
had made repeated appeals for her freedom. Her twin sister, Katie, said in a
statement read on the Al-Arabiya network that "I've been living a nightmare,
worrying if she is hurt or ill."
Kidnappings in Iraq are increasingly common, and thousands of Iraqis are
believed to have been taken, most simply for ransom. More than 200 foreigners
have been abducted, and several American captives have been killed.
But no kidnapping drew the kind of attention that Ms. Carroll's did. In addition
to the fact that she was the only American woman to be abducted, her youth and
what her family described as her desire to publicize the hardships facing the
Iraqi people. Her plight also hit home for the journalists in Iraq who covered
it.
Mr. Bergenheim, the Monitor editor, took note of the wider problem during a
press conference outside the paper's Boston headquarters, saying that "the world
doesn't hear the voice" of kidnapped Iraqis.
"We can't imagine what it would be like to live in a city where 30 or 40 people
a day are being kidnapped," he said, and he hoped that the effort to free Ms.
Carroll had led to a greater awareness of the suffering caused by such crimes.
Ms. Carroll, who grew up in Michigan and speaks some Arabic, had been reporting
in the Middle East since late 2002, mostly in Iraq.
Her father, Jim, released a statement saying, "We are thrilled and relieved at
the safe return of my daughter, Jill."
"We want to thank the thousands of people that prayed and especially the people
at The Christian Science Monitor who did so much to keep her alive," the
statement said. Ms. Carroll, a freelance writer, had been reporting for the
Monitor at the time of her abduction.
Mr. Bergenheim also praised the efforts of people inside Iraq and throughout the
world. "The chorus of Muslim leaders condemning this kidnapping was larger and
louder than has been heard for some time," he said.
The American ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said in a televised briefing
that he had met with Ms. Carroll, whom he described as being in "good health and
great spirits."
He took the occasion to praise Iraqi leaders for working for her release, and
the Islamic party for its role after she was freed.
"We are going to work as hard as we can to help her get home as soon as
possible," he said.
Speaking in Berlin a a meeting on the Iranian nuclear program, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice expressed "great delight and great relief" at the release
of Ms. Carroll, news services reported.
Kirk Semple reported from Baghdad for this article and John O'Neil reported
from New York. Ali Adeeb contributed reporting from Baghdad and Christine Hauser
and Carla Baranauckas contributed reporting from New York.
American Reporter Kidnapped in Baghdad Is Released, NYT, 30.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/international/31iraqcnd.html?hp&ex=1143781200&en=3c9ce3e26b18954f&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, at the Pentagon with Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld,
explaining a map of the mosque compound assaulted by Iraqi and American troops
on Sunday.
Yuri Gripas/Reuters
NYT March 29, 2006
Beleaguered Premier Warns U.S. to Stop
Interfering in Iraq's Politics NYT
30.3.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/international/middleeast/30iraq.html
Beleaguered Premier Warns U.S. to Stop
Interfering in Iraq's Politics
March 30, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 29 — Facing growing
pressure from the Bush administration to step down, Prime Minister Ibrahim
al-Jaafari of Iraq vigorously asserted his right to stay in office on Wednesday
and warned the Americans against interfering in the country's political process.
Mr. Jaafari also defended his recent political alliance with the radical Shiite
cleric Moktada al-Sadr, now the prime minister's most powerful backer, saying in
an interview that Mr. Sadr and his militia, now thousands strong, are a fact of
life in Iraq and need to be accepted into mainstream politics.
Mr. Jaafari said he would work to fold the country's myriad militias into the
official security forces and ensure that recruits and top security ministers
abandoned their ethnic or sectarian loyalties.
The Iraqi government's tolerance of militias has emerged as the greatest source
of contention between American officials and Shiite leaders like Mr. Jaafari,
with the American ambassador contending in the past week that militias are
killing more people than the Sunni Arab-led insurgency. Dozens of bodies,
garroted or with gunshots to the head, turn up almost daily in Baghdad, fueling
sectarian tensions that are pushing Iraq closer to full-scale civil war.
The prime minister made his remarks in an hourlong interview at his home, a
Saddam Hussein-era palace with an artificial lake at the heart of the fortified
Green Zone. He spoke in a languorous manner, relaxing in a black pinstripe suit
in a dim ground-floor office lined with Arabic books like the multivolume "World
of Civilizations."
"There was a stand from both the American government and President Bush to
promote a democratic policy and protect its interests," he said, sipping from a
cup of boiled water mixed with saffron. "But now there's concern among the Iraqi
people that the democratic process is being threatened."
"The source of this is that some American figures have made statements that
interfere with the results of the democratic process," he added. "These
reservations began when the biggest bloc in Parliament chose its candidate for
prime minister."
Mr. Jaafari is at the center of the deadlock in the talks over forming a new
government, with the main Kurdish, Sunni Arab and secular blocs in the
275-member Parliament staunchly opposing the Shiite bloc's nomination of Mr.
Jaafari for prime minister.
Senior Shiite politicians said Tuesday that the American ambassador, Zalmay
Khalilzad, had weighed in over the weekend, telling the leader of the Shiite
bloc that President Bush did not want Mr. Jaafari as prime minister. That was
the first time the Americans had openly expressed a preference for the post, the
politicians said, and it showed the Bush administration's acute impatience with
the political logjam.
Relations between Shiite leaders and the Americans have been fraying for months
and reached a crisis point after a bloody assault on a Shiite mosque compound
Sunday night by American and Iraqi forces.
Mr. Jaafari said in the interview that Ambassador Khalilzad had visited him on
Wednesday morning but did not indicate that he should abandon his job.
American reactions to the political process can be seen as either supporting or
interfering in Iraqi decisions, said Mr. Jaafari, the leader of the Islamic Dawa
Party and a former exile. "When it takes the form of interference, it makes the
Iraqi people worried," he said. "For that reason, the Iraqi people want to
ensure that these reactions stay in a positive frame and do not cross over into
interference that damages the results of the democratic process."
According to the Constitution, the largest bloc in Parliament, in this case the
religious Shiites, has the right to nominate a prime minister. Mr. Jaafari won
that nomination in a secret ballot last month among the blocs' 130 Shiite
members of Parliament. But his victory was a narrow one: he won by only one vote
after getting the support of Mr. Sadr, who controls 32 seats.
That alliance has raised concern among the Americans that Mr. Jaafari will do
little to rein in Mr. Sadr, who led two fierce rebellions against the American
military in 2004. Mr. Sadr's militia, the Mahdi Army, rampaged in Baghdad after
the Feb. 22 bombing of a revered Shiite shrine in Samarra and after a series of
car bomb explosions on March 12 in Baghdad's Sadr City neighborhood. The
violence left hundreds dead and Sunni mosques burnt to the ground.
After the secret ballot last month, Sadr politicians said Mr. Jaafari had agreed
to meet all their demands in exchange for their votes. Mr. Sadr has been pushing
for control of service ministries like health, transportation and electricity.
Mr. Jaafari did not say in the interview what deals he had made, but he insisted
that engagement with the cleric's movement was needed for the stability of Iraq.
He said he had disagreed with L. Paul Bremer III, the former American proconsul,
when Mr. Bremer barred Mr. Sadr and some Sunni Arab groups from the Iraqi
Governing Council in 2003.
"The delay in getting them to join led to the situation of them becoming violent
elements," he said.
"I look at them as part of Iraq's de facto reality, whether some of the
individual people are negative or positive," he said.
Mr. Jaafari used similar language when laying out his policy toward militias:
that inclusion rather than isolation was the proper strategy.
The Iraqi government will try "to meld them, take them, take their names and
make them join the army and police forces."
"And they will respect the army or police rather than the militias."
Recruiting militia members into the Iraqi security forces has not been a problem
under the Jaafari government. The issue has been getting those fighters to act
as impartial defenders of the state rather than as political partisans. The
police forces are stocked with members of the Mahdi Army and the Badr
Organization, an Iranian-trained militia, who still exhibit obvious loyalties to
their political party leaders.
Police officers have performed poorly when ordered to contain militia violence,
and they even cruise around in some cities with images of Mr. Sadr or other
religious politicians on their squad cars.
There is growing evidence of uniformed death squads operating out of the
Shiite-run Interior Ministry, and Ambassador Khalilzad has been lobbying the
Iraqis to place more neutral figures in charge of the Interior and Defense
Ministries in the next government. That has caused friction with Shiite leaders,
and some have even accused the ambassador of implicitly backing the Sunni
Arab-led insurgency.
But Mr. Jaafari said he supported the Americans' goal.
"We insist that the ministers in the next cabinet, especially the ministers of
defense and the interior, shouldn't be connected to any militias, and they
should be nonsectarian," he said. "They should be experienced in security work.
They should keep the institutions as security institutions, not as political
institutions. They should work for the central government."
In the first two years of the war, Mr. Jaafari emerged as one of the most
popular politicians in Iraq, especially compared with other exiles like Ahmad
Chalabi, the former Pentagon favorite. A doctor by training and well-versed in
the Koran, Mr. Jaafari comes from a prominent family in Karbala, the Shiite holy
city. But since taking power last spring, Mr. Jaafari has come under widespread
criticism for failing to stamp out the insurgency and promoting hard-line
pro-Shiite policies.
Beleaguered Premier Warns U.S. to Stop Interfering in Iraq's Politics, NYT,
30.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/30/international/middleeast/30iraq.html
Report Adds to Criticism of Halliburton's
Iraq Role
March 29, 2006
The New York Times
By JAMES GLANZ
Even as a Halliburton subsidiary was absorbing
harsh criticism of its costs on a 2003 no-bid contract for work in Iraq, the
government officials overseeing a second contract wrote that the company was
running up exorbitant new expenses on similar work, according to a report issued
yesterday by the staff for the Democrats on the House Government Reform
Committee.
The report, prepared for a frequent critic of Halliburton, Representative Henry
A. Waxman of California, is based on previously undisclosed correspondence and
performance evaluations from 2004 and 2005.
The documents show that the government's contracting officers became
increasingly frustrated as they tried to penetrate what they considered to be
inaccurate or misleading progress reports and expense vouchers filed by the
subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root.
In August 2004, one of the officers wrote to the company that "you have
universally failed to provide adequate cost information as required."
A few months later, after the company was served with a "cure notice," in which
the government threatened to terminate the contract if performance was not
improved, or "cured," another officer said he was writing "in sheer frustration
with the consistent lack of accurate data."
Kellogg Brown & Root's second contract, awarded in January 2004 for rebuilding
oil infrastructure in southern Iraq, has a maximum value of $1.2 billion. A
company spokeswoman, Melissa Norcross, said that the report was "as devoid of
context as it is new information" and that many of the issues raised by the
contracting officers had been resolved.
The company, Ms. Norcross said, was forced to work with an ever-shifting cast of
oversight organizations and at least 15 government contracting officials. "With
each change, the company adjusted to meet the needs of its customer," she said,
"all while operating in an extremely hostile war zone."
But Mr. Waxman, the ranking Democrat on the committee, said the report showed
that the company had "actually done a worse job under its second Iraq oil
contract than it did under the original no-bid contract."
William L. Nash, a retired Army general who is a senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations and an expert on post-conflict zones, said the unusually
revealing documents laid bare "a microcosm of all the ills" of the Iraq
rebuilding effort. "This a continuing example of the mismanagement of the Iraq
reconstruction from the highest levels down to the contractors on the ground,"
he said.
The second contract was not terminated after the cure notice, and contracting
officers later noted improvements in some areas. But the company received what
appears to be a rebuke when it was given nothing out of a possible $7.9 million
in socalled award fees for its first year of work on the contract. The award
fees are incentives given by the government to reward good performance.
An award fee given for a later period, roughly the first half of 2005, was about
20 percent of the maximum, which Mr. Nash, who has been involved in determining
such fees, described as extraordinarily low.
Both Kellogg Brown & Root contracts called for things like repairing oil wells
and pipelines, installing power generators at oil facilities and importing fuel
to Iraq. The first contract, worth $2.4 billion, generated enormous controversy
after Pentagon auditors questioned more than $200 million in fuel delivery
costs.
Critics like Mr. Waxman called the challenged costs overcharges, a description
rejected by the company, which claimed a measure of vindication last month when
the Army overruled the auditors and reimbursed nearly all of the delivery
charges.
The new report, which says that Pentagon auditors have questioned $45 million of
the $365 million in costs they reviewed, may revive the battle. A spokesman for
the Defense Contract Audit Agency confirmed those figures.
Responding to the numbers, an official with Kellogg Brown & Root said, "Audits
are part of the normal contracting process, and it is important to note that the
auditors' role in the process is advisory only."
But what are likely to be seen as the most striking portions of the report are
those that cite the variously stern, heated and even anguished language of
contracting officers trying to bring the company to heel.
"As I have said in numerous meetings, KBR's lack of cost containment and funds
management is the single biggest detriment to this program," one officer, Maj.
Michael V. Waggle, wrote in the cure notice. He noted that the company had
listed an impossibly high cost overrun of $436,019,574 on one job, charges of
$114,308 for an oil spill cleanup that failed to remove any oil and another set
of tasks in which the overruns were 36.9 percent of all costs.
The slides used in presentations during the deliberations of the board that
determined the first award fee are almost equally eye-catching. On one slide,
covering the company's success at meeting its planned schedules, a section
labeled "Strengths" bears only the notation "N/A," presumably meaning no answer
or not applicable. The "Weaknesses" section contains four detailed items.
Report Adds to Criticism of Halliburton's Iraq Role, NYT, 29.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/international/middleeast/29halliburton.html
Bush Opposes Iraq's Premier, Shiites Report
March 29, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 28 — The American
ambassador has told Shiite officials that President Bush does not want the Iraqi
prime minister to remain the country's leader in the next government, senior
Shiite politicians said Tuesday.
It is the first time the Americans have directly expressed a preference in the
furious debate over the country's top job, the politicians said, and it is
inflaming tensions between the Americans and some Shiite leaders.
The ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, told the head of the main Shiite political
bloc at a meeting on Saturday to pass on a "personal message from President
Bush" to the interim prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, said Redha Jowad Taki,
a Shiite member of Parliament who was at the meeting.
Mr. Khalilzad said Mr. Bush "doesn't want, doesn't support, doesn't accept" Mr.
Jaafari as the next prime minister, according to Mr. Taki, a senior aide to
Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Shiite bloc. It was the first "clear and
direct message" from the Americans on a specific candidate for prime minister,
Mr. Taki said.
The Shiite bloc, which won a plurality in the parliamentary election in
December, nominated Mr. Jaafari last month to retain his post for four more
years.
American officials in Baghdad did not dispute the Shiite politicians' account of
the conversation, though they would not discuss the details of the meeting.
A spokeswoman for the American Embassy confirmed that Mr. Khalilzad met with Mr.
Hakim on Saturday. But she declined to comment on what was said.
"The decisions about the choice of the prime minister are entirely up to the
Iraqis," said the spokeswoman, Elizabeth Colton. "This will be an Iraqi
decision."
In Washington, the State Department said it would not comment on diplomatic
conversations, but Adam Ereli, the deputy spokesman, reiterated American support
for "a government of national unity with strong leadership that can unify all
Iraqis."
The Americans have harshly criticized the Jaafari government in recent months
for supporting Shiite militias that have been fomenting sectarian violence and
pushing Iraq closer to full-scale civil war.
Mr. Khalilzad has sharpened his criticism in the last week, saying the militias
are now killing more people than the Sunni Arab-led insurgency. American
officials have expressed growing concern that Mr. Jaafari is incapable of
reining in the private armies, especially since Moktada al-Sadr, the
anti-American cleric who leads the most volatile militia, is Mr. Jaafari's most
powerful backer.
Haider al-Ubady, a spokesman for Mr. Jaafari, said the prime minister had
received the ambassador's message and accused the Americans of trying to subvert
Iraqi sovereignty.
"How can they do this?" Mr. Ubady said. "An ambassador telling a sovereign
country what to do is unacceptable."
Tensions between Shiite leaders and the American government, which had been
rising for months, boiled over after an assault on Sunday night by American and
Iraqi forces on a Shiite mosque compound in northern Baghdad.
Shiite leaders say at least 17 civilians were killed in the battle, most of them
members of a Shiite political party. American commanders say the soldiers fought
insurgents.
The reported American pressure over Mr. Jaafari's nomination is another sign of
White House impatience over the deadlocked talks to form a new government.
American officials say the impasse has created a power vacuum that has
encouraged lawlessness and civil conflict.
The nomination has become one of the most contentious issues in those talks,
with the main Kurdish, Sunni Arab and secular blocs calling for the Shiites to
replace Mr. Jaafari. On Monday, Shiite leaders suspended their participation in
the negotiations, saying they were enraged by the assault on the mosque complex.
In Baghdad on Tuesday, at least 21 people were abducted in four separate
incidents in the biggest wave of kidnappings in a month, an Interior Ministry
official said. In one incident, 15 men in Iraqi Army uniforms dragged at least
six people from a money exchange shop and stole nearly $60,000. In two other
cases, people wearing Interior Ministry commando uniforms snatched victims from
two electronics shops.
The police in western Baghdad discovered 14 bodies on Tuesday, all killed
execution-style with gunshots to the head, apparently the latest victims of
sectarian bloodletting. On Monday, Iraqi forces found 18 bodies near Baquba with
similar wounds. Earlier reports of 30 beheaded bodies found in that area were
wrong, the Interior Ministry official said.
An American soldier was killed Tuesday by small-arms fire in Baghdad, and
another was killed and three were wounded by a roadside bomb outside Habbaniya,
the American military said.
The Iraqi security minister, Abdul Karim al-Enizi, said on the state-run Iraqiya
network on Tuesday night that the Iraqi forces who had raided the mosque
compound in Baghdad were not part of the Interior or Defense Ministry. A
survivor said the soldiers did not speak Arabic well, implying they may have
been Kurdish militiamen working with Americans, Mr. Enizi said.
At the Pentagon, senior officials defended the raid, releasing photographs they
said proved that weapons and bomb-making materials had been seized inside the
compound, which they described as a school complex that had been turned into a
base for a "hostage ring."
When the soldiers entered the compound, "they found that there was a building
there that had a small minaret and a prayer room inside it," said Gen. Peter
Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Some people are calling that a
mosque."
The surge in violence has shaken confidence in Mr. Jaafari, who has been widely
criticized by Iraqis for failing to smash the Sunni-led insurgency, letting
Shiite death squads run rampant and doing little on reconstruction.
Mr. Jaafari won the Shiite bloc's nomination for prime minister by one vote in a
secret ballot of its members of Parliament, beating out the deputy of Mr. Hakim,
the bloc's leader. As the largest bloc, with 130 of the 275 seats, the Shiites
have the right to nominate the prime minister.
But a two-thirds vote of Parliament is required for approval of the new
government. As long as the other major blocs oppose Mr. Jaafari, the process is
at a standstill.
Thom Shanker and Steven R. Weisman contributed reporting from Washington for
this article.
Bush
Opposes Iraq's Premier, Shiites Report, NYT, 29.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/international/middleeast/29iraq.html?hp&ex=1143608400&en=78384c8a9f82fae6&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Soldiers flee to Canada to avoid Iraq duty
Tuesday March 28, 2006
The Guardian
Duncan Campbell
Hundreds of deserters from the US armed forces
have crossed into Canada and are now seeking political refugee status there,
arguing that violations of the rules of war in Iraq by the US entitle them to
asylum.
A decision on a test case involving two US
servicemen is due shortly and is being watched with interest by fellow
servicemen on both sides of the border. At least 20 others have already applied
for asylum and there are an estimated 400 in Canada out of more than 9,000 who
have deserted since the conflict started in 2003.
Ryan Johnson, 22, from near Fresno in California, was due to be deployed with
his unit to Iraq in January last year but crossed the Canadian border in June
and is seeking asylum. "I had spoken to many soldiers who had been in Iraq and
who told me about innocent civilians being killed and about bombing civilian
neighbourhoods," he told the Guardian.
"It's been really great since I've been here. Generally, people have been really
hospitable and understanding, although there have been a few who have been for
the war." He is now unable to return to the US. "I don't have a problem with
that. I'm in Canada and that's that."
Mr Johnson said it was unclear exactly how many US soldiers were in Canada but
he thought 400 was a "realistic figure". He had been on speaking tours across
the country as part of a war resisters' movement and had come across other
servicemen living underground.
Jeffry House, a Toronto lawyer who represents many of the men, said that an
increasing number were seeking asylum. "There are a fair number without status
and a fair number on student visas," he said, and under UN guidelines on refugee
status they were entitled to seek asylum.
The first test cases involve Jeremy Hinzman, 26, who deserted from the 82
Airborne Division and Brandon Hughey from the 1st Cavalry Division. A decision
on their applications is due within the next few weeks. If they are turned down
the case will be taken to the federal appeal court and the Canadian supreme
court, according to Mr House, a process that would last into next year at least.
All deserters, past and present, are placed on an FBI wanted list. Earlier this
month, Allen Abney, 56, who deserted from the US marines 38 years ago during the
Vietnam war, was arrested as he crossed into the US, a journey he had taken many
times before without problem. He was held in a military jail in California for a
few days, then discharged.
"They have resuscitated long-dormant warrants," said Mr House. "I know 15 people
personally who have crossed 10 or more times without problems and then all of a
sudden they are arresting people. It seems like it would be connected to Iraq."
Lee Zaslofsky, 61, the coordinator of the War Resisters' Support Campaign in
Toronto, said that he was impressed by the young men who were seeking asylum.
"Some have been to Iraq and others have heard what goes on there," he said.
"Mainly, what they discuss is being asked to do things they consider repugnant.
Most are quite patriotic ... Many say they feel tricked by the military."
During the Vietnam war between 50,000 and 60,000 Americans crossed the border to
avoid serving.
Soldiers flee to Canada to avoid Iraq duty, G, 28.3.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1740987,00.html
Iraqi Documents Are Put on Web, and Search
Is On
March 28, 2006
The New York Times
By SCOTT SHANE
WASHINGTON, March 27 — American intelligence
agencies and presidential commissions long ago concluded that Saddam Hussein had
no unconventional weapons and no substantive ties to Al Qaeda before the 2003
invasion.
But now, an unusual experiment in public access is giving anyone with a computer
a chance to play intelligence analyst and second-guess the government. Under
pressure from Congressional Republicans, the director of national intelligence
has begun a yearlong process of posting on the Web 48,000 boxes of
Arabic-language Iraqi documents captured by American troops.
Less than two weeks into the project, and with only 600 out of possibly a
million documents and video and audio files posted, some conservative bloggers
are already asserting that the material undermines the official view. On his
blog last week, Ray Robison, a former Army officer from Alabama, quoted a
document reporting a supposed scheme to put anthrax into American leaflets
dropped in Iraq and declared triumphantly: "Saddam's W.M.D. and terrorist
connections all proven in one document!!!"
Not so, American intelligence officials say. "Our view is there's nothing in
here that changes what we know today," said a senior intelligence official, who
would discuss the program only on condition of anonymity because the director of
national intelligence, John D. Negroponte, directed his staff to avoid public
debates over the documents. "There is no smoking gun on W.M.D., Al Qaeda, those
kinds of issues."
All the documents — available on fmso.leavenworth.army.mil /products-docex.htm —
have received at least a quick review by Arabic linguists and do not alter the
government's official stance, officials say. On some tapes already released, in
fact, Mr. Hussein expressed frustration that he did not have unconventional
weapons.
Intelligence officials had serious concerns about turning loose an army of
amateurs on a warehouse full of raw documents that include hearsay,
disinformation and forgery. Mr. Negroponte's office attached a disclaimer to the
documents, only a few of which have been translated into English, saying the
government does not vouch for their authenticity.
Another administration official underscored the political logic: "If anyone in
the intelligence community thought there was valid information in those
documents that supported either of those questions — W.M.D. or Al Qaeda — they
would have shouted them from the rooftops."
But Representative Peter Hoekstra, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
who led the campaign to get the documents released, does not believe they have
gotten adequate scrutiny. He said he wanted to "unleash the power of the Net" to
do translation and analysis that might take the government decades.
"People today ought to be able to have a closer look inside Saddam's regime,"
Mr. Hoekstra, Republican of Michigan, said.
He said intelligence officials resisted posting the documents, which he overcame
by appealing to President Bush and by proposing legislation to force the
release.
The timing gives the documents a potent political charge. Public doubts about
the war have driven President Bush's approval rating to new lows. A renewed
debate over Saddam Hussein's weapons and terrorist ties could boost the
president's standing, both critics and supporters believe.
"As an historian, I'm glad to have the material out there," said John Prados,
who has written books on national security, including one that accuses the
administration of distorting pre-war intelligence. He said the records are
likely to shed new light on the Iraqi dictatorship. Some of the documents, also
included in a new study by the United States military, already have caused a
stir by suggesting that Russian officials passed American war plans to Mr.
Hussein's government as the invasion began.
But Mr. Prados said the document release "can't be divorced from the political
context. The administration is under fire for going to war when there was no
threat — so the idea here must be to say there was a threat."
That is already the assertion of a growing crowd of bloggers and translators,
almost exclusively on the right. So far they have highlighted documents that
refer to a meeting between Osama bin Laden and an Iraqi intelligence officer in
Sudan in 1995; a plan to train Arab militants as suicide bombers; and a 1997
document discussing the use of "special ammunition," chemical weapons, against
the Kurds.
But the anthrax document that intrigued Mr. Robison, the Alabama blogger, does
not seem to prove much. A message from Iraq's Al Quds Army, a regional militia
created by Mr. Hussein, to Iraqi military intelligence. It passes on reports
picked up by troops, possibly from the radio, since the information is labeled
"open source" and "impaired broadcast." No anthrax was found in Iraq by American
search teams, in leaflets or anywhere else.
"No offense, but the mainstream media tells people what they want them to know,"
said Mr. Robison, who worked in Qatar for the Iraq Survey Group, which did an
exhaustive search for weapons in Iraq.
The document release may help the president, he said, but that's not the point.
"It's not about politics," Mr. Robison said. "It's about the truth."
The truth about pre-war Iraq has proven elusive. The February 2003 presentation
by then Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the United Nations that appeared
to provide incontrovertible proof of Iraqi weapons. But the claims in the speech
have since been discredited.
Given that track record, some intelligence analysts are horrified at exactly the
idea that excites Mr. Hoekstra and the bloggers — that anyone will now be able
to interpret the documents.
"There's no quality control," said Michael Scheuer, a former Central
Intelligence Agency specialist on terrorism. "You'll have guys out there with a
smattering of Arabic drawing all kinds of crazy conclusions. Rush Limbaugh will
cherry-pick from the right, and Al Franken will cherry-pick from the left."
Conservative publications, led by The Weekly Standard, have pushed for months to
have the documents made public. In November, Mr. Hoekstra and Senator Pat
Roberts, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, asked Mr. Negroponte to
post the material on the Web.
When that request stalled, Mr. Hoekstra introduced a bill on March 3 that would
have forced the posting. Mr. Negroponte began the release two weeks later.
Under the program, documents are withheld only if they include information like
the names of Iraqis raped by the secret police, instructions for using
explosives, intelligence sources or "diplomatically sensitive" material.
In addition, the senior intelligence official said, documents known to be
forgeries are not posted. He said the database includes "a fair amount of
forgeries," sold by Iraqi hustlers or concocted by Iraqis opposed to Mr.
Hussein.
In previous Internet projects, volunteers have tested software, scanned chemical
compounds for useful drugs and even searched radiotelescope data for signals
from extraterrestrial life.
The same volunteer spirit, though with a distinct political twist, motivates the
Arabic speakers who are posting English versions of the Iraqi documents.
"I'm trying to pick up documents that shed light on the political debate," said
Joseph G. Shahda, 34, a Lebanese-born engineer who lives in a Boston suburb and
is spending hours every evening on translations for the conservative Free
Republic site. "I think we prematurely concluded there was no W.M.D. and no ties
to Al Qaeda."
Mr. Shahda said he is proud he can help make the documents public. "I live in
this great country and it's a time of war," he said. "This is the least I can
do."
Iraqi
Documents Are Put on Web, and Search Is On, NYT, 28.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/politics/28intel.html
Shiite Leaders Suspend Talks Over
Government
March 28, 2006
The New York Times
By KIRK SEMPLE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 27 — Frayed relations
between Iraq's Shiite leadership and the American authorities came under
increased strain on Monday as Shiite leaders angrily denounced a joint
American-Iraqi raid on a Shiite compound and suspended negotiations over a new
government.
The raid on Sunday evening, which killed at least 16 people, also prompted the
governor of Baghdad to announce a halt in cooperation with the American
authorities, and Shiite militiamen to brandish their weapons in the streets of
eastern Baghdad and declare their readiness to retaliate against American
troops.
The suspension of the difficult talks over the formation of a full four-year
government prolonged a power vacuum that American and Iraqi officials said had
created a fertile environment for a recent surge in lawlessness and sectarian
violence.
In the village of Kasak, between Mosul and Tal Afar, a man wrapped in explosives
detonated himself at an army recruitment center on Monday, killing at least 40
people and wounding at least 30, an official at the Interior Ministry said. The
center is situated in front of a joint American-Iraqi base, though the American
military said that no American troops had been wounded.
President Jalal Talabani said he would lead a joint Iraqi-American committee to
investigate the Sunday evening raid, as American and Iraqi authorities continued
to offer wildly conflicting accounts of it. Shiites said the victims were
civilians gathered in a mosque, while the Americans said they were insurgents
holed up in a guerrilla headquarters. Iraqi leaders said they would reassess the
pause in political talks on a day-by-day basis.
The tension between the American authorities and the Shiite political leadership
has many sources. The United States ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, has
been pressing the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a Shiite, to
crack down on Shiite militias and rid the Interior Ministry of militia
influence.
The militias, and their fighters working within the government's security
forces, have been accused of conducting a dirty war against Sunni Arabs through
kidnappings and executions, and thereby helping to push the country toward
all-out civil war.
In addition, Mr. Khalilzad has been urging the Shiite leaders to be more
politically accommodating to Sunni Arabs. In the aftermath of the bombing of a
major Shiite shrine last month, Shiite leaders began to lash out at the
ambassador for his insistence on working with the Sunnis and defended their use
of militias for self-defense.
Some Shiite leaders warned that the raid had been widely interpreted among their
constituents as a strong-arm tactic to cow them into making political
concessions, including forcing the largest Shiite bloc to drop Mr. Jaafari as
its nominee for prime minister in the new government. They demanded that the
American authorities give a public and transparent accounting of the raid.
"There was something tragically wrong, and it's got to be explained or it's
going to be seen by many to be a crackdown on certain political factions in
Iraqi politics," said Haydar al-Abadi, a top adviser to Mr. Jaafari. "We are
facing a crisis."
President Talabani said at a news conference that Gen. George W. Casey Jr.
agreed to the formation of the joint investigative committee, which was
confirmed by a spokeswoman for the American Embassy. "I will personally
supervise, and we will learn who was responsible," the president said. "Those
who are behind this attack must be brought to justice and punished."
The governor of Baghdad, Hussein al-Tahaan, said he was suspending cooperation
with the American authorities "due to the aggression that the innocent people
and worshipers were subjected to." The practical effects of the move remained
unclear, though it would likely have symbolic resonance.
The raid on Sunday happened at the Mustafa husayniyah, a small Shiite community
center and mosque in Ur, a predominantly Shiite neighborhood in northeastern
Baghdad.
The mosque, with a small minaret, is built around a central open-air courtyard
and was frequented by followers of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr and
his Mahdi Army militia. Mr. Sadr led two major armed uprisings against American
troops in 2004 and has become one of the most powerful political forces in the
country.
An imam at the mosque, Sheikh Safaa al-Tamimi, said he fled the building when
the troops arrived Sunday evening, but returned after the shooting was over and
saw bodies in several different rooms. Adel Abu al-Hassan, 34, the supervisor of
the mosque and a prayer caller, was outside the mosque during the siege but said
he, too, returned to find bodies scattered around the complex.
On Sunday, the Interior Ministry reported that an 80-year-old imam had been
among those killed at the compound.
A reporter visiting the mosque on Monday saw blood stains in rooms and on rugs
that had been hauled into the courtyard, bullet-pocked walls and even a piece of
human brain in a pool of blood on the tile floor of an office used by a Shiite
political party, the Iraq Branch of the Islamic Dawa Party.
In a conference call with reporters in Baghdad late Monday, Lt. Gen. Peter
Chiarelli, commander of the day-to-day operations of the multinational forces in
Iraq, said the building was "an office complex," and not a mosque. He said the
raid, which involved about 50 troops from the Iraqi Special Forces, assisted by
about 25 American advisers, explosives technicians and medical personnel,
singled out an insurgent group that was using the building as a base of
operations for conducting kidnappings and executions.
General Chiarelli said that as the troops approached the complex, they came
under fire from "several buildings" in the area. The troops killed 16
insurgents, wounded three, detained 18 other people, discovered a weapons
stockpile and freed a dental technician who was being held hostage there, he
said.
The soldiers were met with gunfire from many rooms in the building, American
commanders said. "The Iraqi forces did the fighting, make no bones about it,"
the general said, adding that the dead were all killed by Iraqi troops.
General Chiarelli said he did not know which organization the insurgents
represented. "What I know is that we had a terrorist organization that's
involved in executions and murders and was holding a hostage," he stated.
The general said he believed that the scene was disrupted after the raid to make
the building look like something other than a terrorist headquarters, although
he did not give details on how it was done. "After the fact someone went in and
made the scene look different than it was, for whatever purposes," he said.
But Iraqi government officials and political leaders vociferously disputed the
American command's version of events, insisting that Iraqi and American troops
had raided a mosque, not a fortified office complex, as a political party
meeting was under way and unarmed worshipers gathered for evening prayer.
Khudair al-Khuzaie, the spokesman for the Iraq Branch of the Islamic Dawa Party,
said he knew of 16 victims, all of whom had been attending a meeting in the
party's office at the time of the raid. The office is accessible through a
doorway from the mosque's courtyard. Of the victims, he said, 13 were party
members and 3 were civilians.
Jawad al-Maliki, a deputy to Prime Minister Jaafari's Dawa Party, accused the
American command of committing "an ugly crime" that "has dangerous political and
security dimensions intended to ignite the fire of civil war."
In the hours after the attack, an official in the office of Mr. Sadr claimed
that members of his Mahdi Army were among the victims. But on Monday, another
Sadr representative said no Mahdi Army fighters died in the raid.
Mahdi fighters brandishing weapons took to the streets in Ur and Sadr City in a
show of force and warned they were prepared to attack American troops. Many
accompanied a solemn and tense funeral cortege for the victims through the
streets of Ur.
But Shiite leaders, including Mr. Sadr, urged calm.
"We are ready to resist the Americans and strike their bases," vowed Katheer
Abdul-Ridha, 22, a member of the Mahdi Army, who was guarding a roadblock in
Sadr City. "The Sunnis have nothing to do with this, and we shouldn't accuse
them of everything that's going on."
Mr. Khalilzad has been pressuring Iraqi leaders to rein in the militias. On
Saturday, he declared that more Iraqis were dying from militia violence than
from the insurgency.
In the carnage at the northern recruitment center, Gen. Muhammad al-Dosaki,
deputy commander of the Third Division of the Iraqi Army, said the suicide
bomber waded into a crowd of about 70 applicants who had gathered outside the
center and detonated a vest of explosives.
And in Baghdad, Iraqi police recruits stumbled across nine bodies, all garroted,
an official in the Interior Ministry said. At least 267 bodies showing signs of
execution-style killings have been recovered in Baghdad in the past three weeks.
In southern Baghdad, a missile hit a building containing two offices of the
Shiite-led Fadhila and Dawa parties, killing 6 people and wounding 12, an Iraqi
police official in Zafaraniya said.
Reporting for this article was contributed by Khalid al-Ansary, Hosham
Hussein, Qais Mizher, Abdul Omar al-Neami and Razzaq al-Saiedi from Baghdad, and
an Iraqi employee of The New York Times from Mosul.
Shiite Leaders Suspend Talks Over Government, NYT, 28.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/28/international/middleeast/28iraq.html?hp&ex=1143522000&en=89c63d0a3fe99675&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Lifesaving knowledge, innovation emerge in
war clinic
Posted 3/27/2006 12:01 AM
USA TODAY
By Gregg Zoroya
AD DULUIYAH, Iraq — Even with 10 milligrams of
morphine, Army Sgt. Robert Mundo lay in agony after a sniper's bullet pierced
his thigh and blasted through his groin.
Mundo gripped the hand of another GI as medic
Bridgett Joseph surveyed the bloody damage. Then Joseph reached into her bag for
a bandage no other war has seen.
Made with an extract from shrimp cells, the HemCon bandage creates a tight bond
that stopped the bleeding almost instantly. Seconds later, Mundo, 24 — a widower
from Colorado Springs and the father of two young girls — was airlifted to the
Air Force Theater Hospital in Balad, 10 miles away. He got there in five
minutes.
New ways of healing are as much a product of war as are new ways of killing. To
save lives on the battlefield, medical innovations are born in days rather than
in years, military and civilian doctors say. And as with wars past, the new ways
of treating the injured and sick in Iraq and Afghanistan — soldiers such as
Mundo — could have benefits beyond the battlefield. (Related gallery: See and
hear the busiest hospital in Iraq)
Civilian emergency care experts such as Thomas Judgesay medical technicians in
the USA are beginning to use the HemCon bandage and new battlefield tourniquets
to treat trauma patients. A portable heart-lung machine developed in Germany and
not yet approved for use by U.S. doctors is helping wounded soldiers breathe.It
is small — not much larger than a laptop computer — and connects to blood
vessels in the groin to filter out poisonous carbon dioxide while filtering in
oxygen. Military doctors in Balad also are using an expensive clotting drug,
licensed for use on hemophiliacs, to help stem massive hemorrhaging in troops
torn apart by roadside bombs.
Not all advances come easily. Civilian doctors complain that the military
sometimes fails to share information on the success of a new drug or technology.
Military doctors disagree over the effectiveness of some new products. The Army,
for instance, favors the HemCon bandage even though Navy and Marine doctors
question whether it works as well as a cheaper bandage developed by the Navy.
Some innovations, such as the HemCon, result from government-sponsored research.
Others come from the ingenuity of battlefield doctors who seek new ways to use
existing medicines, or try untested technology when all else fails.
"The military has to try things that nobody has tried before," said Judge,
immediate past president of the Association of Air Medical Services, an air
ambulance trade group. "Some of the greatest advancements of medicine only come
about from war."
Controlled chaos
When Mundo arrived at Balad at 11:45 a.m. on March 5, a rickshaw-like gurney
carried him from the helipad into the controlled chaos of the Air Force Theater
Hospital emergency room. Nurses, medical technicians and doctors — some of them
with 9mm pistols slung from shoulder holsters — swarmed over each patient
wheeled inside. (They're under orders to carry weapons, even during surgery.)
As patients arrive, doctors and nurses poke,
prod and inspect; they cut away clothing, shout out blood pressure readings,
insert oxygen tubes and wheel up portable X-ray machines. Helicopter medics,
helmets under their arms, squeeze into the scrum to recite how each soldier fell
on the battlefield.
Bloody linens and body fluids collect on the floor. The clatter of arriving or
departing helicopters, beating against the hospital tents, muffles conversation.
"You got kids?" Air Force Lt. Col. Jay Bishoff, a urologist, asked Mundo. "I
have kids," Mundo answered apprehensively. "But if I get home, I may want more."
"Well," Bishoff replied, "you'll be able to have a lot more."
About 20 minutes after entering the ER, Mundo was wheeled into one of three
operating rooms. There, Bishoff began knitting the soldier back together. "We'll
rebuild everything," Bishoff said through his surgical mask. "We're going to
reconstruct it. Save it."
Simple, effective design
The Air Force hospital in Balad is one of the two largest military hospitals in
Iraq. The other is an Army facility in Baghdad. The 300 staff members at Balad
treat about 9,000 patients a year: Americans, coalition troops, Iraqis, even
captured insurgents. The caseload rivals any major trauma center in the USA,
said Air Force Col. Tyler Putnam, chief of intensive care.
Its 37,000 square feet lie under a series of tents, and surgeons here are
particularly proud of the hospital's simple design. Combat casualties pass from
emergency room to CT scan and into surgery.
"It's this 100 yards from the ER doors to the operating room. It's just a
straight shot. There are no corners, no turns — you just go straight down the
hallway," said Air Force Lt. Col. Jeffrey Bailey, 49, of St. Louis, the chief of
trauma here.
Because a major airbase sits within the Balad installation, almost all sick and
wounded Americans from across Iraq flow through the hospital on their way home.
American casualties here fall into two categories. Those with mild ailments
—kidney stones, for example — are treated and recuperate here, then return to
their units.
The severely wounded undergo surgery, then are quickly placed aboard aircraft
for flights to the Army's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. Mundo
would join this river of casualties soon.
After Mundo underwent almost two hours of surgery, his battalion and company
commanders and other soldiers visited to wish him well. They joked about his
bravely "taking one for the team." A Purple Heart and a Combat Infantryman Badge
were pinned to his pillow.
Bishoff, 44, of San Antonio, said it was the 16th groin injury he has repaired
since arriving in Iraq more than a month ago.
"Every time I do it, I get better, I get faster, I learn more," he said. "In
prior wars, he would have likely lost both of his testicles."
Doctors have learned about the extent of damage caused by high-velocity bullets
and bomb blasts. They have taught themselves how to better identify dead tissue
and reconnect what can be saved.
Applying the lessons
The lessons from treating complex battle wounds can form the basis for seminars
and published papers to educate doctors at home.
Almost every war has given rise to medical achievements. After yellow fever
killed soldiers during the Spanish-American War, military doctors were the first
to prove that mosquitoes carried the disease. Among those doctors: Maj. Walter
Reed, namesake of the famous Army hospital in Washington, D.C.
Large-scale blood transfusions began during World War I. And medical evacuations
by helicopter originated during the Korean War and became common in Vietnam.
Today, the Pentagon is asking civilian researchers to develop dehydrated blood
products that can be stored up to two years; a portable battlefield device that
stops internal bleeding with ultrasound; a non-addictive painkiller as powerful
as morphine, and prosthetics that respond to brain waves.
"Many, if not all, of these will have civilian uses," said Brett Giroir, a
deputy director at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which does
research and development for the Pentagon.
Even more important, doctors say, are further advances in trauma care, the
long-term process of saving, healing and rehabilitating the wounded and injured.
Traumatic injuries remain the No. 1 killer of Americans under age 45. The speed
and efficiency of trauma care, improved upon recently by civilian medicine, are
being pushed even further in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"Things come from civilian medicine, and then
we take it into the cauldron of the war and focus it, test it and evaluate it,
and then use it many, many, many more time than the civilians have. And then
whatever spits out in the end is better," said Army Col. John Holcomb, commander
of the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research.
At the Balad hospital, Air Force Maj. Paul "Chip" Gleason, 35, of Springboro,
Ohio, heads orthopedic surgery. Advances in body armor protect the abdomen and
upper chest of soldiers. But the legs, arms, faces and lower abdomens remain
vulnerable to bullets and explosions. Orthopedic surgeons stay busy. In surgery,
Gleason uses a small digital camera to record images for future lessons. A key
task is recognizing and removing dying tissue eviscerated by bullets or
shrapnel. Dead tissue can cause infection.
Because of endless opportunities to examine torn flesh, "I've noticed a steady
progression in my ability to judge what's viable, what's living and what's been
too damaged," Gleason said.
Back in the USA, experts such as Andrew Pollak, an associate professor of
orthopedics at the University of Maryland School of Medicine, said the knowledge
gained in Iraq will prove priceless.
"If you see these injuries in numbers of one and two, you never gain any
experience," Pollak said. "When you do a high volume ... you can teach people
what works and what didn't work."
Air Force Lt. Col. David Powers, 42, of Louisville, is a facial surgeon at
Balad. He already has helped publish a guide based on his experience treating
the wounded. One lesson: Hold off on surgery until three-dimensional models of
the face can help guide doctors on what lies beneath the damage.
A medical journey
From the moment the sniper shot Mundo in a market in Ad Duluiyah, his world
changed rapidly. After the five-minute helicopter ride to Balad and almost two
hours in surgery, he was recuperating.
By 5 a.m. the next day, he was strapped to a litter and loaded onto a C-17
aircraft headed for Germany.
The Air Force's system of using specially configured aircraft to move thousands
of casualties from war zones almost daily is another crucial innovation. The
technology didn't exist during Vietnam, the last war in which large numbers of
casualties were routinely evacuated to the USA. In those days, doctors typically
waited up to six weeks for patients to become stable enough to complete the
triphome, said Dale Smith, a professor of medical history at the Uniformed
Services University of the Health Sciences in Bethesda, Md.
Now, because of new treatment methods and technology on the aircraft, the most
critically injured patients can make the trip in a few days. "They've really
thought about this very carefully, no wasted moments, no wasted movements,"
Judge said of the military. "It's very, very focused."
He and others say the long-distance air evacuation process — with its speed and
flying care centers — would prove invaluable should a terrorist attack or
natural disaster overwhelm local medical facilities, as happened with Hurricane
Katrina last year. After Katrina, hundreds of patients from flooded hospitals
were moved to other cities by Air Force medical crews. The White House
investigation into the hurricane recommended that disaster response plans better
integrate military air evacuations
Rather than try to re-create in Iraq or Afghanistan sophisticated hospitals such
as Landstuhl, the military has built smaller field hospitals where patients are
treated and stabilized. Doctors in Iraq now leave many wounds open and
vacuum-sealed with plastic. That also was not possible in Vietnam. "Now the
sickest of sick patients can get on that airplane," said Air Force Maj. Timothy
Woods, a general surgeon at Landstuhl.
A hospital in the sky
On a recent C-17 medical evacuation flight from Balad to Landstuhl, 32 patients
rested comfortably, many of them in litters stacked three high on aluminum
racks. Among them: burn patients; an amputee; soldiers with broken bones, a
shoulder sprain and back injuries; one with a blood disorder; two psychiatric
cases; and a servicemember stricken with lung cancer. Two in critical condition
were hooked to ventilators.
Like flight attendants, the nurses, medical technicians and doctors circulated
throughout the plane, offering water, oxygen and medication to relieve the pain.
They also kept a close eye on monitors.
"The civilians are always amazed at how we do this," said Air Force Reserve Maj.
Ken Winslow, 49, a flight nurse from Issaquah, Wash.
About 65 hours after he was shot — and after a stop in Germany — Mundo arrived
at Andrews Air Force Base near Washington. From there, he headed to Walter Reed.
"It was great because I didn't really feel like I needed to be that far away
from home. I wanted to get here to Walter Reed and start doing my rehab," he
said.
Within eight days of his return, Mundo had been reunited with his daughters,
JoLyne, 3, and Shania, 1, and flew home to Colorado. The two girls had lost
their mother, Rachel, to lupus in November, just days before their father
shipped out for Iraq. In his absence, Mundo's sister-in-law, Jessie Mundo, cared
for them.
The children were thrilled to see him and curious about his wound.
"I didn't want to tell them about the sniper or anything," Mundo said. "As far
as they know, it was just a nice little doctor's shot."
Contributing: Paul Overberg, Robert Davis, Liz Szabo in McLean, Va.
Lifesaving knowledge, innovation emerge in war clinic, UT, 27.3.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-03-26-war-clinics_x.htm
Shiite Officials Express Anger Over U.S.
Clash With Militia
March 27, 2006
The New York Times
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN and JOHN O'NEIL
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 27 — Shiite officials
reacted angrily today to a clash that pitted American and Iraqi government
forces against Shiite militiamen in Baghdad on Sunday night.
Iraqi security officials Sunday night said that 17 people had been killed in a
mosque, including its 80-year-old imam. The American military, which denied that
American forces had entered the mosque, said Sunday night that 16 insurgents had
been killed and 15 captured in a combat operation near the mosque against a
terrorist cell.
But other Iraqi officials today put the death toll higher. Abdul al-Karim
al-Enzi, the national security minister, said that 37 people were killed and
charged that they were all unarmed. "Nobody fired a single shot" at the troops,
Mr. al-Enzi told Reuters.
And Interior Minister Bayan Jabr called the incident "unjustified aggression
against the faithful at prayer in a mosque," news services reported.
At a funeral procession today for victims of the clash, the mood was tense and
members of the Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to the radical Shiite cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr, kept their weapons on prominent display. Shiite leaders
demanded a full investigation of the incident, and the governor for Baghdad's
provincial government, Hussein Al-Tahan, said today that he was suspending all
cooperation with American forces until an investigation was completed.
Mr. Al-Tahan said at a press conference that he would start "restricted measures
to protect the dignity of the Iraqi citizen."
In other incidents, at least 40 Iraqis were killed today and 20 were wounded
when a car bomb exploded at a police recruiting station between the cities of
Tal Afar and Mosul in the country's north. The bodies of 45 men who had been
executed were found in three separate locations, according to Iraqi and American
officials.
Those killings came on top of the discovery of 10 bodies in Baghdad on Sunday.
But the shootout with the Shiite militiamen who have come to control much of the
capital raised tensions in a way that the steady stream of bombings and
executions did not.
In its statements after the militia clash, the American military was clearly
worried about exacerbating a combustible situation that many Iraqis are already
describing as civil war.
The differing versions of what happened seemed
to raise a broader question about who is in control of Iraq's security at a time
when Iraqi politicians still have not formed a unified government, sectarian
tensions are higher than ever and mutilated bodies keep surfacing on the
streets. American officials are now saying that Shiite militias are the No. 1
problem in Iraq, more dangerous than the Sunni-led insurgents who for nearly the
past three years have been branded the gravest security threat.
Shiite militias have been accused of running death squads that kidnap and
brutalize Sunni men, and on Sunday the American militay said the cell its forces
raided had kidnapped Iraq civilians.
But the deadly clash could reopen an old wound. The Iraqis who were killed had
apparently worked for Mr. al-Sadr, who has led several bloody rebellions against
American forces.
Mr. Sadr has recently become much more politically aggressive and he is
considered a pivotal force in the maneuvering over the delayed formation of a
new government.
Earlier on Sunday, a mortar shell nearly hit Mr. Sadr's home in the southern
holy city of Najaf. Immediately he accused the Americans of trying to kill him.
American officials have been more overt in the past week than ever in blaming
Mr. Sadr's militia for a wave of sectarian bloodshed that seems to have no end.
On Sunday night, American and Iraqi Army forces surrounded a mosque in northeast
Baghdad used by Mr. Sadr's troops as a headquarters, Iraqi officials said.
Helicopters buzzed overhead as a fleet of heavily armed Humvees sealed off the
exits, witnesses said, and when soldiers tried to enter the mosque, shooting
erupted, and a heavy-caliber gun battle raged for the next hour.
The Interior Ministry said 17 people had been killed, including the mosque's
80-year-old imam and other civilians.
Sheik Yousif al-Nasiri, an aide to Mr. Sadr, said that 25 people had been killed
and that American troops had shot the mosque guards and then burst inside and
killed civilians.
American officials provided few details about the raid on Sunday night.
A short news release said that Iraqi Special Forces soldiers, advised by
American Special Forces personnel, conducted a raid to "disrupt a terrorist
cell" and that "no mosques were entered or damaged during this operation."
The release also said no American soldiers had been hurt in the raid, and one
prisoner being held by the gunman had been freed.
Lt. Col. Jonathan Withington, an Army spokesman, said he could not comment on
any reports of civilian casualties, including the imam.
Iraqi television showed what appeared to be a prayer room filled with more than
a dozen bodies. Several looked well beyond military age. Some had identification
cards on their chests, with jagged bullet holes drilled through the plastic.
The discovery of large numbers of dead bodies is becoming more common around the
country. This morning, Iraqi police discovered 18 men, all Shiites, who had been
kidnapped from a village in Nahrawan in Diyala province northeast of Baghdad.
All of the men had been shot. A similar find — 18 men, all shot — was made in
Baquba, where earlier reports had described 30 men who had been beheaded.
On Saturday, Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, urged Iraqi leaders to
crack down on militias.
"More Iraqis are dying from the militia violence than from the terrorists," he
said. "The militias need to be under control."
Both Shiites and Sunnis have militias. But the Shiite militias are much bigger,
much better organized and, most critically, much better connected to the Iraqi
security forces.
Shiites make up a majority in Iraq, and two rounds of elections have tightened
their grip on power, including over the police and commando forces.
The widespread suspicion is that Shiite militias are running death squads and
focusing on Sunni Arab civilians in a wave of sectarian revenge.
Witnesses have said that they have seen Shiite militiamen and officers in the
Shiite-controlled police force abduct Sunni men, often in daylight and in
public. Their bodies surface days later, many tortured — eyes gouged, toes cut,
faces splashed with acid. Few, if any, cases are investigated.
Mr. Sadr has complicated the picture in two ways. His militia, called the Mahdi
Army, has shown an almost messianic zeal to fight American forces, including a
long and costly battle in Najaf in the summer of 2004.
Now, his militia is being blamed at least in part for the new problem, the death
squads.
Mr. Sadr's top aides deny any connection to the killings, but lower-level Mahdi
Army commanders have boasted of vigilante justice.
In Baghdad on Sunday, Iraqi officials said that American forces raided a small,
secret jail and found several foreign prisoners, possibly people suspected of
being terrorists. The soldiers detained the jail guards, though it is not clear
for how long, and American officials did not provide any information about the
incident.
The Associated Press quoted Interior Ministry officials as saying that the
prison was legitimate and that the detainees had not been abused. Mr. Sabr today
said that the detainees were foreigners who were being held separately from
other prisoners prior to their deportation.
American-led forces have been turning over more and more security responsibility
to the Iraqis, but there are still substantial doubts that Iraqi forces are up
to the job. American commanders have sent more troops into Baghdad in the past
few weeks and increased their patrols.
Also on Sunday, a Kurdish writer was sentenced to a year and a half in jail for
criticizing Kurdish leaders. The writer, Kamal Sayid Qadir, who also uses the
name Kamal Karim, had published stories on a Kurdish Web site accusing one of
the most powerful men in Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, of corruption.
Mr. Qadir was originally sentenced to 30 years for defaming Mr. Barzani, but he
was retried. A judge on Sunday said he was giving him a lenient sentence because
Mr. Qadir was a college professor.
Shiite Officials Express Anger Over U.S. Clash With Militia, NYT, 27.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/international/27cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1143522000&en=49997229b254a332&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Military
Shiite Fighters Clash With G.I.'s and Iraqi
Forces
March 27, 2006
The New York Times
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 26 — American and Iraqi
government forces clashed with Shiite militiamen in Baghdad on Sunday night in
the most serious confrontation in months, and Iraqi security officials said 17
people had been killed in a mosque, including its 80-year-old imam.
The American military, clearly worried about exacerbating a combustible
situation that many Iraqis are already describing as civil war, denied that
American forces had entered the mosque. But it said in a statement that 16
insurgents had been killed and 15 captured in a nearby combat operation against
a terrorist cell.
The differing versions of what happened seemed to underscore growing friction
between the American-led military forces and the fractious Iraqi government, on
a day that was punctuated with rising sectarian tensions, deepening leadership
problems and at least 40 mutilated bodies surfacing in the streets — 30 of them
beheaded.
American officials are now saying that Shiite militias are the No. 1 security
problem in Iraq, more dangerous than the Sunni-led insurgents held responsible
for many of the suicide bombings, homemade bombs, kidnappings and other attacks
since American-led forces ousted Saddam Hussein three years ago.
The deadly clash in Baghdad on Sunday could also reopen an old wound: the Iraqis
who were killed had apparently worked for Moktada al-Sadr, a young radical
Shiite cleric with ties to Iran who has led several bloody rebellions against
American forces.
In recent months Mr. Sadr has become much more politically engaged and is
considered a pivotal force in the maneuvering over the delayed formation of a
new Iraqi government.
Earlier on Sunday, Mr. Sadr's home near the southern holy city of Najaf was
apparently the intended target of a mortar attack from an unidentified source,
and he accused the Americans of trying to kill him.
American officials have been more overt in the past week than ever in blaming
Shiite militias, in particular Mr. Sadr's, for a wave of sectarian bloodshed
that seems to have no end.
American and Iraqi Army forces surrounded a mosque in northeast Baghdad on
Sunday night that is also used as a headquarters for Mr. Sadr's militia, Iraqi
officials said. Helicopters buzzed overhead as a fleet of heavily armed Humvees
sealed off the exits, witnesses said, and when soldiers tried to enter the
mosque, shooting erupted, and a heavy-caliber gun battle raged for the next
hour.
The Interior Ministry said 17 people were killed, including the mosque's
80-year-old imam and other civilians.
Sheik Yousif al-Nasiri, an aide to Mr. Sadr, said that 25 people were killed and
that American troops shot the mosque guards and then burst inside and killed
civilians.
American officials said they could not provide many details on Sunday night.
A short news release said that Iraqi Special Forces, advised by American Special
Forces, conducted a raid to "disrupt a terrorist cell" and that 16 insurgents
were killed and 15 suspects captured.
The news release said "no mosques were entered or damaged during this
operation."
Lt. Col. Jonathan Withington, an Army spokesman, said he could not comment on
any reports of civilian casualties, including the imam.
Iraqi television showed what appeared to be a prayer room filled with more than
a dozen bodies. Several of them looked well beyond military age. Some had
identification cards lying on their chests, jagged bullet holes cut through the
plastic.
Just one day earlier, Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, urged Iraqi
leaders to crack down on militias.
"More Iraqis are dying from the militia violence than from the terrorists," he
said. "The militias need to be under control."
But few expect Iraq's Shiite prime minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, to do anything
soon.
He is embroiled in negotiations over who will serve in the next government, and
despite continuous American prodding, little progress has been made.
To a large extent, Mr. Jaafari needs the support of Shiite militia members in
Parliament to hold on to his job.
Both Shiites and Sunnis have militias. But the Shiite militias are much bigger,
much better organized and, most critically, much better connected to the Iraqi
security forces.
Shiites make up a majority in Iraq, and two rounds of elections have tightened
their grip on power, including over the police and commando forces.
Tensions between Shiites and Sunnis have been steadily building, but an attack
on a Shiite shrine in Samarra on Feb. 22 unleashed a new level of sectarian
fury.
Shiite mobs rampaged through Baghdad, burning Sunni mosques and killing Sunni
civilians. Some Sunnis fought back, killing Shiites.
The situation eventually calmed, at least on the surface. Then the bodies
starting turning up. The Interior Ministry says that the bodies of at least 200
men, many handcuffed and tortured, have been found, but others put the number
much higher.
The widespread suspicion is that Shiite militias are running death squads and
focusing on Sunni Arab civilians in a wave of sectarian revenge.
Witnesses have said that they have seen Shiite militiamen and officers in the
Shiite-controlled police force abduct Sunni men, often in daylight and in
public. Their bodies surface days later, many tortured — eyes gouged, toes cut,
faces splashed with acid. Few, if any, cases are investigated.
The growing belief is that Shiite militias are trying to get even for the Shiite
civilians who have been killed by the thousands and have borne the burnt of
terrorist attacks in Iraq. Sunni terrorists are thought to be responsible, and
now it seems that Sunni civilians are paying the price.
"It's hard sometimes to sort out who's killing who," said Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch,
an American military spokesman. "But there's no doubt there's a significant
Shiite impact on all this."
Mr. Sadr has complicated the picture in two ways. His militia, called the Madhi
Army, has shown an almost messianic zeal to fight American forces, including the
long and costly battle in Najaf in the summer of 2004.
Now, his militia is being blamed at least in part for the new problem, the death
squads.
Mr. Sadr's top aides deny any connection to the killings, but lower-level Madhi
Army commanders have boasted of vigilante justice.
Two weeks ago, Madhi Army militiamen hanged four men, whom they called
terrorists, from lampposts in Baghdad.
Mr. Sadr has been quick to lash out at the Americans, whom he calls occupiers.
After the mortar attack near his home on Sunday, he said in a statement that
American forces " either overlook these attacks or they do it themselves."
The mortar wounded a child and a guard.
Other mortar attacks and bombings across Iraq on Sunday killed at least three
people, including two children.
The most gruesome report of violence for the day came from officials in Baquba,
who said Sunday evening that 30 men had been beheaded and dumped near a highway.
Interior Ministry officials said a driver discovered the bodies heaped in a pile
next to the highway that links Baghdad to Baquba, a volatile city northeast of
Baghdad that has been racked by sectarian and insurgent violence.
Iraqi Army troops waited for American support before venturing into the
insurgent-controlled area to retrieve them.
"It's too dangerous for us to go in there alone," said Tassin Tawfik, an Iraqi
Army commander.
Later, Baquba officials said they were unable to find the bodies but would
continue the search at daybreak.
In Baghdad, Iraqi officials said that American forces raided a small, secret
jail and found several foreign prisoners, possibly people suspected of being
terrorists. The soldiers detained the jail guards, though it is not clear for
how long, and American officials did not provide any information about the
incident. The Associated Press quoted Interior Ministry officials as saying that
the prison was legitimate and that the detainees had not been abused.
Also on Sunday, a Kurdish writer was sentenced to a year and a half in jail for
criticizing Kurdish leaders. The writer, Kamal Sayid Qadir, who also uses the
name Kamal Karim, had published stories on a Kurdish Web site accusing one of
the most powerful men in Kurdistan, Masoud Barzani, of corruption.
Mr. Qadir was originally sentenced to 30 years for defaming Mr. Barzani, but he
was retried. A judge on Sunday said he was giving him a lenient sentence because
Mr. Qadir was a college professor.
Shiite Fighters Clash With G.I.'s and Iraqi Forces, NYT, 27.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/international/middleeast/27iraq.html?hp&ex=1143435600&en=2576108f335c6b89&ei=5094&partner=homepage
In an Election Year, a Shift in
Public Opinion on the War NYT
27.3.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/politics/27war.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
In an Election Year, a Shift in Public
Opinion on the War
March 27, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK and ADAM NAGOURNEY
ALBUQUERQUE, March 25 — Neil Mondragon watched
with approval at an auto repair shop recently as Representative Heather A.
Wilson, a New Mexico Republican visiting her district, dropped into the pit and
drained the oil from a car.
Afterward, Mr. Mondragon recalled how he had backed Ms. Wilson, a supporter of
the Iraq war, in her race for Congress two years ago. He, too, supported the
war.
But now, Mr. Mondragon said, it is time to bring the troops home. And he is
leaning toward voting for Ms. Wilson's opponent, Patricia Madrid, who has called
for pulling the troops out of Iraq by the end of the year.
"The way I see the situation is, we have done what we had to," said Mr.
Mondragon, 27, whose brother fought in the war and returned with post-traumatic
stress disorder. "I don't see the point of having so many guys over there right
now. We can't just stay there and baby-sit forever."
Mr. Mondragon is far from alone in reassessing his view of the war that has come
to define George W. Bush's presidency.
Mr. Bush is pressing ahead with an intensified effort to shore up support for
the war, but an increasingly skeptical and pessimistic public is putting
pressure on Congress about the wisdom behind it, testing the political support
for the White House's determination to remain in Iraq.
The results have been on display over the past week as members of Congress
returned home and heard first-hand what public opinion polls have been
indicating.
"We have been there now for three years, and we have suffered more losses than I
think most people thought we would see," Representative Steve Chabot, an Ohio
Republican from a relatively conservative district near Cincinnati, said in an
interview on Friday. "You may have the president or others now who say we always
knew this would be a long slog, but I think most people did not expect it to be
as hard as it has been."
In Connecticut, Representative Christopher Shays, a Republican who is one of the
Democrats' top targets this year in the midterm elections, has distanced himself
from the White House even as he has emphasized his support for the war, saying
the administration has made "huge mistakes" by allowing looting, disbanding the
Iraqi army and failing to have enough troops on the ground
Senator Mike DeWine, an Ohio Republican who is also facing a tough re-election
challenge, said that "people are not optimistic about what they see."
Even Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Florida Republican who has made her
support for the war a centerpiece of her campaign, said the public seemed "to be
losing patience" with the war.
Interviews with voters, elected officials and candidates around the country
suggest a deepening and hardening opposition to the war. Historians and analysts
said this might mark a turning point in public perception.
"I'm less optimistic because I see the fatalities every day," said Angela Kirby,
32, a lawyer from St. Louis who initially supported the war. "And the longer it
goes on, the less optimistic I am."
Here in New Mexico, Dollie Shoun, 67, said she had gone from being an ardent
supporter of the war and the president to a fierce critic of both.
"There has been too many deaths, and it is time for them to come back home," Ms.
Shoun said. Speaking of Mr. Bush, she added: "I was very much for him, but I
don't trust him at this point in time."
Polls have found that support for the war and expectations about its outcome
have reached their lowest level since the invasion. A Pew Research Center poll
this week found that 66 percent of respondents said the United States was losing
ground in preventing a civil war in Iraq, a jump of 18 percent since January.
The Pew poll also found that 49 percent now believed that the United States
would succeed in Iraq, compared with 60 percent last July. A CBS News poll
completed two weeks ago found that a majority (54 percent) believed Iraq would
never become a stable democracy.
Richard B. Wirthlin, who was the pollster for President Ronald Reagan, says he
sees the beginning of a decisive turn in public opinion against the war. "It is
hard for me to imagine any set of circumstances that would lead to an
enhancement of the public support that we have seen," he said. "It is more
likely to go down, and the question is how far and how fast."
Even more problematic for the administration, pollsters have found, is that
Americans who have soured on the war include many independent voters and some
self-described Republicans.
William Kristol, editor of the conservative Weekly Standard, argued that views
on the war remained fluid and that the White House could still rally support for
the effort if Americans "are convinced we can win."
A perception of progress on the ground could help turn public opinion back
toward Mr. Bush's way, some analysts said. As it is, a significant number of
Americans, including a majority of Republicans, want Mr. Bush to continue the
war.
"Bush is right in being optimistic," said Susan Knapp, 64, a Florida Republican.
"I listened to the news this morning and there are people who think he's out of
touch with reality, but in fact I think he knows better than most of us about
what is going on, and he does know the situation."
And in interviews, some respondents said they agreed with Mr. Bush and Vice
President Dick Cheney that journalists were exaggerating the bad news. "I have
quite a few friends who have served over there and they come back with a
different story than the media portrays," said Jerry Brown, a Republican in
Fairfield County, Conn.
For Mr. Bush today, as it was for Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M.
Nixon decades ago, the question is how long can he continue fighting an
unpopular war without it crippling his presidency by eroding trust in his
judgment and credibility.
"Once the public loses confidence in a president's leadership at a time of war,
once they don't trust him anymore, once his credibility is sharply diminished,
how does he get it back?" said Robert Dallek, a historian who has written
biographies of Johnson and Nixon.
The anxiety about the war could be seen in contested districts around the
country. In recent weeks, Representative Wilson of New Mexico has been sharply
critical of the administration on issues like domestic surveillance and its
public projections about the war. Ms. Wilson said she worried that public
opinion could turn decisively against the war in Iraq as it did during the
Vietnam War. "Wasn't it Kissinger who said the acid test of foreign policy is
public support?" she said.
In Connecticut, Diane Farrell, a Democrat challenging Mr. Shays, said she had
consistently run into voters who drew comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam.
"People are throwing up their hands between the civil unrest, the number of
deaths and the cost to taxpayers," Ms. Farrell said. "People feel worn out by
the war, and they don't see an end. "
At the Capitol recently, Senator John W. Warner, a Virginia Republican who was
the secretary of the Navy during part of the Vietnam War, was introduced to a
visiting Iraqi. Mr. Warner proceeded to lecture her about the need for Iraqis to
form a new government, and fast.
"The American people have a mind of their own," he told her, recalling how he
watched during the Vietnam War as public opinion turned against the conflict —
and inevitably Congress followed. In a later conversation, Mr. Warner said that
such a moment had not been reached yet, but he warned that he sensed a "certain
degree of impatience" in the country and around the world.
David D. Kirkpatrick reported from Albuquerque, N.M., for this article, and
Adam Nagourney from Washington. Reporting was contributed by Coke Ellington in
Alabama, Ellen F. Harris in St. Louis, Stacey Stowe in Connecticut, and Andrea
Zarate in Miami.
In an
Election Year, a Shift in Public Opinion on the War, NYT, 27.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/politics/27war.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Leaders
Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by
British Adviser Says
March 27, 2006
The New York Times
By DON VAN NATTA Jr.
LONDON — In the weeks before the United
States-led invasion of Iraq, as the United States and Britain pressed for a
second United Nations resolution condemning Iraq, President Bush's public
ultimatum to Saddam Hussein was blunt: Disarm or face war.
But behind closed doors, the president was certain that war was inevitable.
During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made
clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade
Iraq without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors
failed to find unconventional weapons, said a confidential memo about the
meeting written by Mr. Blair's top foreign policy adviser and reviewed by The
New York Times.
"Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," David
Manning, Mr. Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at the time, wrote in the memo
that summarized the discussion between Mr. Bush, Mr. Blair and six of their top
aides.
"The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10 March," Mr.
Manning wrote, paraphrasing the president. "This was when the bombing would
begin."
The timetable came at an important diplomatic moment. Five days after the
Bush-Blair meeting, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was scheduled to appear
before the United Nations to present the American evidence that Iraq posed a
threat to world security by hiding unconventional weapons.
Although the United States and Britain aggressively sought a second United
Nations resolution against Iraq — which they failed to obtain — the president
said repeatedly that he did not believe he needed it for an invasion.
Stamped "extremely sensitive," the five-page memorandum, which was circulated
among a handful of Mr. Blair's most senior aides, had not been made public.
Several highlights were first published in January in the book "Lawless World,"
which was written by a British lawyer and international law professor, Philippe
Sands. In early February, Channel 4 in London first broadcast several excerpts
from the memo.
Since then, The New York Times has reviewed the five-page memo in its entirety.
While the president's sentiments about invading Iraq were known at the time, the
previously unreported material offers an unfiltered view of two leaders on the
brink of war, yet supremely confident.
The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition
to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush
predicted that it was "unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the
different religious and ethnic groups." Mr. Blair agreed with that assessment.
The memo also shows that the president and the prime minister acknowledged that
no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq. Faced with the possibility
of not finding any before the planned invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several
ways to provoke a confrontation, including a proposal to paint a United States
surveillance plane in the colors of the United Nations in hopes of drawing fire,
or assassinating Mr. Hussein.
Those proposals were first reported last month in the British press, but the
memo does not make clear whether they reflected Mr. Bush's extemporaneous
suggestions, or were elements of the government's plan.
Consistent Remarks
Two senior British officials confirmed the authenticity of the memo, but
declined to talk further about it, citing Britain's Official Secrets Act, which
made it illegal to divulge classified information. But one of them said, "In all
of this discussion during the run-up to the Iraq war, it is obvious that viewing
a snapshot at a certain point in time gives only a partial view of the
decision-making process."
On Sunday, Frederick Jones, the spokesman for the National Security Council,
said the president's public comments were consistent with his private remarks
made to Mr. Blair. "While the use of force was a last option, we recognized that
it might be necessary and were planning accordingly," Mr. Jones said.
"The public record at the time, including numerous statements by the President,
makes clear that the administration was continuing to pursue a diplomatic
solution into 2003," he said. "Saddam Hussein was given every opportunity to
comply, but he chose continued defiance, even after being given one final
opportunity to comply or face serious consequences. Our public and private
comments are fully consistent."
The January 2003 memo is the latest in a series of secret memos produced by top
aides to Mr. Blair that summarize private discussions between the president and
the prime minister. Another group of British memos, including the so-called
Downing Street memo written in July 2002, showed that some senior British
officials had been concerned that the United States was determined to invade
Iraq, and that the "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy"
by the Bush administration to fit its desire to go to war.
The latest memo is striking in its characterization of frank, almost casual,
conversation by Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair about the most serious subjects. At one
point, the leaders swapped ideas for a postwar Iraqi government. "As for the
future government of Iraq, people would find it very odd if we handed it over to
another dictator," the prime minister is quoted as saying.
"Bush agreed," Mr. Manning wrote. This exchange, like most of the quotations in
this article, have not been previously reported.
Mr. Bush was accompanied at the meeting by Condoleezza Rice, who was then the
national security adviser; Dan Fried, a senior aide to Ms. Rice; and Andrew H.
Card Jr., the White House chief of staff. Along with Mr. Manning, Mr. Blair was
joined by two other senior aides: Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, and
Matthew Rycroft, a foreign policy aide and the author of the Downing Street
memo.
By late January 2003, United Nations inspectors had spent six weeks in Iraq
hunting for weapons under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 1441,
which authorized "serious consequences" if Iraq voluntarily failed to disarm.
Led by Hans Blix, the inspectors had reported little cooperation from Mr.
Hussein, and no success finding any unconventional weapons.
At their meeting, Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair candidly expressed their doubts that
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be found in Iraq in the coming
weeks, the memo said. The president spoke as if an invasion was unavoidable. The
two leaders discussed a timetable for the war, details of the military campaign
and plans for the aftermath of the war.
Discussing Provocation
Without much elaboration, the memo also says the president raised three possible
ways of provoking a confrontation. Since they were first reported last month,
neither the White House nor the British government has discussed them.
"The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover
over Iraq, painted in U.N. colours," the memo says, attributing the idea to Mr.
Bush. "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."
It also described the president as saying, "The U.S. might be able to bring out
a defector who could give a public presentation about Saddam's W.M.D," referring
to weapons of mass destruction.
A brief clause in the memo refers to a third possibility, mentioned by Mr. Bush,
a proposal to assassinate Saddam Hussein. The memo does not indicate how Mr.
Blair responded to the idea.
Mr. Sands first reported the proposals in his book, although he did not use any
direct quotations from the memo. He is a professor of international law at
University College of London and the founding member of the Matrix law office in
London, where the prime minister's wife, Cherie Blair, is a partner.
Mr. Jones, the National Security Council spokesman, declined to discuss the
proposals, saying, "We are not going to get into discussing private discussions
of the two leaders."
At several points during the meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair, there was
palpable tension over finding a legitimate legal trigger for going to war that
would be acceptable to other nations, the memo said. The prime minister was
quoted as saying it was essential for both countries to lobby for a second
United Nations resolution against Iraq, because it would serve as "an insurance
policy against the unexpected."
The memo said Mr. Blair told Mr. Bush, "If anything went wrong with the military
campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning the oil wells, killing
children or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq, a second resolution would
give us international cover, especially with the Arabs."
Running Out of Time
Mr. Bush agreed that the two countries should attempt to get a second
resolution, but he added that time was running out. "The U.S. would put its full
weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would twist arms and even
threaten," Mr. Bush was paraphrased in the memo as saying.
The document added, "But he had to say that if we ultimately failed, military
action would follow anyway."
The leaders agreed that three weeks remained to obtain a second United Nations
Security Council resolution before military commanders would need to begin
preparing for an invasion.
Summarizing statements by the president, the memo says: "The air campaign would
probably last four days, during which some 1,500 targets would be hit. Great
care would be taken to avoid hitting innocent civilians. Bush thought the impact
of the air onslaught would ensure the early collapse of Saddam's regime. Given
this military timetable, we needed to go for a second resolution as soon as
possible. This probably meant after Blix's next report to the Security Council
in mid-February."
Mr. Blair was described as responding that both countries would make clear that
a second resolution amounted to "Saddam's final opportunity." The memo described
Mr. Blair as saying: "We had been very patient. Now we should be saying that the
crisis must be resolved in weeks, not months."
It reported: "Bush agreed. He commented that he was not itching to go to war,
but we could not allow Saddam to go on playing with us. At some point, probably
when we had passed the second resolutions — assuming we did — we should warn
Saddam that he had a week to leave. We should notify the media too. We would
then have a clear field if Saddam refused to go."
Mr. Bush devoted much of the meeting to outlining the military strategy. The
president, the memo says, said the planned air campaign "would destroy Saddam's
command and control quickly." It also said that he expected Iraq's army to "fold
very quickly." He also is reported as telling the prime minister that the
Republican Guard would be "decimated by the bombing."
Despite his optimism, Mr. Bush said he was aware that "there were uncertainties
and risks," the memo says, and it goes on, "As far as destroying the oil wells
were concerned, the U.S. was well equipped to repair them quickly, although this
would be easier in the south of Iraq than in the north."
The two men briefly discussed plans for a post-Hussein Iraqi government. "The
prime minister asked about aftermath planning," the memo says. "Condi Rice said
that a great deal of work was now in hand.
Referring to the Defense Department, it said: "A planning cell in D.O.D. was
looking at all aspects and would deploy to Iraq to direct operations as soon as
the military action was over. Bush said that a great deal of detailed planning
had been done on supplying the Iraqi people with food and medicine."
Planning for After the War
The leaders then looked beyond the war, imagining the transition from Mr.
Hussein's rule to a new government. Immediately after the war, a military
occupation would be put in place for an unknown period of time, the president
was described as saying. He spoke of the "dilemma of managing the transition to
the civil administration," the memo says.
The document concludes with Mr. Manning still holding out a last-minute hope of
inspectors finding weapons in Iraq, or even Mr. Hussein voluntarily leaving
Iraq. But Mr. Manning wrote that he was concerned this could not be accomplished
by Mr. Bush's timeline for war.
"This makes the timing very tight," he wrote. "We therefore need to stay closely
alongside Blix, do all we can to help the inspectors make a significant find,
and work hard on the other members of the Security Council to accept the
noncooperation case so that we can secure the minimum nine votes when we need
them, probably the end of February."
At a White House news conference following the closed-door session, Mr. Bush and
Mr. Blair said "the crisis" had to be resolved in a timely manner. "Saddam
Hussein is not disarming," the president told reporters. "He is a danger to the
world. He must disarm. And that's why I have constantly said — and the prime
minister has constantly said — this issue will come to a head in a matter of
weeks, not months."
Despite intense lobbying by the United States and Britain, a second United
Nations resolution was not obtained. The American-led military coalition invaded
Iraq on March 19, 2003, nine days after the target date set by the president on
that late January day at the White House.
Bush
Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says, NYT, 27.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/international/europe/27memo.html?hp&ex=1143435600&en=b6593aee0e01d384&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Iraqis killed by US troops ‘on rampage’
March 26, 2006
The Sunday Times
Hala Jaber and Tony Allen-Mills, New York
Claims of atrocities by soldiers mount
THE villagers of Abu Sifa near the Iraqi town
of Balad had become used to the sound of explosions at night as American forces
searched the area for suspected insurgents. But one night two weeks ago Issa
Harat Khalaf heard a different sound that chilled him to the bone.
Khalaf, a 33-year-old security officer guarding oil pipelines, saw a US
helicopter land near his home. American soldiers stormed out of the Chinook and
advanced on a house owned by Khalaf’s brother Fayez, firing as they went.
Khalaf ran from his own house and hid in a nearby grove of trees. He saw the
soldiers enter his brother’s home and then heard the sound of women and children
screaming.
“Then there was a lot of machinegun fire,” he said last week. After that there
was the most frightening sound of all — silence, followed by explosions as the
soldiers left the house.
Once the troops were gone, Khalaf and his fellow villagers began a frantic
search through the ruins of his brother’s home. Abu Sifa was about to join a
lengthening list of Iraqi communities claiming to have suffered from American
atrocities.
According to Iraqi police, 11 bodies were pulled from the wreckage of the house,
among them four women and five children aged between six months and five years.
An official police report obtained by a US reporter for Knight Ridder newspapers
said: “The American forces gathered the family members in one room and executed
11 people.”
The Abu Sifa deaths on March 15 were first reported last weekend on the day that
Time magazine published the results of a 10-week investigation into an incident
last November when US marines killed 15 civilians in their homes in the western
Iraqi town of Haditha.
The two incidents are being investigated by US authorities, but persistent
eyewitness accounts of rampaging attacks by American troops are fuelling human
rights activists’ concerns that Pentagon commanders are failing to curb military
excesses in Iraq.
The Pentagon claims to have investigated at least 600 cases of alleged abuse by
American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to have disciplined or punished
230 soldiers for improper behaviour. But a study by three New York-based human
rights groups, due to be published next month, will claim that most soldiers
found guilty of abuse received only “administrative” discipline such as loss of
rank or pay, confinement to base or periods of extra duty.
Of the 76 courts martial that the Pentagon is believed to have initiated, only a
handful are known to have resulted in jail sentences of more than a year —
notably including the architects of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.
Most other cases ended with sentences of two, three or four months. “That’s not
punishment, and that’s the problem,” said John Sifton of Human Rights Watch,
which is compiling the study with two other groups.
“Our concern is that abuses in the field are not being robustly investigated and
prosecuted, and that they are not setting an example with people who cross the
line,” said Sifton. “There is a clear preference by the military for discipline
with administrative and non-judicial punishments instead of courts martial. That
sends the message that you can commit abuse and get away with it.”
Yet the evidence from Haditha and Abu Sifa last week suggested that the Pentagon
is finding it increasingly difficult to dismiss allegations of violent excesses
as propaganda by terrorist sympathisers.
It was on November 19 last year that a US marine armoured vehicle struck a
roadside bomb that killed a 20-year-old lance-corporal. According to a marine
communiqué issued the next day, the blast also killed 15 Iraqi civilians and was
followed by an attack on the US convoy in which eight insurgents were killed.
An investigation by Time established that the civilians had not been killed by
the roadside bomb, but were shot in their homes after the marines rampaged
through Haditha. Among the dead were seven women and three children.
One eyewitness told Time: “I watched them shoot my grandfather, first in the
chest and then in the head. Then they killed my granny.”
A Pentagon inquiry has reportedly confirmed that the civilians were killed by
marines. But it said the deaths were the result of “collateral damage” and not,
as some villagers alleged, murder by marines taking revenge for the death of
their comrade. The case has been handed over to the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service to determine if the rules of war were broken.
In Abu Sifa last week, Khalaf’s account was corroborated by a neighbour, Hassan
Kurdi Mahassen, who was also woken by the sound of helicopters and saw soldiers
entering Fayez’s home after spraying it with such heavy fire that walls
crumbled.
Mahassen said that once the soldiers had left — after apparently dropping
several grenades that caused part of the house to collapse — villagers searched
under the rubble “and found them all buried in one room”.
“Women and even the children were blindfolded and their hands bound. Some of
their faces were totally disfigured. A lot of blood was on the floors and the
walls.”
Khalaf said he had found the body of his mother Turkiya with her face
unrecognisable. “She had been shot with a dumdum bullet,” he claimed.
While many allegations of US atrocities have later turned out to be exaggerated
or false, the Abu Sifa incident was supported by hospital autopsy reports that
said all the victims had died from bullet wounds. A local Iraqi police commander
— supposedly co-operating with US forces — confirmed that the bodies had been
found with their wrists tied.
The US military put the number of civilians killed at four: two women, a child
and a man. A spokesman said troops had gone to the house in response to a tip
that a member of Al-Qaeda was there. The terrorist was found and arrested. The
spokesman insisted that coalition forces “take every precaution to keep
civilians out of harm’s way” and that it was “highly unlikely” that the Abu Sifa
allegations were true.
Some villagers were quoted as confirming that an Al-Qaeda member was visiting
the house. “But was my six-month-old nephew a member of Al-Qaeda?” asked Khalaf.
“Was my 75-year-old mother also from that organisation?” While the Pentagon is
investigating the incident, the soldiers involved remain on active duty.
Sifton acknowledged that human rights activists needed to distinguish between
cases of detainee abuse — invariably carried out in cold blood — and incidents
that occur on a dangerous and volatile battlefield.
“We are not unsympathetic to the stresses of battlefield situations,” he said.
“There’s a saying in the military that it’s better to be judged by 12 (a jury)
than be carried by six (coffin-bearers). We would hesitate to second-guess a
soldier’s reactions under fire. But there’s a limit to how much leniency you can
give troops because of the fog of war. You can’t give the US military a free
pass.”
He added: “If they are pissed off because a buddy got killed and they want
revenge, that’s a violation of the rules of war.”
Senior officers have argued that insurgents are targeting the civilian
population in order to blame coalition forces, and that troops are trained to
take all reasonable precautions to prevent civilian casualties while defending
themselves against attack.
The problem for the Pentagon is that every new incident involving civilian
deaths triggers a new wave of anti-American fervour.
Last week Jalal Abdul Rahman told this newspaper about the death in January of
his 12- year-old son Abdul. It was a Sunday evening and father and son were
driving home after buying a new game for the boy’s PlayStation.
They were a few hundred yards from their home in the Karkh neighbourhood of
Baghdad when — according to Rahman — US forces opened fire on the car, killing
Abdul.
Soldiers approached the car and told Rahman he had failed to stop when ordered
to do so. Rahman said he had never heard an order to stop. The soldiers searched
the car and, as they departed, they threw a black body bag on the ground.
“They said, ‘This is for your son,’ and they left me there with my dead son,” he
added.
Rahman claimed he had had nothing to do with the insurgency until that moment.
“But this is America, the so-called guardian of humanity, and killing people for
them is like drinking water. I shall go after them until I avenge the blood of
my son.”
Additional reporting: Ali Abdul Rahman, Abu Sifa,
and Hamoudi Saffar and Ali Rifat, Baghdad
SPIES JUST CONFUSED SADDAM
A stream of US military intelligence allegedly passed to Saddam Hussein by
Russian spies before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was either ignored or served to
confuse him, according to former Republican Guard commanders, writes Tony
Allen-Mills.
One commander told the Pentagon that Saddam and his sons dismissed accurate
warnings that the main US force was bypassing southern cities and striking
directly at Baghdad.
The leaks appeared to have served the coalition cause so successfully that
military analysts speculated that they were part of a deliberate strategy of
“fog generation” aimed at “obscuring the minds of Iraq’s senior leadership”.
Iraqis killed by US troops ‘on rampage’, STs, 26.3.2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-2103695,00.html
Bound, Blindfolded and Dead: The Face of
Atrocity in Baghdad NYT
26.3.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/26/international/middleeast/26bodies.html?hp&ex=1143435600&en=94974425090a0c2a&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Bound, Blindfolded and Dead: The Face of
Atrocity in Baghdad
March 26, 2006
The New York Times
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 25 — Mohannad al-Azawi
had just finished sprinkling food in his bird cages at his pet shop in southern
Baghdad, when three carloads of gunmen pulled up.
In front of a crowd, he was grabbed by his shirt and driven off.
Mr. Azawi was among the few Sunni Arabs on the block, and, according to
witnesses, when a Shiite friend tried to intervene, a gunman stuck a pistol to
his head and said, "You want us to blow your brains out, too?"
Mr. Azawi's body was found the next morning at a sewage treatment plant. A
slight man who raised nightingales, he had been hogtied, drilled with power
tools and shot.
In the last month, hundreds of men have been kidnapped, tortured and executed in
Baghdad. As Iraqi and American leaders struggle to avert a civil war, the bodies
keep piling up. The city's homicide rate has tripled from 11 to 33 a day,
military officials said. The period from March 7 to March 21 was typically
brutal: at least 191 bodies, many mutilated, surfaced in garbage bins, drainage
ditches, minibuses and pickup trucks.
There were the four Duleimi brothers, Khalid, Tarek, Taleb and Salaam, seized
from their home in front of their wives. And Achmed Abdulsalam, last seen at a
checkpoint in his freshly painted BMW and found dead under a bridge two days
later. And Mushtak al-Nidawi, a law student nicknamed Titanic for his Leonardo
DiCaprio good looks, whose body was returned to his family with his skull
chopped in half.
What frightens Iraqis most about these gangland-style killings is the impunity.
According to reports filed by family members and more than a dozen interviews,
many men were taken in daylight, in public, with witnesses all around. Few
cases, if any, have been investigated.
Part of the reason may be that most victims are Sunnis, and there is growing
suspicion that they were killed by Shiite death squads backed by government
forces in a cycle of sectarian revenge. That allegation has been circulating in
Baghdad for months, and as more Sunnis turn up dead, more people are inclined to
believe it.
"This is sectarian cleansing," said Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of
Parliament, who has maintained a degree of neutrality between Shiites and
Sunnis.
Mr. Othman said there were atrocities on each side. "But what is different is
when Shiites get killed by suicide bombs, everyone comes together to fight the
Sunni terrorists," he said. "When Shiites kill Sunnis, there is no response,
because much of this killing is done by militias connected to the government."
The imbalance of killing, and the suspicion the government may be involved, is
deepening the Shiite-Sunni divide, just as American officials are urging Sunni
and Shiite leaders to form an inclusive government, hoping that such a show of
unity will prevent a full-scale civil war.
The pressure is increasing on Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a Shiite, but
few expect him to crack down, partly because he needs the support of the Shiite
militias to stay in power.
Haidar al-Ibadi, Mr. Jaafari's spokesman, acknowledged that "some of the police
forces have been infiltrated." But he said "outsiders," rather than Iraqis, were
to blame.
Now many Sunnis, who used to be the most anti-American community in Iraq, are
asking for American help.
"If the Americans leave, we are finished," said Hassan al-Azawi, whose brother
was taken from the pet shop.
He thought for a moment more.
"We may be finished already."
The human rights office of the Iraqi Islamic Party, a mostly Sunni group, has
cataloged more than 540 cases of Sunni men and a few of Sunni women who were
kidnapped and killed since Feb. 22, when a Shiite shrine in Samarra was
destroyed, unleashing a wave of sectarian fury.
As the case of Mr. Azawi shows, some were easy targets.
Mr. Azawi was the youngest of five brothers. He was 27 and lived with his
parents. He loved birds since he was a boy. Nightingales were his favorite. Then
canaries, pigeons and doves.
During Saddam Hussein's reign, he was drafted into the army, but he deserted.
"He was crazy about birds," said a Shiite neighbor, Ibrahim Muhammad.
A few years ago, Mr. Azawi opened a small pet shop in Dawra, a rough-and-tumble,
mostly Shiite neighborhood in southern Baghdad.
Friends said that Mr. Azawi was not interested in politics or religion. He never
went to the Sunni mosque, though his brothers did. He did not pay attention to
news or watch television. That characteristic might have cost him his life.
On Feb. 22, the Askariya Shrine in Samarra was attacked at 7 a.m. But Mr. Azawi
did not know what had happened until 4 p.m., his friends said. He was in his own
little world, tending his birds, when a Shiite shopkeeper broke the news and
told him to close. He stayed in his house for three days after that. His friends
said he was terrified.
The day of the shrine attack, Shiite mobs began rampaging through Baghdad,
burning Sunni mosques and slaughtering Sunni residents. Some Sunnis struck back
and killed Shiites. The mayhem claimed hundreds of lives and exposed tensions
that until then had been bubbling just beneath the surface.
Two Shiite militias, the Badr Organization, which once trained in Iran, and the
Mahdi Army, the foot soldiers of a young, firebrand Shiite cleric, Moktada
al-Sadr, were blamed for much of the bloodshed. Mr. Sadr's men often wear
all-black uniforms, and many of the relatives of kidnapped people said men in
black uniforms had taken them. Many people also said the men in black arrived
with the police.
Around 9 on the night of the shrine bombing, a mob of black-clad men surrounded
the Duleimi brothers, family members said.
The brothers lived in New Baghdad, a working-class neighborhood that is mostly
Shiite. They were all gardeners and religious men who prayed five times a day.
They had relatives in Falluja, in the heart of Sunni territory.
Where a family hails from in Iraq often reveals whether it is Sunni or Shiite.
Nowadays, because of the sectarian friction, people are increasingly aware of
the slight regional differences in accent, dress and name. Some first names,
like Omar for Sunnis, or Haidar for Shiites, are clear giveaways. Others, like
Khalid, are not. Tribal names can also be a sign.
A cousin of the Duleimi brothers, who identified himself as Khalaf, said the
four men were taken at gunpoint from the small house they shared. The next day,
their bodies turned up in a drainage ditch near Sadr City, a stronghold of the
Mahdi Army. All their fingers and toes had been sawed off.
That same day Mushtak al-Nidawi, 20, was kidnapped. According to an aunt, Aliah
al-Bakr, he was chatting on his cellphone outside his home in Bayah when a squad
of Mahdi militiamen marched up the street, shouting, "We're coming after you,
Sunnis!"
Ms. Bakr said they snatched Mr. Nidawi while his mother stood at the door. His
body surfaced on the streets seven days later, his skin a map of bruises, his
handsome face burned by acid, his fingernails pulled out.
"I told his mother he was shot," Ms. Bakr said.
Sheik Kamal al-Araji, a spokesman for Mr. Sadr, said "the Mahdi Army does not
commit such crimes."
He also said the militiamen would soon change their uniforms so they would no
longer be confused with thugs.
The question of who exactly is behind these collective assassinations has become
a delicate political issue. So has the disparity in the killings.
Many Sunni politicians, including secular ones like Methal al-Alusi, accuse the
Shiite-led government of backing a campaign to wipe out Sunnis. Many Shiite
leaders, including Prime Minister Jaafari, blame "foreign terrorists," without
being more specific. It seems that Shiite militias, unable to strike back
against the presumably Sunni suicide bombers who kill Shiite civilians, are now
victimizing Sunni civilians. There is no evidence that the Sunnis who have been
kidnapped and killed are connected to terrorists.
Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador, is now saying that militias are
Iraq's No. 1 security threat. But he has been careful to paint the problem in
broad strokes, implying both sides are at fault.
There are a few Shiite victims, like Mohammed Jabbar Hussein, who lived in a
mostly Sunni area west of Baghdad. He disappeared on Feb. 26 and was found four
days later, shot in the head.
But the militias under the greatest suspicion, and the ones with the strongest
ties to the government, are Shiite. Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, a spokesman for the
American military, said Shiite militias have played a role in the killings and
"the government of Iraq has to take action."
Then there is the question of prosecution. While countless Sunni insurgents have
been arrested and tried on murder charges, very few Shiite militiamen have been
apprehended.
Thamir al-Janabi, who is in charge of the Interior Ministry's criminal
investigation department, declined to comment. So did several other Interior
Ministry officials.
A new round of revenge attacks began March 12, around 6 p.m., when a string of
car bombs exploded in Sadr City, killing nearly 50 civilians. Most security
officials, Shiite and Sunni, blamed Sunni terrorists.
An hour and a half later, half a dozen gunmen arrived at Mr. Azawi's pet shop.
Wisam Saad Nawaf was playing pool across the street. He said that a man wearing
a ski mask arrived with the gunmen, who were not wearing masks, and that when
they grabbed Mr. Azawi, the masked man nodded. "He must have been an informant
from the neighborhood," Mr. Nawaf explained.
Mr. Azawi got into a car. The gunmen closed the doors. The next morning Mr.
Azawi's body was found at the sewage plant. Autopsy photos showed how badly he
had been abused. His skin was covered with purple welts. His legs and face had
drill holes in them. Both shoulders had been broken.
His brother Hassan carries the autopsy photos with him, along with a pistol. "I
cannot live without vengeance," he said.
Hassan said there were a few Shiites at his brother's funeral, which he took as
a grim speck of hope.
One week later, on March 20, the body of Mr. Abdulsalam, another Sunni, was
found under a bridge. Mr. Abdulsalam, 21, worked with his father in a real
estate office. His family said he was last seen in his BMW, stopped at a Mahdi
Army checkpoint.
Bound, Blindfolded and Dead: The Face of Atrocity in Baghdad, NYT, 26.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/26/international/middleeast/26bodies.html?hp&ex=1143435600&en=94974425090a0c2a&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Tactics
Iraq Qaeda Chief Seems to Pursue a Lower
Profile
March 25, 2006
The New York Times
By DEXTER FILKINS
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist
and the head of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, has sharply lowered his profile in
recent months, and his group claims to have submitted itself to the leadership
of an Iraqi.
In postings on Web sites used by jihadi groups, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the
terrorist network's arm in Iraq, claims to have joined with five other guerrilla
groups to form the Mujahedeen Shura, or Council of Holy Warriors. The new group,
whose formation was announced in January, is said to be headed by an Iraqi named
Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi. Since then, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia has stopped
issuing its own proclamations.
The Mujahedeen Shura, which continues to call for attacks against American and
Iraqi forces, has stopped taking responsibility for large-scale suicide attacks
against civilians, and it has toned down its fierce verbal attacks against
Iraq's Shiite majority.
Mr. Zarqawi's group also appears to have stopped, at least for now, the practice
of beheading its captives. Since last summer, the group has begun to carry out
attacks outside Iraq.
The activities seem to follow closely the advice in a letter believed to have
been written last year by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda's second in command.
Previously, Mr. Zarqawi's group celebrated large-scale civilian massacres, and
often made videos of the attacks and of beheadings and posted the videos on
jihadi Web sites. Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which is dominated by followers of
Islam's Sunni sect, also boasted of the mass killing of Shiite civilians, whom
it labeled derogatorily as "converters."
While it is impossible to verify the claims on the Web sites, experts believe it
significant that Mr. Zarqawi apparently feels the need to send such signals,
which offer clues about what he and other senior jihadi leaders might be
thinking and doing.
Since the announcement of the Mujahedeen Shura in January, Mr. Zarqawi has
stayed largely out of view. His last public statement, released a few days
before the announcement, ranted in typical fashion against Americans and Jews
but gave no sign that changes were afoot.
American and Iraqi officials, as well as independent terrorism experts, are
divided on the signals from Al Qaeda. Most believe that Mr. Zarqawi is alive, in
Iraq, and still in charge of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. They say the group remains
the leading suspect in the Feb. 22 attack against the Shiite shrine in Samarra,
which set off a wave of sectarian violence. No group has taken responsibility
for that attack.
Sectarian attacks have helped bring Iraq to the brink of full-scale civil war. A
document obtained by the Americans in January 2004, and believed to have been
written by Mr. Zarqawi, calls for attacks on Shiites in order to bring about a
sectarian bloodbath.
American and Iraqi officials concede that they know little about the Mujahedeen
Shura or of Mr. Baghdadi or, indeed, whether they exist at all. The officials
say the proclamations by Al Qaeda and the Mujahedeen Shura, as well as the claim
that an Iraqi is in charge, are probably ploys to give the illusion of changes
that have not taken place.
"Propaganda is a critical component of his efforts, and that's what's involved
here," said an American intelligence official. "It's a shift in tactics, not a
real change."
In the letter thought to have been written by Mr. Zawahiri, an Egyptian
physician believed to be hiding along the mountainous border between Pakistan
and Afghanistan, Mr. Zarqawi was told that he needed to cultivate local support
in Iraq to ensure the survival of his movement. The letter was captured by the
Americans last summer.
The letter suggested a role for a council that would unite the various insurgent
groups and help lay the political groundwork for the day the Americans depart.
It also questioned Mr. Zarqawi's emphasis on killing Shiites, suggesting that
such killings alienated Iraqis and detracted from the larger goal of driving out
the Americans. For the same reasons, the letter said, it was not necessary to
cut off the heads of captives. "We can kill the captives by bullet," the letter
said.
The letter also called for Mr. Zarqawi to "extend the jihad to secular countries
neighboring Iraq." In recent months, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia has taken
responsibility for a number of attacks outside the country, including the
suicide bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November, which killed more
than 57 people. The group has also said it fired rockets from Lebanon into
Israel last December, and a pair of missiles at American naval vessels in Aqaba,
Jordan, last August.
"Zarqawi wanted to hand over Al Qaeda to the Iraqis so he could move on to the
next phase of jihad," said Rita Katz, the director of the SITE Institute, which
tracks violent Islamist groups. Ms. Katz recently made such an argument in an
opinion article in The Boston Globe.
Bruce Hoffman, a terrorist expert at the Rand Corporation's Washington office,
said he believed that the Mujahedeen Shura and Mr. Baghdadi were real, but was
unconvinced that Mr. Zarqawi had ceded control of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.
Having brought the country to the brink of civil war, Mr. Zarqawi may have
decided that it was a good time to step back as events in Iraq unfold, Mr.
Hoffman said, "like a poker player."
There are other reasons why Mr. Zarqawi might want to take a less prominent role
in Iraq. As a Jordanian, Mr. Zarqawi is a foreigner in Iraq, where family and
blood lines count for a lot. In recent months, evidence has surfaced that Iraqi
guerrillas resent the dominance of foreigners in the insurgency.
In addition, there have been growing indications that the large-scale suicide
bombings directed at civilians were alienating Arab backers outside the country
as well as ordinary Iraqis. Mr. Zarqawi is believed to depend heavily on money
provided by Arabs from outside of Iraq.
The suicide attacks on the three Jordanian hotels set off a wave of popular
anger so furious that Mr. Zarqawi released an audio tape to explain his actions.
Mr. Zarqawi did not apologize for the attacks — far from it — but he was clearly
stunned by the vehemence of the reaction. "As for those Muslims who were
killed," Mr. Zarqawi said on the tape, "we have not thought for even one moment
about targeting them, even if they are sinful people."
Ms. Katz, the director of SITE, which provided the translations of his
statements, said that even if he had stepped back, Mr. Zarqawi was probably
still the dominant force in Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.
Mr. Zarqawi has long made it clear that he sees Iraq as a stepping stone to the
larger goal of overthrowing what he believes to be corrupt and secular regimes
across the Arab world and re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate that reigned
over the Middle East for centuries.
Whatever Mr. Zarqawi is up to, the successor organization, the Mujahedeen Shura,
has lost no vehemence. In one of its most recent communiqués, it celebrated an
attack on an American Humvee it claimed to have carried out this week in
Miqadadiya, Iraq.
"A car bomb was detonated on a Crusader support patrol, resulting in the
destruction of the Humvee and all who were in it," the statement said. "Thanks
unto God."
Scott Shane and Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington for this
article.
Iraq
Qaeda Chief Seems to Pursue a Lower Profile, NYT, 25.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/25/international/middleeast/25zarqawi.html?hp&ex=1143349200&en=39e0ea4dd8c5e899&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Espionage
U.S. Inquiry Finds Russians Passed Spy Data
to Iraq in '03
March 25, 2006
The New York Times
By THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, March 24 — Captured Iraqi
documents describe a Russian spy operation that was aimed at the United States
Central Command in the early days of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003,
according to a new American military report. The report says information on war
plans and troop movements was passed through the Russian ambassador in Baghdad.
Revelation of the operation, contained in the public version of a Joint Forces
Command classified study, the Iraqi Perspectives Project, may have more
political than military significance because American forces overwhelmed the
underequipped and poorly led Iraqi Army to oust Saddam Hussein.
The information in the military study, an analysis based on captured documents
and interviews with Iraqi military and political leaders, makes it difficult to
get a clear picture of the Russian spy operation. It says a captured Iraqi
document cited "information that the Russians have collected from their sources
inside the American Central Command in Doha," in Qatar.
But the study notes that some information obtained by Iraq from Russian sources
was false, raising at least the possibility that it was circulated as part of a
deliberate American campaign intended to fool or demoralize Iraqi troops and
leaders. Military officers have disclosed separately that false war plans were
part of the campaign, and it remains unclear whether any Russians may have
played into that strategy.
The Central Command, responsible for American military actions from the Red Sea
to the Indian Ocean, led the Iraq war from headquarters in Qatar, where access
was highly restricted. But the documents cite the Qatar headquarters as the
source of the intelligence.
"Significantly, the regime was also receiving intelligence from the Russians
that fed suspicions that the attack out of Kuwait was merely a diversion," the
report states, citing a document sent to Mr. Hussein on March 24, 2003.
The Russian report stated — inaccurately — that the coalition thrust into
Baghdad would come from the west and would await the Fourth Infantry Division,
whose entry from the north was vetoed by Turkey. In fact, the main lines of the
offensive moved from Kuwait in the south before the arrival of the Fourth
Infantry.
An author of the study, Kevin M. Woods, said during a Pentagon news conference
that there was no obvious reason to doubt the authenticity of the documents.
At the same briefing, Brig. Gen. Anthony Cucolo, in charge of the unit that
conducted the study, said any intelligence-gathering by the Russians was very
likely motivated by economic ties with Iraq.
U.S.
Inquiry Finds Russians Passed Spy Data to Iraq in '03, NYT, 25.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/25/international/europe/25spy.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Steve Bell
The Guardian p. 37
24.3.2006
http://www.guardian.co.uk/cartoons/stevebell/archive/0,,1284265,00.html
From L to R: US President George W. Bush,
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld.
Setting: Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq.
Related:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-04-27-abu-ghraib-changes_x.htm
US troops in Iraq for another three years
Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington
The Guardian Wednesday March 22, 2006
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1736471,00.html
Challenge for U.S.: Iraq's Handling of
Detainees
March 24, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
CAMP JUSTICE, Iraq — The blindfolded detainees
in the dingy hallway line up in groups of five for their turn to see a judge,
like schoolchildren outside the principal's office.
Each meeting lasts a few minutes. The judge rules whether the detainee will go
free, face trial or be held longer at this Iraqi base in northern Baghdad. But
Firas Sabri Ali, squeezed into a fetid cell just hundreds of yards from the
judge's office, has watched the inmates come and go for four months without his
name ever being called.
He is jailed, along with two brothers and his father, solely as collateral, he
says. The Iraqi forces are hunting another brother, suspected of being an
insurgent. The chief American medic here says that he believes Mr. Ali to be
innocent but that it is up to the Iraqi police to decide whether to free him.
The Iraqis acknowledged that they were holding Mr. Ali until they captured his
brother.
"I hope they catch him, because then I'll be released," said Mr. Ali, 38, a
soft-spoken man who until his arrest worked for a British security company to
support his wife and three sons. "They said, 'You must wait.' I told them:
'There's no law. This is injustice.' "
Such is the challenge facing the American military as it tries to train the
Iraqi security forces to respect the rule of law. Three years after the invasion
of Iraq, American troops are no longer simply teaching counterinsurgency
techniques; they are trying to school the Iraqis in battling a Sunni-led
rebellion without resorting to the tactics of a "dirty war," involving
abductions, torture and murder.
The legacy of Abu Ghraib hampers the American military. But the need to instill
respect for human rights has gained a new urgency as Iraq grapples with the
threat of full-scale civil war and continuing sectarian bloodletting. It is not
uncommon now for dozens of bodies, with hands bound and gunshot wounds to the
heads, to surface across Baghdad on any given day.
The Americans are pushing the Shiite-dominated Iraqi forces to ask judges for
arrest warrants, restrain their use of force and ensure detainees' rights.
The Iraqi officers at this base, the headquarters of the Public Order Forces, a
police paramilitary division with a history of torture and abuse, are gradually
changing their behavior, American military advisers say. Cases of detainee abuse
have declined in recent months, they say.
But detainees can still languish for months without any hope of a legal appeal
because of a shortage of judges or, in the case of Mr. Ali, an unwillingness by
the Iraqi police to allow detainees to see a judge. Overcrowding is chronic,
because the Justice Ministry has been slow in building new prisons.
"The tradition in this country of a law enforcement agency that had absolute
power over people, we've got to break them of that," said Maj. Andrew Creel, the
departing joint operations officer here. "I think it'll take years. You can't
change a cultural mind-set overnight."
Control of the Interior Ministry, which oversees the police, has become one of
the stumbling blocks in forming the new national government, with Sunni Arab
politicians accusing Shiite leaders of running militias and death squads from
the ministry.
Last fall the American military raided at least two police prisons where it said
detainees had been abused. This year's State Department human rights report
noted that the police, especially the paramilitary forces, had been accused of
torture and killings.
Those forces number 17,500. This base — in the heart of Kadhimiya, just blocks
away from a golden-domed Shiite shrine — serves as the headquarters for one of
the two major paramilitary branches, the 7,700-member Public Order Forces. An
11-member American military team began advising the Iraqi commanders here last
spring. It moved into the base in October and is now handing over its duties to
a new team.
Here, 650 prisoners are packed into four spartan rooms. They complain of a lack
of food and regular access to showers and toilets. A foul odor wafts from each
holding pen. To cope with the overcrowded conditions, the police converted the
dining hall into a cell; the three other areas were originally built as storage
rooms.
Camp Justice was never meant to hold prisoners for more than a few weeks. Iraqi
law says prisoners to be tried are to be transferred to a Justice Ministry
penitentiary after interrogation. But the ministry has been unable to build
enough jails to keep pace with arrests. It has 10 centers across Iraq, which
hold 7,500 detainees, and an additional 7 are expected to be built, a ministry
spokesman said.
So the detainee population at temporary police prisons like the one here,
separate from those of the Justice Ministry, has ballooned to more than 10,000
in Baghdad alone, spread across a shadowy network of about 10 centers, an
Interior Ministry official said.
That has ignited concerns among American officials. But Col. Gordon Davis Jr.,
the head of Camp Justice's departing advisory team, praised the Iraqi commander
here, Maj. Gen. Mehdi Sabih Hashem al-Garawi, for showing a willingness to
embrace human rights. The general has, for instance, assigned the Iraqi
division's only medic to look after the detainees.
"I won't say he's gone 180, but he's realized that the best way of getting
information is not to beat or abuse detainees," Colonel Davis said as he stood
in the operations room, the walls plastered with maps of Baghdad.
"The current generation has been brought up with a certain code and a certain
tolerance for abuse," he said in another interview. "They've got to be
constantly worked on."
The academy for recruits to the Public Order Forces has increased the time spent
on human rights training to 20 hours from about eight last October, the colonel
said.
Lt. Col. Dhia al-Shammari, the chief interrogator and a supervisor of detainee
operations, said: "Beating or insults, any policeman can do. Professionals don't
use them. This is not allowed, and I myself reject it."
Certain Public Order units have had fearsome reputations, and residents of
Baghdad and nearby towns have complained of abuse and torture. From April to
June of last year, American advisers found prisoners with bruises at the
headquarters of the Second Brigade every couple of weeks, Colonel Davis said.
When confronted with incidents of abuse, the colonel said, the Iraqi brigade
commander told the Americans, "Are you more worried about our enemies or about
us?"
That officer was replaced at the urging of the Americans. So was a commander of
the Third Brigade, in Salman Pak. Prisoner abuse has been relatively rare here
at the division level, the advisers say, and became even scarcer after the
American team moved in last fall. Before that, the advisers had been living at
an American base. If the Americans saw a bruised prisoner back then, they often
kept quiet for fear of alienating the Iraqi officers, said Master Sgt. Joseph
Kaiser, a medic who regularly examines the detainees.
Now the Americans can be more direct, advisers say. The Americans have trained a
32-man guard force. Sergeant Kaiser helps supervise the Iraqi medic who examines
the detainees daily.
The Iraqi division's intelligence chief "said we have to treat detainees, since
they're subjected to visits by the press and human rights groups," said the
medic, Hazem, 32, who declined to give his full name for security reasons. "He
said to me, 'Your main job is to treat the patients, not to check if they're
terrorists.' If I know they're terrorists and I'm told to kill them, I'd kill
them. But I do what my job requires."
Checking on the Detainees
On a balmy afternoon, as Sergeant Kaiser walked up to a holding pen to make one
of his daily health checks, a blindfolded man in a brown leather jacket squatted
outside the metal door. The man was awaiting interrogation, said several guards
with Kalashnikov rifles.
The guards went into the cell and brought out Mr. Ali, the man whose brother is
being hunted by the Iraqi police. Dressed in a blue and pink tracksuit and a
black ski cap, he shuffled up to the sergeant. Because Mr. Ali speaks English,
he serves as an unofficial cellblock leader.
"How are the people inside?" Sergeant Kaiser asked.
"We need to have more food," Mr. Ali said. Mr. Ali said he dreaded the idea of
American advisers leaving this base one day. "That's bad," he said, shaking his
head. "That's very bad. We need the sergeant or another American officer here.
When we see them we say, 'Please stay here.' "
A reporter asked Mr. Ali whether detainees had been abused or tortured. "Don't
ask these questions," he said, lowering his voice. "You know that."
Sergeant Kaiser said that since September, when he joined the advisory team, he
had found only "a few" cases of abuse. He recalled two that he had written up.
Prisoners have been brought in with baton marks, he said, but they might have
been resisting arrest.
Sergeant Kaiser and Mr. Ali stepped into the cell. Some sunlight streamed in
through three small windows near the roof. Three ceiling fans whirred. The 140
detainees mostly sat up on blankets; there was not enough room for them to lie
down without touching each other. By the door, one detainee used an electric
hair clipper to shave the head of another. A man with glasses sat reading the
Koran.
The detainees complained that family visits occurred only once every couple of
months. The sick lay on blankets. Sergeant Kaiser gave medicine for diarrhea to
a man in gray robes and tablets for oral fungus to an inmate with yellowing
teeth. He poked at the torso of a man with rib pains.
"Some are innocent," said a guard, Sabah Ali, 21, as he looked around the room.
"But some have given their confessions and they are guilty. Those who are
innocent, we'll release them."
But those detainees sometimes end up waiting months before being freed, because
the division prefers to release detainees in large groups.
Prisoners from the division's field units are funneled to this base "so you can
exploit intelligence and take any opportunity for abuse out of the field," said
Lt. Col. John Shattuck, the deputy commander of the advisory team.
Seeking Arrest Warrants
Since his appointment to Camp Justice in February, Judge Majid has come for
several hours almost every day. He is a nervous man dressed in a dark suit who
prefers that his full name not be printed.
Detainees are marched from cells in groups of five to see him in an office. The
ringing of his cellphone can keep him up at all hours — he is expected to be on
call around the clock to approve an arrest warrant if the Iraqi forces suddenly
come up someone they want to detain.
Arrest warrants were mandated by Interior Ministry officials starting last July
to provide some accountability, especially among the paramilitary forces. It is
unclear, though, how closely field units stick to the requirement.
The Iraqi operations officer at Camp Justice says warrants are needed only for
apprehending people on the Interior Ministry's wanted list, not for instances in
which the police may be responding to a report of suspicious activity.
Colonel Davis says the warrant policy has had some effect. Because of it, and
because the Iraqis are improving their intelligence gathering, the Public Order
Forces no longer round up hundreds of people on each raid, he said. On a typical
operation, he added, they may take in a dozen.
After being brought here, the detainees are fingerprinted and have their retinas
scanned. A photograph is taken, partly to record their condition at the time of
arrest. The Americans have asked the Iraqis to deliver a daily report accounting
for all detainees held throughout the division; one recent printout listed 896.
The law says detainees are entitled to have their cases reviewed by a judge
every two weeks, but there are not enough judges, said Colonel Shammari, the
chief interrogator.
The main question, one impossible to answer for now, is whether respect for rule
of law will become deeply rooted in the Iraqi forces, despite a tradition of
tyranny in this country, as the guerrilla war continues to rage.
Outside one of the prison cells, a blue-uniformed guard, Salim Abdul Hassan, 35,
watched as his colleagues led blindfolded detainees to a row of outdoor toilets.
He said that the American training had been of great help, but that "it would be
much better if the Iraqis worked on their own without the Americans."
"We wouldn't be tied down," he said. "Three-quarters of the terrorists ask for
the help of the Americans. They want to be in the care of the Americans, not the
Iraqis."
Khalid al-Ansary and Max Becherer contributed reporting for this article.
Challenge for U.S.: Iraq's Handling of Detainees, NYT, 24.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/24/international/middleeast/24detain.html?hp&ex=1143262800&en=9281cf8a84fc3329&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Iraq Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower
Ranks
March 23, 2006
The New York Times
By ERIC SCHMITT
With the conviction on Tuesday of an Army dog
handler, the military has now tried and found guilty another low-ranking soldier
in connection with the pattern of abuses that first surfaced two years ago at
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
But once again, an attempt by defense lawyers to point a finger of
responsibility at higher-ranking officers failed in the latest case to convince
a military jury that ultimate responsibility for the abuses lay farther up the
chain of command.
Some military experts said one reason there had not been attempts to pursue
charges up the military chain of command was that the military does not have
anything tantamount to a district attorney's office, run by commanders with the
authority to go after the cases.
"The real question is, who is the independent prosecutor who is liberated to
pursue these cases," said Eugene Fidell, a specialist in military law. "There is
no central prosecution office run by commanders. So you don't have a D.A.
thinking, I'm going to follow this wherever it leads."
Among all the abuse cases that have reached military courts, the trial of the
dog handler, Sgt. Michael J. Smith, had appeared to hold the greatest potential
to assign accountability to high-ranking military and perhaps even civilian
officials in Washington. Some military experts had thought the trial might
finally explore the origins of the harsh interrogation techniques that were used
at Abu Ghraib; at the Bagram detention center in Afghanistan; and at other sites
where abuses occurred.
Sergeant Smith, who was convicted Tuesday for abusing detainees in Iraq with his
black Belgian shepherd, had said he was merely following interrogation
procedures approved by the chief intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib, Col. Thomas
M. Pappas. In turn, Colonel Pappas had said he had been following guidance from
Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, commander of the military prison at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, who in September 2003 visited Iraq to discuss ways to "set the
conditions" for enhancing prison interrogations, as well as from superiors in
Baghdad.
General Miller had been dispatched to Guantánamo Bay by Defense Secretary Donald
H. Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve the interrogation
procedures and the quality of intelligence at the compound in Cuba.
But in Sergeant Smith's trial, General Miller was never called to testify.
Colonel Pappas acknowledged that he had mistakenly authorized a one-time use of
muzzled dogs to keep prisoners in order outside their cells, but he said that he
had no idea that dog handlers were using unmuzzled dogs to terrorize detainees
as part of the interrogation process. Colonel Pappas had previously been
reprimanded and relieved of his command, but was permitted to testify under a
grant of immunity.
Previous defendants who have tried and failed to win approval from military
judges to summon high-ranking officers to explain their own role in abuse cases
include Charles A. Graner Jr. and Lynndie R. England, two of the Army reservists
who were convicted in 2005 for their misconduct at Abu Ghraib. In denying
defense requests for testimony from witnesses including Mr. Rumsfeld and Lt.
Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, formerly the top American commander in Iraq, an Army
judge, Col. James Pohl, ruled that their actions did not have any direct bearing
on the reservists' conduct.
In a telephone interview on Wednesday, Maj. Wayne Marotto, an Army spokesman,
said that more than 600 accusations of detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan
since October 2001 had been investigated, and that 251 officers and enlisted
soldiers had been punished in some way for misconduct related to prisoners. To
date, the highest-ranking officer convicted in relation to the abuses is Capt.
Shawn Martin of the Army, who was found guilty last March of kicking detainees
and staging the mock execution of a prisoner. He was sentenced to 45 days in
jail and fined $12,000.
Sergeant Smith had faced a maximum sentence of eight and a half years, but on
Wednesday was sentenced to just under six months (179 days) in prison.
"A mere tap on the wrist for abusing prisoners gives the appearance that once
again that the United States is not serious about its responsibility to
discipline those convicted of human rights violations," Curt Goering, Amnesty
International's senior deputy executive director for policy and programs, said
in a statement.
Sergeant Smith will also be demoted to private, fined $2,250 and will be
released from the Army with a bad-conduct discharge after serving his sentence.
Several generals and colonels have received career-ending reprimands and have
been stripped of their commands, but there is no indication that other
senior-level officers and civilian officials will ever be held accountable for
the detainee abuses that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The toughest official criticism Mr. Rumsfeld has faced was a relatively mild
admonishment in August 2004 from a panel led by former Defense Secretary James
R. Schlesinger, which faulted Mr. Rumsfeld for not exercising sufficient
oversight.
But when Mr. Schlesinger was asked at the time if Mr. Rumsfeld or other
high-ranking officials should resign in an ultimate act of accountability, he
said that the secretary's "resignation would be a boon for all of America's
enemies." President Bush later declined to accept Mr. Rumsfeld's two offers to
resign.
Congress has largely retreated from any meaningful effort to hold senior
officials accountable. Last year, Senator John W. Warner, a Virginia Republican
who heads the Armed Services Committee, vowed to hold hearings on senior-level
accountability. But Mr. Warner later backed off his promise, saying it would
have to wait until judicial and nonjudicial proceedings were exhausted, a
process that could take several more months.
The Senate Armed Services Committee has delayed General Miller's scheduled
retirement, and Mr. Warner said in an interview on Tuesday that he would call
both Colonel Pappas and General Miller to testify before the committee once all
court proceedings that could involve them are complete.
Two other cases may yield new information. Army officials are still reviewing a
possible criminal case against Lt. Col. Steven L. Jordan, another former senior
intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib.
The trial of a second dog handler, Sgt. Santos A. Cardona, is scheduled to begin
on May 22, and it may offer another occasion for defense lawyers to try to
direct blame at higher levels. Sergeant Cardona's lawyer, Harvey Volzer, said in
a telephone interview on Wednesday that his defense would include information
not revealed in Sergeant Smith's trial. Mr. Volzer said he would seek to have
Mr. Rumsfeld, Gen. John P. Abizaid, the commander of American forces in the
Mideast, and General Sanchez all testify at Sergeant Cardona's trial.
Kate Zernike contributed reporting for this article.
Iraq
Abuse Trial Is Again Limited to Lower Ranks, NYT, 23.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/politics/23abuse.html
Bush raises possibility of years-long Iraq
presence
Tue Mar 21, 2006 12:09 PM ET
Reuters
By Steve Holland
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President George W.
Bush held out the possibility on Tuesday of a U.S. troop presence in Iraq for
many years, saying a full withdrawal would depend on decisions by future U.S.
presidents and Iraqi governments.
Bush, struggling to rebound from low job approval ratings that he blamed largely
on the war, was asked at a news conference if there would come a time when no
U.S. troops are in Iraq.
"That, of course, is an objective. And that will be decided by future presidents
and future governments of Iraq," said Bush, who will be president until January
2009.
Three years after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, there are 133,000 U.S. troops
in the country.
Bush has laid the groundwork for possible U.S. troop reductions by the end of
the year, saying he aims to get Iraqi forces sufficiently trained to take over
by then.
But until now he had not given a prediction on how long there might be an
American presence. Many Arabs are concerned that the United States might want a
permanent presence in Iraq, and those concerns were likely to be heightened by
Bush's comments.
Opinion polls show Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied over a war in
which more than 2,300 U.S. troops have died. Democrats have seized on this in a
congressional election year to criticize the Republican president's handling of
the war.
Appearing for nearly an hour at his second formal solo news conference of the
year, Bush mixed his prognosis of progress in Iraq with a realistic description
of events, reflecting a recent White House pattern of admitting mistakes have
been made in the war.
He acknowledged errors in the Iraqi reconstruction effort had cost valuable time
in rebuilding and said the U.S. military was adjusting to insurgent tactics.
But he insisted that his bedrock belief remained that Iraq can become a beacon
of democracy in the Middle East.
"I'm optimistic we'll succeed," he said. "If not, I'd pull our troops out. If I
didn't believe we had a plan for victory, I wouldn't leave our people in harm's
way."
Bush said insurgent attacks that have killed hundreds of Iraqis in recent weeks
were designed in part by the attackers to create horrific images for U.S.
television screens and generate doubts about the mission among Americans.
"Please don't take that as criticism," Bush told reporters. "But it also is a
realistic assessment of the enemy's capability to affect the debate, and they
know that."
Bush also said he disagreed with those who said Iraq had fallen into a civil
war.
Asked whether he agreed with former Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's
comments that Iraq was already in civil war, Bush said: "I do not, there are
other voices coming out of Iraq."
"We all recognize that there is violence, that there is sectarian violence,"
Bush said. "The way I look at it the Iraqis took a look and decided not to give
in to civil war."
A Newsweek magazine poll conducted last week showed Bush's approval rating fell
to 36 percent, down 21 points from a year ago, amid discontent about Iraq. The
survey said 65 percent of Americans were dissatisfied with Bush's handling of
the war.
"I fully understand the consequences of this war. I understand people's lives
are being lost," Bush said.
"But I also understand the consequences of not achieving our objective by
leaving too early. Iraq would become a place of instability, a place from which
the enemy can plot, plan and attack," he added.
(Additional reporting by Tabassum Zakaria)
Bush
raises possibility of years-long Iraq presence, R, 21.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyID=2006-03-21T170849Z_01_N20244851_RTRUKOC_0_US-BUSH.xml
Abu Ghraib dog handler found guilty of
abuse
Tue Mar 21, 2006 11:45 AM ET
Reuters
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A U.S. Army dog handler
was found guilty on Tuesday of abusing detainees at Baghdad's notorious Abu
Ghraib prison and faces up to eight years and nine months in prison, an Army
spokeswoman said.
The sentencing hearing for Army Sgt. Michael Smith, 24, was set to begin later
today, Lt. Col. Shawn Jirik said.
Smith was charged with using his dog to harass and threaten inmates at Abu
Ghraib in order to make them urinate and defecate on themselves in 2003 and
2004.
His lawyers said he was unfairly lumped in with others on the night shift who
physically abused detainees or allowed their dogs to bite them, and was acting
at the request of interrogators and prison authorities.
Disturbing photos of dogs barking and growling at inmates were seen around the
world in the abuse scandal, which cut into Washington's efforts to win support
for its war in Iraq.
Abu
Ghraib dog handler found guilty of abuse, R, 21.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyID=2006-03-21T164503Z_01_N21260522_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-ABUSE.xml
Bush: troop pullout from Iraq decided in
future
Tue Mar 21, 2006 11:05 AM ET
Reuters
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President George W.
Bush on Tuesday refused to give a timetable for the pullout of American troops
from Iraq and suggested they many remain there beyond his term in office.
Asked about full troop withdrawal from Iraq, Bush told a news conference: "That
of course is an objective and that will be decided by future presidents and
future governments of Iraq."
He reiterated that troop withdrawal decisions would be made by commanders on the
ground.
Bush:
troop pullout from Iraq decided in future, R, 21.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-03-21T160411Z_01_N21215697_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&related=true&src=cms
Bush disagrees that Iraq in civil war
Tue Mar 21, 2006 10:49 AM ET
Reuters
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President George W.
Bush on Tuesday said he disagreed with those who said Iraq had fallen into a
civil war.
Asked whether he agreed with former Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's
comments that Iraq was already in civil war, Bush said: "I do not, there are
other voices coming out of Iraq."
"We all recognize that there is violence, that there is sectarian violence,"
Bush said at a press conference. "The way I look at it the Iraqis took a look
and decided not to give in to civil war."
Public opinion polls show Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied with
Bush's handling of the Iraq war in which more than 2,300 U.S. troops have been
killed.
Bush
disagrees that Iraq in civil war, R, 21.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-03-21T154816Z_01_N20244851_RTRUKOC_0_US-BUSH-IRAQ.xml&archived=False&src=cms
Bush Defends Decisions on Iraq, but
Concedes Public's Unease
March 21, 2006
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 11:34 a.m. ET
The New York Times
WASHINGTON (AP) -- President Bush said Tuesday
the decision about when to withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq will fall to
future presidents and Iraqi leaders, suggesting that U.S. involvement will
continue at least through 2008.
Acknowledging the public's growing unease with the war -- and election-year
skittishness among fellow Republicans -- the president nonetheless vowed to keep
U.S. soldiers in the fight.
''If I didn't believe we could succeed, I wouldn't be there. I wouldn't put
those kids there,'' Bush declared.
He also stood by embattled Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld.
''I don't believe he should resign. He's done a fine job. Every war plan looks
good on paper until you meet the enemy,'' he said.
In his second full-blown news conference of the year, Bush confronted his
political problems by addressing them directly.
''Nobody likes war. It creates a sense of uncertainty in the country,'' he said.
''War creates trauma.'' He acknowledged that Republicans are worried about their
political standing in November.
''There's a certain unease as you head into an election year,'' Bush told a
wide-ranging news conference that lasted nearly an hour.
More than 2,300 Americans have died in three years of war in Iraq. Polls show
the public's support of the war and Bush himself have dramatically declined in
recent months, jeopardizing the political goodwill he carried out of the 2004
re-election victory.
''I'd say I'm spending that capital on the war,'' Bush quipped.
When asked about his failed Social Security plan, he simply said: ''I didn't get
done.'' But the president defiantly defended his warrantless eavesdropping
program, and baited Democrats who suggest that he broke the law.
Calling a censure resolution ''needless partisanship,'' Bush challenged
Democrats to go into the November midterm elections in opposition to
eavesdropping on suspected terrorists. ''They ought to stand up and say, `The
tools we're using to protect the American people should not be used,''' Bush
said.
The news conference marked a new push by Bush to confront doubts about his
strategy in Iraq. A day earlier, he acknowledged to a sometimes skeptical
audience that there was dwindling support for his Iraq policy and that he
understood why people were disheartened.
''The terrorists haven't given up. They're tough-minded. They like to kill,'' he
said Tuesday. ''There will be more tough fighting ahead.''
The president said he did not agree with former interim Iraqi Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi, who told the British Broadcasting Corporation Sunday, ''If this is
not civil war, then God knows what civil war is.''
Bush said others inside and outside Iraq think the nation has stopped short of
civil war. ''There are other voices coming out of Iraq, by the way, other than
Mr. Allawi, who I know by the way -- like. A good fellow.''
''We all recognized that there is violence, that there is sectarian violence.
But the way I look at the situation is, the Iraqis looked and decided not to go
into civil war.''
Nearly four out of five Americans, including 70 percent of Republicans, believe
civil war will break out in Iraq, according to a recent AP-Ipsos poll.
Bush said he's confident of victory in Iraq. ''I'm optimistic we'll succeed. If
not, I'd pull our troops out,'' he said, warning that abandoning the nation
would be a dangerous mistake.
''So failure in Iraq, which isn't going to happen, would send all kinds of
terrible signals to an enemy that wants to hurt us and people who are desperate
to change the condition in the broader Middle East,'' Bush said.
He said he agreed to U.S. talks with Iran to underscore his point that Tehran's
attempts to spread sectarian violence or provide support to Iraqi insurgents was
unacceptable to the United States.
His opening remarks were designed to steel Americans for more fighting in Iraq
and put an optimistic spin on the state of the U.S. economy.
''Productivity is strong. Inflation is contained. Household net worth is at an
all-time high,'' Bush said, crediting his administration's policies.
On Iraq, Bush bristled at a suggestion that he had wanted to wage war against
that country since early in his presidency.
''I didn't want war. To assume I wanted war is just flat wrong ... with all due
respect,'' he told a reporter. ''No president wants war.'' To those who say
otherwise, ''it's simply not true,'' Bush said.
Asked about former supporters who now oppose him and the war, Bush said he's
trying to win them over by ''talking realistically to people'' about the war and
its importance to the nation.
''I can understand how Americans are worried about whether or not we can win,''
Bush said, adding that most Americans want victory ''but they're concerned about
whether or not we can win.''
Bush scoffed at a question suggesting he should reshuffle or shake up his White
House staff to help raise his sagging poll standings. But he did hint that he
might bring in an experienced Washington insider to work with a disgruntled
Congress.
''I'm not going to announce it right now,'' Bush said, adding that he's
satisfied with the staff he's surrounded himself with.
Bush
Defends Decisions on Iraq, but Concedes Public's Unease, NYT, 21.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Bush.html?hp&ex=1143003600&en=2d6b6e2cfeb353cf&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Iraqi police claim US troops executed
family
· Women and children shot in raid, says
official report
· Marines accused after 15 died in separate incident
Tuesday March 21, 2006
Guardian
Julian Borger in Washington
Iraqi police have accused American soldiers of
executing 11 Iraqi civilians, including four children and a six-month-old baby,
in a raid on Wednesday near the city of Balad, it was reported yesterday.
The allegations are contained in an Iraqi
police report on the killings, obtained and published by the Knight Ridder news
agency. The report emerged at a time when a US navy criminal investigation is
under way into a previous incident, in November, in which marines are accused of
killing 15 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in reprisal for a bomb attack on a US
patrol.
Last week's incident in the village of Abu Sifa, near Balad, stand out because
of the seriousness of the accusations and the fact that they appear on an
official police report signed by Iraqi officers.
After listing other incidents in the area, the report for March 15 states:
"American forces used helicopters to drop troops on the house of Faiz Harat
Khalaf situated in the Abu Sifa village of the Ishaqi district. The American
forces gathered the family members in one room and executed 11 people, including
five children, four women and two men, then they bombed the house, burned three
vehicles and killed their animals." Among victims the report lists two
five-year-old children, two three-year-olds and a six-month-old baby.
The US military say that the deaths occurred when US troops raided a house in
pursuit of an al-Qaida suspect and that only four people were killed. Major Tim
Keefe, a US military spokesman in Baghdad said: "A battle damage assessment, the
initial reports, said that what they saw were four people killed - a woman and
two children and an enemy - and they detained an enemy."
Brigadier General Issa al-Juboori, who runs the joint coordination centre in
Tikrit, stood by the report and said he knew the police officer running the
investigation. "He's a dedicated policeman, and a good cop," Gen Juboori told
Knight Ridder. "I trust him."
Both accounts of the incident agree there was a firefight in the early hours of
the morning when US troops raided a house which an al-Qaida suspect was
suspected to be visiting. The American account said the house collapsed as a
result of the firefight, killing two women, a child, and a man believed to have
al-Qaida links. The suspect survived and was captured. But the Iraqi police
report suggests that the killings took place when the house was still standing.
A local police commander, Lieutenant Colonel Farooq Hussain, said hospital
autopsies "revealed that all the victims had bullet shots in the head and all
bodies were handcuffed".
Maj Keefe said: "I saw those [autopsy] photos and it didn't appear there were
any handcuffs."
In last year's Haditha incident, US troops are accused of killing civilians
after a bomb attack. An initial marine report on the incident said a roadside
bomb on November 19 last year killed a lance corporal and 15 Iraqi civilians.
But further investigation revealed that the civilians had been shot with marine
weapons after the blast.
A nine-year-old survivor, Eman Waleed, who lived in a house 150 metres from the
roadside bomb attack told Time magazine that after the explosion her father
began reading the Qur'an. "First, they went into my father's room, where he was
reading the Qur'an, and we heard shots," she said. "I couldn't see their faces
very well, only their guns sticking into the doorway. I watched them shoot my
grandfather first in the chest and then in the head. Then they killed my
granny."
Time quoted officials familiar with the investigation as saying the marines
thought they heard a gun being cocked inside the house and feared they were
about to be ambushed so they broke down two doors simultaneously and opened
fire.
Iraqi
police claim US troops executed family, G, 21.3.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1735748,00.html
Bush Defends His Iraq Record, but Concedes
Some Setbacks
March 21, 2006
The New York Times
By ELISABETH BUMILLER
CLEVELAND, March 20 — President Bush on Monday
held out the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar as an example of American success
in the war, but he also acknowledged in remarks that were as grim as they were
hopeful that the city's improvements were not matched in other parts of Iraq.
In the second of a series of speeches meant to build up sagging support for the
war, Mr. Bush said American forces had driven insurgents from Tal Afar in 2004,
only to see them move back in two months later. The Americans learned from their
mistakes, he said, and in 2005 worked with Iraqi forces to retake lost ground
and begin to bring the city back to life.
"I wish I could tell you that the progress made in Tal Afar is the same in every
single part of Iraq," he told the City Club of Cleveland at the Renaissance
Cleveland Hotel. "It's not."
Over all, Mr. Bush's speech was a positive message that conceded some of the
setbacks on the ground, a formulation meant to portray the president as not
living in a fantasy world about the three-year-long war.
"In the face of continued reports about killings and reprisals, I understand how
some Americans have had their confidence shaken," he said. "Others look at the
violence they see each night on their television screens and they wonder how I
can remain so optimistic about the prospects of success in Iraq. They wonder
what I see that they don't."
To answer that, Mr. Bush told his audience his story of Tal Afar, a city of
200,000 near the Syrian border that was a crucial base of operations for the
Iraqi insurgent group Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. The insurgents had turned the
city into a nightmare of violence, he said, with beheadings, kidnappings and
mortars fired into soccer fields filled with children.
"In one grim incident, the terrorists kidnapped a young boy from the hospital
and killed him, and then they booby-trapped his body and placed him along the
road where his family would see him," he said. "And when the boy's father came
to retrieve his son's body, he was blown up."
But Mr. Bush recounted how American and Iraqi forces initiated a major military
offensive against the insurgents last fall, including the construction of an
eight-foot dirt wall around the city to cut off escape routes. After successful
combat operations were over, he said, more than 1,000 Iraqi forces were deployed
to keep order. "In short, you see a city coming back to life," he said.
Military analysts do not dispute Mr. Bush's version of events, and
correspondents on the ground say that the security situation in Tal Afar is
significantly better than it was before the military operation last fall.
But the analysts also say that the offensive required so many American troops —
5,000 — that it would be difficult if not impossible to replicate in other parts
of Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, and that success in Tal Afar does not
translate into improved security for most Iraqis.
Democrats used Mr. Bush's speech to step up their criticism on the three-year
anniversary of the war, saying that the White House was on the verge of trading
a brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein, for chaos.
"That outcome looks increasingly likely because of the dangerous incompetence of
this administration," Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, said in
a statement. "We went to war without letting the weapons inspectors finish their
job, without the support of our major allies, without enough troops to prevent a
security vacuum, and without a plan to win the peace."
After Mr. Bush concluded his remarks, he took numerous questions from the City
Club, a nonpartisan group that calls itself the oldest free-speech forum in
America and prides itself on asking sharp questions. Members of the audience
queried him about the administration's secret eavesdropping program and the
failure to find unconventional weapons in Iraq, among other topics.
Mr. Bush appeared relaxed throughout, and in a question about Iraq segued to
Iran. "The threat from Iran is, of course, their stated objective to destroy our
strong ally Israel," he said, adding, "I made it clear, I'll make it clear
again, that we will use military might to protect our ally, Israel."
The crowd broke into applause and then Mr. Bush said, "At any rate, our
objective is to solve this issue diplomatically."
Bush
Defends His Iraq Record, but Concedes Some Setbacks, NYT, 21.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/21/politics/21prexy.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
On Anniversary, Bush and Cheney See Iraq
Success
March 20, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID E. SANGER and THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, March 19 — On the third
anniversary of a war that they once expected to be over by now, President Bush
and senior officials argued Sunday that their strategy was working despite
escalating violence in Iraq, even as a former Iraqi prime minister once favored
by the White House declared a civil war had already started.
Displaying a carefully calibrated mix of optimism about eventual victory and
caution about how long American troops would be involved, the officials who
marked the day — including Mr. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld — sounded much as they had on the first anniversary
of the invasion. At that time, the rebuilding effort had just begun, the
insurgency was far less fierce, and the American occupation had suppressed,
temporarily, the sectarian violence scarring Iraq today.
The picture painted by the administration clashed with that of the former
interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi, once hailed by Mr. Bush as the kind of
fair-minded leader Iraq needed. He declared in an interview with the BBC that
the country was nearing a "point of no return."
"It is unfortunate that we are in civil war," said Mr. Allawi, who served as
prime minister after the American invasion and now leads a 25-seat secular
alliance of representatives in Iraq's 275-seat National Assembly. "We are losing
each day, as an average, 50 to 60 people through the country, if not more."
"If this is not civil war," he said, "then God knows what civil war is."
Mr. Allawi's assessment was contradicted by Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior
American commander in Iraq, who said on CNN's "Late Edition" that "We're a long
way from civil war."
As Iraqi politicians in Baghdad moved incrementally forward on Sunday on forming
a unified government, at least 15 more bodies were discovered around the
capital, bringing to more than 200 the number of people believed killed in
sectarian violence in the past few weeks. [Page A10.]
The war has taken more than 2,300 American lives, and those of 33,000 to 37,000
Iraqis, according to the estimates of the Iraq Body Count Project, an
independent group that monitors the news media.
Mr. Rumsfeld dismissed calls for withdrawal by comparing the current battle to
the two great struggles of his generation: World War II and the cold war.
"Turning our backs on postwar Iraq today would be the modern equivalent of
handing postwar Germany back to the Nazis," he wrote in an op-ed article
published in The Washington Post. "It would be as great a disgrace as if we had
asked the liberated nations of Eastern Europe to return to Soviet domination."
Mr. Bush is entering the fourth year of the war able to declare success in the
dismantling of Saddam Hussein's tyrannical government and in providing a
framework for democratic elections, though the country has so far failed to put
together the institutions to make a democracy work.. Mr. Bush's approval rating,
which soared in the early days of the invasion as Americans rushed to Baghdad,
has sunk to the low-to-mid 30 percent range as the chaos and number of Iraqis
meeting violent deaths has escalated.
Mr. Cheney, in an interview on the CBS News program "Face the Nation," was
challenged on his statement three years ago that "we will be greeted as
liberators" and his assertion 10 months ago that the insurgency was in its "last
throes."
He insisted that in both cases his facts were right, but that the news media had
created a different perception with vivid imagery of killing.
"I think it has less to do with the statements we've made, which I think were
basically accurate and reflect reality, than it does with the fact that there's
a constant sort of perception, if you will, that's created because what's
newsworthy is the car bomb in Baghdad," he said.
The administration could take heart this weekend from the relatively small
antiwar protests around the country, compared with protests held on the previous
two anniversaries of the Iraq invasion. An estimated 7,000 people demonstrated
in Chicago on Saturday and smaller protests were held over the weekend in
Boston, San Francisco and other cities. In Times Square, the figure was about
1,000.
Television was the forum where the administration's representatives and
opponents marshaled the statistics that they believe made their cases. Mr. Bush
argued last week that by the end of the year, Iraqi forces would be in control
of more than half of the country; Representative John P. Murtha, the
long-hawkish Pennsylvania Democrat who late last year called publicly for
American withdrawal, said Sunday on NBC News' "Meet the Press" that the
statistic was meaningless.
"I flew for an hour and 15 minutes over desert," he said of a recent trip.
"Wasn't a soul. And that's the territory I guess they're talking about."
Meanwhile, he noted, unemployment has soared in the areas hardest hit by
sectarian violence. Oil production, which the administration once said would pay
for the rebuilding of Iraq, was markedly below last year's levels.
As midterm elections approach, the White House is concerned that support for the
war is ebbing fastest among Republicans who supported the war, including some
influential conservatives who argue that the job of liberation is done, and
American troops should not be left in the crossfire of civil strife.
Mr. Bush talked about the war in a two-minute statement on Sunday when he
returned to the White House from Camp David, urging Iraq to form a unity
government, and saying, "I'm encouraged by the progress." Then, ignoring
reporters who met his helicopter, he entered the White House with his wife,
Laura.
He offered no answers to questions about the gap between his expectations three
years ago and the realities of Iraq today, seemingly underscoring the problem
the White House faced in explaining the war. He successfully put a floor under
eroding support for his Iraq strategy last December, explaining his military,
political and economic strategy and admitting some early errors. But that was
before the images of Shiites fighting Sunnis began a new erosion of support.
On the critical political question — how long American forces will stay —
General Casey has said a significant presence will be required for "a couple
more years," and "over 2006, we will continue to see a gradual reduction in
coalition forces."
When the war was launched three years ago, the Pentagon expected a short
conflict. Its classified plans called for the withdrawal of the majority of
American troops by the fall of 2003. Today there are roughly 133,000 still
there.
As of Friday, 2,313 American military personnel and Defense Department civilians
had died during the Iraq effort; of that figure, 1,811 were killed in action and
502 died in non-hostile events, like accidents, a Pentagon spokesman said
Sunday. The spokesman also cited statistics that 7,912 American military
personnel had been wounded so severely in action in Iraq that they could not
return to duty, and that 9,212 had been wounded in action but were able to
return to duty.
Mr. Rumsfeld, whose refusal to send larger numbers of troops into Iraq after the
initial invasion has made him a lightning rod for critics, said in his published
remarks on Sunday that terrorists, not the American-led coalition, are losing in
Iraq, a message repeated by Mr. Cheney. "I believe that history will show that
to be the case."
And like Mr. Cheney, Mr. Rumsfeld insisted the problem was the imagery created
by a 24-hour news cycle. "Fortunately, history is not made up of daily
headlines, blogs on Web sites or the latest sensational attack," Mr. Rumsfeld
wrote. "History is a bigger picture, and it takes some time and perspective to
measure accurately."
On
Anniversary, Bush and Cheney See Iraq Success, NYT, 20.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/20/politics/20war.html?_r=1&hp&ex=1142830800&en=f3c0c5b8c7ee2700&ei=5094&partner=homepage&oref=slogin
US objectives in Iraq prove elusive
Sun Mar 19, 2006 8:30 PM ET
Reuters
By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The world's only
superpower has learned some hard lessons during three years of war in Iraq and
there is increasing skepticism about whether it can ever achieve its objectives
there.
President George W. Bush's stated rationale for invading in March 2003 --
ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction -- quickly proved illusory. No such
arms were ever found.
Three years later, as bodies are dumped daily on the streets of Baghdad and
civil war is very possible, longer term U.S. ambitions for a stable and
democratic Iraq also seem shaky, experts say.
"It's quite clear, the United States did not achieve its objectives in Iraq"
because they were "fundamentally wrong," said Anthony Cordesman, a former
Pentagon official who once worked for Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona.
Iraq had "no serious weapons of mass destruction program ... so we went to war
for the wrong reason to deal with a threat that didn't exist," he told Reuters.
Rather than ridding the Middle East of Islamic extremists, the U.S. invasion has
strengthened them, and there is "much more threat from al Qaeda in Iraq," said
Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Although U.S. officials remain upbeat about Iraq's prospects, public opinion
polls show deep division among ordinary Americans. Bush's popularity has sunk to
its lowest point in his six years in office, support for keeping U.S. troops in
Iraq has plummeted and there is deepening concern about Iraq's future.
U.S. political leaders are so worried they created a high-powered bipartisan
study group last week to look at alternatives for U.S. policy in Iraq that could
unite Americans. Participants, who acknowledged their task would be extremely
difficult, did not set a deadline for completing the work.
Judith Yaphe, an Iraq specialist at the National Defense University, noted the
invasion succeeded in ousting Saddam Hussein and bringing the dictator to trial.
But Iraq is far from being a stable democracy that could serve as a model for
regional change, and it definitely was not the U.S. aim to trigger civil war,
she said.
REPEATED WARNINGS IGNORED
"It was simplistic of people to think that you could get rid of Saddam and
things would be fine. ... The U.S. government understood very little about Iraq
and how easily and quickly it is for a country which was held together by 35
years of repression to spin out of control," Yaphe added.
Yet in the run-up to war, Bush and his foreign policy team -- one of the most
experienced in modern U.S. history -- were warned repeatedly -- by allies,
experts and other U.S. officials -- about the difficulties Iraq presented.
Danielle Pletka of the conservative American Enterprise Institute acknowledged
that building a stable U.S.-style democracy in Iraq is probably out of reach.
But "if the goal is to create a relatively stable democracy and a slow but
improving security environment for the Iraqis, then I think we're on our way,"
she insisted.
There is broad consensus among experts that the U.S. failure to plan for the
postwar period was a major flaw that allowed the insurgency to take hold.
The administration tried to correct that in part by establishing a State
Department office to coordinate postwar stabilization and reconstruction efforts
in future crises, but it has run into bureaucratic problems.
Other lessons are showing up in U.S. policy documents. The just-released
National Security Strategy and a recent defense planning paper emphasize working
with allies and play down the kind of unilateral tendencies the United States
displayed in Iraq, Cordesman said.
"We've learned a great deal and it's been a set of painful lessons," he said.
Those lessons include the need for U.S. forces that fight conventional wars and
conduct counterinsurgency operations; a vigorous nation-building capability; and
a stronger State Department that can manage diplomacy as well as aid for
training police in post-conflict situations, he said.
Another realization is that "military options can create as many problems as
they solve," he added.
Pletka said the administration also realized the importance of having a
lower-key chief representative in Iraq -- like U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad
-- and that "reinforcing existing fissures" in Iraqi society by including
sectarian militias in the army is not a good idea.
US
objectives in Iraq prove elusive, R, 19.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=politicsNews&storyID=2006-03-20T013028Z_01_N17263130_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-USA-OBJECTIVES.xml
Cheney: Iraq not in civil war, predicts
success
Sun Mar 19, 2006 12:49 PM ET
Reuters
By Tabassum Zakaria
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Vice President Dick
Cheney on Sunday said Iraq had not fallen into civil war despite extremist
attempts to foment one, and warned that allowing the insurgents to succeed would
leave the country a failed state.
Three years after the U.S. invasion, bombings, killings and kidnappings continue
the unabated violence in Iraq.
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said on BBC television that Iraq was
nearing the "point of no return" and had already plunged into sectarian civil
war.
Cheney said "terrorists" like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al Qaeda in Iraq,
and others were trying to stop the formation of a democratically elected
government in Iraq by violence such as the bombing of the Golden Mosque in
Samarra on February 22, one of the holiest Shi'ite sites.
"What we've seen is a serious effort by them to foment civil war, but I don't
think they've been successful," Cheney said on CBS television's "Face the
Nation."
Increasing public discontent over the Iraq war in which more than 2,300 American
troops have died has helped push President George W. Bush's approval ratings to
the lowest of his presidency.
Bush has repeatedly said that U.S. forces will not pull out until Iraqi forces
can take over security operations.
Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, also said a civil war had not
started in Iraq and nor was it imminent or inevitable. "Is there terrorist
violence in Iraq? Yes there is ... But we're a long way from civil war," he said
on CNN's "Late Edition."
"But I don't want to sugar-coat it either. This is a very fragile time," Casey
said, adding that people were getting killed as the extremists try to derail the
political process.
'A LOT AT STAKE'
Democrats sharply criticized the administration's Iraq policies.
"I think that the political leaders in Washington have failed when it comes to
our policy in Iraq. They misled us into believing there were weapons of mass
destruction and connections between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein. None of that
existed," Sen. Richard Durbin, an Illinois Democrat, said on "Fox News Sunday."
"Here we are, on the third anniversary, with no end in sight," he said.
Cheney said it was important for the whole region and the security of the United
States that the insurgency in Iraq does not succeed.
"There's a lot at stake here. It's not just about Iraq, it's not about just
today's situation in Iraq, it's about where we are going to be 10 years from now
in the Middle East," he said.
"If they ("terrorists") succeed then the danger is that Iraq will become a
failed state as Afghanistan was a few years ago when it was governed by the
Taliban," he said. That enabled Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network to
launch attacks against the United States and its allies, Cheney said.
He said the "biggest threat" faced now was not another September 11 attack in
which hijacked planes were used as weapons, but the danger of extremists having
nuclear or biological weapons to use against the United States.
Cheney attributed the administration's "aggressive, forward-leaning strategy" in
going after extremists since the September 11 attacks as one of the main reasons
the United States had not been struck again at home.
"I think we are going to succeed in Iraq, I think the evidence is overwhelming,"
Cheney said.
(Additional reporting by Doug Palmer)
Cheney: Iraq not in civil war, predicts success, R, 19.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-03-19T174904Z_01_N19198417_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-USA.xml
Rumsfeld: leaving Iraq like giving Nazis
Germany
Sun Mar 19, 2006 8:24 AM ET
Reuters
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Leaving Iraq now would
be like handing postwar Germany back to the Nazis, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld said in a column published on Sunday, the third anniversary of the
start of the Iraq war.
"Turning our backs on postwar Iraq today would be the modern equivalent of
handing postwar Germany back to the Nazis," he wrote in an essay in The
Washington Post.
Rumsfeld said "the terrorists" were trying to fuel sectarian tensions to spark a
civil war, but they must be "watching with fear" the progress in the country
over the past three years.
In London, former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said on Sunday that Iraq is
in a civil war and is nearing the point of no return when the sectarian violence
will spill over throughout the Middle East.
"It is unfortunate that we are in civil war. We are losing each day, as an
average, 50 to 60 people throughout the country, if not more. If this is not
civil war, then God knows what civil war is," he told BBC television.
Rumsfeld's view was that the Iraqi insurgency was failing.
"The terrorists seem to recognize that they are losing in Iraq. I believe that
history will show that to be the case," he wrote.
He said 75 percent of all military operations in Iraq include Iraqi security
forces.
"Today, some 100 Iraqi army battalions of several hundred troops each are in the
fight, and 49 percent control their own battle space," Rumsfeld wrote.
Thousands of anti-war protesters gathered in cities around the world for
demonstrations on Saturday to mark the anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq.
Doubts about the Iraq war have helped drive down President George W. Bush's
approval ratings to their lowest level.
In a Newsweek poll released on Saturday, only 36 percent of Americans said they
approved of his performance as president. Sixty-five percent disapprove of his
handling of the situation in Iraq, once one of his strongest suits.
Bush used his weekly radio address on Saturday to urge Americans to resist a
temptation to retreat from Iraq, but opposition Democrats pressed him to offer a
plan for drawing down U.S. troops and said Iraq was moving closer to a civil
war.
Rumsfeld wrote that if U.S. forces leave Iraq now, "there is every reason to
believe Saddamists and terrorists will fill the vacuum -- and the free world
might not have the will to face them again."
A recent Le Moyne College/Zogby poll showed 72 percent of U.S. troops serving in
Iraq think that the United States should exit within a year. Nearly one in four
said the troops should leave immediately.
Rumsfeld: leaving Iraq like giving Nazis Germany, R, 19.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyID=2006-03-19T132421Z_01_N19209143_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-RUMSFELD.xml
Demonstrations Mark Third Anniversary of
Iraq Invasion
March 19, 2006
The New York Times
By NICHOLAS CONFESSORE
About 1,000 people gathered near Times Square
yesterday, in one of dozens of energetic and often unfocused rallies held in
cities across the United States and around the world to protest the third
anniversary of the United States invasion of Iraq.
Yesterday's protests, like those held to mark each of the two previous
anniversaries of the March 2003 invasion, were vigorous and peaceful but far
smaller than the large-scale marches that preceded the war, despite polls
showing lower public support for the war than in years past and anemic approval
ratings for President Bush, himself a focus of many of the protesters.
But the Iraq war itself — though the obvious inspiration for the march — was
noticeably less central to the proceedings than in previous years. The rally in
Times Square featured dozens of speakers on topics ranging from relations with
Iran to the treatment of Hurricane Katrina refugees.
"No group owns the day," said Dustin Langley, a spokesman for the Troops Out Now
Coalition, which helped organize protests in New York, Boston, Washington, Los
Angeles, Atlanta and other cities. "Whoever you are, be out there on the
streets."
Tens of thousands of people marched in Rome, while officials in London reported
a crowd of 15,000. Other demonstrations occurred in Greece, Turkey, Spain,
Brazil, Australia and Canada.
One of the biggest protests in the United States was held in San Francisco, for
decades a hub of antiwar sentiment. The police there estimated the crowd
gathered outside City Hall at 6,000. Many chanted slogans opposing Mr. Bush, and
most appeared to hail from a distinctly grayer demographic than that of other
protest events.
"There are not enough young people here," said Paul Perchonock, 61, a medical
doctor from the Bay Area. "They don't see themselves as having a stake."
In his weekly radio address, President Bush defended the administration's record
in Iraq, saying that the country's decision to depose the regime of Saddam
Hussein was "a difficult decision—and it was the right decision." He pledged to
"finish the mission" despite calls for withdrawal.
Today marks the third anniversary of the invasion.
In Washington, a relatively small crowd of about 300 people gathered at the
United States Naval Observatory, where Vice President Dick Cheney lives.
Debbie Boch, 52, a restaurant manager from Denver, said she and two friends
bought plane tickets to Washington two months ago, before the demonstration had
been planned. It was the fifth protest march she attended since the war began,
she said, and among the smallest.
"It's very disappointing, especially in Washington, D.C.," she said. "You think
this is the place where people come to make things happen. I'm just not sure why
there aren't more people hear today."
But other marchers took solace from recent opinion polls showing public opinion
slowly drifting against the war.
"Three years ago, folks thought we were crazy; two years ago, people still
thought we were crazy," said the Rev. Graylan Scott Hagler, a minister at
Plymouth Congregational United Church of Christ in Washington. "We know now that
most of the American people do not believe that we are crazy anymore."
In New York, protesters gathered on three lanes of Broadway south of 42nd
Street, after the city denied the organizers permission to set up near an armed
services recruitment office. Mounted police patrolled the avenue, while dozens
of police officers attempted to keep traffic moving on the street and sidewalk.
The demonstrators, bundled against the cold and confined by police fences to a
two-block stretch, came from as close as Chelsea and as far away as South Korea.
Quakers mixed with communists and labor organizers with high school students, as
antiwar entrepreneurs hawked T-shirts under the sultry gaze of a Calvin Klein
model, reclining in a massive billboard advertisement overhead.
"I am just sick and grief stricken that we are continuing this war in Iraq,"
said Julie Finch, 63, who lives in Manhattan. "I mourn every soldier that dies.
This war was based on lies."
A nearby Starbucks — a chain once disparaged by the anti-globalization
protesters from which today's antiwar movement draws some inspiration — served
as a warming hut and bathroom station for the protesters, even serving up a
latte or two to placard-brandishing customers. Journalists conducted interviews
in the heated vestibule of a Gap store on 42nd Street until a security guard
asked them to move.
A recorded message from Mumia Abu-Jamal, an inmate in Pennsylvania and a
left-wing cause célèbre, drifted across the speakers as garbled as the service
announcements emanating from subway speakers in the station below ground.
Around 2:30 p.m., the rally turned into a march, as those gathered walked around
the corner down 42nd Street, bound for the United Nations. They moved slowly,
sprawling the length of two crosstown blocks, with a few Katrina refugees at the
column's front. At the back, Devin Kyle, 26, and Tonia Shoumatoff, 50, carried a
20-foot banner reading, simply, "May Peace Prevail."
"Rather than fight hatred with hatred," Mr. Kyle said, "I came here to be a
peaceful presence."
Reporting for this article was contributed by Lakiesha R. Carr and Lynette
Clemetson in Washington, Carolyn Marshall in San Francisco and Colin Moynihan in
New York.
Demonstrations Mark Third Anniversary of Iraq Invasion, NYT, 19.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/nyregion/19protest.html
Task Force 6-26
Before and After Abu Ghraib, a U.S. Unit
Abused Detainees
March 19, 2006
The New York Times
By ERIC SCHMITT and CAROLYN MARSHALL
As the Iraqi insurgency intensified in early
2004, an elite Special Operations forces unit converted one of Saddam Hussein's
former military bases near Baghdad into a top-secret detention center. There,
American soldiers made one of the former Iraqi government's torture chambers
into their own interrogation cell. They named it the Black Room.
In the windowless, jet-black garage-size room, some soldiers beat prisoners with
rifle butts, yelled and spit in their faces and, in a nearby area, used
detainees for target practice in a game of jailer paintball. Their intention was
to extract information to help hunt down Iraq's most-wanted terrorist, Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, according to Defense Department personnel who served with the unit
or were briefed on its operations.
The Black Room was part of a temporary detention site at Camp Nama, the secret
headquarters of a shadowy military unit known as Task Force 6-26. Located at
Baghdad International Airport, the camp was the first stop for many insurgents
on their way to the Abu Ghraib prison a few miles away.
Placards posted by soldiers at the detention area advised, "NO BLOOD, NO FOUL."
The slogan, as one Defense Department official explained, reflected an adage
adopted by Task Force 6-26: "If you don't make them bleed, they can't prosecute
for it." According to Pentagon specialists who worked with the unit, prisoners
at Camp Nama often disappeared into a detention black hole, barred from access
to lawyers or relatives, and confined for weeks without charges. "The reality
is, there were no rules there," another Pentagon official said.
The story of detainee abuse in Iraq is a familiar one. But the following account
of Task Force 6-26, based on documents and interviews with more than a dozen
people, offers the first detailed description of how the military's most highly
trained counterterrorism unit committed serious abuses.
It adds to the picture of harsh interrogation practices at American military
prisons in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as well as at secret Central
Intelligence Agency detention centers around the world.
The new account reveals the extent to which the unit members mistreated
prisoners months before and after the photographs of abuse from Abu Ghraib were
made public in April 2004, and it helps belie the original Pentagon assertions
that abuse was confined to a small number of rogue reservists at Abu Ghraib.
The abuses at Camp Nama continued despite warnings beginning in August 2003 from
an Army investigator and American intelligence and law enforcement officials in
Iraq. The Central Intelligence Agency was concerned enough to bar its personnel
from Camp Nama that August.
It is difficult to compare the conditions at the camp with those at Abu Ghraib
because so little is known about the secret compound, which was off limits even
to the Red Cross. The abuses appeared to have been unsanctioned, but some of
them seemed to have been well known throughout the camp.
For an elite unit with roughly 1,000 people at any given time, Task Force 6-26
seems to have had a large number of troops punished for detainee abuse. Since
2003, 34 task force members have been disciplined in some form for mistreating
prisoners, and at least 11 members have been removed from the unit, according to
new figures the Special Operations Command provided in response to questions
from The New York Times. Five Army Rangers in the unit were convicted three
months ago for kicking and punching three detainees in September 2005.
Some of the serious accusations against Task Force 6-26 have been reported over
the past 16 months by news organizations including NBC, The Washington Post and
The Times. Many details emerged in hundreds of pages of documents released under
a Freedom of Information Act request by the American Civil Liberties Union. But
taken together for the first time, the declassified documents and interviews
with more than a dozen military and civilian Defense Department and other
federal personnel provide the most detailed portrait yet of the secret camp and
the inner workings of the clandestine unit.
The documents and interviews also reflect a culture clash between the
free-wheeling military commandos and the more cautious Pentagon civilians
working with them that escalated to a tense confrontation. At one point, one of
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's top aides, Stephen A. Cambone, ordered a
subordinate to "get to the bottom" of any misconduct.
Most of the people interviewed for this article were midlevel civilian and
military Defense Department personnel who worked with Task Force 6-26 and said
they witnessed abuses, or who were briefed on its operations over the past three
years.
Many were initially reluctant to discuss Task Force 6-26 because its missions
are classified. But when pressed repeatedly by reporters who contacted them,
they agreed to speak about their experiences and observations out of what they
said was anger and disgust over the unit's treatment of detainees and the
failure of task force commanders to punish misconduct more aggressively. The
critics said the harsh interrogations yielded little information to help capture
insurgents or save American lives.
Virtually all of those who agreed to speak are career government employees, many
with previous military service, and they were granted anonymity to encourage
them to speak candidly without fear of retribution from the Pentagon. Many of
their complaints are supported by declassified military documents and e-mail
messages from F.B.I. agents who worked regularly with the task force in Iraq.
A Demand for Intelligence
Military officials say there may have been extenuating circumstances for some of
the harsh treatment at Camp Nama and its field stations in other parts of Iraq.
By the spring of 2004, the demand on interrogators for intelligence was growing
to help combat the increasingly numerous and deadly insurgent attacks.
Some detainees may have been injured resisting capture. A spokesman for the
Special Operations Command, Kenneth S. McGraw, said there was sufficient
evidence to prove misconduct in only 5 of 29 abuse allegations against task
force members since 2003. As a result of those five incidents, 34 people were
disciplined.
"We take all those allegations seriously," Gen. Bryan D. Brown, the commander of
the Special Operations Command, said in a brief hallway exchange on Capitol Hill
on March 8. "Any kind of abuse is not consistent with the values of the Special
Operations Command."
The veil of secrecy surrounding the highly classified unit has helped to shield
its conduct from public scrutiny. The Pentagon will not disclose the unit's
precise size, the names of its commanders, its operating bases or specific
missions. Even the task force's name changes regularly to confuse adversaries,
and the courts-martial and other disciplinary proceedings have not identified
the soldiers in public announcements as task force members.
General Brown's command declined requests for interviews with several former
task force members and with Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who leads the Joint
Special Operations Command, the headquarters at Fort Bragg, N.C., that supplies
the unit's most elite troops.
One Special Operations officer and a senior enlisted soldier identified by
Defense Department personnel as former task force members at Camp Nama declined
to comment when contacted by telephone. Attempts to contact three other Special
Operations soldiers who were in the unit — by phone, through relatives and
former neighbors — were also unsuccessful.
Cases of detainee abuse attributed to Task Force 6-26 demonstrate both confusion
over and, in some cases, disregard for approved interrogation practices and
standards for detainee treatment, according to Defense Department specialists
who have worked with the unit.
In early 2004, an 18-year-old man suspected of selling cars to members of the
Zarqawi terrorist network was seized with his entire family at their home in
Baghdad. Task force soldiers beat him repeatedly with a rifle butt and punched
him in the head and kidneys, said a Defense Department specialist briefed on the
incident.
Some complaints were ignored or played down in a unit where a conspiracy of
silence contributed to the overall secretiveness. "It's under control," one unit
commander told a Defense Department official who complained about mistreatment
at Camp Nama in the spring of 2004.
For hundreds of suspected insurgents, Camp Nama was a way station on a journey
that started with their capture on the battlefield or in their homes, and ended
often in a cell at Abu Ghraib. Hidden in plain sight just off a dusty road
fronting Baghdad International Airport, Camp Nama was an unmarked, virtually
unknown compound at the edge of the taxiways.
The heart of the camp was the Battlefield Interrogation Facility, alternately
known as the Tactical Screening Facility and the Temporary Holding Facility. The
interrogation and detention areas occupied a corner of the larger compound,
separated by a fence topped with razor wire.
Unmarked helicopters flew detainees into the camp almost daily, former task
force members said. Dressed in blue jumpsuits with taped goggles covering their
eyes, the shackled prisoners were led into a screening room where they were
registered and examined by medics.
Just beyond the screening rooms, where Saddam Hussein was given a medical exam
after his capture, detainees were kept in as many as 85 cells spread over two
buildings. Some detainees were kept in what was known as Motel 6, a group of
crudely built plywood shacks that reeked of urine and excrement. The shacks were
cramped, forcing many prisoners to squat or crouch. Other detainees were housed
inside a separate building in 6-by-8-foot cubicles in a cellblock called Hotel
California.
The interrogation rooms were stark. High-value detainees were questioned in the
Black Room, nearly bare but for several 18-inch hooks that jutted from the
ceiling, a grisly reminder of the terrors inflicted by Mr. Hussein's
inquisitors. Jailers often blared rap music or rock 'n' roll at deafening
decibels over a loudspeaker to unnerve their subjects.
Another smaller room offered basic comforts like carpets and cushioned seating
to put more cooperative prisoners at ease, said several Defense Department
specialists who worked at Camp Nama. Detainees wore heavy, olive-drab hoods
outside their cells. By June 2004, the revelations of abuse at Abu Ghraib
galvanized the military to promise and better treatment for prisoners. In one
small concession at Camp Nama, soldiers exchanged the hoods for cloth blindfolds
with drop veils that allowed detainees to breathe more freely but prevented them
from peeking out.
Some former task force members said the Nama in the camp's name stood for a
coarse phrase that soldiers used to describe the compound. One Defense
Department specialist recalled seeing pink blotches on detainees' clothing as
well as red welts on their bodies, marks he learned later were inflicted by
soldiers who used detainees as targets and called themselves the High Five
Paintball Club.
Mr. McGraw, the military spokesman, said he had not heard of the Black Room or
the paintball club and had not seen any mention of them in the documents he had
reviewed.
In a nearby operations center, task force analysts pored over intelligence
collected from spies, detainees and remotely piloted Predator surveillance
aircraft, to piece together clues to aid soldiers on their raids. Twice daily at
noon and midnight military interrogators and their supervisors met with
officials from the C.I.A., F.B.I. and allied military units to review operations
and new intelligence.
Task Force 6-26 was a creation of the Pentagon's post-Sept. 11 campaign against
terrorism, and it quickly became the model for how the military would gain
intelligence and battle insurgents in the future. Originally known as Task Force
121, it was formed in the summer of 2003, when the military merged two existing
Special Operations units, one hunting Osama bin Laden in and around Afghanistan,
and the other tracking Mr. Hussein in Iraq. (Its current name is Task Force
145.)
The task force was a melting pot of military and civilian units. It drew on
elite troops from the Joint Special Operations Command, whose elements include
the Army unit Delta Force, Navy's Seal Team 6 and the 75th Ranger Regiment.
Military reservists and Defense Intelligence Agency personnel with special
skills, like interrogators, were temporarily assigned to the unit. C.I.A.
officers, F.B.I. agents and special operations forces from other countries also
worked closely with the task force.
Many of the American Special Operations soldiers wore civilian clothes and were
allowed to grow beards and long hair, setting them apart from their uniformed
colleagues. Unlike conventional soldiers and marines whose Iraq tours lasted 7
to 12 months, unit members and their commanders typically rotated every 90 days.
Task Force 6-26 had a singular focus: capture or kill Mr. Zarqawi, the Jordanian
militant operating in Iraq. "Anytime there was even the smell of Zarqawi nearby,
they would go out and use any means possible to get information from a
detainee," one official said.
Defense Department personnel briefed on the unit's operations said the harsh
treatment extended beyond Camp Nama to small field outposts in Baghdad, Falluja,
Balad, Ramadi and Kirkuk. These stations were often nestled within the alleys of
a city in nondescript buildings with suburban-size yards where helicopters could
land to drop off or pick up detainees.
At the outposts, some detainees were stripped naked and had cold water thrown on
them to cause the sensation of drowning, said Defense Department personnel who
served with the unit.
In January 2004, the task force captured the son of one of Mr. Hussein's
bodyguards in Tikrit. The man told Army investigators that he was forced to
strip and that he was punched in the spine until he fainted, put in front of an
air-conditioner while cold water was poured on him and kicked in the stomach
until he vomited. Army investigators were forced to close their inquiry in June
2005 after they said task force members used battlefield pseudonyms that made it
impossible to identify and locate the soldiers involved. The unit also asserted
that 70 percent of its computer files had been lost.
Despite the task force's access to a wide range of intelligence, its raids were
often dry holes, yielding little if any intelligence and alienating ordinary
Iraqis, Defense Department personnel said. Prisoners deemed no threat to
American troops were often driven deep into the Iraqi desert at night and
released, sometimes given $100 or more in American money for their trouble.
Back at Camp Nama, the task force leaders established a ritual for departing
personnel who did a good job, Pentagon officials said. The commanders them with
two unusual mementos: a detainee hood and a souvenir piece of tile from the
medical screening room that once held Mr. Hussein.
Early Signs of Trouble
Accusations of abuse by Task Force 6-26 came as no surprise to many other
officials in Iraq. By early 2004, both the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. had expressed
alarm about the military's harsh interrogation techniques.
The C.I.A.'s Baghdad station sent a cable to headquarters on Aug. 3, 2003,
raising concern that Special Operations troops who served with agency officers
had used techniques that had become too aggressive. Five days later, the C.I.A.
issued a classified directive that prohibited its officers from participating in
harsh interrogations. Separately, the C.I.A. barred its officers from working at
Camp Nama but allowed them to keep providing target information and other
intelligence to the task force.
The warnings still echoed nearly a year later. On June 25, 2004, nearly two
months after the disclosure of the abuses at Abu Ghraib, an F.B.I. agent in Iraq
sent an e-mail message to his superiors in Washington, warning that a detainee
captured by Task Force 6-26 had suspicious burn marks on his body. The detainee
said he had been tortured. A month earlier, another F.B.I. agent asked top
bureau officials for guidance on how to deal with military interrogators across
Iraq who used techniques like loud music and yelling that exceeded "the bounds
of standard F.B.I. practice."
American generals were also alerted to the problem. In December 2003, Col.
Stuart A. Herrington, a retired Army intelligence officer, warned in a
confidential memo that medical personnel reported that prisoners seized by the
unit, then known as Task Force 121, had injuries consistent with beatings. "It
seems clear that TF 121 needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of
detainees," Colonel Herrington concluded.
By May 2004, just as the scandal at Abu Ghraib was breaking, tensions increased
at Camp Nama between the Special Operations troops and civilian interrogators
and case officers from the D.I.A.'s Defense Human Intelligence Service, who were
there to support the unit in its fight against the Zarqawi network. The discord,
according to documents, centered on the harsh treatment of detainees as well as
restrictions the Special Operations troops placed on their civilian colleagues,
like monitoring their e-mail messages and phone calls.
Maj. Gen. George E. Ennis, who until recently commanded the D.I.A.'s human
intelligence division, declined to be interviewed for this article. But in
written responses to questions, General Ennis said he never heard about the
numerous complaints made by D.I.A. personnel until he and his boss, Vice Adm.
Lowell E. Jacoby, then the agency's director, were briefed on June 24, 2004.
The next day, Admiral Jacoby wrote a two-page memo to Mr. Cambone, under
secretary of defense for intelligence. In it, he described a series of
complaints, including a May 2004 incident in which a D.I.A. interrogator said he
witnessed task force soldiers punch a detainee hard enough to require medical
help. The D.I.A. officer took photos of the injuries, but a supervisor
confiscated them, the memo said.
The tensions laid bare a clash of military cultures. Combat-hardened commandos
seeking a steady flow of intelligence to pinpoint insurgents grew exasperated
with civilian interrogators sent from Washington, many of whom were novices at
interrogating hostile prisoners fresh off the battlefield.
"These guys wanted results, and our debriefers were used to a civil
environment," said one Defense Department official who was briefed on the task
force operations.
Within days after Admiral Jacoby sent his memo, the D.I.A. took the
extraordinary step of temporarily withdrawing its personnel from Camp Nama.
Admiral Jacoby's memo also provoked an angry reaction from Mr. Cambone. "Get to
the bottom of this immediately. This is not acceptable," Mr. Cambone said in a
handwritten note on June 26, 2004, to his top deputy, Lt. Gen. William G.
Boykin. "In particular, I want to know if this is part of a pattern of behavior
by TF 6-26."
General Boykin said through a spokesman on March 17 that at the time he told Mr.
Cambone he had found no pattern of misconduct with the task force.
A Shroud of Secrecy
Military and legal experts say the full breadth of abuses committed by Task
Force 6-26 may never be known because of the secrecy surrounding the unit, and
the likelihood that some allegations went unreported.
In the summer of 2004, Camp Nama closed and the unit moved to a new headquarters
in Balad, 45 miles north of Baghdad. The unit's operations are now shrouded in
even tighter secrecy.
Soon after their rank-and-file clashed in 2004, D.I.A. officials in Washington
and military commanders at Fort Bragg agreed to improve how the task force
integrated specialists into its ranks. The D.I.A. is now sending small teams of
interrogators, debriefers and case officers, called "deployable Humint teams,"
to work with Special Operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senior military commanders insist that the elite warriors, who will be relied on
more than ever in the campaign against terrorism, are now treating detainees
more humanely and can police themselves. The C.I.A. has resumed conducting
debriefings with the task force, but does not permit harsh questioning, said a
C.I.A. official.
General McChrystal, the leader of the Joint Special Operations Command, received
his third star in a promotion ceremony at Fort Bragg on March 13.
On Dec. 8, 2004, the Pentagon's spokesman, Lawrence Di Rita, said that four
Special Operations soldiers from the task force were punished for "excessive use
of force" and administering electric shocks to detainees with stun guns. Two of
the soldiers were removed from the unit. To that point, Mr. Di Rita said, 10
task force members had been disciplined. Since then, according to the new
figures provided to The Times, the number of those disciplined for detainee
abuse has more than tripled. Nine of the 34 troops disciplined received written
or oral counseling. Others were reprimanded for slapping detainees and other
offenses.
The five Army Rangers who were court-martialed in December received punishments
including jail time of 30 days to six months and reduction in rank. Two of them
will receive bad-conduct discharges upon completion of their sentences.
Human rights advocates and leading members of Congress say the Pentagon must
still do more to hold senior-level commanders and civilian officials accountable
for the misconduct.
The Justice Department inspector general is investigating complaints of detainee
abuse by Task Force 6-26, a senior law enforcement official said. The only
wide-ranging military inquiry into prisoner abuse by Special Operations forces
was completed nearly a year ago by Brig. Gen. Richard P. Formica, and was sent
to Congress.
But the United States Central Command has refused repeated requests from The
Times over the past several months to provide an unclassified copy of General
Formica's findings despite Mr. Rumsfeld's instructions that such a version of
all 12 major reports into detainee abuse be made public.
Before and After Abu Ghraib, a U.S. Unit Abused Detainees, NYT, 19.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/international/middleeast/19abuse.html?hp&ex=1142744400&en=9efb5b3a1aa3d685&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Cited as Symbol of Abu Ghraib, Man Admits He Is Not in Photo
Related
March 18, 2006
The New York Times
By KATE ZERNIKE
In the summer of 2004, a group of former
detainees of Abu Ghraib prison filed a lawsuit claiming that they had been the
victims of the abuse captured in photographs that incited outrage around the
world.
One, Ali Shalal Qaissi, soon emerged as their chief representative, appearing in
publications and on television in several countries to detail his suffering. His
prominence made sense, because he claimed to be the man in the photograph that
had become the international icon of the Abu Ghraib scandal: standing on a
cardboard box, hooded, with wires attached to his outstretched arms. He had even
emblazoned the silhouette of that image on business cards.
The trouble was, the man in the photograph was not Mr. Qaissi. [Editors' Note,
Page A2.]
Military investigators had identified the man on the box as a different detainee
who had described the episode in a sworn statement immediately after the
photographs were discovered in January 2004, but then the man seemed to go
silent.
Mr. Qaissi had energetically filled the void, traveling abroad with slide shows
to argue that abuse in Iraq continued, as head of a group he called the
Association of Victims of American Occupation Prisons.
The New York Times profiled him last Saturday in a front-page article; in it,
Mr. Qaissi insisted he had never sought the fame of his iconic status. Mr.
Qaissi had been interviewed on a number of earlier occasions, including by PBS's
"Now," Vanity Fair, Der Spiegel and in the Italian news media as the man on the
box.
This week, after the online magazine Salon raised questions about the identity
of the man in the photograph, Mr. Qaissi and his lawyers insisted he was telling
the truth.
Certainly, he was at Abu Ghraib, and appears with a hood over his head in some
photographs that Army investigators seized from the computer belonging to
Specialist Charles Graner, the soldier later convicted of being the ringleader
of the abuse.
However, he now acknowledges he is not the man in the specific photograph he
printed and held up in a portrait that accompanied the Times article. But he and
his lawyers maintain that he was photographed in a similar position and shocked
with wires and that he is the one on his business card. The Army says it
believes only one prisoner was treated in that way.
"I know one thing," Mr. Qaissi said yesterday, breaking down in tears when
reached by telephone. "I wore that blanket, I stood on that box, and I was wired
up and electrocuted."
Susan Burke, a lawyer in Philadelphia who is representing Mr. Qaissi and other
former prisoners in a lawsuit against civilian interrogators and translators at
Abu Ghraib, said that Mr. Qaissi had been abused in the same way as the man in
the photo. "The sad fact is that there is not only one man on the box," she
said.
Using a name that Mr. Qaissi is often called, she said, "Haj Ali is but one of
many victims of the torture by Graner and the others."
In the interview for the article, Mr. Qaissi pointed to his deformed hand and
said it matched the hand in the photograph. A close look at the photograph,
however, is inconclusive.
Whether he was forced to stand on a box and photographed is not clear, but
evidence suggests that he adopted the identity of the iconic man on the box, the
very symbol of Abu Ghraib, well after he left the prison.
Records confirm that Mr. Qaissi became inmate 151716 sometime after the prison
opened in June 2003, but do not give firm dates; Mr. Qaissi, a 43-year-old
former Baath Party member and neighborhood mayor in Baghdad, said he arrived at
Abu Ghraib in October 2003 and was released in March 2004, two months after the
Army began an investigation into the abuse.
And he suffered mistreatment and humiliation at the hands of the same people who
photographed the man on the box: photographs investigators seized show him
forced into a crouch, identifiable by his mangled hand, with the nickname guards
gave him — "The Claw" — scrawled in black marker across his orange jumpsuit.
But if he was the hooded man on the box, he did not mention it on several key
occasions in the first months after the scandal broke.
In the spring of 2004, Mr. Qaissi approached Muhammad Hamid al-Moussawi, the
deputy director of the Human Rights Organization of Iraq, and proposed that the
men set up a group for prisoners of the occupation, Mr. Moussawi said this week.
Yet Mr. Qaissi never claimed at the time that he had been the man in the
photograph, Mr. Moussawi recalled.
A journalist who interviewed Mr. Qaissi three times that May and June about what
happened at Abu Ghraib similarly said he never mentioned the pose or the
photograph. The journalist, Gert Van Langendonck, said Mr. Qaissi mentioned the
other cruelties he described in the Times profile.
A lawsuit Mr. Qaissi joined, filed on July 27, 2004, also made no allegation
that he was shocked with wires or forced to stand on a box. That allegation
appeared only on an amended version of a complaint he later joined, filed last
month, which said he had been forced to stand on the box and fell off from the
shocks of the electrocution: "They repeated this at least five times."
Another man had already been publicly identified as the man on the box in May
2004, when documents including logbooks and sworn statements from detainees and
soldiers were leaked to The Times.
On May 22, 2004, The Times quoted the testimony of a detainee, Abdou Hussain
Saad Faleh: "Then a tall black soldier came and put electrical wires on my
fingers and toes and on my penis, and I had a bag over my head. Then he was
saying, 'Which switch is on for electricity?'"
Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the soldiers later convicted of abuse,
identified the man by his nickname, Gilligan, in her statement.
She left some room to believe that others were subjected to the same treatment.
"The wires part," she said, was her idea, but she said Specialist Graner and
Staff Sgt. Ivan Frederick II had forced detainees to stand on a box to stay
awake, and did so at the request of military intelligence officials. Abu Ghraib
photographs show more than one example of a hooded man forced to stand on boxes.
But Chris Grey, a spokesman for the Army's Criminal Investigation Command, said
that the military believed that Mr. Faleh had been the only prisoner subjected
to the treatment shown in the photo. "To date, and after a very thorough
criminal investigation, we have neither credible information, nor reason to
believe, that more than one incident of this nature occurred," he said.
Mr. Qaissi's lawyer, Ms. Burke, countered, "We do not trust the torturers."
Mr. Qaissi seems to have first begun identifying himself as the hooded man in
the fall of 2004, by which point he had started his prisoners' group out of a
politically charged mosque in Baghdad.
In an article in the February 2005 issue of Vanity Fair, Donovan Webster
identified Mr. Qaissi as Haj Ali, the likely man on the box, based on an
extensive investigation of military records. Soon, Mr. Qaissi was featured in
numerous profiles, including in Der Spiegel, reprinted by Salon, as well as on
the PBS current affairs program "Now," where he described being shocked: "It
felt like my eyeballs were coming out of my sockets."
With his soft voice and occasionally self-deprecating humor, he has impressed
interviewers as affable and credible. He told his story with a level of detail
that separated it from that of many others.
Most of his assertions and details could be confirmed, Mr. Webster and others
stress. In his three-hour interview with The Times, Mr. Qaissi did not veer from
reported details and appeared confident in his discussion, punctuating his story
with bitter laughter and occasionally, tears. But he never raised the
possibility that another man may have also been photographed in the same pose.
Human rights workers were compelled by his story, as well. Reporting the
Saturday article, The Times relied in part on their statements that he could
well be the hooded man, as well as on prison records and interviews with friends
and his lawyers, who say they have Mr. Qaissi's blanket, the same one, they
said, draped over the man in the photograph. Army officials at the time refused
to confirm or refute Mr. Qaissi's claims, citing privacy protections in the
Geneva Convention.
Abdel Jabbar al-Azzawi, who now lives in Baghdad and says he was in the prison
with both Mr. Qaissi and the man named Gilligan and has joined the lawsuit, says
he saw Mr. Qaissi wearing the blanket fashioned into a poncho depicted in the
photograph, though he did not see the photographs being taken.
Mr. Qaissi's lawyers also stress that the iconic photograph is not the basis of
his case. In court papers, he also says he was punched, kicked, hit with a stick
and chained to his cell while his captors poured cold water over his naked body.
Meanwhile, it is not clear what happened to the real hooded man, Mr. Faleh. An
Army spokesman said he was released from American custody in January 2004.
Tribal leaders, and the manager of a brick factory next to the address where
prison records say he lived, said they had never heard the name. Besides, they
said, detainees often make up identities when they are imprisoned. Mr. Qaissi's
attorneys said they have not attempted to search for him.
Hassan M. Fattah contributed reporting from Beirut for this article, Eric
Schmitt from Washington and employees of The New York Times from Iraq.
Cited
as Symbol of Abu Ghraib, Man Admits He Is Not in Photo, NYT, 18.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/18/international/middleeast/18ghraib.html?hp&ex=1142744400&en=f5a8a35705134516&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Editors' Note
March 17, 2006
The New York Times
A front-page article last Saturday profiled
Ali Shalal Qaissi, identifying him as the hooded man forced to stand on a box,
attached to wires, in a photograph from the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal of
2003 and 2004. He was shown holding such a photograph. As an article on Page A1
on Saturday makes clear, Mr. Qaissi was not that man.
The Times did not adequately research Mr. Qaissi’s insistence that he was the
man in the photograph. Mr. Qaissi’s account had already been broadcast and
printed by other outlets, including PBS and Vanity Fair, without challenge.
Lawyers for former prisoners at Abu Ghraib vouched for him. Human rights workers
seemed to support his account. The Pentagon, asked for verification, declined to
confirm or deny it.
Despite the previous reports, The Times should have been more persistent in
seeking comment from the military. A more thorough examination of previous
articles in The Times and other newspapers would have shown that in 2004
military investigators named another man as the one on the box, raising
suspicions about Mr. Qaissi’s claim.
Editors' Note, NYT, 17.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/international/18editors.note.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
U.S.-Led Forces Continue Sweep for
Insurgent Bases in Iraq
March 17, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 17 — The United States
military and Iraqi security forces continued to search for insurgent bases
today, the second day of a large-scale assault that included helicopters and
ground forces outside Samarra, a city north of Baghdad where the bombing of a
revered Shiite shrine last month sent sectarian violence soaring in Iraq.
About 50 suspects were detained, with 17 later released after questioning, said
a spokesman, Lt. Col. Edward Loomis, a spokesman for the 101st Airborne. Caches
of weapons including mortars, rockets and bomb-making materials were uncovered,
he said.
The assault outside Samarra, which was led by the 101st Airborne Division but
also included other American and Iraqi ground units, started on Thursday with
more than 50 aircraft for transport and air cover, hundreds of armored vehicles,
and about 1,500 American and Iraqi troops, military spokesmen said. The Sunni
Arab-dominated area has long been troubling for the American military, which has
repeatedly raided it with little lasting effect on the insurgency.
The American military called the new operation the largest air assault — a
military term for the insertion of soldiers by helicopters — since the invasion
of Iraq in 2003. But in terms of overall scale, it did not involve relatively
large number of soldiers: for comparison, one of the armored sweeps in Anbar
Province late last year involved about 3,500 American and Iraqi troops.
There were no reports of casualties on either side.
The American military did not say whether the operation was connected to the
bombing last month that destroyed the golden mosque dome at the Askariya Shrine,
one of Shiite Islam's holiest sites, and spurred Shiite militiamen to rampage
across eastern Baghdad and cities in the south, leaving hundreds dead.
On Thursday, Baghdad police officials said that 36 bodies, all killed with
gunshots to the head, had been discovered in various parts of the capital since
Wednesday morning.
The raids in northern Iraq are being conducted across wide swaths of land around
three villages east of Samarra, said an Iraqi Army official at an operations
center in the city.
Most of the aircraft being deployed are Black Hawk and Chinook transport
helicopters and Apache attack helicopters that are being used for air cover,
said Colonel Loomis.
He did not specify whether any airstrikes with missiles or bombs had been
launched.
Iraqi officials have announced the arrests of suspects connected to the bombing
of the Askariya Shrine. On Sunday, Interior Minister Bayan Jabr gave details of
the attack, saying 20 men placed 475 pounds of explosives throughout the mosque
between 8 p.m. and 5:40 a.m. The explosives were then remotely detonated.
The violent aftermath of that attack continues to roil Iraq. American and Iraqi
officials fear that a prolonged political battle over the formation of the
government could widen sectarian rifts and fuel the Sunni Arab-led insurgency.
As large-scale sectarian reprisals continue, Pentagon officials are revisiting
plans to draw down the force of 133,000 American troops in Iraq this year.
In Baghdad, Iraqi legislators convened the long-awaited first session of the new
Parliament on Thursday. The body's 275 members, all elected in December, were
sworn in, and leaders delivered speeches calling for unity before adjourning the
session and rushing to continue negotiations to form a full government.
In the 40-minute parliamentary session, Iraqi leaders gave frank assessments of
the country's problems. "The country is going through dangerous times," said
Adnan Pachachi, the newly appointed temporary speaker of Parliament. "Sectarian
tensions have increased and begun to create a national crisis that could destroy
Iraq. We have to prove to the whole world that there will not be civil war
between the people of this country. The danger is still there, and our enemies
are watching us."
With the start of Parliament, Iraqi leaders face a tight formal deadline to
establish a government. The new Constitution says the Parliament must appoint
the Iraqi president by a two-thirds vote within 30 days of its first sitting. No
more than 15 days later, the president is supposed to assign the prime minister
nominee, chosen by the largest bloc, to appoint a cabinet. The nominee then has
30 days to do that. The executive branch has to be approved by a majority vote
of Parliament.
But the reality is that Iraqi leaders have missed deadlines throughout the
political process. On Thursday, the more optimistic politicians said they
expected the government to be formed within a month. But many others said the
talks could drag on until the summer. The American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad,
has been urging quick resolution to the most contentious issues.
The negotiations only began in earnest on Sunday, after weeks of sniping between
the political parties. Their biggest disagreement right now is over the prime
ministerial nominee. The main Shiite bloc has backed Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the
current prime minister, while a loose alliance of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and secular
politicians is opposing him.
In a news conference after the parliamentary meeting, Mr. Jaafari said he would
step aside if asked to do so. But the Shiites have banded together in support,
and Mr. Jaafari said later in an interview with Iraqiya, the state-financed TV
network, that the Shiites had chosen their nominee in a democratic process.
U.S.-Led Forces Continue Sweep for Insurgent Bases in Iraq, NYT, 17.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/international/middleeast/17cnd-iraq.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
U.S. Forces in Big Assault Near Samarra
March 17, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 16 — The United States
military announced Thursday that it had begun a large-scale assault on insurgent
bases outside Samarra, a city north of Baghdad where the bombing of a revered
Shiite shrine last month sent sectarian violence soaring in Iraq.
In Baghdad, Iraqi legislators convened the long-awaited first session of the new
Parliament. The body's 275 members, all elected in December, were sworn in, and
leaders delivered speeches calling for unity before adjourning the session and
rushing to continue negotiations to form a full government.
The assault outside Samarra, which was led by the 101st Airborne Division but
also included other American and Iraqi ground units, involved more than 50
aircraft for transport and air cover, hundreds of armored vehicles, and about
1,500 American and Iraqi troops, military spokesmen said. The Sunni
Arab-dominated area has long been troubling for the American military, which has
repeatedly raided it with little lasting effect on the insurgency.
The American military called the new operation the largest air assault — a
military term for the insertion of soldiers by helicopters — since the invasion
of Iraq in 2003. But in terms of overall scale, it did not involve relatively
large number of soldiers: for comparison, one of the armored sweeps in Anbar
Province late last year involved about 3,500 American and Iraqi troops.
Initial reports indicated that soldiers taking part in this latest operation,
which is expected to last for several days, had come across insurgent hideouts
with six stockpiles of artillery shells, explosives, bomb-making equipment and
military uniforms, spokesmen for the 101st Airborne Division said. Soldiers also
detained at least 40 men suspected of being insurgents. There were no immediate
reports of casualties on either side.
The American military did not say whether the operation was connected to the
bombing last month that destroyed the golden mosque dome at the Askariya Shrine,
one of Shiite Islam's holiest sites, and spurred Shiite militiamen to rampage
across eastern Baghdad and cities in the south, leaving hundreds dead.
On Thursday, Baghdad police officials said that 36 bodies, all killed with
gunshots to the head, had been discovered in various parts of the capital since
Wednesday morning.
The raids in northern Iraq are being conducted across wide swaths of land around
three villages east of Samarra, said an Iraqi Army official at an operations
center in the city.
Most of the aircraft being deployed are Black Hawk and Chinook transport
helicopters and Apache attack helicopters that are being used for air cover,
said Lt. Col. Edward Loomis, a spokesman for the 101st Airborne. The colonel did
not specify whether any airstrikes with missiles or bombs had been launched.
Hoshyar Zebari, the Iraqi foreign minister, told CNN that insurgents "had been
trying to create another Falluja" in the area, a reference to the Sunni Arab
city west of Baghdad that had been an insurgent stronghold until the Marines
assaulted it in a ground offensive in late 2004. "After the Falluja operation
many of the insurgents moved on to other parts of the country," Mr. Zebari said.
Iraqi officials have announced the arrests of suspects connected to the bombing
of the Askariya Shrine. On Sunday, Interior Minister Bayan Jabr gave details of
the attack, saying 20 men placed 475 pounds of explosives throughout the mosque
between 8 p.m. and 5:40 a.m. The explosives were then remotely detonated.
The violent aftermath of that attack continues to roil Iraq. American and Iraqi
officials fear that a prolonged political battle over the formation of the
government could widen sectarian rifts and fuel the Sunni Arab-led insurgency.
As large-scale sectarian reprisals continue, Pentagon officials are revisiting
plans to draw down the force of 133,000 American troops in Iraq this year.
In the 40-minute parliamentary session on Thursday, Iraqi leaders gave frank
assessments of the country's problems. "The country is going through dangerous
times," said Adnan Pachachi, the newly appointed temporary speaker of
Parliament. "Sectarian tensions have increased and begun to create a national
crisis that could destroy Iraq. We have to prove to the whole world that there
will not be civil war between the people of this country. The danger is still
there, and our enemies are watching us."
With the start of Parliament, Iraqi leaders face a tight formal deadline to
establish a government. The new Constitution says the Parliament must appoint
the Iraqi president by a two-thirds vote within 30 days of its first sitting. No
more than 15 days later, the president is supposed to assign the prime minister
nominee, chosen by the largest bloc, to appoint a cabinet. The nominee then has
30 days to do that. The executive branch has to be approved by a majority vote
of Parliament.
But the reality is that Iraqi leaders have missed deadlines throughout the
political process. On Thursday, the more optimistic politicians said they
expected the government to be formed within a month. But many others said the
talks could drag on until the summer. The American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad,
has been urging quick resolution to the most contentious issues.
The negotiations only began in earnest on Sunday, after weeks of sniping between
the political parties. Their biggest disagreement right now is over the prime
ministerial nominee. The main Shiite bloc has backed Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the
current prime minister, while a loose alliance of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and secular
politicians is opposing him.
In a news conference after the parliamentary meeting, Mr. Jaafari said he would
step aside if asked to do so. But the Shiites have banded together in support,
and Mr. Jaafari said later in an interview with Iraqiya, the state-financed TV
network, that the Shiites had chosen their nominee in a democratic process.
Iraqi officials imposed a travel ban across Baghdad on Thursday, as they had
done in the days after sectarian violence erupted last month. In the late
morning, Parliament members began arriving at the convention center inside the
fortified Green Zone, protected by layers of concrete blast walls, miles of
concertina wire, and Georgian soldiers and South American guards who speak
neither English nor Arabic.
After a singing of Koranic verses, the speaker of the transitional assembly,
Hajim al-Hassani, announced the appointment of Mr. Pachachi. At 83, Mr. Pachachi
is the oldest member of Parliament and entitled, by Arab tradition, to assume
the role of speaker until someone is appointed permanently.
Mr. Pachachi tried to outline the importance of the political talks, and said
the appointment of ministers should not be done on the basis of sect. But he was
interrupted by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the main Shiite bloc. "The first
session of Parliament, according to the Constitution, should be for
administering the oath of office and appointing a speaker," Mr. Hakim said,
sitting in black robes in the front row. "These discussions should come later."
Mr. Hakim's outburst underscored the sectarian tensions that Mr. Pachachi had
tried to highlight. Some Sunni Arab politicians later expressed fury at the
interruption. Mr. Hakim's party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq, is considered by many Sunnis to be one of Iraq's most dangerous
elements. It has a conservative Shiite ideology and an Iranian-trained militia,
the Badr Organization, that has seized top posts in the security forces.
Violence erupted in Diyala Province on Thursday when a bomb exploded at a school
around the town of Khalis, killing three girls and wounding two others, police
officials said. Near Miqdadiya, gunmen shot dead a man and a woman. In Mosul, a
bomb aimed at an American convoy killed an Iraqi civilian.
Inquiry Into Marine Counterattack
By The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 16 — The United States military is investigating whether a
Marine squad ambushed in November near the Iraqi town of Haditha committed
wrongdoing when its counterattack killed 15 civilians, military officials said.
Maj. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer, the top Marine commander in Iraq, ordered the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service to examine the incident after a preliminary
inquiry last month recommended further investigation "into whether Marine
response to the insurgent attack was appropriate and whether proper procedures
were followed," a military official familiar with the investigation said.
Military officers said the marines were on patrol near the town when a roadside
bomb detonated and they came under fire from nearby houses. Civilians were
caught in the crossfire during the ensuing fight, the officers said.
The Iraqi deaths were attributed incorrectly in a news release issued after the
incident to a roadside bomb blast, according to another officer. The
investigation was first reported by CNN. Several officers who spoke about the
inquiry were granted anonymity so that they could discuss an investigation that
is in its early stages.
John O'Neil contributed reporting fromNew York for this article, and Abdul
Razzaq al-Saiedi and Omar al-Neami fromBaghdad.
U.S.
Forces in Big Assault Near Samarra, NYT, 17.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/17/international/middleeast/17iraq.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Iraqi Parliament Convenes as U.S. Air
Assault Begins
March 16, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 16 — The new Iraqi
Parliament convened for the first time today with blunt speeches about the
nation's problems that were underscored by the announcement of a large-scale
American assault to clear out a new insurgent stronghold.
The military said in a statement that the air assault northeast of Samarra was
the largest since the 2003 invasion, involving more than 50 aircraft along with
1,500 Iraqi and American troops using more than 200 vehicles. The statement said
that raids would continue for several days, and that a number of insurgent
weapons caches had been discovered. Samarra is home to the Shiite shrine whose
destruction last month set off waves of violence, but the majority of its
residents are Sunni. Repeated sweeps by American soldiers have failed to secure
the city.
Iraq's foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari, said in a televised interview on CNN
that insurgents "had been trying to create another Fallujah" in the area, a
reference to a former insurgent stronghold that was cleared by an American
offensive that destroyed much of the city in the process.
"After the Fallujah operation many of the insurgents moved on to other parts of
the country," Mr. Zebari said.
In Baghdad, the long-awaited gathering of legislators elected three months
earlier began with its leaders acknowledging the rising sectarian tensions and
the vacuum of power.
In the absence of any real authority, the Parliament adjourned after engaging in
40 minutes of ceremonial procedures, with party leaders hastening off to
afternoon meetings to continue negotiations over forming the new, four-year
government.
The remarks by the Iraqi officials were some of the frankest assessments in
recent weeks of the country's problems.
"The country is going through dangerous times, it faces challenges, and the
perils come from every direction," said Adnan Pachachi, the newly appointed
temporary speaker of Parliament. "Sectarian tensions have increased. We have to
prove to the whole world that there will not be civil war between the people of
this country. The danger is still there, and our enemies are watching us."
Much is at stake in the turbulent political process. The talks began in earnest
only this week, after weeks of bitter political sniping, and are deadlocked over
several critical issues, including the nominee for prime minister. American and
Iraqi officials fear that a prolonged political battle could fuel the Sunni-led
insurgency and widen sectarian rifts, which in turn could push Iraq further down
the path to full-scale civil war and affect the Bush administration's plans to
start drawing down the 133,000 troops here.
The most optimistic politicians said today that they expected the government to
be formed in a month, with the prime minister, president and cabinet positions
appointed. But many others estimated the talks would drag on until the summer.
The American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, has been urging quick resolution to
the most contentious issues, and has shepherded several meetings himself.
In a sign of the precarious situation here, Iraqi officials imposed an
extraordinary travel ban across Baghdad today, as they had done in the days
after sectarian violence erupted last month. When the transitional parliament
met last year, there was no such curfew, and streets were jammed with the cars
of people going about their daily business.
The widening cycle of violence even touched Iraqi Kurdistan, long believed to be
a haven of calm. In the northern town of Halabja, hundreds of protesters angry
at lack of services took to the streets and burned down a museum that had been
erected, with international financing, in memory of the 5,000 Kurds killed by
Saddam Hussein's military in a gas attack in the 1980's. Protesters were injured
and some may have been killed. The crowd was demonstrating against the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, the party that governs eastern Kurdistan and whose leader,
Jalal Talabani, is president of Iraq.
In the late morning, members of Parliament began arriving at the convention
center inside the fortified Green Zone, protected by layers of concrete blast
walls, miles of concertina wire and Georgian soldiers who speak neither English
nor Arabic.
The top party leaders stood in the front row of the assembly hall and shook
hands with the legislators as they filed past. Ambassador Khalilzad walked in
with Bayan Jabr, the interior minister — a much-maligned figure who has been
criticized by the Americans for allowing Shiite militias into the police forces.
After a singing of Koranic verses, the speaker of the transitional assembly,
Hajim al-Hassani, announced the temporary appointment of Mr. Pachachi to the new
job. Mr. Pachaci took the lectern in a dark suit and blue tie, a white
handkerchief poking out of a breast pocket. At 83, he is the oldest member of
Parliament and entitled, by Arab tradition, to take the role of speaker until
someone is appointed permanently.
Mr. Pachachi tried to outline what is at stake in the political talks, saying
that the appointment of ministers should not be done on a sectarian basis.
But he was interrupted by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the main Shiite bloc.
"The first session of Parliament, according to the constitution, should be for
administering the oath of office and appointing a speaker," Mr. Hakim said,
sitting in black robes and turban in the front row. "These discussions should
come later."
Mr. Hakim's outburst underscored the very sectarian tensions that Mr. Pachachi
had sought to highlight. Some Sunni Arab politicians later expressed fury at the
interruption. Mr. Hakim and his party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, are viewed by many Sunnis as one of Iraq's most dangerous
elements, because the party adheres to a conservative Shiite ideology and has an
Iranian-trained militia, the Badr Organization, that has filled top posts in the
security forces.
In a news conference afterward, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the prime minister, who has
been nominated by the Shiites to keep his job, said he would step aside if asked
to do so. But the Shiites have banded behind him in support, even though the
main Sunni Arab parties, the Kurds and secular leaders are insisting on his
departure.
Later, in an interview with Iraqiya, the state-financed television network, Mr.
Jaafari affirmed his right to the nomination by saying the Shiites had chosen
him in a fair vote last month.
Also today, a spokesman for the American military said that it had "no reason to
doubt" the Iraqi report that 11 civilians were killed in a raid near the Sunni
town of Balad on Wednesday.
The military on Wednesday had said that only three civilians had been killed by
ground and air fire that had been called in when soldiers trying to capture an
insurgent suspect came under fire from a farmhouse.
John O'Neil contributed reporting from New York for this article.
Iraqi
Parliament Convenes as U.S. Air Assault Begins, NYT, 16.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/16/international/middleeast/16cnd-iraq.html?hp&ex=1142571600&en=c0661470fcb43785&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Taking the witness stand Wednesday for the
first time in his trial, Saddam Hussein argued with the judge.
Pool Photo by Jacob Silberberg
NYT March 16, 2006
Hussein Urges Iraqis to Unify in War on U.S.
NYT 16.3.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/16/international/middleeast/16saddam.html
Hussein Urges Iraqis to Unify in War on
U.S.
March 16, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 15 — Saddam Hussein took
the witness stand on Wednesday for his first formal testimony in his trial and
delivered an incendiary political diatribe that urged Iraqis to stop sectarian
bloodshed and to carry on the war against the Americans. The presiding judge
halted the session after Mr. Hussein, brandishing thick reading glasses,
repeatedly lambasted the court.
Mr. Hussein's nearly 40-minute speech was the most riveting element so far in a
trial that has already been punctuated by tirades from the defendants and
searing testimony from victims. Mr. Hussein marched up to the defendants'
lectern in the midafternoon, after his half brother had spent three hours
proclaiming their innocence, and read from a yellow notepad.
He had delivered outbursts before, but his sense of decorum and calm manner on
Wednesday showed he was keenly aware that this afternoon, at this hour, the
spotlight was reserved for him. He was better dressed than in previous sessions,
draped in a black suit and charcoal-gray vest with a white shirt. His hair was
combed and parted.
He went on to do exactly what Iraqi and American officials had long feared he
might — use the session, televised across the Middle East, to try to incite the
Sunni-led insurgency to further violence.
"You've been great throughout history and you've been great in your resistance
to the American and Zionist invasion and its followers," he said in a firm
voice, after calling on Iraqis to stop the sectarian violence. "You've been
great in my eyes."
"You're defending your country against the occupation," he continued. "I want
you to stick to your virtues, your faith and your patience."
In sharp rejoinders, Mr. Hussein demonstrated a command of recent events in
Iraq. Told by the judge that he was accused of killing innocent people, Mr.
Hussein pointed to the scores of bodies found this week, the victims of
sectarian killings. "Just yesterday, 80 bodies of Iraqis were discovered in
Baghdad," he said. "Aren't they innocent?"
Not once did Mr. Hussein address the case at hand, in which he and seven
co-defendants are charged with jailing, torturing and executing 148 men and boys
from the Shiite village of Dujail in the 1980's. The expression on the face of
the presiding judge, Raouf Abdel-Rahman, turned from bemusement to fatigue to
fury. After a few heated exchanges, and after cutting off the sound at least
nine times, the judge barred reporters from the court for more than 90 minutes,
allowing them to return only after Mr. Hussein had finished speaking.
Mr. Hussein was the last of the defendants to testify, marking the mid-way point
of the trial. Judge Abdel-Rahman adjourned the court until April 5, when Mr.
Hussein may return for cross-examination. The three-judge panel will then decide
what formal charges to bring against each defendant, while lawyers for both
sides prepare for further arguments. American officials say the trial will
continue until at least late May.
Even before Dujail ends, investigative judges are expected to refer the next
case against Mr. Hussein for trial. It covers what is known as the Anfal
campaign, in which Mr. Hussein's government razed villages across Iraqi
Kurdistan in the 1980's and killed about 80,000 Kurds.
Since October, when the Dujail trial opened, Iraqi and American officials have
struggled to establish the legitimacy of the Iraqi High Tribunal in the eyes of
international observers and ordinary Iraqis. Even before the first session, the
court was plagued by the assassinations of a judge and defense lawyers;
political machinations aimed at purging judges; and attempts by the Iraqi
government to shape the trial. During the trial, the court has had to contend
with disorderly defendants, ambiguous witness testimony and a reshuffling of
judges, after the first presiding judge resigned over criticism that he was too
lenient.
American and Iraqi officials have insisted that the trial be held in this
country, in defiance of a growing chorus of human rights advocates and foreign
observers who urge that it be moved to an international venue. In any case,
those critics would be difficult to win over, because most of them oppose the
death penalty, which is expected to be levied against Mr. Hussein and his top
aides.
The trial took a serious turn on Feb. 28, when the lead prosecutor presented
documents that, he argued, showed Mr. Hussein's signature on execution orders of
the 148 victims, who were rounded up in Dujail after a failed assassination
attempt on Mr. Hussein there in 1982. But Mr. Hussein's fiery speech on
Wednesday threatened to plunge the trial back into the circuslike atmosphere
that has dogged it.
Though Iraqis huddle around television sets during each court session, there are
few in this country who have not already made up their minds about Mr. Hussein.
His supporters, mostly Sunni Arabs, have been bolstered by his display of
defiance. His detractors say that same defiance shows Mr. Hussein is
unrepentant, and should have been marched to his death immediately.
"This is a farce," said Akil Mutar, 24, a worker in a cramped foodstuffs shop
downtown. "A man like Saddam shouldn't be submitted to the court, but should
instead be executed even without being questioned. Saddam, through his speech,
thinks and talks as if he's still the president."
Judge Abdel-Rahman, though firm in previous sessions, appeared to stumble a bit
on Wednesday on the tightrope he has walked between allowing the defendants
their right to speak and silencing them when they grandstand. American and Iraqi
officials say they need to find that balance because they are anxious to
demonstrate that this is not just a show trial leading to an inevitable verdict.
Mr. Hussein's half brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, who oversaw the
intelligence service during the Dujail massacre, strode into court before 11
a.m. on Wednesday in a gray robe and red-and-white head scarf, a statement in
his hand. Six of the eight defendants had testified Sunday and Monday. Like the
others, Mr. Ibrahim denied any wrongdoing and said that, during the Dujail
incident, he had "released many detainees and shook hands with them."
He justified the trials of those rounded up from Dujail by saying they had
conspired with Iran to try to assassinate Mr. Hussein.
Mr. Ibrahim also said that documentary evidence that the prosecution had
unveiled in earlier sessions had all been forged. Court officials have not
explained whether or how they are authenticating evidence.
After a recess, Mr. Hussein glided up to the lectern.
He spoke of the Feb. 22 bombing of a revered Shiite shrine in Samarra, and how
"criminals" and not Iraqis were responsible. "This is part of a plan to divide
the people instead of carrying out jihad," he said, brown-rimmed glasses perched
on his nose. "We know the resistance against the occupation will organize and go
on and on, and the government will stumble even if it's supported by the
occupiers."
Judge Abdel-Rahman interrupted a couple of minutes later.
"This is rhetoric," he said. "What's its relation to the subject?"
"I am still the president of the state," Mr. Hussein said. "I am president."
"You were president of the state," the judge said. "Now you are a defendant."
Mr. Hussein responded, "This is what you say and this is according to you and
your conscience. As for me, I hold my oath in front of my people until the
people choose someone other than me."
He labeled the Americans "criminals who came under the pretext of weapons of
mass destruction and the pretext of democracy."
The prosecutor, Jaafar al-Mousawi, shouted a harsh warning to Mr. Hussein. The
defense lawyers and Mr. Hussein yelled back.
The judge pressed a button. Television screens across Iraq went silent. The
reporters and cameramen inside the courtroom were asked to leave.
They were allowed back in for a few final remarks. Later, in the hallway, Mr.
Mousawi told reporters that during the closed session, Mr. Hussein had "gone on
saying what he wanted to say."
Khalid al-Ansary contributed reporting for this article.
Hussein Urges Iraqis to Unify in War on U.S., NYT, 16.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/16/international/middleeast/16saddam.html
Few Rules in Use of Abu Ghraib Dogs, an
Officer Testifies
March 16, 2006
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
The New York Times
FORT MEADE, Md., March 15 — The Army lacked
clear rules for using dogs in interrogations at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,
its former military intelligence chief acknowledged Wednesday during a
court-martial of a dog handler.
The officer, Col. Thomas M. Pappas, commander of military intelligence at Abu
Ghraib in late 2003 and early 2004, was the highest-ranking witness scheduled to
testify at the trial of the dog handler, Sgt. Michael J. Smith, who is charged
with abusing detainees at the prison in Iraq.
Colonel Pappas, testifying for the defense under a grant of immunity, said he
regretted having failed to set "appropriate controls" at the prison, where
detainees were bitten by dogs and assaulted and sexually humiliated by guards.
"In hindsight, clearly we probably needed to establish some definitive rules and
put out some clear guidance to everybody concerned," Colonel Pappas said.
Nevertheless, he said under cross-examination that a photograph showing Sergeant
Smith's unmuzzled dog straining at its leash just inches from the face of a
terrified prisoner was not consistent with any policy or guidance.
Colonel Pappas provided few details about the genesis of harsh interrogation
tactics that included exploiting "Arab fear of dogs," a technique recommended in
a policy dated Sept. 14, 2003. But he said the dogs were to be used "to assist
in setting conditions for interrogations."
The policy required interrogators to get case-by-case approval from Colonel
Pappas's supervisor, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, and required dogs to wear muzzles
and to be controlled by their handlers.
Few
Rules in Use of Abu Ghraib Dogs, an Officer Testifies, NYT, 16.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/16/international/middleeast/16dogs.html?hp&ex=1142571600&en=df1a4d85877d375a&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Hussein Testimony Prompts Closure of Court
to Public
March 15, 2006
The New York Times
By EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, March 15 - Saddam Hussein took
the witness stand today for his first formal testimony in his trial, delivering
a rambling political diatribe urging Iraqis to continue their resistance to the
American occupation.
Mr. Hussein, the last of the defendants to testify, did not address the charges
against him, concerning the torture and killing of Shiite villagers in the
1980's.
He walked into the court, neatly dressed in a black suit and dark gray vest over
a white shirt, put on a pair of glasses and began his testimony by reading from
a written statement that essentially was an address to the country's insurgents.
"In your resistance to the American-Zionist invasion, you are great, and you
will always be great in my eyes," Mr. Hussein said. "You're defending your
country against the occupation. I want you to stick to your virtues, your faith
and your patience."
"It's only a question of time till the sun rises and you will be victorious," he
declared
Mr. Hussein called on Iraqis to stop fighting each other and said that
"criminals" were responsible for the bombing in Samarra that touched off waves
of sectarian killings.
The trial's chief judge, Raouf Abdel-Rahman, repeatedly interrupted Mr. Hussein,
telling him to stick to the charges against him.
"This is a criminal court, we are not in politics," the judge said.
"If it wasn't for politics neither you nor I would be here today," Mr. Hussein
retorted.
Later, when the judge reminded Mr. Hussein that he was charged with killing
innocent people, Mr. Hussein replied. "Yesterday 80 people were found in
Baghdad. Weren't they innocent?"
Finally, after more than half an hour, the chief judge ordered that the live
broadcast of the trial be cut off. "This is something between you and the
Americans," he told Mr. Hussein. "Don't involve the court in the struggle
between you and the Americans."
Mr. Hussein's testimony concluded the second portion of the trial, in which he
and seven other former government officials are charged with wrongly imprisoning
and killing 148 men and boys from the Shiite village of Dujail after assassins
there tried to gun down Mr. Hussein in 1982.
The prosecution ended its case last week. After months of repeated delays,
outbursts from the defendants and changes in the judges hearing the case, the
trial picked up speed earlier this month when prosecutors presented reams of
documents, including what they described as Mr. Hussein's signature on execution
orders.
The panel of judges will now consider what charges to proceed on, after which
the defense will have an opportunity to present witnesses.
Mr. Hussein's testimony came after his half-brother, Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti,
much feared and loathed among Iraqis, presented the first formal defense of his
actions in court today, saying he had played no role in the villagers' deaths.
He walked into court in the morning dressed in a red headscarf and gray robes,
and proceeded to read from a lengthy statement. On occasion, he looked up at the
judge, thick glasses perched on his nose.
"I would rather be a victim than inflict injustice on others," said Mr. Ibrahim,
who led the intelligence service in the early 1980's. "I appreciate you giving
me time to defend myself."While denying any role in the massacre, Mr. Ibrahim
said the government was justified in trying the villagers because they had
worked with Iran in the assassination attempt.
In his meandering testimony, which began at a courthouse in the Green Zone
before 11 a.m. and went on into the afternoon, Mr. Ibrahim said documents that
had been presented as evidence had been forged; complained about his treatment
in prison; asked the authorities to released his jailed son; and mocked the
Americans for invading Iraq on false premises.
"Your honor, during the last three years, I was under torture both physically
and mentally," Mr. Ibrahim said. "The total time of interrogation was about four
hours, and the rest of the time I was sitting in my damp cell."
The American military is believed to be holding Mr. Ibrahim and his
co-defendants at Camp Cropper, a small detention center near Baghdad
International Airport. Mr. Hussein and others have complained about torture
during the trial, but American officials have said the accusations are false,
merely thrown out there by the defendants to bolster the circus atmosphere of
the trial.
At times today, the judge showed impatience with Mr. Ibrahim, telling him to
limit his pronouncements to the Dujail case.
Other defendants have already testified before the court. On Monday, Awad
al-Bandar, a former judge in the Revolutionary Court, said the people from
Dujail who were killed had received a proper trial and had confessed to trying
to assassinate Mr. Hussein at the instigation of Iran.
On Sunday, lower-level Baath Party officials from Dujail said they had seen men
being rounded up and carted off to prison in the hours after the assassination
attempt, but denied playing any role in that.
Hussein Testimony Prompts Closure of Court to Public, NYT, 15.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/international/middleeast/15cnd-hussein.html?hp&ex=1142485200&en=962231fdb9abeea2&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Pentagon Plans to Send Extra Troops to Iraq
During Holiday
March 15, 2006
The New York Times
By THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, March 15 — The American military
is planning to send a battalion of about 800 troops from Kuwait into Iraq to
coincide with a surge of pilgrims expected to visit Muslim shrines in coming
days, Pentagon officials said today.
In both 2004 and 2005, violence was sometimes directed at Shiite pilgrims during
religious holidays. Officials involved in the discussions said the plan was to
send in a battalion-size group, of about 800 troops.
Pentagon civilian and military officials said the extra forces would come from a
brigade of about 3,500 to 4,000 troops now stationed in Kuwait for just such a
need if conditions deteriorated.
The deployment — expected to last 30 to 45 days — would be the first time the
brigade, a unit of the First Armored Division, left its standby status and
entered the fight.
The officials who described the outlines of the deployment were granted
anonymity because the troop movement has not been officially announced, and no
deployment order is final until signed by Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.
But Mr. Rumsfeld hinted at the temporary increase in troop levels on Tuesday, as
he described discussions he has held with Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior
commander in Iraq.
"We move troops in and out depending on events, like we did for the referendum,
the election," Mr. Rumsfeld said on Tuesday. "General Casey may decide he wants
to bulk up slightly for the pilgrimage."
Mr. Rumsfeld did not specify which holiday or pilgrimage was prompting the
security concern. The Muslim holy day of Arbaeen falls on March 20; it
commemorates the 40th day after Imam Hussein's martyrdom, a key moment in the
history of Shia Islam, and features travel to shrines at Karbala and Najaf.
The discussions on troop numbers come at a time of continuing sectarian violence
in Iraq that senior military officials now say poses a greater security threat
than terrorists or the insurgency.
Until the recent surge in violence, there had been talk of additional,
incremental reductions in the numbers of American forces this spring and summer.
One reason for concern, Mr. Rumsfeld said, was the number of pilgrims from Iran
who go to Iraq. President Bush, Mr. Rumsfeld and other officials have said in
recent days that Iran is intervening in Iraqi affairs and fomenting attacks.
Mr. Rumsfeld avoided making predictions on Tuesday about future troop levels,
saying they would fluctuate as the United States worked to reduce its forces by
handing off security responsibilities to Iraqis, but he sought not to withdraw
at such a pace that it invited sectarian, insurgent or terrorist violence.
"We're continuing to pull troops down," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "And we're continuing
to shift our weight, as we've said, between the combat patrol aspects of it,
over to the training and the equipping and providing the enablers."
The American troop presence in Iraq stood at 133,000 on Tuesday, according to
Pentagon statistics.
Mr. Rumsfeld also said Tuesday for the first time that American intelligence
agencies were analyzing the possibility of a civil war in Iraq, but he insisted
that Iraq was not close to such widespread sectarian conflict.
"Is it true the people in the intelligence community are thinking about this and
analyzing it and doing red team — A team/B team-type looks at it?" Mr. Rumsfeld
said. "Sure they are. And they should be. Do I think we're in a civil war at the
present time? No."
At the same news conference, Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said both "the path toward civil war" and "the path to freedom and
representative government and a prosperous future" are before the Iraqi people.
"I believe that they have looked at the path that leads to civil war and decided
they do not want to go in that direction, and they're very much looking toward
how can they have a unified government and move down that path," he said.
Pentagon Plans to Send Extra Troops to Iraq During Holiday, NYT, 15.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/international/middleeast/15cnd-military.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Rumsfeld Hints at Troop Increase During
Pilgrimage Surge
March 15, 2006
The New York Times
By THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON, March 14 — Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld gave a strong hint on Tuesday that American troop levels in
Iraq might be increased in coming days, perhaps only slightly and temporarily.
At a Pentagon news briefing, Mr. Rumsfeld said any increase in troops would
coincide with a surge of pilgrims expected to visit Muslim shrines in coming
weeks. In both 2004 and 2005, violence was sometimes directed at Shiite pilgrims
during religious holidays.
Three officials involved in the discussions said a leading proposal was to send
in a battalion-size group, about 800 troops.
Pentagon civilian and military officials said any extra forces that might be
ordered into Iraq would come from an armored brigade of about 3,500 to 4,000
troops now stationed in Kuwait for just such a need if conditions deteriorated.
If the deployment were to occur, it would be the first time the brigade, a unit
of the First Armored Division, left its standby status and entered the fight.
Officials said neither Mr. Rumsfeld nor Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the senior
commander in Iraq, had made a final decision on troop movements yet.
"We move troops in and out depending on events, like we did for the referendum,
the election," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "General Casey may decide he wants to bulk up
slightly for the pilgrimage." Mr. Rumsfeld did not specify which holiday or
pilgrimage was prompting the security concern.
The discussions on troop numbers come at a time of continuing sectarian violence
in Iraq that senior military officials now say poses a greater security threat
than terrorists or the insurgency.
Until the recent upwelling of violence, there had been talk of additional,
incremental reductions in the numbers of American forces this spring and summer.
One reason for concern, Mr. Rumsfeld said, was the number of pilgrims from Iran
who come to Iraq. President Bush, Mr. Rumsfeld and other officials have said in
recent days that Iran is intervening in Iraqi affairs and fomenting attacks.
Mr. Rumsfeld avoided making predictions about future troop levels, saying they
would fluctuate as the United States worked to reduce its forces by handing off
security responsibilities to Iraqis, but sought not to withdraw at such a pace
that it invited sectarian, insurgent or terrorist violence.
"We're continuing to pull troops down," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "And we're continuing
to shift our weight, as we've said, between the combat patrol aspects of it,
over to the training and the equipping and providing the enablers."
The American troop presence in Iraq stood at 133,000 on Tuesday, according to
Pentagon statistics.
Mr. Rumsfeld also said Tuesday for the first time that American intelligence
agencies were analyzing the possibility of a civil war in Iraq, but he insisted
that Iraq was not close to such widespread sectarian conflict.
"Is it true the people in the intelligence community are thinking about this and
analyzing it and doing red team — A team/B team-type looks at it?" Mr. Rumsfeld
said. "Sure they are. And they should be. Do I think we're in a civil war at the
present time? No."
At the same news conference, Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said both "the path toward civil war" and "the path to freedom and
representative government and a prosperous future" are before the Iraqi people.
"I believe that they have looked at the path that leads to civil war and decided
they do not want to go in that direction, and they're very much looking toward
how can they have a unified government and move down that path," he said.
Rumsfeld Hints at Troop Increase During Pilgrimage Surge, NYT, 15.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/politics/15military.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Bush, Conceding Problems, Defends Iraq War
March 14, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON, March 13 — President Bush on
Monday pushed back at critics on the left and right who had urged that American
troops be withdrawn from Iraq before they were caught in a civil war, contending
in the first of a new series of speeches that his strategy is working and
declaring, "We will not lose our nerve."
Yet Mr. Bush acknowledged that the conflict that began three years ago next
week, when he ordered the start of an invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, had
taken on a different complexion with the recent acceleration of sectarian
violence. Twice he used the words "civil war" in his speech, but only to
describe the objectives of Sunnis, Saddamists and members of Al Qaeda seeking to
keep a new government from forming, rather than to characterize the current
state of events.
"I wish I could tell you that the violence is waning and that the road ahead
will be smooth," Mr. Bush said in a speech before the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, an institute created after the Sept. 11 attacks that has been
supportive of Mr. Bush's agenda. "It will not. There will be more tough fighting
and more days of struggle, and we will see more images of chaos and carnage in
the days and months to come."
Mr. Bush's muted tone came less than 10 months after his vice president, Dick
Cheney, said, "I think they're in the last throes, if you will, of the
insurgency."
Mr. Bush has expressed concern that televised images of the continuing violence
in Iraq, especially between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, is further undercutting
support for the war. In advance of the speech, one of Mr. Bush's aides said last
week that "at various moments, we have had to get the president out there to
reassure people, re-explain the strategy, and make it clear that we have a
long-term approach."
But the frequency of those presidential messages seems to be increasing as the
situation in Iraq grows more volatile. When Mr. Bush last gave a series of
speeches on Iraq in December — timed with the release of a National Security
Council document called "Our National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" — the effort
temporarily halted a decline in both his approval ratings and support for a
short-term exit strategy. Both have fallen in the past month.
Monday's speech was in the same vein, but Mr. Bush was clearly seeking to manage
expectations and answer a new group of critics — neoconservatives who have said
that because Iraq is now liberated, it is up to the Iraqis themselves to defend
the country and piece together a government acceptable to all factions. Among
them have been William F. Buckley Jr. and Francis Fukuyama, who have expressed
doubt about the speed with which the Iraqis will embrace democratic change.
In the speech, Mr. Bush gave no ground on that issue, repeating his conviction
that the insurgents will be defeated. But he acknowledged new challenges,
describing last month's attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra as "a clear
attempt to ignite a civil war."
"We can expect the enemy will try again, and they will continue to sow violence
and destruction designed to stop the emergence of a free and democratic Iraq,"
Mr. Bush said. "The enemies of a free Iraq are determined, yet so are the Iraqi
people, and so are America and coalition partners. We will not lose our nerve."
Mr. Bush also included in his speech a specific accusation against Iran,
accusing it of providing technology to improve the lethality of the bombs known
as improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.'s. "Some of the most powerful
I.E.D.'s we are seeing in Iraq today include components that came from Iran," he
said. "Coalition forces have seized I.E.D.'s and components that were clearly
produced in Iran." But he issued no warnings beyond his stock phrase that Iran's
intervention in Iraq and its effort to process uranium that the United States
contends could be used in a nuclear weapon "are increasingly isolating Iran."
"It was a very deliberate message at a very crucial moment," one of Mr. Bush's
senior aides said of the president's comments on Iran. The aide noted that the
United Nations Security Council was beginning to debate this week how to respond
to the nuclear challenge.
But if Mr. Bush is turning attention to Iran, he seemed aware on Monday that
Iraq was what was on American television screens. "Terrorists are losing on the
field of battle, so they are fighting this war through the pictures we see on
television and in the newspapers every day," he said. "They're hoping to shake
our resolve and force us to retreat. They are not going to succeed."
But while he predicted victory, he made clear the consequences of defeat. "The
enemy will emerge from Iraq one of two ways: emboldened or defeated," he said,
allowing for a possibility he had not before discussed. "The stakes in Iraq are
high. By helping Iraqis build a democracy, we will deny the terrorists a safe
haven to plan attacks against America. By helping Iraqis build a democracy, we
will gain an ally in the war on terror. By helping Iraqis build a democracy, we
will inspire reformers across the Middle East. And by helping Iraqis build a
democracy, we will bring hope to a troubled region, and this will make America
more secure in the long term."
Mr. Bush set a loose goal of training enough Iraqi police and soldiers to
control a majority of Iraq's territory by the end of this year. The target could
be misleading, however, because the sectarian violence is concentrated in small
but strategically crucial parts of the country.
Mr. Bush is using each speech to focus on an element of his strategy. On Monday
he focused on reducing the threat of the improvised explosive devices.
Bush,
Conceding Problems, Defends Iraq War, NYT, 14.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/14/politics/14prexy.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Dash to Baghdad Left Top U.S. Generals
Divided
March 13, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHAEL R. GORDON and BERNARD E. TRAINOR
The war was barely a week old when Gen. Tommy
R. Franks threatened to fire the Army's field commander.
From the first days of the invasion in March 2003, American forces had tangled
with fanatical Saddam Fedayeen paramilitary fighters. Lt. Gen. William S.
Wallace, who was leading the Army's V Corps toward Baghdad, had told two
reporters that his soldiers needed to delay their advance on the Iraqi capital
to suppress the Fedayeen threat in the rear.
Soon after, General Franks phoned Lt. Gen. David D. McKiernan, the commander of
allied land forces, to warn that he might relieve General Wallace.
The firing was averted after General McKiernan flew to meet General Franks. But
the episode revealed the deep disagreements within the United States high
command about the Iraqi military threat and what would be required to defeat it.
The dispute, related by military officers in interviews, had lasting
consequences. The unexpected tenacity of the Fedayeen in the battles for
Nasiriya, Samawa, Najaf and other towns on the road to Baghdad was an early
indication that the adversary was not merely Saddam Hussein's vaunted Republican
Guard.
The paramilitary Fedayeen were numerous, well-armed, dispersed throughout the
country, and seemingly determined to fight to the death. But while many officers
in the field assessed the Fedayeen as a dogged foe, General Franks and Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld saw them as little more than speed bumps on the way
to Baghdad. Three years later, Iraq has yet to be subdued. Many of the issues
that have haunted the Bush administration about the war — the failure to foresee
a potential insurgency and to send sufficient troops to stabilize the country
after Saddam Hussein's government was toppled — were foreshadowed early in the
conflict. How some of the crucial decisions were made, the behind-the-scenes
debate about them and early cautions about a sustained threat have not been
previously known.
¶A United States Marines intelligence officer warned after the bloody battle at
Nasiriya, the first major fight of the war, that the Fedayeen would continue to
mount attacks after the fall of Baghdad since many of the enemy fighters were
being bypassed in the race to the capital.
¶In an extraordinary improvisation, Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi exile leader who
was a Pentagon favorite, was flown to southern Iraq with hundreds of his
fighters as General Franks's command sought to put an "Iraqi face" on the
invasion; the plan was set in motion without the knowledge of top administration
officials, including Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and George J. Tenet, the
director of central intelligence.
¶Instead of sending additional troops to impose order after the fall of Baghdad,
Mr. Rumsfeld and General Franks canceled the deployment of the First Cavalry
Division;
General McKiernan was unhappy with the decision, which was made at a time when
ground forces were needed to deal with the chaos in Iraq.
This account of decision-making inside the American command is based on
interviews with dozens of military officers and government officials over the
last two years. Some asked to remain unidentified because they were speaking
about delicate internal deliberations that they were not authorized to discuss
publicly.
Early Resistance Wasn't Foreseen
As American-led forces prepared to invade Iraq in March 2003, American
intelligence was not projecting a major fight in southern Iraq. C.I.A. officials
told United States commanders that anti-Hussein tribes might secure a vital
Euphrates River bridge and provide other support. Tough resistance was not
expected until Army and Marine troops began to close in on Baghdad.
Almost from the start, however, the troops found themselves fighting the
Fedayeen and Baath Party paramilitary forces. The Fedayeen had been formed in
the mid-1990's to suppress any Shiite revolts. Equipped with rocket-propelled
grenades and small arms, they wore civilian dress and were positioned in
southern Iraq. The first marine to die in combat, in fact, was shot by a
paramilitary fighter in a Toyota pickup truck.
After Nasiriya, Lt. Col. Joseph Apodaca, a Marine intelligence officer in that
critical first battle, drafted a classified message concluding that the Fedayeen
would continue to be a threat. Many had sought sanctuary in small towns that
were bypassed in the rush to Baghdad. The colonel compared the Fedayeen attacks
to insurgencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Colombia, and warned that unless
American troops went after them in force, the enemy would continue their attacks
after Baghdad fell, hampering efforts to stabilize Iraq.
At the land war headquarters, there was growing concern about the Fedayeen as
well. On March 28, General McKiernan, the land war commander, flew to the
Jalibah airfield to huddle with his Army and Marine commanders. General Wallace
reported that his troops had managed to contain the Iraqi paramilitary forces
but that the American hold on them was tenuous. His concern was that the
Fedayeen were threatening the logistics needed to push to Baghdad. "I am not
sure how many of the knuckleheads there are," he said, according to notes taken
by a military aide.
Lt. Gen. James T. Conway, the top Marine field commander, was also impressed by
the fighters' tenacity. Bypassed enemy units were attacking American supply
lines.
General McKiernan concluded that the United States faced two "centers of
gravity": the Republican Guard, concentrated near Baghdad, and the paramilitary
Fedayeen. He decided to suspend the march to the capital for several days while
continuing airstrikes and engaging the Fedayeen. Only then, he figured, would
conditions be right for the final assault into Baghdad to remove Mr. Hussein
from power. To provide more support, General McKiernan freed up his only
reserve, troops from the 82nd Airborne Division.
When he returned to his headquarters in Kuwait, there was a furor in Washington
over General Wallace's comments to the press.
"The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against,
because of these paramilitary forces," General Wallace had said to The New York
Times and The Washington Post. "We knew they were here, but we did not know how
they would fight." Asked whether the fighting increased the chances of a longer
war than forecast by some military planners, he responded, "It's beginning to
look that way."
Relying on Speed Over Manpower
To General Franks, those remarks apparently were tantamount to a vote of
no-confidence in his war plan. It relied on speed, and he had told Mr. Rumsfeld
that his forces might take Baghdad in just a few weeks. In Washington, General
Wallace's comments were seized on by critics as evidence that Mr. Rumsfeld had
not sent enough troops. More than a year earlier, he had ridiculed the initial
war plan that called for at least 380,000 troops and had pushed the military's
Central Command to use fewer soldiers and deploy them more quickly. At a
Pentagon news conference, the defense secretary denied that he had any role in
shaping the war plan. "It was not my plan," he said. "It was General Franks's
plan, and it was a plan that evolved over a sustained period of time."
Privately, Mr. Rumsfeld hinted at his impatience with his generals. Newt
Gingrich, the former Republican House speaker and a Rumsfeld adviser, forwarded
a supportive memo from Col. Douglas Macgregor, who had long assailed the Army
leadership as risk averse. In a blistering attack, Colonel Macgregor denounced
the decision to suspend the advance. Replying to Mr. Gingrich, the secretary
wrote: "Thanks for the Macgregor piece. Nobody up here is thinking like this."
General McKiernan, for his part, was stunned by the threat to fire General
Wallace. "Talk about unhinging ourselves," he told Lt. Gen. John P. Abizaid,
General Franks's deputy, according to military aides who later learned of the
conversation.
At General Franks's headquarters in Qatar the next day, General McKiernan made
the case against removing General Wallace, according to officers who learned
about the episode. Gary Luck, a retired general and an adviser to General
Franks, said General Wallace was not one to shrink from a fight. General Wallace
survived, but the strategy debate was far from over.
General Franks did not respond to requests for comment for this article. An
aide, Michael Hayes, a retired Army colonel, said that to his knowledge, the
accounts of General Franks's threat to fire General Wallace and other
conversations with his commanders were inaccurate, but he declined to address
specifics.
Seeking an Iraqi Face for the War
Calculating the resistance would fade if the invasion had an Iraqi face, General
Franks's command turned to an unlikely ally.
Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi exile leader who had been long been pushing for Saddam
Hussein's ouster and was championed by some Pentagon officials, was based in
northern Kurdistan with his fighters. An American colonel, Ted Seel, was
assigned as a military liaison.
On March 27, he was asked to call General Abizaid's office. The general wanted
to know how many fighters Mr. Chalabi had and if he would be willing to deploy
them, according to Colonel Seel.
Mr. Chalabi said he could field as many as 1,000, but Colonel Seel thought 700
was more accurate. The United States Air Force could fly them in to the Tallil
Air Base just south of Nasiriya.
Eager to reassure the White House that he had an Iraqi ally, General Franks told
Mr. Bush in a videoconference that Iraqi freedom fighters would be joining the
American-led forces. Franklin C. Miller, the senior National Security Council
deputy for defense issues, was taken aback by the plan. Unlike a small group of
Iraq exiles recruited by the Pentagon and trained in Hungary, these fighters had
not been screened or trained by the American military.
He approached Mr. Tenet, the director of central intelligence. Who are these
freedom fighters? he asked, according to an official who was present. Mr. Tenet
said he had no idea.
When the airlift finally started in early April, about 570 fighters were ready.
As the C-17's were being loaded, Mr. Chalabi wanted to go as well. General
Abizaid objected, arguing in an exchange with Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy
defense secretary, that the military command should not be taking sides in
future Iraqi politics by flying a potential Iraqi leader to southern Iraq, but
Mr. Wolfowitz did not yield. He said Mr. Chalabi's fighters did not want to go
without their leader, according to officials familiar with the exchange. When
General Abizaid awoke the next day, Mr. Chalabi was at Tallil. His fighters
would never play a meaningful role in the war. They arrived without their arms
and were not well supervised by the United States Special Forces. But Mr.
Chalabi, now the deputy prime minister of Iraq, proved to be undeterred. After
arriving at Tallil, he drove to Nasiriya and delivered a rousing speech. It was
the beginning of his political comeback.
Harsh Criticism From a General
Determined to spur his ground war commanders to renew the push toward Baghdad,
General Franks flew to General McKiernan's headquarters in Kuwait on March 31,
where he delivered some harsh criticism.
Only the British and the Special Operations forces had been fighting, he
complained, according to participants in the meeting. General Franks said he
doubted that the Third Infantry Division had had a serious tank engagement and
warned of the embarrassment that would follow if they failed. The resistance
around Karbala on the Army's route to Baghdad was minor, he said, and easily
crushed. He expressed frustration that neither General McKiernan nor the Marines
had forced the destruction of Iraq's 10th and Sixth Army Divisions, units the
Marines and General McKiernan viewed as severely weakened by airstrikes, far
from the invasion route and posing little threat.
One of the most critical moments of the meeting came when General Franks
indicated he did not want to be slowed by overly cautious generals concerned
about holding casualties to a minimum, though no one had raised the issue of
casualties. To dramatize his point, according to one participant, General Franks
put his hand to his mouth and made a yawning motion.
After the session, General McKiernan approached Maj. Gen. Albert Whitley, his
top British deputy. "That conversation never happened," General McKiernan said,
according to military officials who learned of the exchange. By April 2,
American forces were closing in on the capital. Even before the war, Mr.
Rumsfeld saw the deployment of United States forces more in terms of what was
needed to win the war than to secure the peace.
With the tide in the United States' favor, he began to raise the issue of
canceling the deployment of the First Cavalry Division — some 16,000 soldiers.
General Franks eventually went along. Though the general insisted he was not
pressured to agree, he later acknowledged that the defense secretary had put the
issue on the table. "Don Rumsfeld did in fact make the decision to off-ramp the
First Cavalry Division," General Franks said in an earlier interview with The
New York Times.
General McKiernan, the senior United States general in Iraq at the time, was not
happy about the decision but did not protest.
Three years later, with thousands of lives lost in the tumult of Iraq, senior
officers say that canceling the division was a mistake, one that reduced the
number of American forces just as the Fedayeen, former soldiers and Arab
jihadists were beginning to organize in what would become an insurgency.
"The Baathist insurgency surprised us and we had not developed a comprehensive
option for dealing with this possibility, one that would have included more
military police, civil affairs units, interrogators, interpreters and Special
Operations forces," said Gen. Jack Keane of the Army, who is now retired and
served as the acting chief of staff during the summer of 2003.
"If we had planned for an insurgency, we probably would have deployed the First
Cavalry Division and it would have assisted greatly with the initial occupation.
"This was not just an intelligence community failure, but also our failure as
senior military leaders."
Dash
to Baghdad Left Top U.S. Generals Divided, NYT, 13.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/middleeast/13command.html?hp&ex=1142226000&en=6d9e5888362acdbb&ei=5094&partner=homepage
After Invasion, Point Man for Iraq Was
Shunted Aside
March 13, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHAEL R. GORDON and BERNARD E. TRAINOR
As the Bush administration's envoy for Iraqi
politics, Zalmay Khalilzad had considerable experience dealing with Iraqi
opponents of Saddam Hussein.
Before the war, Mr. Khalilzad was the White House's point man in meetings with
Iraqi exile leaders in London and Kurdistan. After the shooting started, he was
a key figure at political gatherings in Baghdad and at Tallil air base to begin
assembling a new Iraqi leadership.
So when the White House prepared to announce the appointment of L. Paul Bremer
III as the chief civilian administrator in Iraq in May 2003, Mr. Khalilzad had
every expectation that he would continue in his political role. But just before
the announcement, he learned he was not going to Iraq with Mr. Bremer after all.
In fact, his Iraqi political portfolio was gone. The decision surprised not just
Mr. Khalilzad, but also Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, according to former
State Department officials who asked to remain anonymous because they were
talking about private discussions. Why, Mr. Powell wondered, was the Bush
administration excluding the one guy who knew all the players and was trusted by
them?
Mr. Powell phoned Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's national security adviser,
for an explanation. Ms. Rice replied she had had nothing to do with the
decision. In a White House meeting with Mr. Bush, Mr. Bremer had insisted on
sole control of the occupation authority as well as efforts to engineer a new
government, Mr. Bremer notes in his book.
Gen. Jay Garner, who had served as the chief civilian administrator in Iraq
before Mr. Bremer's appointment, said the decision to exclude Mr. Khalilzad was
a mistake. "I thought it was absolutely tragic when Zal got edged out," General
Garner said in an interview. "He was damn good as a diplomat and my sense was
that the Iraqis trusted him."
While Mr. Bremer had experience on terrorism issues and was energetic, he had
never served in the Middle East and had no nation-building experience. In
Baghdad, he made several decisions that he vigorously defends, but which critics
say proved fateful in slowing the rebuilding of the country and allowing
violence to mount. He dissolved the Iraq Army and backed the White House policy
of purging many Baath Party members from government positions.
Military officials complained he was not committed to local elections. When the
United States Marines organized voting in Najaf, Mr. Bremer ordered the military
to cancel it after concluding that a candidate he did not favor would win,
according to senior Marine commanders. "When we denied Iraqis the opportunity to
elect local officials," said Lt. Gen. James Conway, "we were increasingly seen
as occupiers."
After Mr.Bremer went to Baghdad, Mr.
Khalilzad, who grew up in Afghanistan, was appointed ambassador to his native
country. After Mr. Bremer left Iraq, and after a short tour by John D.
Negroponte, Mr. Khalilzad was appointed the United States ambassador in Baghdad.
As a conservative strategist, Mr. Khalilzad was among those who pushed for tough
action on Iraq. In his current role, he has drawn criticism from Shiites and
Sunnis in recent weeks as sectarian violence has heightened the threat of civil
war. But both sides also praise his negotiating skills and say he is essential
to bring the factions together to form a new government. "He was very flexible,"
Mr. Garner said of Mr. Khalilzad's pragmatic approach. "If something did not
work out, he would try another path."
For Mr. Powell and his aides, the decision to exclude Mr. Khalilzad demonstrated
the administration's tendency to make important decisions without consulting key
officials. Neither he nor Ms. Rice were told in advance of the decision to
dissolve the Iraqi military, according to State Department officials.
As he was preparing to leave office, Mr. Powell told Mr. Bush that the national
security process was broken, according to former officials who did not want to
comment on the record about a private conversation.
After
Invasion, Point Man for Iraq Was Shunted Aside, NYT, 13.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/13/international/middleeast/13zalmay.html
In April 2003, Iraqi television showed what
it said was Saddam Hussein in Baghdad while he was on the run from allied
attacks.
Reuters
NYT March 11, 2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/middleeast/12saddam.html?hp&ex=
1142226000&en=84de85596df57700&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Even as U.S. Invaded, Hussein Saw Iraqi
Unrest as Top Threat NYT
12.3.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/middleeast/12saddam.html?hp&ex=
1142226000&en=84de85596df57700&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Even as U.S. Invaded, Hussein Saw Iraqi
Unrest as Top Threat
March 12, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHAEL R. GORDON and BERNARD E. TRAINOR
As American warplanes streaked overhead two
weeks after the invasion began, Lt. Gen. Raad Majid al-Hamdani drove to Baghdad
for a crucial meeting with Iraqi leaders. He pleaded for reinforcements to
stiffen the capital's defenses and permission to blow up the Euphrates River
bridge south of the city to block the American advance.
But Saddam Hussein and his small circle of aides had their own ideas of how to
fight the war. Convinced that the main danger to his government came from
within, Mr. Hussein had sought to keep Iraq's bridges intact so he could rush
troops south if the Shiites got out of line.
General Hamdani got little in the way of additional soldiers, and the grudging
permission to blow up the bridge came too late. The Iraqis damaged only one of
the two spans, and American soldiers soon began to stream across.
The episode was just one of many incidents, described in a classified United
States military report, other documents and in interviews, that demonstrate how
Mr. Hussein was so preoccupied about the threat from within his country that he
crippled his military in fighting the threat from without.
Only one of his defenses — the Saddam Fedayeen — proved potent against the
invaders. They later joined the insurgency still roiling Iraq, but that was
largely by default, not design.
Ever vigilant about coups and fearful of revolt, Mr. Hussein was deeply
distrustful of his own commanders and soldiers, the documents show.
He made crucial decisions himself, relied on his sons for military counsel and
imposed security measures that had the effect of hobbling his forces. He did
that in several ways:
¶The Iraqi dictator was so secretive and kept information so compartmentalized
that his top military leaders were stunned when he told them three months before
the war that he had no weapons of mass destruction, and they were demoralized
because they had counted on hidden stocks of poison gas or germ weapons for the
nation's defense.
¶He put a general widely viewed as an incompetent drunkard in charge of the
Special Republican Guard, entrusted to protect the capital, primarily because he
was considered loyal.
¶Mr. Hussein micromanaged the war, not allowing commanders to move troops
without permission from Baghdad and blocking communications among military
leaders.
The Fedayeen's operations were not shared with leaders of conventional forces.
Republican Guard divisions were not allowed to communicate with sister units.
Commanders could not even get precise maps of terrain near the Baghdad airport
because that would identify locations of the Iraqi leader's palaces.
Much of this material is included in a secret history prepared by the American
military of how Mr. Hussein and his commanders fought their war. Posing as
military historians, American analysts interrogated more than 110 Iraqi
officials and military officers, treating some to lavish dinners to pry loose
their secrets and questioning others in a detention center at the Baghdad
airport or the Abu Ghraib prison. United States military officials view the
accounts as credible because many were similar. In addition, more than 600
captured Iraqi documents were reviewed.
Overseen by the Joint Forces Command, an unclassified version of the study is to
be made public soon. A classified version was prepared in April 2005. Titled
"Iraqi Perspectives on Operation Iraqi Freedom, Major Combat Operations," the
study shows that Mr. Hussein discounted the possibility of a full-scale American
invasion.
"A few weeks before the attacks Saddam still thought the U.S. would not use
ground forces," Tariq Aziz, the former Iraqi deputy prime minister, told
American interrogators. "He thought they would not fight a ground war because it
would be too costly to the Americans."
Despite the lopsided defeat his forces suffered during the Persian Gulf war in
1991, Mr. Hussein did not see the United States as his primary adversary. His
greater fear was a Shiite uprising, like the one that shook his government after
the 1991 war.
His concern for the threats from within interfered with efforts to defend
against an external enemy, as was evident during a previously unknown review of
military planning in 1995. Taking a page out of the Russian playbook, Iraqi
officers suggested a new strategy to defend the homeland. Just as Russia yielded
territory to defeat Napoleon and later Hitler's invading army, Iraq would resist
an invading army by conducting a fighting retreat. Well-armed Iraqi tribes would
be like the Russian partisans. Armored formations, including the Republican
Guard, would assume a more modest role.
Mr. Hussein rejected the recommendation. Arming local tribes was too risky for a
government that lived in fear of a popular uprising.
While conventional military planning languished, Mr. Hussein's focus on internal
threats led to an important innovation: creation of the Fedayeen paramilitary
forces. Equipped with AK-47's, rocket propelled grenades and small-caliber
weapons, one of their primary roles was to protect Baath Party headquarters and
keep the Shiites at bay in the event of a rebellion until more heavily equipped
Iraqi troops could crush them.
Controlled by Uday Hussein, a son of the Iraqi leader, the Fedayeen and other
paramilitary forces were so vital to the survival of the government that they
"drained manpower" that would otherwise have been used by Iraq's army, the
classified report says.
Mr. Hussein was also worried about his neighbor to the east. Like the Bush
administration, Mr. Hussein suspected Iran of developing nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction. Each year the Iraqi military conducted an exercise
code-named Golden Falcon that focused on defense of the Iraq-Iran border.
The United States was seen as a lesser threat, mostly because Mr. Hussein
believed that Washington could not accept significant casualties. In the 1991
war, the United States had no intention of taking Baghdad. President George H.
W. Bush justified the restraint as prudent to avoid the pitfalls of occupying
Iraq, but Mr. Hussein concluded that the United States was fearful of the
military cost.
Mr. Hussein's main concern about a possible American military strike was that it
might prompt the Shiites to take up arms against the government. "Saddam was
concerned about internal unrest amongst the tribes before, during or after an
attack by the U.S. on Baghdad," Mr. Aziz told his interrogators. Other members
of Mr. Hussein's inner circle thought that if the Americans attacked, they would
do no more than conduct an intense bombing campaign and seize the southern oil
fields.
Steps to Avoid War
Mr. Hussein did take some steps to avoid provoking war, though. While diplomatic
efforts by France, Germany and Russia were under way to avert war, he rejected
proposals to mine the Persian Gulf, fearing that the Bush administration would
use such an action as an excuse to strike, the Joint Forces Command study noted.
In December 2002, he told his top commanders that Iraq did not possess
unconventional arms, like nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, according to
the Iraq Survey Group, a task force established by the C.I.A. to investigate
what happened to Iraq's weapons programs. Mr. Hussein wanted his officers to
know they could not rely on poison gas or germ weapons if war broke out. The
disclosure that the cupboard was bare, Mr. Aziz said, sent morale plummeting.
To ensure that Iraq would pass scrutiny by United Nations arms inspectors, Mr.
Hussein ordered that they be given the access that they wanted. And he ordered a
crash effort to scrub the country so the inspectors would not discover any
vestiges of old unconventional weapons, no small concern in a nation that had
once amassed an arsenal of chemical weapons, biological agents and Scud
missiles, the Iraq survey group report said.
Mr. Hussein's compliance was not complete, though. Iraq's declarations to the
United Nations covering what stocks of illicit weapons it had possessed and how
it had disposed of them were old and had gaps. And Mr. Hussein would not allow
his weapons scientists to leave the country, where United Nations officials
could interview them outside the government's control.
Seeking to deter Iran and even enemies at home, the Iraqi dictator's goal was to
cooperate with the inspectors while preserving some ambiguity about its
unconventional weapons — a strategy General Hamdani, the Republican Guard
commander, later dubbed in a television interview "deterrence by doubt."
That strategy led to mutual misperception. When Secretary of State Colin L.
Powell addressed the Security Council in February 2003, he offered evidence from
photographs and intercepted communications that the Iraqis were rushing to
sanitize suspected weapons sites. Mr. Hussein's efforts to remove any residue
from old unconventional weapons programs were viewed by the Americans as efforts
to hide the weapons. The very steps the Iraqi government was taking to reduce
the prospect of war were used against it, increasing the odds of a military
confrontation.
Even some Iraqi officials were impressed by Mr. Powell's presentation. Abd
al-Tawab Mullah Huwaish, who oversaw Iraq's military industry, thought he knew
all the government's secrets. But Bush administration officials were so
insistent that he began to question whether Iraq might have prohibited weapons
after all. "I knew a lot, but wondered why Bush believed we had these weapons,"
he told interrogators after the war, according to the Iraq Survey Group report.
Guarding Against Revolt
As the war approached, Mr. Hussein took steps to suppress an uprising. Fedayeen
paramilitary units were dispersed throughout the south, as were huge stashes of
small-caliber weapons. Mr. Hussein divided Iraq into four sectors, each led by a
member of his inner circle. The move was intended to help the government fend
off challenges to its rule, including an uprising or rioting.
Reflecting Mr. Hussein's distrust of his own military, regular army troops were
deployed near Kurdistan or close to the Iranian border, far from the capital. Of
the Iraqi Army, only the Special Republican Guard was permitted inside Baghdad.
And an array of restraints were imposed that made it hard for Iraq's military to
exercise command.
Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Tai, Mr. Hussein's defense minister who had distinguished
himself during the Iran-Iraq war, held an important title, for example. But he
had little influence. "I effectively became an assistant to Qusay, only
collecting and passing information," he told interrogators, referring to a son
of Mr. Hussein.
To protect Baghdad, Mr. Hussein selected Brig. Gen. Barzan abd al-Ghafur
Solaiman Majid al-Tikriti, a close cousin, to head the Special Republican Guard
even though he had no field experience, had failed military staff college and
was a known drunkard. Asked about his military skills, General Tai laughed out
loud. Even so, the Special Republican Guard commander was closely monitored by
Mr. Hussein's agents and later told American interrogators that he had held the
most dangerous job in Iraq. "They watched you go to the bathroom," he said.
"They listened to everything you said and bugged everything."
Once the war began, field commanders faced numerous restrictions, including bans
on communications, to minimize chances of a coup.
"We had to use our own reconnaissance elements to know where the other Iraqi
units were located on our flanks," the commander of the First Republican Guard
Corps told interrogators. "We were not allowed to communicate with our sister
units."
Even as the Americans were rapidly moving north, Mr. Hussein did not appreciate
the seriousness of the threat. While the Fedayeen had surprised the allied
forces with their fierce resistance and sneak attacks, Iraqi conventional forces
were overpowered.
At an April 2 meeting, General Hamdani, the commander of the Second Republic
Guard Corps, correctly predicted that the American Army planned to drive through
the Karbala Gap on the way to Baghdad. General Tai, the Iraqi defense minister,
was not persuaded. He argued that the attack in the south was a trick and that
the main American offensive would come from the west, perhaps abetted by the
Israelis. That day, Mr. Hussein ordered the military to prepare for an American
attack from Jordan.
As a sop, General Hamdani received a company of Special Operations forces as
reinforcements and was finally granted permission to destroy the Euphrates River
bridge southwest of Baghdad. But it was too little, too late.
By April 6, the day after the first United States Army attack on Baghdad, the
so-called thunder run, Mr. Hussein's desperate predicament began to sink in. At
a safe house in the Mansour district of Baghdad, he met with his inner circle
and asked Mr. Aziz to read an eight-page letter.
Mr. Hussein showed no emotion as the letter was read. But Mr. Aziz later told
interrogators that the Iraqi leader seemed to be a defeated man, and the letter
appeared to be his farewell. His rule was coming to an end.
"We didn't believe it would go all the way to Baghdad," a senior Republican
Guard staff officer later told his interrogators. "We thought the coalition
would go to Basra, maybe to Amara, and then the war would end."
Even
as U.S. Invaded, Hussein Saw Iraqi Unrest as Top Threat, NYT, 12.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/middleeast/12saddam.html?hp&ex=1142226000&en=84de85596df57700&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Iraqi Leader, in Frantic Flight, Eluded
U.S. Strikes
March 12, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHAEL R. GORDON and BERNARD E. TRAINOR
Saddam Hussein turned to his sons. as American
troops were fanning out across Baghdad. "We are leaving now," he said.
Mr. Hussein, the Iraqi leader, was determined to make his escape before more
checkpoints were set up around the capital. He had not anticipated the fall of
the city, and his plan was simple: drive west toward Ramadi, where there were
few United States forces.
In an examination of Iraq's military strategy, the United States Joint Forces
Command prepared a day-by-day reconstruction of Mr. Hussein's movements, which
shows that his escape was desperate and improvised. The study also indicates
that American intelligence knew little about his whereabouts during the early
part of the war and that Mr. Hussein was nowhere near the site of two failed
bombing raids intended to kill him.
For Mr. Hussein, the first strike was a surprise. Relying on Central
Intelligence Agency intelligence, President Bush ordered a March 19 bombing at
the Dora Farms complex southwest of Baghdad. A C.I.A. operative had reported
that Mr. Hussein was in an underground bunker there, and Mr. Bush hoped to end
the war with one blow.
Two F-117 Stealth fighters dropped bunker-busting bombs on the site, while
warships fired nearly 40 cruise missiles. The fighters scored a direct hit, and
for a while American officials believed that Mr. Hussein was wounded or dead.
But the Iraqi leader was not at Dora Farms and had not visited it since 1995,
according to statements made to American interrogators by Abid Hamid Mahmud
al-Tikriti, Mr. Hussein's personal secretary. The airstrike nonetheless appeared
to rattle Mr. Hussein. After the attack, he arrived at Mr. Mahmud's home. The
two men went to a safe house in Baghdad so the Iraqi leader could watch the
international news reports and draft a statement to the Iraqi people.
After an Iraqi man with thick glasses read the televised speech, American
officials speculated that he was a double. In fact, it was Mr. Hussein,
according to the secretary's account. Typically, large text was printed on cue
cards for him, but no printer was available and he needed glasses to read his
writing. The tape was sent to the Information Ministry for broadcast.
For the next several weeks, Mr. Hussein moved among a network of safe houses.
The United States bombed military command sites in the capital, but Mr. Hussein
stayed in civilian neighborhoods. The United States never came close to killing
him. "Most of the leadership strikes were offset from where Saddam stayed during
the war, denying use of government buildings, but not threatening his life," the
classified study says.
The Americans made a final attempt to kill Mr. Hussein on April 7 after the
C.I.A. was tipped that he was in a safe house near a restaurant in Baghdad's
Mansour district. A B-1 bomber dropped four 2,000-pound bombs. The blast killed
18 innocent Iraqis, according to Human Rights Watch. "Saddam was not in the
targeted area at the time of the attack," the Joint Forces Command study notes.
Mr. Hussein did have a close call. Early on April 7, he happened to be in a safe
house one and a half miles from the route taken by United States troops on their
second "Thunder Run" into Baghdad. Two days later, his situation was desperate.
Army troops had moved into the western part of the city and marines were moving
into the eastern part. He appeared before supporters in Baghdad. But after his
convoy encountered American armored vehicles, Mr. Hussein and his aides were
frantic, and forced their way into a Baghdad residence. As American troops
searched, he hid there until morning.
Early on April 10, he decided to flee to Ramadi with his two sons and Mr.
Mahmud, according to the account that Mr. Mahmud provided after American troops
captured him. Earlier, Mr. Hussein thought that the main American attack might
come from Jordan, but by now it was clear to the Iraqis that the United States
did not have substantial troops in the west. The escape soon became an ordeal.
That night, the Americans bombed a building next to a Ramadi house where he was
hiding. Alarmed, Mr. Hussein, his sons and Mr. Mahmud got in their cars and
drove toward Hit, spending the night in palm grove outside town.
The next morning Mr. Hussein decided they should split up to minimize the
chances of capture. Qusay Hussein, Uday Hussein and Mr. Mahmud made their way to
Damascus, Syria, according to a map of their journey in the Joint Forces Command
report. Mr. Hussein's sons were apparently too hot for the Syrians to handle.
The brothers went back to Iraq, eventually reaching Tikrit and Mosul, where
American troops killed them in July 2003.
Mr. Hussein's first stop was Hit. In December 2003, American forces captured the
unshaven Iraqi leader in a spider hole near Tikrit. On the wall of the dank
hide-out was a poster of Noah's Ark; on the floor was a beat-up suitcase filled
with clothes and a heart-shaped clock.
Iraqi
Leader, in Frantic Flight, Eluded U.S. Strikes, NYT, 12.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/international/middleeast/12escape.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Ali Shalal Qaissi in Amman, Jordan,
recently with a picture of himself
standing atop a box and attached to electrical wires
in Abu Ghraib.
Shawn Baldwin for The New York Times
Symbol of Abu Ghraib Seeks to Spare Others
His Nightmare
NYT 11.3.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/11/international/middleeast/11ghraib.html?hp&ex=
1142139600&en=762326e6cb35fa0d&ei=5094&partner=homepage
The business card of Ali Shalal Qaissi, an
Abu Ghraib torture victim, and the advocacy group for former prisoners that he
helped start.
March 10, 2006
NYT
Symbol of Abu Ghraib Seeks to Spare Others
His Nightmare
NYT 11.3.2006
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/11/international/middleeast/11ghraib.html?hp&ex=
1142139600&en=762326e6cb35fa0d&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Symbol of Abu Ghraib Seeks to Spare Others
His Nightmare
Related
March 11, 2006
The New York Times
By HASSAN M. FATTAH
AMMAN, Jordan, March 8 — Almost two years
later, Ali Shalal Qaissi's wounds are still raw.
There is the mangled hand, an old injury that became infected by the shackles
chafing his skin. There is the slight limp, made worse by days tied in
uncomfortable positions. And most of all, there are the nightmares of his nearly
six-month ordeal at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003 and 2004.
Mr. Qaissi, 43, was prisoner 151716 of Cellblock 1A. The picture of him standing
hooded atop a cardboard box, attached to electrical wires with his arms
stretched wide in an eerily prophetic pose, became the indelible symbol of the
torture at Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad. [The American military said Thursday
that it would abandon the prison and turn it over to the Iraqi government.]
"I never wanted to be famous, especially not in this way," he said, as he sat in
a squalid office rented by his friends here in Amman. That said, he is now a
prisoner advocate who clearly understands the power of the image: it appears on
his business card.
At first glance, there is little to connect Mr. Qaissi with the infamous picture
of a hooded man except his left hand, which he says was disfigured when an
antique rifle exploded in his hands at a wedding several years ago. A disfigured
hand also seems visible in the infamous picture, and features prominently in Mr.
Qaissi's outlook on life. In Abu Ghraib, the hand, with two swollen fingers, one
of them partly blown off, and a deep gash in the palm, earned him the nickname
Clawman, he said.
A spokesman for the American military in Iraq declined to comment, saying it
would violate the Geneva Conventions to disclose the identity of prisoners in
any of the Abu Ghraib photographs, just as it would to discuss the reasons
behind Mr. Qaissi's detention.
But prison records from the Coalition Provisional Authority, which governed Iraq
after the invasion, made available to reporters by Amnesty International, show
that Mr. Qaissi was in American custody at the time. Beyond that, researchers
with both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International say they have interviewed
Mr. Qaissi and, along with lawyers suing military contractors in a class-action
suit over the abuse, believe that he is the man in the photograph.
Under the government of Saddam Hussein, Mr. Qaissi was a mukhtar, in effect a
neighborhood mayor, a role typically given to members of the ruling Baath Party
and closely tied to its nebulous security services. After the fall of the
government, he managed a parking lot belonging to a mosque in Baghdad.
He was arrested in October 2003, he said, because he loudly complained to the
military, human rights organizations and the news media about soldiers' dumping
garbage on a local soccer field. But some of his comments suggest that he is at
least sympathetic toward insurgents who fight American soldiers.
"Resistance is an international right," he said.
Weeks after complaining about the garbage, he said, he was surrounded by
Humvees, hooded, tied up and carted to a nearby base before being transferred to
Abu Ghraib. Then the questioning began.
"They blamed me for attacking U.S. forces," he said, "but I said I was
handicapped; how could I fire a rifle?" he said, pointing to his hand. "Then he
asked me, 'Where is Osama bin Laden?' And I answered, 'Afghanistan.' "
How did he know? "Because I heard it on TV," he replied.
He said it soon became evident that the goal was to coax him to divulge names of
people who might be connected to attacks on American forces. His hand, then
bandaged, was often the focus of threats and inducements, he said, with
interrogators offering to fix it or to squash it at different times. After
successive interrogations, he said he was finally given a firm warning: "If you
don't speak, next time, we'll send you to a place where even dogs don't live."
Finally, he said, he was taken to a truck, placed face down, restrained and
taken to a special section of the prison where he heard shouts and screams. He
was forced to strip off all his clothes, then tied with his hands up high. A
guard began writing on his chest and forehead, what someone later read to him
as, "Colin Powell."
In all, there were about 100 cells in the cellblock, he said, with prisoners of
all ages, from teenagers to old men. Interrogators were often dressed in
civilian clothing, their identities strictly shielded.
The prisoners were sleep deprived, he said, and the punishments they faced
ranged from bizarre to lewd: an elderly man was forced to wear a bra and pose; a
youth was told to hit the other adults; and groups of men were organized in
piles. There was the dreaded "music party," he said, in which prisoners were
placed before loudspeakers. Mr. Qaissi also said he had been urinated on by a
guard. Then there were the pictures.
"Every soldier seemed to have a camera," he said. "They used to bring us
pictures and threaten to deliver them to our families"
Today, those photographs, turned into montages and slideshows on Mr. Qaissi's
computer, are stark reminders of his experiences in the cellblock. As he scanned
through the pictures, each one still instilling shock as it popped on the
screen, he would occasionally stop, his voice breaking as he recounted the story
behind each photograph.
In one, a young man shudders in fear as a dog menaces him.
"That's Talib," he said. "He was a young Yemeni, a student of the Beaux-Arts
School in Baghdad, and was really shaken."
In another, Pfc. Lynndie R. England, who was convicted last September of
conspiracy and maltreatment of Iraqi prisoners, poses in front of a line of
naked men, a cigarette in her mouth. "That's Jalil, Khalil and Abu Khattab," he
said. "They're all brothers, and they're from my neighborhood."
Then there is the picture of Mr. Qaissi himself, standing atop a cardboard box,
taken 15 days into his detention. He said he had only recently been given a
blanket after remaining naked for days, and had fashioned the blanket into a
kind of poncho.
The guards took him to a heavy box filled with military meal packs, he said, and
hooded him. He was told to stand atop the box as electric wires were attached to
either hand. Then, he claims, they shocked him five times, enough for him to
bite his tongue.
Specialist Sabrina Harman was convicted last May for her role in abusing
prisoners at Abu Ghraib, but she was accused of threatening to electrocute a
hooded inmate on a box if he stepped off it, not of shocking him while he was
atop it.
After almost six months in Abu Ghraib, Mr. Qaissi said, he was loaded onto a
truck, this time without any shackles, but still hooded. As the truck sped out
of the prison, another man removed the hood and announced that they had been
freed.
With a thick shock of gray hair and melancholy eyes, Mr. Qaissi is today a
self-styled activist for prisoners' rights in Iraq. Shortly after being released
from Abu Ghraib in 2004, he started the Association of Victims of American
Occupation Prisons with several other men immortalized in the Abu Ghraib
pictures.
Financed partly by Arab nongovernmental organizations and private donations, the
group's aim is to publicize the cases of prisoners still in custody, and to
support prisoners and their families with donations of clothing and food.
Mr. Qaissi has traveled the Arab world with his computer slideshows and
presentations, delivering a message that prisoner abuse by Americans and their
Iraqi allies continues. He says that as the public face of his movement, he
risks retribution from Shiite militias that have entered the Iraqi police forces
and have been implicated in prisoner abuse. But that has not stopped him.
Last week, he said, he lectured at the American University in Beirut, on Monday
he drove to Damascus to talk to students and officials, and in a few weeks he
heads to Libya for more of the same.
Despite the cruelty he witnessed, Mr. Qaissi said he harbored no animosity
toward America or Americans. "I forgive the people who did these things to us,"
he said. "But I want their help in preventing these sorts of atrocities from
continuing."
Kirk Semple contributed reporting from Baghdad for this article.
Symbol of Abu Ghraib Seeks to Spare Others His Nightmare, NYT, 11.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/11/international/middleeast/11ghraib.html?hp&ex=1142139600&en=762326e6cb35fa0d&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Christian Worker Kidnapped in Iraq Last
Year Is Found Slain
March 11, 2006
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
The New York Times
WASHINGTON, March 10 (AP) — An American who
was among four Christian workers kidnapped last year in Iraq has been killed, a
State Department spokesman said Friday.
The F.B.I. verified that a body found Friday morning in Iraq was that of Tom
Fox, 54, of Clearbrook, Va., the spokesman, Noel Clay, said. He said he had no
information on the other three hostages.
Mr. Clay said he did not know how Mr. Fox was killed, but said additional
forensic tests would be done in the United States. The American Embassy in
Baghdad is investigating, he said.
"The State Department continues to call for the unconditional release of all
other hostages" in Iraq, Mr. Clay said.
Mr. Fox was one of four members of Christian Peacemaker Teams kidnapped Nov. 26
in Iraq.
On Tuesday, Al Jazeera television broadcast a brief video, dated Feb. 28, of the
three other members, purportedly appealing to their governments to secure their
release. They are James Loney, 41, and Harmeet Singh Sooden, 32, both of Canada,
and Norman Kember, 74, of Britain.
Christian Peacemaker Teams has been working in Iraq since October 2002,
investigating allegations that American and Iraqi forces abused Iraqi detainees.
Its members hold human rights conferences in conflict zones, promoting peaceful
solutions.
Paul Slattery of McLean, Va., who was a member of Mr. Fox's United States-based
support team, said Mr. Fox had worked on three major projects: helping families
of incarcerated Iraqis, escorting shipments of medicine to clinics and hospitals
in Falluja and helping form Islamic Peacemaker Teams.
The previously unknown Swords of Righteousness Brigades claimed responsibility
for kidnapping the four.
The four hostages had been seen earlier in a video played by Al Jazeera on Jan.
28, dated from a week before. A statement reportedly accompanying that tape said
they would be killed unless all Iraqi prisoners were released from United States
and Iraqi prisons. No deadline was set.
Iraqi and Western security officials repeatedly warned the four before their
abduction that they were taking a grave risk by moving around Baghdad without
bodyguards.
In the three years since the American-led invasion of Iraq, insurgents have
kidnapped at least 250 foreigners and killed at least 40 of them.
In one of the most high-profile cases, Jill Carroll, a freelance writer for The
Christian Science Monitor, was kidnapped Jan. 7 in Baghdad. Three videos of Ms.
Carroll delivered by her kidnappers to Arab satellite television stations
identified the group holding her as the Revenge Brigades.
Carroll's kidnappers have publicly demanded the release of all female detainees
in Iraq. The Monitor began a campaign on Iraqi television stations on Wednesday
asking Iraqis, in Arabic, to "Please help with the release of journalist Jill
Carroll."
Christian Worker Kidnapped in Iraq Last Year Is Found Slain, NYT, 11.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/11/politics/11fox.html?hp&ex=1142139600&en=960385752a89d36d&ei=5094&partner=homepage
U.S. Would Rely on Iraqi Forces to Quell
Civil War, Rumsfeld Says
March 9, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID STOUT
WASHINGTON, March 9 — Defense Secretary Donald
H. Rumsfeld told senators today that the United States would count on Iraqi
security forces to quell an all-out civil war in their country, but that
America's paramount goal is to prevent such a conflict in the first place.
Mr. Rumsfeld testified at a sometimes tense hearing of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, whose ranking Democrat, Senator Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia,
questioned him closely about the administration's request for more money.
"In recent days, Iraq has only narrowly missed descending into an all-out civil
war, and top administration officials acknowledged that the threat of civil war
is still very real," Mr. Byrd said. "The Congress and the public have a right to
know the administration's plans for Iraq before scores of additional billions of
dollars, billions of dollars, are spent in that war."
"Secretary Rumsfeld," Mr. Byrd said a moment later, "what is the plan if Iraq
descends into civil war? Will our troops hunker down and wait out the violence?
If not, whose side would our troops be ordered to take in a civil war?"
Mr. Rumsfeld replied that the "sectarian tension and conflict" in Iraq do not
constitute a civil war "at the present time by most experts' calculation."
The secretary went on to say that he believed the unrest in Iraq "while changing
in its nature from insurgency toward sectarian violence" was still "controllable
by Iraqi security forces and multinational forces."
Despite the daily carnage in Iraq, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Iran
might be an even bigger danger. "We may face no greater challenge from a single
country than from Iran," she said, describing that country's leadership as "the
central banker for terrorism," an oppressor of its own people, a fomenter of
unrest in the Middle East, and a would-be member of the nuclear-weapons club.
Secretary Rice said the administration's $75 million package for Iran — a tiny
part of a $92 billion supplemental-funds request for needs as varied as the Iraq
and Afghanistan campaigns and hurricane relief in the United States — would be
used "to reach the Iranian people" through radio broadcasts, Web sites and other
means.
The session had the ingredients for tension, and it flared at the outset.
"How many of you have children in this illegal, immoral war?" a member of the
audience shouted.
"The blood is on your hands, and you cannot wash it away," someone else shouted.
"Fire Rumsfeld! Fire Rumsfeld!" someone cried out, before Senator Thad Cochran,
Republican of Mississippi and the committee chairman, calmly asked security
personnel to restore order, thereby setting the stage for Senator Byrd, who
prodded Mr. Rumsfeld repeatedly early in the hearing.
"Mr. Secretary," the senator asked, "how can Congress be assured that the funds
in this bill won't be used to put our troops right in a middle of a full-blown
Iraqi civil war?"
Mr. Rumsfeld said Iraqi forces "at least thus far" have been able to deal with
security problems "for the most part," and that the real foundation for
stability is a government that will unify the country — the kind of government
that is still a new concept for the people.
"That is true, Mr. Secretary," Mr. Byrd persisted. "Is there any plan to respond
to a civil war in Iraq?"
"The plan is to prevent a civil war," Mr. Rumsfeld said, "and to the extent one
were to occur, to have the — from a security standpoint — have the Iraqi
security forces deal with it to the extent they're able to."
But how can the United States avoid being dragged into a civil war, Mr. Byrd
asked. By bringing the Iraqi political parties together to form a unifying
government, Mr. Rumsfeld repeated.
Mr. Rumsfeld defended the administration's practice of financing much of the
Iraq and Afghanistan operations through supplemental requests, as opposed to the
Defense Department's regular annual budget. Supplemental financing is more
suitable than the cumbersome annual-budget procedures for meeting the
quick-changing, day-to-day needs of war, he said.
Mr. Rumsfeld said, in response to Senator Herb Kohl, Democrat of Wisconsin, that
it would not be wise for the United States to give the Iraqis a deadline for
achieving the broad political stability necessary to defeat the insurgency.
"My personal view is that it is not useful, in the context of their current
political situation, to do anything other than what we have said," Mr. Rumsfeld
said, "which is that we are training and equipping their forces to take over
these responsibilities, and as their forces stand up, we will pass
responsibility to them, as we have been doing."
U.S.
Would Rely on Iraqi Forces to Quell Civil War, Rumsfeld Says, NYT, 9.3.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/09/international/middleeast/09cnd-military.html?hp&ex=1141966800&en=e39ff71da2e9d03b&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Steve Bell
The Guardian p. 33
8.3.2006
US says to close Abu Ghraib prison
Thu Mar 9, 2006 12:47 PM ET
Reuters
By Alastair Macdonald
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - The U.S. military will
close Abu Ghraib prison, probably within three months, and transfer some 4,500
prisoners to other jails in Iraq, a military spokesman said on Thursday.
The prison in western Baghdad was a torture center under Saddam Hussein before
photographs of American soldiers abusing Iraqis there in 2003 gave it a new
notoriety and made it a touchstone for Arab and Muslim rage over the U.S.
occupation.
"We will transfer operations from Abu Ghraib to the new Camp Cropper once
construction is completed there," Lieutenant Colonel Keir-Kevin Curry told
Reuters.
"No precise dates have been set, but the plan is to accomplish this within the
next two to three months," said Curry, the spokesman for U.S. detention
operations in Iraq.
Camp Cropper is a detention facility in the U.S. military headquarters base at
Baghdad airport, not far from Abu Ghraib.
It currently houses only 127 "high-value" detainees, among them Saddam himself.
U.S. military officials say a purpose-built prison at Camp Cropper will provide
better conditions for Iraqis detained on suspicion of insurgent activity.
The buildings at Abu Ghraib, including the original brick- built jail and
surrounding tented camp that has sprung up under U.S. control, will be handed
over to the Iraqi government.
At present, U.S. forces are holding 14,589 people in four jails in Iraq. More
than half are at Camp Bucca, in the south.
The conviction of several low-ranking U.S. soldiers for abusing prisoners at Abu
Ghraib in late 2003 -- secured after photographs taken by the soldiers emerged
in public -- failed to quiet anger among many Iraqis at the treatment of
detainees.
Thousands of people are held on suspicion of guerrilla activity for many months.
The United Nations and Iraqi ministers have complained that the system is an
abuse of human rights.
The U.S. military cites its powers under a United Nations Security Council
resolution to provide security in Iraq and says its facilities and procedures
meet international standards.
US
says to close Abu Ghraib prison, R, 9.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=newsOne&storyID=2006-03-09T174648Z_01_L0915476_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-ABUGHRAIB1.xml
Matt Bors
Idiot Box Cagle
7.3.2006
http://cagle.msnbc.com/politicalcartoons/PCcartoons/bors.asp
Peace activist Sheehan arrested in NY
protest
Mon Mar 6, 2006 7:52 PM ET
Reuters
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Cindy Sheehan, the
anti-war activist whose son was killed in the Iraq war, was arrested with three
other protesters in New York on Monday after a rally with women from Iraq.
Sheehan became a central figure in the U.S. anti-war movement last summer after
she camped outside President George W. Bush's Texas ranch and has been arrested
at least two other times at protests.
On Monday, she had joined a delegation of women from Iraq at the rally at the
United Nations, urging the global body to help prevent civil war in Iraq.
About 20 protesters went to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to deliver a
petition with 60,000 signatures seeking an end to the war.
The protesters said they had been told they could send a delegation into the
building to present their petition, but that no one showed up to receive them.
A Reuters photographer said security guards inside the building had held the
doors to prevent them from entering.
But Richard Grenell, the spokesman for the U.S. Mission to the United Nations,
said the protesters had been invited in but had refused to do so because media
representatives were not allowed to accompany them.
"We invited them in to the U.S. mission in a small group," Grenell said. "They
were not willing to separate themselves from the media."
Sheehan and three other American women then sat down in front of the building,
refused to leave, and were arrested.
A police spokesman said they were expected to be released later on Monday.
The Iraqi women plan to deliver a petition to the White House on Wednesday.
Earlier they held a news conference at U.N. headquarters calling for the United
States to withdraw its forces.
Entisar Mohammad Ariabi, a pharmacist at Baghdad's Yarmook Teaching Hospital,
wept as she told reporters of the hardships experienced by Iraqi women.
"U.S. occupation has destroyed our country, made it into a prison," she said.
"Schools are bombed, hospitals are bombed."
"We thank you, Mr. Bush, for liberating our country from Saddam. But now, go
out! Please go out!" she said.
(Additional reporting by Irwin Arieff)
Peace
activist Sheehan arrested in NY protest, R, 6.3.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyid=2006-03-07T005159Z_01_N06290383_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-SHEEHAN.xml
Midday
'14,000 detained without trial in Iraq'
Monday March 6, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
Mike McDonough
US and UK forces in Iraq have detained
thousands of people without charge or trial for long periods and there is
growing evidence of Iraqi security forces torturing detainees, Amnesty
International said today.
In a new report published today, the human
rights group criticised the US-led multinational force for interning some 14,000
people.
Around 3,800 people have been held for over a year, while another 200 have been
detained for more than two years, the report - Beyond Abu Ghraib: detention and
torture in Iraq - said.
"It is a dangerous precedent for the world that the US and UK think it
completely defensible to hold thousands of people without charge or trial,"
Amnesty spokesman Neil Durkin said.
The detainee situation in Iraq was comparable to Guantánamo Bay, he added, but
on a much larger scale, and the detentions appeared to be "arbitrary and
indefinite".
"It sends a very worrying message to the people of Iraq that the multinational
force does not think normal human rights standards apply," he said.
Amnesty said there was no fresh evidence of US-led troops abusing detainees in
ways similar to Abu Ghraib prison, but it warned that the US practice of denying
detainees access to lawyers or visits by relatives for their first 60 days in
custody left the door open to mistreatment.
"The worry is that people will suffer abuse during that period and it is less
likely to be checked if there is no form of external oversight," Mr Durkin said.
The Amnesty report also claimed Iraqi security forces were systematically
violating the rights of detainees.
Many cases of torture, including electric shocks or beatings with plastic
cables, have been reported since US-led forces handed power to Iraqi officials
in June 2004, the document said.
Several detainees reportedly died in Iraqi custody last year, and some of their
bodies bore injuries consistent with torture, Amnesty said.
The report expressed particular concern about the activities of the Wolf
brigade, a unit that reports to the Iraqi interior ministry.
Mr Durkin insisted it was feasible for the Iraqi authorities to implement
international human rights standards despite the country's extremely volatile
security situation.
"We do not see what is unreasonable about abiding by human rights standards in
attempts to police Iraq," he said. "And you are not going to fuel resentment to
the same degree as if you imprison people without charge, that is a recipe for
disaster."
Amnesty acknowledged that armed groups opposed to the US-led force were
responsible for many of the abuses being committed in Iraq, including attacks
targeting civilians.
But the group said it had addressed that issue in earlier reports, and that it
was not the focus of its latest publication.
The vast majority of the 14,000 people held in Iraq are in US custody.
British troops are holding 43 detainees at a facility in Shaiba, southern Iraq,
a spokesman for the Foreign Office said. Their detention is subject to regular
review by an internment panel, but lawyers can only make written submissions.
Amnesty said it was concerned the lawyers do not have access to any substantive
evidence against their clients.
One man, Hillal "Abdul Razzaq" Ali al-Jedda, has been in British custody since
his arrest in October 2004. The 48-year-old dual Iraqi and UK national has not
been charged with any offence, and a court of appeal judgment on his detention
is awaited following a hearing in January.
The Foreign Office said the UK followed UN guidelines for detaining suspects.
"We believe that the detention is legal and fair and subject to review," a
spokesman said.
'14,000 detained without trial in Iraq', G, 6.3.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1724837,00.html
1-in-10 US Iraq veterans have stress
disorder: study
Tue Feb 28, 2006 4:35 PM ET
Reuters
CHICAGO (Reuters) - Nearly one in 10 American
soldiers who served in Iraq were diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder,
most after witnessing death or participating in combat, a study said on Tuesday.
Mental health screening of veterans showed 21,620 out of 222,620 returning from
Iraq and assessed over the year ending April 30, 2004, suffered from
post-traumatic stress -- a disorder that can lead to nightmares, flashbacks and
delusional thinking.
Overall, 19.1 percent of soldiers and Marines who returned from Iraq met the
military's "risk criteria for a mental health concern" such as post-traumatic
stress or depression, compared to 11.3 percent among veterans who served in
Afghanistan and 8.5 percent from deployments elsewhere, the report published in
the Journal of the American Medical Association said.
The survey covered 222,620 returning veterans from Iraq, 16,318 from Afghanistan
and 64,967 from other deployments.
"A higher percentage of those soldiers (returning from Iraq) report mental
health concerns and use mental health services when they get home ... compared
to soldiers who are returning from deployment to Afghanistan or other
locations," said study author Col. Charles Hoge of Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research in Silver Spring, Maryland.
Of those diagnosed with post-traumatic stress, 80 percent said they had
witnessed people being killed or wounded or had participated in combat and fired
their weapon, the report said. Of those not diagnosed, half had experienced
violence or combat.
Post-traumatic stress disorder and other combat-related mental problems can lead
to family strife, divorce, alcohol and substance abuse, and unemployment, Hoge
said.
While one in five veterans returning from Iraq reported concerns about their
mental health, about one-third ultimately went for at least one session to be
evaluated or counseled, the study said.
"The majority of service members who were referred for mental health treatment,
got that treatment," Hoge said. "We're trying to encourage soldiers to come in
early because we know that earlier treatment of mental health problems is the
best way to prevent the long-term consequences that we've seen from past wars.
"The findings have important implications for estimating the level of mental
health services that may be needed," Hoge added.
1-in-10 US Iraq veterans have stress disorder: study, R, 28.2.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=domesticNews&storyID=2006-02-28T213511Z_01_MAC231520_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-HEALTH.xml
German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense
Plan, Report Says
February 27, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
WASHINGTON, Feb. 26 — Two German intelligence
agents in Baghdad obtained a copy of Saddam Hussein's plan to defend the Iraqi
capital, which a German official passed on to American commanders a month before
the invasion, according to a classified study by the United States military.
In providing the Iraqi document, German intelligence officials offered more
significant assistance to the United States than their government has publicly
acknowledged. The plan gave the American military an extraordinary window into
Iraq's top-level deliberations, including where and how Mr. Hussein planned to
deploy his most loyal troops.
The German role is not the only instance in which nations that publicly
cautioned against the war privately facilitated it. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for
example, provided more help than they have disclosed. Egypt gave access for
refueling planes, while Saudi Arabia allowed American special operations forces
to initiate attacks from its territory, United States military officials say.
But the German government was an especially vociferous critic of the Bush
administration's decision to use military force to topple Mr. Hussein. While the
German government has said that it had intelligence agents in Baghdad during the
war, it has insisted it provided only limited help to the United States-led
coalition.
In a report released Thursday, German officials said much of the assistance was
restricted to identifying civilian sites so they would not be attacked by
mistake. The classified American military study, though, documents the more
substantive help from German intelligence.
Reached by telephone, Ulrich Wilhelm, the chief spokesman for the German
government, declined to comment on Sunday on the role of the German agents.
The prelude to the Iraq war was a period of intense strain in German-American
relations. In his 2002 political campaign, Gerhard Schröder, then the German
chancellor, warned against an invasion and vowed that Germany would not
participate. President Bush declined to make the customary congratulatory phone
call to Mr. Schröder when he won re-election that September. Annoyed by the
antiwar stances of Germany and France, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld
offended the two nations by labeling them "old Europe" shortly before the war in
March 2003.
Longstanding relations between American and German intelligence agencies,
however, persisted. As the American military prepared to invade Iraq, the German
intelligence agents operated in Baghdad.
Among their tasks, they sought to obtain Mr. Hussein's plan to defend Baghdad,
the United States study asserts. For years, the Iraqi military had relied on a
strategy that called for deploying Iraqi forces along the invasion route to
Baghdad in the hope of bloodying and weakening an invading army before it
arrived at the capital.
But on Dec. 18, 2002, Mr. Hussein summoned his commanders to a strategy session
where a new plan was unveiled, former Iraqi officers and government officials
told American interrogators. Among those attending were Qusay Hussein, the Iraqi
leader's son who oversaw the Republican Guard; Lt. Gen. Sayf al-Din Fulayyih
Hasan Taha al-Rawi, the Republican Guard chief of staff, and other Republican
Guard generals. Mr. Hussein's instructions were to mass troops along several
defensive rings near the capital, including a "red line" that Republican Guard
troops would hold to the end.
An account of the German role in acquiring a copy of Mr. Hussein's plan is
contained in the American military study, which focuses on Iraq's military
strategy and was prepared in 2005 by the United States Joint Forces Command.
After the German agents obtained the Iraqi plan, they sent it up their chain of
command, the study said.
In February 2003, a German intelligence officer in Qatar provided a copy to an
official from the United States Defense Intelligence Agency who worked at the
wartime headquarters of the overall commander, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, according
to the American military study. Officials at the agency shared the plan with the
Central Command's J-2 office, or intelligence division. That division supplied
information for the report.
The classified study contains a copy of the sketch supplied by the Germans. "The
overlay was provided to the Germans by one of their sources in Baghdad (identity
of the German sources unknown)," the study notes. "When the bombs started
falling, the agents ceased ops and went to the French Embassy."
That account of German assistance differs from one the German government has
provided publicly. After the election of a new government led by Chancellor
Angela Merkel in 2005, German officials insisted that they had not provided
substantial help to the United States-led coalition. Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who was Mr. Schröder's chief of staff during the
invasion, denounced news media reports last month that German agents had picked
targets for American warplanes as "absurd."
On Thursday, the German government released a new report that acknowledged that
German agents had provided some intelligence but suggested it was very limited.
The 90-page report is the public version of a much longer classified account.
The public report, for example, stated that the agents provided information on
"civilian protected or other humanitarian sites, such as Synagogues and Torah
rolls and the possible locations of missing U.S. pilots." It said that agents
also provided the United States with descriptions of "the character of military
and police presence in the city" and "descriptions in isolated cases of Iraqi
military forces along with geographic coordinates." The report noted that as the
war approached, the German diplomatic corps was evacuated, but on March 17, just
days before the invasion, the German agents were instructed to remain in
Baghdad.
The public report, however, did not mention anything about securing the Baghdad
defense plan or passing it to the United States military, nor has the German
government released any information about that.
A majority of the German Parliament did not support a call for a formal inquiry
into any German intelligence assistance last week. "The issue has been cleared
up, and all allegations dispelled," said Norbert Röttgen, chairman of the
parliamentary control committee, which reviewed the classified version of the
German report. Some opposition politicians, however, have argued that a further
investigation is needed.
Germany is not the only case in which a government that warned against the
invasion quietly helped United States forces wage the war. The Egyptian
president, Hosni Mubarak, publicly warned that the invasion of Iraqi might lead
to a human catastrophe and insisted that Egypt would not provide direct help to
a United States-led military coalition. "It is not the case, and it won't be the
case," he said in late March 2003.
But Mr. Mubarak quietly allowed United States aerial refueling tankers to be
based at an Egyptian airfield, according to a United States military official
involved in managing the air war against Iraq, who asked to remain anonymous
because he was speaking about delicate diplomatic arrangements.
The tankers were used to refuel Navy aircraft in the Mediterranean and
land-based warplanes on their missions to and from Iraq. United States warplanes
also flew through Egyptian airspace to carry out missions over Iraq, American
military officials said.
United States nuclear-powered vessels were allowed to quickly move through the
Suez Canal, and cruise missiles were fired at targets in Iraq from the Red Sea.
The Saudis have played down the extent of their cooperation with the Bush
administration. But they allowed the Delta Force and other American Special
Operations Forces to mount attacks in Iraq from a secret base at Arar, Saudi
Arabia, according to United States commandos who asked not to be identified
because their operations were secret. The public Saudi explanation was that the
area was being cordoned off for a potential flood of Iraqi refugees.
In the months before the war, military aides to the Joint Chiefs of Staff began
to write a classified list of which nations had joined President Bush's
"coalition of the willing" to topple Mr. Hussein and soon discovered that they
had to add categories. While Germany had loudly opposed the war, it did not
obstruct the United States military's efforts and even offered limited
cooperation. So Germany was listed as "noncoalition but cooperating," said a
Pentagon official who asked to remain anonymous because the list was not public.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt were more supportive but did not want to be perceived as
facilitating the attack. They were listed as "silent partners."
Besides the support by German intelligence, the German government cooperated
with the United States military in other ways.
German ships guarded the sea lanes near the Horn of Africa as part of Task Force
150, an effort to deter terrorist attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, for
example. The patrols helped safeguard the waterways the United States used to
build up its forces in the Persian Gulf for the invasion of Iraq.
German troops were also part of a "consequence management" team, at the United
States military base at Camp Doha, Kuwait, which was charged with protecting
Kuwaitis after a chemical attack. The measure was justified as defensive. German
personnel also guarded American military bases in Germany, freeing United States
soldiers to go to Iraq.
When NATO debated whether to send Awacs radar planes and Patriot missile
batteries to Turkey, a move the United States was promoting to help persuade
Ankara to open a northern front in Iraq, Germany initially was opposed. But it
soon dropped its objections. Germany later provided the missiles for the Patriot
batteries sent to Turkey.
The Iraq defense plan passed on to General Franks's command was the subject of
considerable debate in the Iraqi military. Some officers contended it did not
sufficiently account for terrain or the capabilities of the United States
military.
American intelligence thought before the war that crossing the "red line" on the
plan would be the trigger for an Iraqi chemical attack. But after the war,
United States intelligence determined that the use of chemical or germ weapons
had never been contemplated in the plan, according to the Iraq Survey Group, a
task force set up by the Central Intelligence Agency to investigate what had
happened to Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear programs.
The Baghdad Defense Plan, the Iraqi Survey Group reported, had its origins in
tactics taught to Iraqi officers in Britain in the 1950's and in British-style
training in Pakistan.
There is no question, however, that it reflected the thinking of Mr. Hussein and
his top aides, according to United States government interviews of senior Iraqi
officers. According to the United States military study, an Iraqi general
responsible for defending the southern approaches to Baghdad raised concerns
about the wisdom of the plan. Qusay Hussein cut off the discussion.
"Qusay said the plan was already approved by Saddam and 'it was you who would
now make it work,' " the Republican Guard commander told his American
interrogators.
German Intelligence Gave U.S. Iraqi Defense Plan, Report Says, NYT, 27.2.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/27/politics/27germans.html?hp&ex=1141016400&en=ea7e53dd35d8ba35&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Younger Clerics Showing Power in Iraq's
Unrest
February 26, 2006
The New York Times
By ROBERT F. WORTH and EDWARD WONG
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Feb. 25 — American officials
have been repeatedly stunned and frequently thwarted in the past three years by
the extraordinary power of Muslim clerics over Iraqi society. But in the
sectarian violence of the past few days, that power has taken an ominous turn,
as rival hard-line Shiite clerical factions have pushed each other toward more
militant and anti-American stances, Iraqi and Western officials say.
Even Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the paramount Shiite cleric to whom the
Americans have often looked for moderation, appears to have been outflanked by
younger and more aggressive figures.
After a bomb exploded in Samarra at one of Iraq's most sacred Shiite shrines on
Wednesday, many young Shiites ignored his pleas for calm, instead heeding more
extreme calls and attacking Sunni mosques and killing Sunni civilians, even
imams, in a crisis that has threatened to provoke open civil war.
On Saturday, Iraqi political leaders from across the spectrum joined with Prime
Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari in a televised show of unity to try to quell the
violence. President Bush telephoned several leaders to urge them to return to
talks. [Page 10.]
Earlier, as the critical moment of Friday Prayer approached, American officials
and their allies were left almost helpless, hoping that Iraq's imams would step
up to calm the crisis. But that hope gave way to the realization that the
clerics could do as much harm as good, and for the first time since the toppling
of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi authorities imposed a daytime curfew to keep people
from attending the sermons.
"Sectarian divisions are not new, and sectarian violence is not new," said a
Western diplomat in Baghdad who spoke on condition of anonymity because he did
not want to be seen as interfering. "What is different this time is that the
Shiites, in a sign that their patience is limited, reacted violently in a number
of places."
The violence and new militancy has come in part from a competition among Shiite
factions to be seen as the protectors of the Shiite masses. The main struggle
has been between the leading factions, both backed by Iran, and their spiritual
leaders.
Many of the retaliatory attacks after the bombing were led by Mahdi Army
militiamen loyal to Moktada al-Sadr, the Shiite cleric whose anti-American
crusades have turned him into a rising political power.
His main rival, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, a cleric and the leader of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or Sciri, defended the right of
Shiites to respond to the bombing. He has shown a new willingness to publicly
attack the American role in Iraq, once the preserve of Mr. Sadr, and he also
commands a powerful militia, the Badr Organization.
"There are clerics who are very moderate and who understand what the current
situation demands, and there are clerics who have political agendas and who
marshal forces for their own gain," said Joost Hiltermann, the Middle East
director of the International Crisis Group. "Those are the dangerous ones."
The more political clerics, Mr. Hiltermann added, "are quite willing to push
their agendas no matter what it might lead to, including civil war and the
breakup of the country."
The violence and escalating rhetoric among Sunnis and Shiites has left the
mostly secular Iraqi leaders favored by the United States farther than ever from
power.
"I think people are rapidly losing confidence in the political class, and I
don't blame them," said Adnan Pachachi, a former foreign minister and a member
of the shrinking secular alliance led by the former interim prime minister, Ayad
Allawi.
Shiite clerics were not the only ones whose power was on display this week. As
the violence escalated after the shrine attack, some Sunni Arab religious
leaders tried to rally Sunnis in Iraq and other Arab countries to ever more
aggressive stands. Members of the Association of Muslim Scholars, a hard-line
Sunni group, have cast the violence as part of a broader struggle between Sunnis
and Shiites across the region.
Most religious leaders condemned the violence. But some, including many who also
play roles as leading politicians, continued to fuel their followers' sense of
grievance about the shrine bombing and the reprisals.
The fact that many hard-line political leaders are also clerics complicates the
situation. The Iraqi leaders, for instance, can say one thing to American
officials while spreading a different message to a vast network of followers
through mosques and militias. After Mr. Hakim on Wednesday accused the American
ambassador to Iraq of being partly responsible for the Samarra bombing, he
distanced himself from the statement and met with the ambassador, Zalmay
Khalilzad.
But on Friday, clerics loyal to Mr. Hakim's political party, Sciri, repeated the
accusation against Mr. Khalilzad, and it quickly spread to the street, with some
Shiites rallying in the southern city of Basra to demand Mr. Khalilzad's
removal.
To some, the crisis of the past few days has underscored a longstanding American
failure to reach out effectively to moderate Islamists who might give them
better access to the Iraqi masses.
From the earliest days of the occupation in 2003, American officials seemed to
place most of their faith in secular figures like Mr. Allawi and Ahmad Chalabi,
believing they had popular support. They also gave posts of authority to Mr.
Hakim and other conservative religious figures, thinking they would play a
lesser role in the new Iraq. But Mr. Hakim and others used their positions to
help build their political base.
"The Americans knew what was coming, but they underestimated the power — they
thought they could control the power of the clerics," said Hatem Mukhlis, a
secular Sunni Arab politician who met with President Bush before the war.
Despite Iraq's relatively secular government over the past century, the country
remains a part of the broader Islamic world, where bonds between religion and
state are deep.
Iraqi Shiites in particular have rallied around their religious leadership
before, most recently in the uprising against Saddam Husseinin 1991, but also
earlier, as in the revolt against the British in 1920.
"What's happened over the last three years is that there has been an ongoing
crisis," said Laith Kubba, a former adviser to Prime Minister Jaafari who is now
out of politics. "Even many Iraqis didn't accurately foresee the situation, that
in an Iraq so highly polarized, religious leaders would become the rallying
points."
Clerics have never been as influential among Sunnis in Iraq, who lack the
religious hierarchy of the Shiites. Partly for that reason, the Sunnis were
unable to organize as effectively as the Shiites, who dominated the January 2005
elections.
But the example of the Shiites, who formed a powerful political alliance under
Ayatollah Sistani's guidance, pushed Sunnis toward their own religious leaders
in the December vote.
"In the last election, they saw themselves in danger, so they decided to elect a
Sunni list," said Saleh Mutlak, a Sunni Arab leader whose secular party received
far fewer votes than the Iraqi Consensus Front, a Sunni group with a strong
religious bent.
To some extent, the American government did recognize a need to court moderate
religious figures who could play roles in Iraq's future. Even before the 2003
invasion, American officials allied themselves with exiled clerics like Ayad
Jamal Addin and Sheik Abdel Majid al-Khoei, a member of one of Iraq's most
prominent Shiite families.
But the Americans seemed unaware of the complex and deadly rivalries among
Iraq's religious factions. After being brought back to Iraq by the Americans in
2003, Mr. Khoei was stabbed to death in the Shiite holy city of Najaf by
followers of Mr. Sadr. That killing led the American occupation authority to
issue an arrest warrant for Mr. Sadr, which was dropped after he led two bloody
uprisings in 2004 and became one of Iraq's most powerful figures.
Mr. Sadr's family has long been engaged in a rivalry with the Shiite religious
establishment in Iraq, known as the Hawza. Under the rule of Saddam Hussein, Mr.
Sadr's revered father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was one of the few
clerics to openly defy the dictator. He also expressed contempt for Ayatollah
Sistani and other senior clerics, calling them the "Silent Hawza" for their
complacent attitude in the face of tyranny. The young Sadr claimed his father's
mantle after Mr. Hussein had the elder Sadr and his two eldest sons killed in
1999.
The militancy and growing power of Mr. Sadr and Mr. Hakim are upending the
Shiite hierarchy, in which four grand clerics in Najaf are supposed to wield the
most influence. When Mr. Sadr led his two anti-American uprisings in 2004,
taking the city of Najaf hostage, Ayatollah Sistani initially watched helplessly
from his home there.
The stridency of Mr. Sadr and Mr. Hakim has also contributed in pushing the
older clerics to adopt a more aggressive tone toward Sunni militants, especially
as the patience of the Shiite people wears thin in the face of relentless
slaughter. After the shrine bombing on Wednesday, Ayatollah Sistani called on
"believers" to defend religious sites if the government was unable to do so —
exactly the same language that Mr. Sadr used in telling the Mahdi Army to defend
places of worship.
The tensions between Mr. Sadr and Mr. Hakim have affected virtually every aspect
of Iraqi society. Each man has staked out territory in the police and commando
forces by swelling the ranks of those units with their militiamen. This month,
Mr. Sadr played the role of kingmaker by throwing his support to Mr. Jaafari
during a Shiite vote for the prime ministerial nominee, effectively blocking Mr.
Hakim's candidate. Occasionally the rivalry explodes into violence, as it did
last summer when Sadr militiamen stormed Supreme Council offices across the
south.
Given all this, and amid the growing sectarian bloodshed, the voices of
religious moderates like Ayatollah Sistani are increasingly falling on deaf
ears. Shiite tribes "have put a lot of pressure on Sistani in the last year to
go for revenge," said Mr. Hiltermann of the Crisis Group. "People are just not
listening anymore in the face of these sick outrages."
Younger Clerics Showing Power in Iraq's Unrest, NYT, 26.2.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/international/middleeast/26clerics.html?hp&ex=1141016400&en=3f531d42c4c34602&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Violence Strains U.S. Strategy and Imperils
Pullout Plans
February 24, 2006
The New York Times
By STEVEN R. WEISMAN and ROBERT F. WORTH
WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 — The violence in Iraq
after the bombing of a Shiite mosque this week has abruptly thrown the Bush
administration on the defensive, and there were signs on Thursday that American
officials recognized new perils to their plans to withdraw troops this year. The
American enterprise in Iraq seemed beleaguered on two fronts, political and
military.
Senior administration officials in Washington and Baghdad said the next few days
would test American and Iraqi resolve, as the United States military, despite
pressure to intervene and angry accusations that it stood by while Iraq erupted
in revenge killings, holds back to see if Iraqis can quell violence themselves.
An unusual daytime curfew in Baghdad scheduled for Friday Prayer could help, the
officials said.
Iraqis and some American officials also said the Bush administration might have
to rethink its political strategy in Baghdad.
The American ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, has reached out to Sunnis, pushing to
include them in the government and pressing Shiite leaders hard to keep
politicians with ties to Shiite militias out of sensitive security posts. Sunnis
have accused these Shiite leaders of running death squads. But Mr. Khalilzad's
stance has infuriated Shiites.
Mr. Khalilzad said Monday that the United States would not "invest the resources
of the American people" in Iraqi security forces if they were "run by people who
are sectarian." The comment provoked unusually direct criticism from Shiite
leaders, some of whom suggested that maligning the Iraqi security leadership led
to the attack on the mosque in Samarra on Wednesday.
Because sensitive negotiations are continuing and because officials fear that
American comments could further inflame a volatile situation, few officials
interviewed here or in Baghdad would be quoted by name.
For the moment, American officials said they doubted that Mr. Khalilzad would
change course. They said the Americans were pressing Iraqi leaders not to go
forward with political negotiations without Sunni participation.
Since the major Sunni party has suspended its participation in the talks,
officials hope waiting a few days may allow tensions to recede.
Iraqi security forces were unable — or, Sunni leaders suggested, unwilling — to
quell the violence after the bombing. In many cases, the American military was
either not present or not able to stop Shiite mobs exacting revenge killings
across Iraq.
Military officials said the Pentagon was in effect watching and waiting to see
what the next 48 hours would bring before deciding on whether a more visible
American presence might be needed — in effect, sending American forces back into
areas that they had turned over to the Iraqis.
A senior official said there was no thought being given now to changing the
"trajectory" of pulling American forces back and eventually withdrawing part of
them this year.
But other administration officials said expanding the American presence might be
necessary to contain the violence, partly because despite strenuous efforts, the
Iraqi armed forces are still divided along sectarian lines. In particular, Iraqi
Sunnis see Shiite-dominated troops as part of the problem, not the solution.
"Just in the last 36-hour period, Sunni Arabs who were urging us to withdraw
forces from cities like Baghdad are now urging us to stay," a senior American
official said. "I don't know if the American military is reconsidering its
posture, but I can tell you that the Iraqis are reconsidering."
Top aides at the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department all
expressed the hope that the new violence did not portend civil war in Iraq. They
found it in evidence that all sides were appealing for restraint, even the
firebrand Moktada al-Sadr in Baghdad.
"Rather than see a collapse or a setback, I think in some ways, you can see an
affirmation that the approach we've been taking has worked," said Adam Ereli, a
State Department spokesman. "You've got political leadership acting together on
behalf of the common good, and you've got security forces demonstrating that
capability and a responsibility as a national entity that we've been working to
develop and that has now been put to the test and, I think, is proving
successful."
Despite optimistic official comments, the possibility of violent breakdown
loomed large. One official called the bombing "an event that brings us to the
precipice — you can see the chasm below that could mean a descent into civil war
and everyone is taking a deep breath."
In Baghdad and among some experts, there were questions about how much Mr.
Khalilzad's influence could help broker a political solution given the anger
between Shiites and Sunnis, and the Shiite anger at Mr. Khalilzad himself.
A high-ranking Shiite official said some of the Sunnis Mr. Khalilzad wanted to
bring into the government were Baathists and former members of Saddam Hussein's
government.
"The situation is very, very, very bad," said Reuel Marc Gerecht, a fellow at
the American Enterprise Institute who supports the American efforts in Iraq.
"The bombing has completely demolished what Zalmay was trying to do to get
certain Sunnis into the interior and defense ministries."
A statement by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim charging that Mr. Khalilzad's comments on
Monday had helped to provoke the bombing were a particularly ominous sign. But
American officials said Mr. Khalilzad was unlikely to give up his demands.
"It's important for the Shia leadership to understand our concerns," an American
official said. "We're still in conversations with Hakim, and they are unhappy
with the ambassador's remarks."
Mr. Khalilzad has gained great popularity among Iraqis, especially among Sunnis,
said Saleh Mutlak, a hard-line Sunni Arab member of the new Parliament. He said
even the resistance was pleased with his comments about Shiite abuses.
But Mr. Mutlak added that Sunni leaders felt betrayed that American soldiers did
not stop the marauding Shiite militiamen on Wednesday, an approach reminiscent
of their inaction in the face of looting after the fall of Baghdad in April
2003.
Steven R. Weisman reported from Washington for this article, and Robert F.
Worth fromBaghdad. Thom Shanker contributed reporting from Washington.
Violence Strains U.S. Strategy and Imperils Pullout Plans, NYT, 24.2.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/24/politics/24diplo.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Violent Cycle of Revenge Stuns Iraqis
February 24, 2006
The New York Times
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Feb. 23 — After a day of
violence so raw and so personal, Iraqis woke on Thursday morning to a tense new
world in which, it seemed, anything was possible.
The violence on Wednesday was the closest Iraq had come to civil war, and Iraqis
were stunned. In Al Amin, a neighborhood in southeast Baghdad, a Shiite man said
he had watched gunmen set a house on fire. It was identified as the residence of
Sunni Arab militants, said the man, Abu Abbas, though no one seemed to know for
sure who they were.
"We all were shocked," said Abu Abbas, a vegetable seller, standing near crates
of oranges and tomatoes. "We saw it burning. We called the fire department. We
didn't know how to behave. Chaos was everywhere."
Of the seven men inside, at least three were brought out dead, said Abu Abbas,
32, who said it would be dangerous to give more than his Iraqi nickname.
Everything felt different on Thursday morning. A Shiite newspaper, Al Bayyna al
Jadidah, used unusually angry language in a front-page editorial: "It's time to
declare war against anyone who tries to conspire against us, who slaughters us
every day. It is time to go to the streets and fight those outlaws."
Many Iraqis, including Abu Abbas, blamed the militia loyal to the Shiite cleric,
Moktada al-Sadr, for the attacks. The fighters are known as the Mahdi Army but
they are little more than large groups of poor Shiites with guns. Indeed, the
neighborhoods in eastern Baghdad on the edges of the vast Shiite slum, Sadr
City, where most of those fighters live, seem to have been hit the hardest.
The fighters are not organized, but are a powerful force: they fought two
uprisings against the American military at the command of the strongly
anti-American Mr. Sadr.
It was shortly after noon on Wednesday when truckloads of gunmen identified as
Mahdi fighters drove into Al Shabab, a mixed neighborhood near Sadr City, and
mounted an attack on Ibad Al Rahman, a Sunni mosque.
Ahmed al-Samarai, who lives in front of the mosque, said he saw about seven cars
full of men wearing black, the signature Mahdi dress, fire machine guns and
rocket-propelled grenades at the mosque, gouging a large hole in a side wall.
They entered the building and led away a man who performs the call to prayer,
Abu Abdullah, telling his wife and three children to leave the building, Mr.
Samarai said. They returned later, poured gasoline in the mosque, and set it on
fire. Neighbors are still looking for Mr. Abdullah.
Sahera Ibrahim, a 60-year-old homemaker who lives nearby, recounted an angry
exchange with one of the Shiite attackers, who seemed to hold her entire Sunni
sect responsible for the destruction of the Shiite shrine at Samarra, where a
bombing on Wednesday set off the violence.
"I told one of them, 'You do not have the fear of God — how could you attack
this house of God?' " she recalled. "He answered me, 'Did you not have the fear
when you attacked the shrine of the imam?' "
Still, the neighborhood itself did not divide along sectarian lines: Shiite
residents also condemned Wednesday's assaults. Neighborhoods all over Baghdad
reported similar camaraderie.
"As a Shiite, I do not accept this," said Saadiya Salim, a 50-year-old
homemaker. "These acts will lead to violence, because the Sunnis will attack"
Shiite mosques.
As the afternoon dragged on and law enforcers were nowhere to be seen,
neighborhoods seemed to shrink into themselves, setting up makeshift roadblocks
out of the trunks of palm trees and, pieces of castaway metal stoves.
It was behind such a barricade that a frightened group of Sunni men took refuge,
blocking off the entrance to their mosque, Malik bin Anas, in Al Moalimin
district. Men with machine guns stood on the roof, their faces wrapped in
scarves.
The scent of burned plaster hung heavily in the air. The mosque's interior had
been ignited shortly before 3 p.m., and the men, who were worshipers, said they
had spent the late afternoon dragging out damaged carpets and furniture.
"We were watching our own house burn, so you can imagine our feeling," said one
man, Abu Yusef.
"They burned our beliefs," said another, who spoke in English.
A third held out a cellphone with a short video of smoke billowing from the
mosque. "It's obvious the Shia people feel safer here," he said of the
neighborhood. He said neighborhood Shiites helped put out the fire.
The men said a police commando vehicle was parked near the mosque and did
nothing, echoing a frequently repeated complaint.
Many Shiites condemned Wednesday's violence, while at the same time
acknowledging that their sect had been responsible for it. Most said they had
heeded the advice of their religious leaders, who all called for restraint in a
flurry of statements on Wednesday.
In some cases, that advice came too late, or was simply ignored. One Mahdi
fighter, Ahmed Saheb, said in an interview on Wednesday that he had been
summoned to Mr. Sadr's main office in Sadr City in the morning to await orders,
but that none ever came.
"People attacked Sunni mosques because they were angry," said Mr. Saheb, who
said he had not taken part in the attacks. "We couldn't control them, they were
doing it on their own."
A demonstration moved slowly along Sadr City's main boulevards on Thursday. Men
and boys, many holding guns, real and toy, waved green flags and portraits of
Shiite saints. Many said they planned to go to Samarra on Friday to help protect
the shrine.
"We cut the hands of those who try to twist Shiite hands around," the crowd
chanted.
All the pain and anger of the past three years seemed to burst to the surface in
the bombing of the Samarra shrine, said one marcher, Abbas Allawi Metheb, an
employee in the Trade Ministry. It was as if the Shiites' heart had been torn
out.
"You have a TV, you follow the news," he said. "Who is most often killed? Whose
mosques are exploded? Whose society was destroyed?"
Shiites are fed up, and heeded their leaders' calls for restraint only
grudgingly. The anger, he said, is simmering. "Maybe this is just the
beginning."
"If they have 100 people, we have millions," Mr. Metheb added, motioning to the
wide stream of demonstrators. "Look at these people. I'm just a drop in this
ocean."
Mona Mahmoud and Hosham Hussein contributed reporting for this article.
Violent Cycle of Revenge
Stuns Iraqis, NYT, 24.2.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/24/international/middleeast/24mosque.html?hp&ex=1140757200&en=ca0bd88439af9a0a&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Iraq slips towards civil war after attack
on Shia shrine
Appeals for calm fail to halt reprisals
Thursday February 23, 2006
Guardian
Michael Howard in Irbil
Iraq's political and religious leaders were
engaged in a desperate effort last night to stop the country from sliding into
civil war after a huge bomb shattered the golden-domed mosque in the city of
Samarra, one of Shia Islam's most revered sites.
At least six people were killed as demonstrations and armed clashes erupted
across southern Iraq, and there were retaliatory attacks on Sunni mosques in
Baghdad as thousands of furious Shia Muslims took to the streets. In an apparent
reprisal attack, gunmen in police uniforms seized a dozen Sunni men suspected of
being insurgents from a prison in the mainly Shia city of Basra and killed 11 of
them, police and British forces said.
Appeals for unity and calm were made by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's
senior Shia cleric, and the president, Jalal Talabani, who warned that Iraq was
in "grave danger" and urged Iraqis to work together to prevent a civil war.
The calls were echoed in Washington and London. President George Bush pledged
American financial help to reconstruct the mosque. "Violence will only
contribute to what the terrorists sought to achieve by this act," he said. Tony
Blair, who also promised help with the rebuilding, said the attackers' aim was
to foment violence between Shias and Sunnis, and urged both communities not to
"fall into the trap".
Tariq al-Hashimi, a leading Sunni politician, said 29 Sunni mosques had been
attacked nationwide, and at least one cleric killed. He urged religious leaders
and politicians to calm the situation "before it spins out of control". Other
leading Sunnis condemned the blast.
The attack on the mosque in the mainly Sunni town of Samarra, 60 miles north of
Baghdad, occurred shortly after dawn, when up to 10 gunmen dressed as police
commandos burst into the compound, tied up the guards and triggered a series of
explosions that brought the golden dome crashing to the ground. All that
remained was the wall of the mosque, flanked by two minarets.
US and Iraqi forces sealed off the mosque - which contains the tombs of two
ninth century imams - and searched local houses. There was no claim of
responsibility, but the five police officers responsible for protecting the
mosque were taken into custody, and Iraqi authorities said another 10 men "with
links to al-Qaida" had been arrested.
It was the third large-scale attack in as many days aimed at Iraqi Shias, who in
the postwar chaos have been targeted by Sunni extremists with hundreds of car
and suicide bombs. Though no one was reported killed, the impact was immediate
and far reaching.
Protests in Samarra were repeated and magnified in the Shia heartlands of
Baghdad and cities throughout the south. In the capital, residents woke up to
shouts of Allah Akhbar (God is great) booming out from loudspeakers at Shia
mosques.
"The Takfiris [Sunni extremists] have destroyed our holy shrine in Samarra,"
imams informed their neighbourhoods before reciting verses from the Qur'an.
Shopkeepers shut their stores as thousands of mainly young Shias took to the
streets, urging reprisal attacks against Sunni targets.
"I am going to go and burn the Abu Hanifa mosque [a revered Sunni place of
worship in Baghdad]," said one youth who was carrying a picture of the militant
cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. "It is time to take revenge for the martyrs."
Police said that at least 17 Sunni mosques in the capital had been fired on and
one cleric killed by Shia militants wearing the black uniforms of Mr Sadr's
al-Mahdi army. A police spokesman said three other mosques had been set on fire,
but could not provide details.
In Basra, Sadr militants surrounded and attacked the office of the mainstream
Sunni Iraqi Islamic party. Smoke billowed from the building after an exchange of
gunfire with the office's guards and a strike on the building by a
rocket-propelled grenade. The number of casualties was unknown.
There were other angry demonstrations in the southern cities of Kut, Amara,
Nassiriya, and Diwaniya, where one Mahdi army militiaman was killed in clashes
with Sunni residents.
Despite the violence and horrific attacks on the civilian population, it is
difficult to imagine an act more designed to stoke civil war than the
destruction of one of Shia Islam's holiest shrines.
For the past 100 years the 72,000 golden tiles that form the mosque's famous
dome have shone out across the rooftops of Samarra, attracting pilgrims from
afar to the shrines of Imam Ali al-Hadi and his son, Imam Hassan al-Askari. It
is one of Shia Islam's four major shrines in Iraq. Relics of the buried imams,
including a helmet and shield, were reported damaged in the blasts.
Since the US invasion the city has fallen into the hands of insurgents and
Islamic radicals, despite repeated claims by US forces to have removed them.
Sunni militants have carried out lethal attacks on Shia pilgrims.
Such is the potential fallout from the explosion that the reclusive Ayatollah
Sistani appeared on television. He said nothing, but later his office issued a
statement legitimising protests "only if they are peaceful".
Another senior member of the Shia establishment, Grand Ayatollah Bashir
al-Najafi, told the Guardian he was "distraught by the events", but criticised
those charged with protecting the shrine: "The attack is the work of Takfiris
who blemish Islam, and who strike at the heart of Islam. It is an attempt to
start civil war in Iraq. We warned the government and the US about protecting
holy shrines. They should do their legitimate and national duty. If they are
unable to, the people will take their security into their own hands."
President Talabani, said the perpetrators were bent on "driving a wedge" between
Iraq's Sunni and Shia communities and wrecking talks to form a government of
national unity. In a televised address, he urged all Iraqis to "stand together
to avoid the most dangerous prospect we can think of".
· Additional reporting by Qais al-Bashir
Iraq
slips towards civil war after attack on Shia shrine, G, 23.2.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,1715981,00.html
Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq
February 23, 2006
The New York Times
By ROBERT F. WORTH
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Feb. 22 — A powerful bomb shattered the golden dome at one of
Iraq's most revered Shiite shrines on Wednesday morning, setting off a day of
sectarian fury in which mobs formed across Iraq to chant for revenge and
attacked dozens of Sunni mosques.
The bombing, at the Askariya Shrine in Samarra, 60 miles north of Baghdad,
wounded no one but left the famous golden dome at the site in ruins. The shrine
is central to one of the most dearly held beliefs of Shiite Islam, and the
bombing, coming after two days of bloody attacks that have left dozens of Shiite
civilians dead, ignited a nationwide outpouring of rage and panic that seemed to
bring Iraq closer than ever to outright civil war.
Shiite militia members flooded the streets of Baghdad, firing rocket-propelled
grenades and machine guns at Sunni mosques while Iraqi Army soldiers who had
been called out to stop the violence stood helpless nearby. By the day's end,
mobs had struck or destroyed 27 Sunni mosques in the capital, killing three
imams and kidnapping a fourth, Interior Ministry officials said. In all, at
least 15 people were killed in related violence across the country.
Thousands of grief-stricken people in Samarra crowded into the shrine's
courtyard after the bombing, some weeping and kissing the fallen stones, others
angrily chanting, "Our blood and souls we sacrifice for you, imams!"
Iraq's major political and religious leaders issued urgent appeals for
restraint, and Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari called for a three-day mourning
period in a televised address. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq's most
senior Shiite cleric, released an unusually strong statement in which he said,
"If the government's security forces cannot provide the necessary protection,
the believers will do it."
Most Iraqi leaders attributed the attack to terrorists bent on exploiting
sectarian rifts, but some also blamed the United States for failing to prevent
it. Even the leader of Iraq's main Shiite political alliance said he thought
Zalmay Khalilzad, the American ambassador to Iraq, bore some responsibility. The
Shiite leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, said Mr. Khalilzad's veiled threat on Monday
to withdraw American support if Iraqis could not form a nonsectarian government
helped provoke the bombing. "This declaration gave a green light for these
groups to do their operation, so he is responsible for a part of that," Mr.
Hakim said at a news conference.
The shrine bombing came as Iraq's political leaders continued to struggle under
heavy American pressure to agree on the principles of a new national unity
government. As in past moments of political transition here, violence has
mounted during the uncertainty, and the attacks, mostly against Shiite
civilians, seemed aimed specifically at creating more conflict between Iraq's
Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni Arab populations. That effort had at least a momentary
success on Wednesday, and the streets of the capital emptied as Iraqis hurried
home early, fearing further attacks by Shiite militia members or possible
reprisals by Sunni Arabs.
Mr. Khalilzad issued a joint statement with Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top
American commander in Iraq, in which he deplored the bombing as a "crime against
humanity" and pledged American help in rebuilding the dome. In Washington,
President Bush issued a statement extending his sympathy to Iraqis. "The United
States condemns this cowardly act in the strongest possible terms," Mr. Bush
said. "I ask all Iraqis to exercise restraint in the wake of this tragedy, and
to pursue justice in accordance with the laws and Constitution of Iraq."
The Shiite cleric and political leader Moktada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army militia
led many of the violent protests on Wednesday, placed some blame on what he
called the "occupation forces" for the bombing but did not give more details.
Mr. Sadr told the Arabic satellite network Al Jazeera that he was cutting short
his visit in Lebanon because of the bombing.
The attack in Samarra began at 7 a.m., when a dozen men dressed in paramilitary
uniforms entered the shrine and handcuffed four guards who were sleeping in a
back room, a spokesman for the provincial governor's office said. The attackers
then placed a bomb in the dome and detonated it, collapsing most of the
structure and heavily damaging an adjoining wall.
The shrine is one of four major Shiite shrines in Iraq, and the site has special
meaning because 2 of the 12 imams revered by mainstream Shiites are buried
there: Ali al-Hadi, who died in A.D. 868 and his son, the 11th imam, Hassan
al-Askari. Also, according to legend, the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, known as
the "Hidden Imam," was at the site of the shrine before he disappeared.
These figures resonate with Iraqi Shiites, whose traditions have long been
shaped by violence with the rival Sunni sect. At an earlier time of rising
tensions, the 10th imam was forced from his home in Medina by the powerful Sunni
caliph in Baghdad and was sent to live in Samarra, where he could be kept under
closer supervision. Both he and his son were believed to have been poisoned by
the caliphate.
Fearing such persecution, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who was just a child when he became
the 12th imam, was hidden away in a cave, where he held forth through
intermediaries for about 70 years. Then he is said to have gone into what
Shiites call occultation, a kind of suspended state from which it is believed he
will return before the Judgment Day to bring justice during a time of chaos.
No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but some Iraqi officials pointed
a finger at Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the terrorist group believed to be
responsible for many of the attacks on Shiite civilians and mosques in the past
two years.
Samarra's population is mostly Sunni Arab, and it was a haven for insurgents
until 2004, when American and Iraqi troops carried out a major operation to
retake the city and the Golden Mosque from guerrilla fighters. But the
insurgents have filtered back since then, and American troops in and around the
city are now regularly attacked.
Shops soon closed across the country as angry mobs filled the streets. In
Kirkuk, about a thousand Shiites marched in the streets, chanting against
America, members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, and Takfiris, a word used to
describe militant Islamists who denounce other Muslims as infidels. Similar
demonstrations broke out in Baquba, Najaf, Karbala, and other cities. In the
southern Shiite city of Basra, Shiite militia members damaged at least two Sunni
mosques, killing an imam, and launched an attack on the headquarters of Iraq's
best-known Sunni Arab political party. One man was killed in the gun battle that
ensued and 14 were wounded, the police said.
Later, the Basra police took 10 foreign Arabs who had been jailed in connection
with terrorist attacks from their cells and shot them dead, apparently in
retaliation for the shrine bombing, a police official said.
Ayatollah Sistani issued another statement on Wednesday warning the faithful not
to attack any Sunni holy sites. But it was too late: angry mobs had already
begun shooting and firing rocket-propelled grenades, and setting some mosques on
fire. Imams at three Baghdad mosques — Al Sabar, Al Yaman, and Al Rashidi — were
killed, Interior Ministry officials said. A fourth imam, Sheik Abdul Qadir Sabih
Nori of the Amjed al-Zahawi mosque, was kidnapped, the officials said.
The violence was not confined to big cities. In Salman Pak, a town just south of
Baghdad, Shiite militia members evacuated a Sunni mosque and a religious school,
warning the imam that he would be killed if he did not leave the town within two
days.
Sunni Arab political leaders mixed their denunciations of the shrine bombing
with anger at the attacks on Sunni mosques. Tarik al-Hashimi, the leader of the
Iraq Islamic Party, Iraq's best-known Sunni political group, urged Iraqis to
"confront the criminals and put a stop to these crimes before it is too late."
Adnan Dulaimi, another Sunni leader, told Al Jazeera that he thought the attacks
on Sunni mosques had been planned before the Samarra bombing as part of a
broader vendetta against Sunnis.
In Sadr City, the vast Shiite slum in Baghdad, flatbed trucks bristled with
black-clad militia fighters carrying guns. Leaning out car windows, men with
grenade launchers pointed at them menacingly.
"If I could find the people who did this, I would cut him into pieces," said
Abdel Jaleel al-Sudani, a 50-year-old employee of the Health Ministry, who said
he had marched in a demonstration earlier. "I would rather hear of the death of
a friend than to hear this news."
Reporting for this article was contributed by Sabrina Tavernise, Mona
Mahmoud, Khalid al-Ansary, Omar al-Neami and Qais Mizher from Baghdad, and by
Iraqi employees of The New York Times from Basra, Kirkuk, Najaf, and Karbala.
John Kifner contributed from New York.
Blast at Shiite Shrine
Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq, NYT, 13.6.2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/23/international/middleeast/23iraq.html?ex=1181880000&en=29e242112b53345f&ei=5070
White House requests $115B for Iraq,
Afghanistan
Posted 2/16/2006 2:02 PM Updated 2/16/2006
9:49 PM
USA Today
WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. military spending for
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will rise to $115 billion for this year — and
nearly $400 billion since the fighting started — under a new White House request
submitted to Congress Thursday.
A separate request for almost $20 billion in new hurricane relief funds would
bring total spending in response to Katrina and Rita to more than $100 billion.
(Related story: Proposal would boost uninsured victims, levees)
The Bush administration submitted a $65.3 billion war request, and Pentagon
officials said the money would be sufficient to conduct the two wars at least
through Sept. 30. Congress had approved $50 billion more for the war effort in
December.
"These funds support U.S. Armed Forces and Coalition partners as we advance
democracy, fight the terrorists and insurgents, and train and equip Iraqi
security forces so that they can defend their sovereignty and freedom,"
President Bush said in a letter transmitting the request to Congress.
The war in Iraq now costs about $5.9 billion a month, while Afghanistan
operations cost about $900 million per month, said Pentagon Comptroller Tina
Jonas. That doesn't include the costs of replacing worn-out or destroyed
equipment or training Iraqi and Afghan forces.
The Pentagon said the latest request assumes a U.S. force of 138,000 troops on
the ground in Iraq through Sept. 30, the end of the fiscal year, even though the
administration has signaled that troop numbers would fall below that this year.
The supplemental spending request for the wars would bring the total price tag
for the Iraq and Afghanistan missions to almost $400 billion. Bush's budget
anticipates an additional $50 billion for the budget year beginning Oct. 1,
though the costs are likely to be much greater.
Thursday's dual requests totaled $91 billion and came 10 days after Bush
submitted his $2.8 trillion federal budget for 2007. Overall, the cost of the
Iraq and Afghanistan wars consumes about 4% of the budget.
Still, war and hurricane relief costs and the burgeoning budget deficit —
estimated to hit a record $423 billion this year — have put a squeeze on other
programs. Bush's budget proposed cuts for a variety of domestic programs such as
education, Amtrak, community development and local law enforcement grants, and
also proposed curbing inflation increases for Medicare providers.
Congress is likely to vote on the massive requests next month, but lawmakers are
already grumbling that the White House left out funds for highway repairs in
Gulf Coast states and for various agriculture disasters dotting the Midwest. On
the other side of the spectrum, conservatives believe the Katrina request should
be matched with spending cuts elsewhere.
The latest request also includes $4.2 billion for State Department operations
and foreign aid, such as $75 million to promote democratic institutions in Iran
and $514 million to support peacekeeping efforts and provide food aid in Sudan.
The request also includes $2.9 billion for intelligence gathering and other
related activities.
The $19.8 billion being requested for hurricane relief along the Gulf Coast
includes $4.2 billion in flexible community development block grants aimed at
compensating Louisiana residents whose homes have been damaged or destroyed.
Louisiana officials said their state was shortchanged when Congress approved
$11.5 billion in such funds in December.
The congressional delegations from bordering states Texas and Mississippi say
they will resist devoting the new community development funds exclusively to
Louisiana.
"The complete lack of funding in this proposed supplemental for a state that
absorbed enormous costs from two hurricanes is stunning," said Sen. John Cornyn,
R-Texas. "This is a major disappointment, but one the entire Texas delegation
will fight to correct."
An additional $1.5 billion would go toward levee repair, storm-proofing drainage
pumps and other flood control projects, including $100 million to restore
wetlands around New Orleans. Some $3.1 billion would go to repair and rebuild
federal facilities such as military bases and a veterans hospital in New
Orleans.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency's disaster relief fund is seeking $9.4
billion for such tasks as debris cleanup, housing aid and other relief. The
request comes less than two months after lawmakers took $23.4 billion from
FEMA's coffers to help pay for a $29 billion Katrina relief bill.
The latest request would push total federal spending for hurricane rebuilding to
more than $100 billion, according to administration tallies. That reflects about
$68 billion in emergency appropriations, $18.5 billion in available flood
insurance funds and the latest $19.8 billion request.
The latest war request includes:
•$33.4 billion for operations and maintenance costs, including logistics, troop
security, food and fuel associated with the Iraq and Afghanistan missions.
•$10.4 billion to fix or replace damaged equipment such as Humvees and Bradley
Fighting Vehicles.
•$9.6 billion for personnel costs.
•$5.9 billion to train and equip Afghanistan's and Iraq's military forces.
•$1.9 billion for equipment to detect and neutralize roadside bombs and other
so-called improvised explosive devices.
•$1.5 billion to increase military survivors' benefits and increase benefits for
those injured in combat.
White
House requests $115B for Iraq, Afghanistan, UT, 16.2.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-02-16-spending_x.htm
The Military
Pentagon Widens Program to Foil Bombings in
Iraq
February 6, 2006
The New York Times
By ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON, Feb. 5 — The Pentagon is tripling
its spending, to about $3.5 billion this year, on a newly expanded effort to
combat the rising number of increasingly powerful and sophisticated homemade
bombs that are the No. 1 killer of American troops in Iraq, military officials
say.
The move is a tacit acknowledgment that despite years of rising death tolls from
the devices, the response has not been sufficiently focused or coordinated at
the highest levels. And it comes in addition to recent spending to get more and
better armor for troops and their vehicles, spurred by concerns expressed by
Congress and the American public.
Interviews with a dozen officials in Washington and Iraq detailed an intensive
effort on the overall project, which at one time was led by a one-star general
but was recently put under a retired four-star Army general, Montgomery C.
Meigs.
In the next few months, the Defense Department plans to double the number of
technical, forensic and intelligence specialists assigned to the problem, to
about 360 military service members and contractors in the United States and
Iraq. Hundreds of other experts are being called in, including more than are
currently involved from the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central
Intelligence Agency. New technology and training techniques are also quickly
being pushed into service.
The increased response comes after the number of attacks with makeshift bombs
against allied and Iraqi forces and Iraqi civilians nearly doubled in the last
year, to 10,593 in 2005 from 5,607 in 2004. The military says it is able to
discover and defuse only about 40 percent of the bombs, and the result is
deadly: 407 of the 846 Americans killed last year in Iraq were killed by the
bombs, which are called improvised explosive devices.
Army officials say new tactics and equipment, like more heavily armored
vehicles, are reducing the lethality of the bombs. But Deputy Defense Secretary
Gordon England said at a forum of more than 800 industry and military experts
last month that nearly 90 percent of the Army's casualties were caused by the
devices.
"The insurgents' use of increasingly lethal improvised explosive devices, and
the I.E.D.-makers' adaptiveness to coalition countermeasures, remain the most
significant day-to-day threat to coalition forces, and a complex challenge for
the intelligence community," John D. Negroponte, the director of national
intelligence, told the Senate Intelligence Committee last Thursday.
Some independent specialists and influential members of Congress say the
military has failed to harness more effectively the expertise of all federal
agencies, international allies and industries to battle the threat in an
all-encompassing way.
"We're doing a lot, but we must do more," said Representative Duncan Hunter, a
California Republican who is the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
He just returned from a trip to Iraq."
Mr. Hunter said in a telephone interview that the committee would soon send to
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top
commander in Iraq, a proposal to dispatch more technology and operational
assistance to combat zones, a move that has caused tension with some senior
American officers. "Not all the commanders agree with me," Mr. Hunter said.
The bombs' appeal for insurgents is clear: they can hurt a larger and more
sophisticated military force with devices that are inexpensive to make. American
troops face an array of improvised explosive devices fashioned from Iraq's vast
stockpile of missiles, artillery shells and other arms. They are detonated by an
equally diverse array of triggers, including garage-door openers, infrared
beams, pressure switches and timers, commanders in Iraq say.
Some of the most deadly bombs use shaped charges, which penetrate armor by
focusing explosive power in a single direction and by firing a metal projectile
embedded in the device into the target at high speed. American intelligence
officials say the most potent of these new weapons have been designed in Iran
and shipped to Iraq from there.
"Tehran has been responsible for at least some of the increasing lethality of
anticoalition attacks by providing Shia militants with the capability to build
improvised explosive devices with explosively formed projectiles similar to
those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah," Mr. Negroponte told senators
last week.
The American military adviser team to Iraqi special police forces in Salman Pak,
12 miles southeast of Baghdad, said it had been seeing more sophisticated
shaped-charge explosions since last spring. A senior Army intelligence officer
said the charges were being used mostly by Shiite militia groups, but added,
"Our fear is that the technology will migrate to Sunni insurgent groups."
To combat the threat, commanders are pressing for better intelligence to help
destroy bomb-making cells. Scores of secret new electronic jamming devices are
being rushed to Iraq to help thwart bombs that are remotely detonated. And the
Army is creating a combat laboratory at Fort Irwin, Calif., in the Mojave
Desert, to test new tactics, techniques and training to counter the threat.
Army and Marine forces confront simulated roadside bombings at training ranges
before they are sent to Iraq and Afghanistan. Troops learn to watch for rough
patches in a road where bombs have been buried, to avoid dead animals on streets
that may conceal explosives and to drive at high speeds through potential
ambushes.
The military is working with about 80 contractors on some 100 technology
initiatives to detect, defuse and defeat the makeshift bombs. Troops are using
microwave blasts, chemical sensors and radio-frequency jamming devices to thwart
some bombs and detonate others before the insurgents can.
"Trying to stay one step ahead of the enemy is the most challenging part of my
job," said Lt. Cmdr. Huan Nguyen, a Navy reservist and electrical engineer at
Camp Liberty, a base near Baghdad. Commander Nguyen is helping to field new
versions of the jamming equipment.
Every day throughout Iraq, scores of American troops are involved in hunting for
hidden roadside bombs.
On a recent night, soldiers from Company B of the Fifth Engineering Battalion,
from Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., met in a darkened tent to prepare for their
road-clearing mission in a 27-foot armored vehicle called the Buffalo. At the
end of their meeting, Staff Sgt. Ramon Martinez, 31, of Yuma, Ariz., led his
team in a prayer.
Out on the road, crawling along at five miles per hour, the crew peered through
blast-resistant glass windows and used giant floodlights and a remotely operated
steel arm to help them detect any telltale disturbance in the pavement or median
below that would reveal a buried bomb.
The engineers, known as sappers, say that while on their perilous duty they try
to think the way the enemy does to accomplish their mission. "When we're out,"
said Sergeant Martinez, "we're thinking of ways how we'd blow ourselves up."
General Meigs's organization, called the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Task Force, had its origins in a 12-person Army office in October 2003.
The organization soon was elevated to a Pentagon office, and its budget grew to
$1.2 billion last year from $600 million in 2004. The details of this year's
budget are still being refined, at about $3.5 billion, but senior officials say
they essentially have a blank check.
"We will have the resources we need to pursue the programs that we need to
pursue," said Brig. Gen. Daniel B. Allyn of the Army, the task force's deputy
director.
General Allyn said the changes included creating a subordinate organization in
Iraq, called Task Force Troy, that would coordinate the activities of several
existing but previously disparate military efforts.
Sabrina Tavernise contributed reporting from Baghdad, Iraq, for this
article.
Pentagon Widens Program to Foil Bombings in Iraq, NYT, 6.2.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/06/politics/06military.html?hp&ex=1139202000&en=25e8e5401d33b778&ei=5094&partner=homepage
$70 Billion More Is Sought for Military in
War Zones
February 3, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID S. CLOUD
WASHINGTON, Feb. 2 — The Bush administration
said Thursday that it would seek about $120 billion in additional financing to
pay for continuing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2006.
The request shows that the cost of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
has remained at virtually the same level for several years, despite hopes that a
large number of the American troops may leave Iraq by the end of the year.
The $120 billion includes money for the fiscal year that began in October in the
form of a $70 billion supplemental spending request, which had been expected. It
also includes $50 billion in the overall budget request for the first months of
the 2007 fiscal year that President Bush will submit to Congress on Monday, a
figure that was described as basically a placeholder until a more specific
number can be developed.
Over all, the Bush administration will propose a Defense Department budget of
$439.3 billion for the 2007 fiscal year, almost a 5 percent increase over this
year, according to a Pentagon official who spoke on condition of anonymity
because the budget request has not officially been submitted to Congress.
The figure does not include the proposed new money for military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed in stand-alone supplemental
spending bills since 2001.
The administration's request for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan would
bring their total cost in the 2006 fiscal year to about $120 billion, some of
which Congress has already approved. In a briefing for reporters, Joel Kaplan,
the deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget, said the costs of
military operations this year "will be roughly similar" to last year's costs.
These costs include pay and benefits for reservists, war-related benefits for
the active-duty military, fuel, spare parts, transportation and contractor
support.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld acknowledged the growing sentiment for
reducing the 130,000 American troops in Iraq in a speech on Thursday at the
National Press Club, but reiterated that any further reductions depend on
improvements in conditions in Iraq.
"We ought to be able to pull down our troops, but anyone who predicts 100,000 or
some other number, I think is making a mistake," he said. "As the Iraqis become
more capable, and they have a bigger number, one would think we'd be able to
continue" troop reductions.
A significant amount of the money in the supplemental request to Congress would
be spent on training the new Iraqi military forces.
Steven M. Kosiak, director of budget studies at the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, a research group here, said that up until this most
recent request, the total cost of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
had been about $331 billion since Sept. 11, 2001.
Mr. Kosiak said the total included $76 billion for operations in Afghanistan;
$226 billion for Iraq; and $29 billion for homeland defense (mainly air patrols
after 9/11) and other expenses.
Mr. Rumsfeld said terrorist groups remained determined to strike American
targets. "The enemy — while weakened and under great pressure — is still capable
of global reach, still possesses the determination to kill more Americans and is
still trying to do so with increasingly powerful weapons," he said.
Meanwhile, Army officials defended a proposal included in the administration's
2007 budget request to provide funds for a National Guard of 333,000 members,
rather than the 350,000 authorized by Congress.
The proposal has been criticized by governors and members of Congress, even
though recruitment difficulties have kept the Guard from reaching its authorized
size.
"We have no intention of cutting" the National Guard, the Army chief of staff,
Gen. Peter Schoomaker, told reporters at a Pentagon briefing, adding that the
Army would find money in its budget if the Guard was able to recruit enough
soldiers to meet its authorized level.
The Adjutants General Association, a lobbying group representing the leaders of
state National Guard organizations, has been lobbying Congress to overturn the
plan. Coming up with more money to train and equip recruits above the 333,000
level proposed in the administration's budget will not be easy, the group said.
Eric Schmitt contributed reporting for this article.
$70
Billion More Is Sought for Military in War Zones, NYT, 3.2.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/03/politics/03pentagon.html
Bush to request $120B more for wars in
Iraq, Afghanistan
Posted 2/2/2006 4:41 PM Updated 2/2/2006 11:22
PM
USA TODAY
By Richard Wolf
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration will ask
Congress soon for another $120 billion to pay for the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, bringing total spending since the Sept. 11 attacks to about $440
billion.
Administration officials said the request is
intended to fund operations into next year. However, deputy budget director Joel
Kaplan and Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman acknowledged that won't be enough,
even as the U.S. military tries to turn more responsibility over to Iraqi
forces. (Related: Bush to request $439.3B defense budget)
Training and equipping Iraqi forces will allow U.S. troops to "take more of a
supporting role, a training role, and eventually be able to reduce our numbers
as they take over more control," Whitman said.
The war in Iraq is costing about $150 million a day, while continued fighting in
Afghanistan is costing about $27 million a day.
The cost of the Iraq war has substantially exceeded early estimates. In 2002,
White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey suggested the cost could reach
$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, then the White House budget director, said
Lindsey's number was too high, and said the cost would be $60 billion or less.
Lindsey resigned a few months later.
Taken together, the two wars' projected $440
billion cost is almost as much as the Korean War, which cost $445 billion in
2006 dollars, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
Only World War II and the Vietnam War were more expensive.
The new request is not likely to include any money for reconstruction in Iraq,
officials said. Congress appropriated $18 billion for that in 2003, but much of
it has been diverted to train and equip Iraqi forces.
All funding requests for the troops have been strongly approved by Congress, and
this one is unlikely to generate much opposition.
"This Congress, in a very strong bipartisan way, has done anything they've been
asked to do to be supportive of the troops," said Rep. C.W. Bill Young, R-Fla.,
chairman of the House defense appropriations panel.
Democrats say that with the federal budget deficit expected to reach about $360
billion this year, more should be done to offset the wars' costs.
"The way we're doing this is very irresponsible," said Rep. Norm Dicks, D-Wash.
"We're not demanding a sacrifice from the American people."
The administration also will ask Congress for:
• About $18 billion for hurricane-related expenses in the Gulf Coast. That would
bring the total to about $103 billion. Rep. Richard Baker, R-La., expressed
concern that "Congress is in no mood to continue spending such resources."
• About $2.3 billion to prepare for a potential bird flu pandemic. Health and
Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt told USA TODAY that while a vaccine is
available, "We don't have the capacity to manufacture it in great enough
quantities in small enough times."
-----------------
WAR COSTS
Money for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Upcoming request: $120 billion
Total to Sept. 2007: $440 billion
Cost per person in USA: $1,477
Sources: Office of Management and Budget; Census Bureau
Bush
to request $120B more for wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, UT, 2.2.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-02-02-war-spending_x.htm
Guilty Plea and Wider Scheme Are Seen in
Rebuilding of Iraq
February 2, 2006
The New York Times
By JAMES GLANZ
Robert J. Stein Jr. could not have been
clearer about his feelings toward the American businessman who was receiving
millions of dollars in contracts from Mr. Stein to build a major police academy
and other reconstruction projects in Iraq.
"I love to give you money," Mr. Stein wrote in an e-mail message to the
businessman, Philip H. Bloom, on Jan. 3, 2004, just as the United States was
trying to ramp up its rebuilding program in Iraq.
As it turned out, Mr. Stein had the money to give. Despite a prior conviction on
felony fraud that his Pentagon background check apparently missed, Mr. Stein was
hired and put in charge of at least $82 million of reconstruction money in the
south central Iraqi city of Hilla by the Coalition Provisional Authority, the
American-led administration that was then running Iraq.
In United States District Court in Washington, court papers indicate, Mr. Stein
will plead guilty today to conspiracy, bribery, money laundering, possession of
a machine gun and being a felon in possession of firearms, for essentially
giving millions of that money to Mr. Bloom, and taking millions more for
himself. Mr. Stein used some of his stolen money, the papers say, to buy items
as wildly diverse as grenade launchers, machine guns, a Lexus, "an interest in
one Porsche," a Cessna airplane, two plots of real estate in Hope Mills, N.C., a
Toshiba personal computer, 18 Breitling watches, a 6-carat diamond ring and a
collection of silver dollars. The papers say that the ring of corruption was
much wider than previously known, drawing at least seven Americans, including
Mr. Stein, Mr. Bloom and five Army reserve officers, into what is portrayed as a
maelstrom of greed, sex and gun-running at the heart of the American occupation
of a conservative Muslim country.
As part of their bribery scheme, Mr. Stein and his co-conspirators dispensed and
received a wide range of other items like cigars, alcohol, first-class plane
tickets and "money laundering services," according to the papers. And if all of
that were not enough reason for Mr. Stein to love giving money to his partner,
the papers say, there was another: Mr. Bloom kept a villa in Baghdad where he
provided women who gave sexual favors to officials he hoped to influence,
including Mr. Stein. Mr. Bloom's lawyer, Robert A. Mintz, declined to comment on
the case.
The court papers say the money was taken by outright theft of millions of
dollars in cash — some of it then lugged aboard commercial flights back to the
United States — by steering millions of dollars in construction contracts to Mr.
Bloom's companies in return for bribes, and through international wire transfers
of millions more.
Over all, Mr. Stein is accused of stealing at least $2 million of American
taxpayer money and Iraqi funds, which came from Iraqi oil proceeds and money
seized from Saddam Hussein's government, accepting at least $1 million in money
and goods in direct bribes and grabbing another $600,000 in cash and goods that
belonged to the Coalition Provisional Authority. In return, Mr. Stein and his
cronies used rigged bids to steer at least $8.6 million in contracts for
buildings like the police academy, a library and a center meant to promote
democracy, the papers say.
The papers say "Stein and his co-conspirators recommended numerous construction
projects in Hilla, Iraq, that were intended to be, and were in fact, steered" to
Mr. Bloom. That charge suggests that Mr. Stein, using his perch at the
provisional authority, was manipulating at least part of the reconstruction
program to enrich himself and his cronies.
There have so far been four arrests in the case, including Mr. Stein, of
Fayetteville, N.C., and Mr. Bloom, who lived for many years in Romania. The
others, who like Mr. Stein served as C.P.A. officials whose authority extended
over a vast territory centered on Hilla, are Lt. Col. Debra Harrison of Trenton
and Lt. Col. Michael Wheeler of Amherst Junction, Wis. They were all arrested
late last year. Lawyers for Colonel Harrison and Colonel Wheeler did not
immediately respond to phone messages left late last night.
The papers covering Mr. Stein's likely plea deal refer to Mr. Bloom, Colonel
Harrison and Colonel Wheeler only as numbered co-conspirators, but their names
are easily deduced from the context. The remaining three people called
co-conspirators have not yet been publicly charged with crimes and their names
are not known. The papers also suggest that others may have been involved.
As described in the court papers, reports by the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction, and other public documents, the story of Mr. Stein's slide
into the depths of corruption began shortly after he was sent to Iraq after
being hired by S&K Technologies, a St. Ignatius, Mont., company that had won
Army contracts to provide administrative support in Iraq.
Although S&K's contract called for Pentagon background checks, some of which
were actually carried out, according to former S&K employees, Mr. Stein was
given extraordinary authority in Iraq to authorize and spend money, in spite of
his fraud conviction in the mid-1990's.
Mr. Stein's control over astonishing sums of cash became so great, interviews
with former officials in Hilla indicate, that at one point he and others picked
up $58.8 million in shrink-wrapped $100 bills from provisional authority
headquarters and drove back with it to Hilla. There Mr. Stein controlled access
to the vault where the cash was put — though not before local employees posed
for pictures in front of the money.
The story of Mr. Stein's misdeeds begins, according to the court papers, with an
e-mail message Mr. Stein sent to Mr. Bloom asking if one of the other
conspirators was now "on board." A few days later, Mr. Stein sent an exultant
note saying that he had pushed through the first of the police academy
contracts, for preparing the ground. "I will give you 200K sometime tomorrow
afternoon!" Mr. Stein wrote.
Some $7.3 million in contracts and grants ultimately was written for the
academy, with much of it going to Mr. Bloom, the papers say. Agents from the
special inspector general's office later found that the work was done improperly
or not at all. Mr. Stein had authority only to write contracts for under
$500,000. He evaded that limit by writing at least 11 separate contracts, each
for under that amount, federal papers say.
A few days after that first e-mail message, in the first of a series of wire
transfers, Mr. Bloom sent $30,000 from a bank in Kuwait to an account controlled
by Mr. Stein's wife at the Bragg Mutual Federal Credit Union in North Carolina.
Two weeks later, the papers indicate, $70,000 more went out by the same route.
The bribes had begun.
From that point on, through contract after contract, Mr. Stein, Mr. Bloom and
the other conspirators descended into unbridled corruption, the papers indicate.
They appeared to draw more people into the scam and became fearful of being
exposed. On Feb. 25, 2004, Mr. Stein wrote a message saying that the official
who had been brought "on board" had just stomped out of Mr. Stein's office, the
papers say. "I guess he was expecting the next chunk for 60 sent," Mr. Stein
wrote, referring to a bribe of $60,000, "and he got a call from his wife stating
he had not received it."
And after Mr. Bloom wrote back saying "I sent the funds a week ago" and "tell
him to stop acting like a child," Mr. Stein replied, seemingly with trepidation:
"Shall I go ahead and give" the official "the 50 or 60 to shut him up?" The
demands of the co-conspirators seemed to grow more extreme as time went on. By
late June, Mr. Bloom carried on a correspondence with a car dealer in the United
States to satisfy highly expensive demands by yet another alleged player in the
scheme.
"Your friend is seeking a very desirable, hard-to-find color: electric blue,"
the dealer wrote back. "It appears that there are only two blue Nissan 350Z
hardtops in the western United States," adding that the person "wants the
following specifications: Touring model, manual transmission, aerodynamics
package, cargo convenience package, floor mats, splash guards and trunk mat."
Cost: $35,990.
A frantic tone crept into Mr. Stein's correspondence as he realized
investigators could be closing in. One official, Mr. Stein wrote on June 25 to
the person who wanted the Nissan, "is pushing some things that could snowball
out of control."
"I am doing my best to keep a formal investigation from happening," Mr. Stein
wrote. He added, "I would like to know if you are going to stand behind me or
not!"
Elizabeth Rubin contributed reporting for this article.
Guilty Plea and Wider Scheme Are Seen in Rebuilding of Iraq, NYT, 2.2.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/international/middleeast/02reconstruct.html?hp&ex=1138856400&en=adfbcc23cab49dd5&ei=5094&partner=homepage
The Wounded
A New Kind of Care in a New Era of
Casualties
January 31, 2006
The New York Times
By ERIK ECKHOLM
TAMPA, Fla. — Morning rounds at the Tampa
veterans hospital, and a phalanx of specialists stands at Joshua Cooley's door.
Inert in his bed, the 29-year-old Marine reservist is a survivor of an Iraq car
bombing and a fearsome scramble of wounds: profound brain injury, arm and facial
fractures, third-degree burns, tenacious infections of the central nervous
system. Each doctor, six in all on a recent day, is here to monitor some aspect
of his care.
As they cluster at the threshold, one gently closes the door — not to shield
their patient from bad news, but to avoid overstimulating the nervous system of
a man whose frontal lobe has been ripped by shrapnel. Not that the news right
now is good: Corporal Cooley is spiking a fever, presumably because of his
newest problem, blood clots in his left leg.
The doctors sort through a calculus of competing interests. Should they
prescribe a blood thinner to dissolve the dangerous clots, even though that
could cause more bleeding in the brain? Or should they just wait? At this point,
the doctors decide, the clots pose the greater risk.
Thousands of miles from the battlefield, intricate medical choices have become
routine here, at one of four special rehabilitation centers the government
created last year to treat the war's most catastrophically wounded troops.
"These soldiers were kept alive," said Dr. Steven G. Scott, the Tampa center's
director. "Now it's up to us to try and give them some meaningful life."
With their concentrated batteries of specialists and therapists, these centers
are developing a new model of advanced care, a response to the distinctive
medical conundrum of the Iraq war. With better battlefield care and protective
gear, the military is saving more of the wounded, yet the insurgents' heavy
reliance on car bombs and buried explosives means the survivors are more damaged
— and damaged in more different ways — than ever before.
To describe the maimed survivors of this ugly new war, a graceless new word,
polytrauma, has entered the medical lexicon. Each soldier arriving at Tampa's
Polytrauma Rehabilitation Center, inside the giant veterans hospital, brings a
whole world of injury. The typical patient, Dr. Scott said, has head injuries,
vision and hearing loss, nerve damage, multiple bone fractures, unhealed body
wounds, infections and emotional or behavioral problems. Some have severed limbs
or spinal cords.
"Two years ago we started seeing injured soldiers coming back of a different
nature," recalled Dr. Scott, who is also the hospital's chief of physical
medicine and rehabilitation. Then last spring, with a Congressional mandate, the
Department of Veterans Affairs created the four new centers, formalizing changes
that a few top veterans hospitals were already starting to make.
After weeks or months of intensive care in military hospitals, more than 215
soldiers and a few more each week — still a tiny fraction of the roughly 16,000
soldiers who have been wounded in Iraq — have been sent here or to the other
centers, inside V.A. hospitals in California, Minnesota and Virginia.
The surge in complex casualties, doctors found, required major reorganizing,
enabling them to focus extraordinary medical and therapeutic expertise on each
patient and to offer counseling, housing and other aid to their often
shellshocked wives, children and parents.
"In the outside world you might have two or three consultants seeing a patient,"
said Dr. Andrew Koon, a specialist in internal medicine who was checking
laboratory results on a portable computer during bedside rounds. "Here it's not
unusual to have 10 specialists on board."
The multiple wounds have required medical balancing acts and unusual cooperation
across departments. One quadriplegic patient was so weakened by recurring
infections that doctors had to wait a year before removing shrapnel from his
neck. In other cases, the risk of new infection has delayed treatment of the
spasms that some paralyzed patients suffer, which can require an implanted pump
to inject medicine into the spinal column.
Of some 90 soldiers with extreme injuries who were treated in Tampa over the
last year only one has died, of a rare form of meningitis. The drama here is
more excruciatingly drawn out: Over months and months of painstaking physical
and psychological therapy, the patients and their families start learning the
boundaries of their future lives.
Quiet Struggles
The medical challenges are often persistent and daunting, but the real focus of
the new centers is rehabilitation. Even as doctors battle drug-resistant
bacteria blown into wounds with Iraqi dirt, patients start relearning to talk
and focus their thoughts, to walk and run or maneuver a wheelchair. Some go home
in almost normal shape; for others, simply swallowing is a milestone.
To spend several recent days here is to witness a panorama of quiet struggles. A
young man with brain and nerve damage slowly fits big round pegs into big round
holes. Another beams after jogging a full minute for the first time since his
injury, but cannot voice his mix of pride and impatience because shrapnel
destroyed the language center in his brain.
A quadriplegic is lifted by a giant sling from his bed to a high-tech
wheelchair, which he has learned to drive with a mouthpiece.
Progress on these wards can be measured in agonizing increments.
Corporal Cooley, a 6-foot 6-inch former deputy sheriff, arrived in Tampa on
Sept. 29 after more than two months at the Bethesda Naval Hospital outside
Washington. His doctors and relatives were encouraged when, after another couple
of months, he wriggled his fingers and feet, and answered yes-no questions with
blinks.
"They got him to make noises the other day," offered his wife, Christina. "He's
doing really well." At "rehab rounds" one recent day, assorted therapists took
up Corporal Cooley's case, reporting on small steps forward and compromises
along the way.
The speech therapist said he was responding to questions with blinks about 30
percent of the time when she was alone with him, but less if distracted. She
described her gingerly efforts to train him to swallow, using thin pudding,
apple sauce and ice chips.
The respiratory therapist said his tracheotomy had to be changed to a larger,
cuffed device that would allow them to expand his lower right lung.
The speech therapist groaned, "That will make it harder to swallow." They agreed
that the lung had to take priority, but the speech therapist added, "Let's get
rid of that cuffed trach as soon as possible."
Brain injuries — the signature wounds inflicted by the blast waves and flying
shrapnel of explosives — are pervasive, and they tend to dictate the arc of
care.
"It's really the brain injury that directs how we approach other impairments,"
Dr. Barbara Sigford, V.A.'s national director of physical medicine and
rehabilitation and chief of the Minneapolis polytrauma center, said in a
telephone interview. "Many types of rehab rely on intact thinking, learning and
memory skills."
Using advanced prosthetic limbs, for example, requires control of specific
muscles; patients without that capacity must use simpler models. Blind people
are normally taught to navigate using their memory of the environment; if memory
is spotty, they must find other ways.
In the recreational therapy room in Tampa on a recent day, several men are being
led through a round of Uno, a card game that involves matching numbers and
colors. Some play well. Some fumble trying to pick up cards. One rocks in
frustration at his inability to summon the word "blue."
Sgt. Antwain Vaughn, 31, an Army combat engineer who took a roadside blast in
the face on Aug. 31, arrives late and in a wheelchair. A padded helmet covers a
large indentation where his shattered skull will receive a metal plate.
Sergeant Vaughn came to Tampa after two months on a ventilator and feeding tube.
In addition to brain damage, facial fractures, pulmonary problems, blood clots
and infections, he lost an eye and has trouble with complex tasks, something the
card game could help.
Here he has learned to swallow and eat and in daily therapy, when he is feeling
up to it, he is working to reclaim a life. But this time, he will not join the
game. "My head's hurting a lot," he quietly tells the group.
Head injuries have also left some soldiers in a peculiar psychological box.
Before Iraq, most head injuries at the Tampa hospital involved car accidents,
said Dr. Rodney D. Vanderploeg, the chief of neuropsychology. Though it may seem
counterintuitive, soldiers with penetrating brain injuries, in which a fragment
crashed through their skulls, are far more likely to remember the attack and its
bloody aftermath, perhaps including the deaths of friends, he said.
These memories often cause great psychological stress. But psychotherapy becomes
especially difficult if injury has impaired a patient's insight and
understanding.
Making Progress
In the hallways, the banter tends to be upbeat, as perhaps it needs to be for
patients and staff. A patient shows off his stair-climbing wheelchair. Others
compare the merits of prosthetic leg models. Nearly every patient vows, not
always realistically, that he will get back on his feet and more.
"The way I see it, if I get able to walk a little bit, then eventually I'm going
to walk a lot," said Specialist Charles Mays, 31, who was left with multiple
fractures and partial paralysis of his legs after being blasted out of his
Humvee by a vertically buried rocket south of Baghdad.
Sometimes the hallways bring success stories like Specialist Nicholas Boutin,
who was slowly walking on his own to speech therapy in a hockey helmet,
apparently not at all self-conscious about the red pit where an artificial eye
will be implanted or about the large dent where a piece of skull will be
replaced.
Specialist Boutin, 21, had arrived in Tampa just five weeks before, mute and
hardly able to swallow, his right arm and leg almost useless. During a midnight
patrol in a village near Samarra, an insurgent dropped a grenade into his
Bradley fighting vehicle. Fragments sprayed into his face and the left side of
his brain, leaving him with Broca's aphasia — able to comprehend but not to
speak.
He weathered fungal infections, facial pain where nerves were damaged and the
destruction of his pituitary gland and a maxillary sinus, the kind of internal
wound that can torment a person for life.
But now, after hard hours each day in therapy, he can jog briefly and write
messages with his right hand. As speech therapists coax the right side of his
brain to take over lost functions from the left, he has begun to make one-word
responses and spontaneously utter a few words at a time. Soon he will head home
to Georgia for continued therapy.
"Yes," he uttered instantly when asked if he felt he was progressing.
Determination gleamed from his remaining eye.
Behind closed doors, though, bravado sometimes gives way to depression,
explosive anger, survivors' guilt. Some patients sit quietly with glum faces or
obsess endlessly about their buddies and time in Iraq.
As much as the nurses are often buoyed by their patients' progress, they say the
relentless intensity of the work can sometimes bring them to tears. They spend
as much time interacting with stressed-out relatives as with the patients.
"Relatives take out their frustrations on the nurses," said Laureen G.
Doloresco, assistant nursing chief. "It's also hard on the nurses because of the
youth of the patients. Many of them have sons the same age."
Support Systems
At the bedsides of many of these young men are their equally young wives, whose
lives have also been wrenched onto unexpected paths.
Before he was sent to Iraq last Jan. 1, Corporal Cooley and his wife were
partners on the vice/narcotics squad of a sheriff's department in central
Florida. They married just before his deployment.
Soon after the car bombing on July 5, she and her husband's parents were
summoned to the American military hospital in Landstuhl, Germany, and warned to
expect the worst.
After the car bomb detonated, near the town of Hit, Corporal Cooley had been
pulled from his burning amtrack, an armored vehicle, unconscious and with a
gaping hole in his head. The medics had at first refused to load him onto the
evacuation helicopter, Christina Cooley later learned. They changed their minds
when they heard a moan.
Ms. Cooley recalled telling doctors that they were showing her the wrong
patient, that this bloated figure was not her husband. She was convinced only
after she saw his tattoos.
She also saw, though, that he was breathing on his own. Days later, he was flown
to the Bethesda Naval Hospital, and for two months, his wife and the in-laws she
still barely knew shared a hotel room and spent their days around Corporal
Cooley's bed in intensive care.
Here in Tampa, despite continued medical setbacks like the blood clots,
attention was turning to his potential for physical and mental recovery.
So far, he had been put in a chair for a few hours a day and strapped into a
"tilt board" at a 45-degree angle for 10 minutes at a time, to forestall the
drops in blood pressure that occur when long-prone patients raise up.
His wife finds hope where she can.
Corporal Cooley often stares vacantly, she said, and "you don't know if he's
there." But one day when she asked him, "Who's my hero?" he pointed a finger
toward himself.
Their home county, outside Tampa, has raised money that she plans to use on an
accessible house.
"I hope he'll walk through the door of that house," she said. "If not, I'll take
him as a vegetable. I'll take care of him the rest of my life. I love that man
to death."
Overhearing her, Dr. Scott, the center's director, marshaled his characteristic
optimism. "He can already move both legs," he said. "It's possible he can be
rehabbed to walk. How far he'll go we just don't know."
The polytrauma centers themselves remain works in progress, sharing lessons with
one another and with the major military hospitals by videophone, and pushing
scientific inquiry into the myriad, often invisible effects of explosive blasts.
The Department of Veterans Affairs says it has not calculated the cost of
establishing the centers, bolstering their staffs and treating patients so long
and intensively. The Tampa hospital's director, Forest Farley Jr., said that
here alone, it was "several millions of dollars."
Though the average stay in polytrauma centers is 40 days, many patients remain
for months and some for more than a year. In the end, a few must go to nursing
homes, but most go home, where they receive continued care at less-specialized
veterans hospitals, with oversight from the centers. Some require
round-the-clock home aides and therapists and costly equipment, paid for by the
government on top of monthly disability payments. Even so, wives or parents
often must give up their jobs.
For the worst off, the ongoing annual costs — largely hidden costs of this war —
can easily be several hundred thousand dollars or more.
"We expect to follow these patients for the rest of their lives," Dr. Scott
said. "But I have a great deal of concern about our country's long-term
commitment to these individuals. Will the resources be there over time?"
A New
Kind of Care in a New Era of Casualties, NYT, 31.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/31/national/31wounded.html?hp&ex=1138683600&en=008435735bba6533&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Iraq Rebuilding Badly Hobbled, U.S. Report
Finds
January 24, 2006
The New York Times
By JAMES GLANZ
The first official history of the $25 billion
American reconstruction effort in Iraq depicts a program hobbled from the outset
by gross understaffing, a lack of technical expertise, bureaucratic infighting,
secrecy and constantly increasing security costs, according to a preliminary
draft.
The document, which begins with the secret prewar planning for reconstruction
and touches on nearly every phase of the program through 2005, was assembled by
the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and debated
last month in a closed forum by roughly two dozen experts from outside the
office.
A person at the forum provided a copy of the document, dated December 2005, to
The New York Times. The inspector general's office, whose agents and auditors
have been examining and reporting on various aspects of the rebuilding since
early 2004, declined to comment on the report other than to say it was highly
preliminary.
"It's incomplete," said a spokesman for the inspector general's office, Jim
Mitchell. "It could change significantly before it is finally published."
In the document, the paralyzing effect of staffing shortfalls and contracting
battles between the State Department and the Pentagon, creating delays of months
at a stretch, are described for the first time from inside the program.
The document also recounts concerns about writing contracts for an entity with
the "ambiguous legal status" of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the
question of whether it was an American entity or a multinational one like NATO.
Seemingly odd decisions on dividing the responsibility for various sectors of
the reconstruction crop up repeatedly in the document. At one point, a planning
team made the decision to put all reconstruction activities in Iraq under the
Army Corps of Engineers, except anything to do with water, which would go to the
Navy. At the time, a retired admiral, David Nash, was in charge of the
rebuilding.
"It almost looks like a spoils system between various agencies," said Steve
Ellis, a vice president and an authority on the Army corps at Taxpayers for
Common Sense, an organization in Washington, who read a copy of the document.
"You had various fiefdoms established in the contracting process."
One authority on reconstruction who attended the session last month, John J.
Hamre, said the report was an unblinking and unbiased look at the program.
"It's gutsy and it's honest," said Mr. Hamre, president of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, a public policy group based in Washington.
He was not the source of the leaked document. Even in the early stages of
writing the draft, Mr. Hamre said, one central message on the reconstruction
program was already fairly clear, that "it didn't go particularly well."
"The impression you get is of an organization that had too little structure on
the ground over there, that it had conflicting guidance from the United States,"
Mr. Hamre said. "It had a very difficult environment and pressures by that
environment to quickly move things."
A situation like that, Mr. Hamre said, "creates shortcuts that probably turn
into short circuits."
The draft report is emerging as the rebuilding comes under fresh criticism in
the United States and Iraq. Partly because of sabotage to oil and gas pipelines
and electrical transmission lines, Iraq's oil exports have plummeted over the
last several months, and its national electrical output has again dipped below
prewar levels.
After years of shifting authority, agencies that have come into and out of
existence and that experienced constant staff turnover, the rebuilding went
through another permutation last month with almost no public notice. The Corps
of Engineers has been given command of the severely criticized office set up by
President Bush to oversee some $13 billion of the reconstruction funds.
The shift occurred days before Mr. Bush said the early focus of the rebuilding
program on huge public works projects - largely overseen by the office, the
Project and Contracting Office - had been flawed.
That office is now under Brig. Gen. William H. McCoy, commander of the gulf
region division of the Corps of Engineers, said Lt. Col. Stan Heath, a spokesman
for the corps who has served in Iraq.
Officials with the contracting office said the move was natural as more and more
projects went from the contracting phase to construction and completion.
A spokesman for the office, James Crum, said 1,636 projects of 2,265 originally
under the office had been completed.
Mr. Ellis, of the taxpayers group, said it was unclear that the change would
satisfy critics of the rebuilding program. "At one level," he said, "you would
say, 'Wow that makes a lot of sense.' But if your concern is that the previous
organization built big New Deal-style projects, then the corps is not going to
give you much of a change of pace."
The draft report by the inspector general says the rebuilding program began with
a task that is tiny in retrospect but cast a long shadow.
The Army appropriated $1.9 million in November 2002 to create a "contingency
plan" for what to do if Iraqi forces damaged or destroyed the nation's oil
complexes and pipelines. That "task order," under a running contract, went to
Kellogg, Brown & Root, a Halliburton subsidiary. The Army later used that task
order as a justification for awarding the company a new $1.4 billion
noncompetitive contract to restore oil equipment, a program that became one of
the most criticized moves of the conflict partly because Vice President Dick
Cheney was once the top executive at Halliburton.
Until January 2003, reconstruction planning was conducted in secrecy "to avoid
the impression that the U.S. government had already decided on intervention,"
the draft history says. Possibly as a result, the American administrative
authority arrived with no written plans or strategies for purchasing and
contracting and no personnel with expertise in the area.
Among the first challenges the program faced were the impossibly great needs of
crumbling public works. Mr. Nash is cited in the document as saying that
officials realized early on that Iraq would need $70 billion to $100 billion
over several years. They were forced cut the list of projects down again and
again.
"No matter how we pared the list, we needed $20 billion more than we had
available or Iraqi reconstruction and transition would stall," Mr. Nash is
quoted as saying.
Finally, a list of mostly large projects in several infrastructure areas,
including oil, electricity, water, health care and security, was settled on. But
a bottleneck immediately arose as the contracting process descended into chaos,
the document says. One informer for the inspector general said there were "about
20 different organizations undertaking contracting."
"The C.P.A. was contracting, companies were contracting subcontractors, and some
people who didn't have authority such as the ministries were also awarding
contracts," the informer told the inspector general.
In the midst of that confusion, at the offices that were actually charged with
carrying out those duties "the contracting function was grossly understaffed,"
the document says.
"They were in need of both larger numbers of personnel, and personnel with
qualifications more in line with the work that needed to be done," the document
says.
Iraq
Rebuilding Badly Hobbled, U.S. Report Finds, NYT, 24.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/24/international/middleeast/24reconstruct.html?hp&ex=1138165200&en=22937e7e88d8b89e&ei=5094&partner=homepage
Attacks in Iraq jumped in 2005
By Rick Jervis, USA TODAY
Posted 1/22/2006 11:18 PM
BAGHDAD — The number of attacks against
coalition troops, Iraqi security forces and civilians increased 29% last year,
and insurgents are increasingly targeting Iraqis, the U.S. military says.
Insurgents launched 34,131 attacks last year,
up from 26,496 the year before, according to U.S. military figures released
Sunday.
Insurgents are widening their attacks to include the expanding Iraqi forces
engaged in the fighting, said Brig. Gen. Donald Alston, a coalition spokesman.
He added, "It tells me the coalition and the Iraqi forces have been very
aggressive in taking the fight to the enemy."
The number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has grown to 227,000.
They outnumber U.S. forces in Iraq. They are often more exposed and are taking a
more visible role in fighting the insurgency.
"They're easier targets," said Andrew Krepinevich, a counterinsurgency expert at
the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington-based defense
think tank.
In 2005, 2,713 Iraqi police and military were killed, according to the Brookings
Institute, a Washington-based think tank. Similar numbers for 2004 were not
available, and Iraq's government has not released comprehensive casualty numbers
for Iraqi security forces. Thousands of Iraqi civilians have also been killed,
but no precise tally is available.
U.S. forces have become more effective at protecting against attacks. In 2004,
714 U.S. troops were killed in action and 673 last year, despite the increase in
attacks. The number of wounded dropped 26%, from 7,990 to 5,939 during the same
period.
The U.S. military attributes that to an increase in effectiveness in protecting
its forces against roadside bombs and other attacks. Maj. Gen. William Webster
said recently that 10% of the attacks against U.S. forces cause casualties, down
from about 25%-30% a year ago.
The new statistics show:
•The number of car bombs more than doubled to 873 last year from 420 the year
before. The number of suicide car bombs went to 411 from 133.
• Sixty-seven attackers wore suicide vests last year, up from seven in 2004.
Suicide and car bombs are often targeted at Iraqis, causing high casualties.
• Roadside bombs, or improvised explosive devices, as the military calls them,
continue to be the most common weapon. Roadside bombs increased to 10,953 in
2005 from 5,607 the year before. Those numbers include roadside bombs that are
discovered and defused. These bombs account for nearly one-third of all
insurgent attacks.
Contributing: Traci Watson in McLean, Va.
Attacks in Iraq jumped in 2005, UT, 22.1.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-01-22-iraq-statistics_x.htm
The Wounded
Struggling Back From War's Once-Deadly
Wounds
January 22, 2006
The New York Times
By DENISE GRADY
PALO ALTO, Calif. - It has taken hundreds of
hours of therapy, but Jason Poole, a 23-year old Marine corporal, has learned
all over again to speak and to walk. At times, though, words still elude him. He
can read barely 16 words a minute. His memory can be fickle, his thinking
delayed. Injured by a roadside bomb in Iraq, he is blind in his left eye, deaf
in his left ear, weak on his right side and still getting used to his new face,
which was rebuilt with skin and bone grafts and 75 to 100 titanium screws and
plates.
Even so, those who know Corporal Poole say his personality - gregarious, kind
and funny - has remained intact. Wounded on patrol near the Syrian border on
June 30, 2004, he considers himself lucky to be alive. So do his doctors.
"Basically I want to get my life back," he said. "I'm really trying."
But he knows the life ahead of him is unlikely to match the one he had planned,
in which he was going to attend college and become a teacher, get married and
have children. Now, he hopes to volunteer in a school. His girlfriend from
before he went to war is now just a friend. Before he left, they had agreed they
might talk about getting married when he got back.
"But I didn't come back," he said.
Men and women like Corporal Poole, with multiple devastating injuries, are the
new face of the wounded, a singular legacy of the war in Iraq. Many suffered
wounds that would have been fatal in earlier wars but were saved by helmets,
body armor, advances in battlefield medicine and swift evacuation to hospitals.
As a result, the survival rate among Americans hurt in Iraq is higher than in
any previous war - seven to eight survivors for every death, compared with just
two per death in World War II.
But that triumph is also an enduring hardship of the war. Survivors are coming
home with grave injuries, often from roadside bombs, that will transform their
lives: combinations of damaged brains and spinal cords, vision and hearing loss,
disfigured faces, burns, amputations, mangled limbs, and psychological ills like
depression and post-traumatic stress.
Dr. Alexander Stojadinovic, the vice chairman of surgery at Walter Reed Army
Medical Center, said, "The wounding patterns we see are similar to, say, what
Israel will see with terrorist bombings - multiple complex woundings, not just a
single body site."
[American deaths in Iraq numbered 2,225 as of Jan. 20. Of 16,472 wounded, 7,625
were listed as unable to return to duty within 72 hours. As of Jan. 14, the
Defense Department reported, 11,852 members of the military had been wounded in
explosions - from so-called improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.'s, mortars,
bombs and grenades.]
So many who survive explosions - more than half - sustain head injuries that
doctors say anyone exposed to a blast should be checked for neurological
problems. Brain damage, sometimes caused by skull-penetrating fragments,
sometimes by shock waves or blows to the head, is a recurring theme.
More than 1,700 of those wounded in Iraq are known to have brain injuries, half
of which are severe enough that they may permanently impair thinking, memory,
mood, behavior and the ability to work.
Medical treatment for brain injuries from the Iraq war will cost the government
at least $14 billion over the next 20 years, according to a recent study by
researchers at Harvard and Columbia.
Jill Gandolfi, a co-director of the Brain Injury Rehabilitation Unit of the
Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, where Corporal Poole is being
treated, said, "We are looking at an epidemic of brain injuries."
The consequences of brain injury are enormous. Penetrating injuries can knock
out specific functions like vision and speech, and may eventually cause epilepsy
and increase the risk of dementia. What doctors call "closed-head injuries,"
from blows to the head or blasts, are more likely to have diffuse effects
throughout the brain, particularly on the frontal lobes, which control the
ability to pay attention, make plans, manage time and solve problems.
Because of their problems with memory, emotion and thinking, brain-injured
patients run a high risk of falling through the cracks in the health care
system, particularly when they leave structured environments like the military,
said Dr. Deborah Warden, national director of the Defense and Veterans Brain
Injury Center, a government program created in 1992 to develop treatment
standards for the military and veterans.
So many military men and women are returning with head injuries combined with
other wounds that the government has designated four Veterans Affairs hospitals
as "polytrauma rehabilitation centers" to take care of them. The Palo Alto
hospital where Corporal Poole is being treated is one.
"In Vietnam, they'd bring in a soldier with two legs blown off by a mine, but he
wouldn't have the head injuries," said Dr. Thomas E. Bowen, a retired Army
general who was a surgeon in the Vietnam War and who is now chief of staff at
the veterans hospital in Tampa, Fla., another polytrauma center. "Some of the
patients we have here now, they can't swallow, they can't talk, they're
paralyzed and blind," he said.
Other soldiers have been sent home unconscious with such hopeless brain injuries
that their families have made the anguished decision to take them off life
support, said Dr. Andrew Shorr, who saw several such patients at Walter Reed.
Amputations are a feature of war, but the number from Iraq - 345 as of Jan. 3,
including 59 who had lost more than one limb - led the Army to open a new
amputation center at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio in addition to
the existing center at Walter Reed. Amputees get the latest technology,
including $50,000 prosthetic limbs with microchips.
Dr. Mark R. Bagg, head of orthopedic surgery at Brooke, said, "The complexity of
the injuries has been challenging - horrific blast injuries to extremities, with
tremendous bone loss and joint, bone, nerve, arterial and soft tissue injuries."
It is common for wounded men and women to need months of rehabilitation in the
hospital. Some, like Corporal Poole, need well over a year, and will require
continuing help as outpatients. Because many of these veterans are in their 20's
or 30's, they will live with their disabilities for decades. "They have to
reinvent who they are," said Dr. Harriet Zeiner, a neuropsychologist at the Palo
Alto veterans center.
No Memory of the Blast
Corporal Poole has no memory of the explosion or even the days before it,
although he has had a recurring dream of being in Iraq and seeing the sky
suddenly turn red.
Other marines have told him he was on a foot patrol when the bomb went off.
Three others in the patrol - two Iraqi soldiers and an interpreter - were
killed. Shrapnel tore into the left side of Corporal Poole's face and flew out
from under his right eye. Metal fragments and the force of the blast fractured
his skull in multiple places and injured his brain, one of its major arteries,
and his left eye and ear. Every bone in his face was broken. Some, including his
nose and portions of his eye sockets, were shattered. Part of his jawbone was
pulverized.
"He could easily have died," said Dr. Henry L. Lew, an expert on brain injury
and the medical director of the rehabilitation center at the Palo Alto veterans
hospital. Bleeding, infection, swelling of the brain - any or all could have
killed someone with such a severe head injury, Dr. Lew said.
Corporal Poole was taken by helicopter to a military hospital in Iraq and then
flown to one in Germany, where surgeons cut a plug of fat from his abdomen and
mixed it with other materials to seal an opening in the floor of his skull.
He was then taken to the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, Md. His
parents, who are divorced, were flown there to meet him - his father, Stephen,
from San Jose, Calif., and his mother, Trudie, from Bristol, England, where
Jason was born. Jason, his twin sister, Lisa, and a younger brother, David,
moved to Cupertino, Calif., with their father when Jason was 12.
His interest in the Marine Corps started in high school, where he was an athlete
and an actor, a popular young man with lots of friends. He played football and
won gold medals in track, and had parts in school plays. When Marine recruiters
came to the school and offered weekend outings with a chance to play sports,
Corporal Poole happily took part. He enlisted after graduating in 2000.
"We talked about the possibility of war, but none of us thought it was really
going to happen," said his father, who had to sign the enlistment papers because
his son was only 17. Jason Poole hoped the Marines would help pay for college.
His unit was among the first to invade Iraq. He was on his third tour of duty
there, just 10 days from coming home and leaving the Marines, when he was
wounded in the explosion.
A week later, he was transferred to Bethesda, still in a coma, and his parents
were told he might never wake up.
"I was unconscious for two months," Corporal Poole said in a recent interview at
the V.A. center in Palo Alto. "One month and 23 days, really. Then I woke up and
came here."
He has been a patient at the center since September 2004, mostly in the brain
injury rehabilitation unit. He arrived unable to speak or walk, drooling, with
the left side of his face caved in, his left eye blind and sunken, a feeding
tube in his stomach and an opening in his neck to help him breathe.
"He was very hard of hearing, and sometimes he didn't even know you were in the
room," said Debbie Pitsch, his physical therapist.
Damage to the left side of his brain had left him weak on the right, and he
tended not to notice things to his right, even though his vision in that eye was
good. He had lost his sense of smell. The left side of the brain is also the
home of language, and it was hard for him to talk or comprehend speech. "He
would shake his head no when he meant yes," said Dr. Zeiner, the
neuropsychologist. But he could communicate by pointing. His mind was working,
but the thoughts were trapped inside his head.
An array of therapists - speech, physical, occupational and others - began
working with him for hours every day. He needed an ankle brace and a walker just
to stand at first. His balance was way off and, because of the brain injury, he
could not tell where his right foot was unless he could see it. He often would
just drag it behind him. His right arm would fall from the walker and hang by
his side, and he would not even notice. He would bump into things to his right.
Nonetheless, on his second day in Palo Alto, he managed to walk a few steps.
"He was extremely motivated, and he pushed himself to the limit, being a
marine," Ms. Pitsch said. He was so driven, in fact, that at first his
therapists had to strap him into a wheelchair to keep him from trying to get up
and walk without help.
By the last week of September, he was beginning to climb stairs. He graduated
from a walker to a cane to walking on his own. By January he was running and
lifting weights.
"It's not his physical recovery that's amazing," his father said. "It's not his
mental recovery. It's his attitude. He's always positive. He very rarely gets
low. If it was me I'd fall apart. We think of how he was and what he's had taken
from him."
Corporal Poole is philosophical. "Even when I do get low it's just for 5 or 10
minutes," he said. "I'm just a happy guy. I mean, like, it sucks, basically, but
it happened to me and I'm still alive."
A New Face
"Jason was definitely a ladies' man," said Zillah Hodgkins, who has been a
friend for nine years.
In pictures from before he was hurt, he had a strikingly handsome face and a
powerful build. Even in still photographs he seems animated, and people around
him - other marines, Iraqi civilians - are always grinning, apparently at his
antics.
But the explosion shattered the face in the pictures and left him with another
one. In his first weeks at Palo Alto, he hid behind sunglasses and, even though
the weather was hot, ski caps and high turtlenecks.
"We said, 'Jason, you're sweating. You have to get used to how you look,' " Dr.
Zeiner said.
"He was an incredibly handsome guy," she said. "His twin sister is a beautiful
woman. He was the life of the party. He was funny. He could have had any woman,
and he comes back and feels like now he's a monster."
Gradually, he came out of wraps and tried to make peace with the image in the
mirror. But his real hope was that somehow his face could be repaired.
Reconstructive surgery should have been done soon after the explosion, before
broken bones could knit improperly. But the blast had caused an artery in
Corporal Poole's skull to balloon into an aneurysm, and an operation could have
ruptured it and killed him. By November 2004, however, the aneurysm had gone
away.
Dr. H. Peter Lorenz, a plastic surgeon at Stanford University Medical Center,
planned several operations to repair the damage after studying pictures of
Corporal Poole before he was injured. "You could say every bone in his face was
fractured," Dr. Lorenz said.
The first operation took 14 hours. Dr. Lorenz started by making a cut in
Corporal Poole's scalp, across the top of his head from ear to ear, and peeling
the flesh down over his nose to expose the bones. To get at more bone, he made
another slit inside Corporal Poole's mouth, between his upper lip and his teeth,
and slipped in tools to lift the tissue.
Many bones had healed incorrectly and had to be sawed apart, repositioned and
then joined with titanium pins and plates. Parts of his eye sockets had to be
replaced with bone carved from the back of his skull. Bone grafts helped to
reposition Corporal Poole's eyes, which had sunk in the damaged sockets.
Operations in March and July repaired his broken and dislocated jaw, his nose
and damaged eyelids and tear ducts. He could not see for a week after one of the
operations because his right eye had been sewn shut, and he spent several weeks
unable to eat because his jaws had been wired together.
Dr. Lorenz also repaired Corporal Poole's caved-in left cheek and forehead by
implanting a protein made from human skin that would act as a scaffolding and be
filled in by Corporal Poole's own cells.
Later, he was fitted with a false eye to fill out the socket where his left eye
had shriveled.
Some facial scars remain, the false eye sometimes looks slightly larger than the
real one, and because of a damaged tear duct, Corporal Poole's right eye is
often watery. But his smile is still brilliant.
In a recent conversation, he acknowledged that the results of the surgery were a
big improvement. When asked how he felt about his appearance, he shrugged and
said, "I'm not good-looking but I'm still Jason Poole, so let's go."
But he catches people looking at him as if he is a "weird freak," he said,
mimicking their reactions: a wide eyed stare, then the eyes averted. It makes
him angry.
"I wish they would ask me what happened," he said. "I would tell them."
Learning to Speak
Evi Klein, a speech therapist in Palo Alto, said that when they met in September
2004 Corporal Poole could name only about half the objects in his room.
"He had words, but he couldn't pull together language to express his thoughts,"
Ms. Klein said. "To answer a question with more than one or two words was beyond
his capabilities."
Ms. Klein began with basics. She would point to items in the room. What's this
called? What's that? She would show him a picture, have him say the word and
write it. He would have to name five types of transportation. She would read a
paragraph or play a phone message and ask him questions about it. Very
gradually, he began to speak. But it was not until February that he could string
together enough words for anyone to hear that he still had traces of an English
accent.
Today, he is fluent enough that most people would not guess how impaired he was.
When he has trouble finding the right word or loses the thread of a
conversation, he collects himself and starts again. More than most people, he
fills in the gaps with expressions like "basically" and "blah, blah, blah."
"I thought he would do well," Ms. Klein said. "I didn't think he'd do as well as
he is doing. I expect measurable gains over the next year or so."
With months of therapy, his reading ability has gone from zero to a level
somewhere between second and third grade. He has to focus on one word at a time,
he said. A page of print almost overwhelms him. His auditory comprehension is
slow as well.
"It will take a bit of time," Corporal Poole said, "but basically I'm going to
get there."
One evening over dinner, he said: "I feel so old." Not physically, he said, but
mentally and emotionally.
On a recent morning, Ms. Gandolfi of the brain injury unit conducted an exercise
in thinking and verbal skills with a group of patients. She handed Corporal
Poole a sheet of paper that said, "Dogs can be taught how to talk." A series of
questions followed. What would be the benefits? Why could it be a problem? What
would you do about it?
Corporal Poole hunched over the paper, pen in hand. He looked up. "I have no
clue," he said softly.
"Let's ask this one another way," Ms. Gandolfi said. "What would be cool about
it?"
He began to write with a ballpoint pen, slowly forming faint letters. "I would
talk to him and listen to him," he wrote.
In another space, he wrote: "lonely the dog happy." But what he had actually
said to Ms. Gandolfi was: "I could be really lonely and this dog would talk to
me."
Some of his responses were illegible. He left one question blank. But he was
performing much better than he did a year ago.
He hopes to be able to work with children, maybe those with disabilities. But,
Dr. Zeiner said, "He is not competitively employable."
His memory, verbal ability and reading are too impaired. He may eventually read
well enough to take courses at a community college, but, she said, "It's years
away."
Someday, he might be able to become a teacher's aide, she said. But he may have
to work just as a volunteer and get by on his military benefits of about $2,400
a month. He will also receive a $100,000 insurance payment from the government.
"People whose brains are shattered, it's incredible how resilient they are," Dr.
Zeiner said. "They keep trying. They don't collapse in despair."
Back in the World
In mid-December, Corporal Poole was finally well enough to leave the hospital.
With a roommate, he moved into a two-bedroom apartment in Cupertino, the town
where Corporal Poole grew up. His share of the rent is $800 a month. But he had
not lived outside a hospital in 18 months, and it was unclear how he would fare
on his own.
"If he's not able to cope with the outside world, is there anywhere for him to
go, anyone there to support him if it doesn't go well?" asked his mother, who
still lives in Bristol, where she is raising her three younger children. "I
think of people from Vietnam who wound up on the streets, or mental patients, or
in prison."
He still needs therapy - speech and other types - several times a week at Palo
Alto and that requires taking three city buses twice a day. The trip takes more
than an hour, and he has to decipher schedules and cross hair-raising
intersections on boulevards with few pedestrians. It is an enormous step, not
without risk: people with a brain injury have increased odds of sustaining
another one, from a fall or an accident brought about by impaired judgment,
balance or senses.
In December, Corporal Poole practiced riding the buses to the hospital with Paul
Johnson, a co-director of the brain injury unit. As they crossed a busy street,
Mr. Johnson gently reminded him, several times, to turn and look back over his
left shoulder - the side on which he is blind - for cars turning right.
After Corporal Poole and Mr. Johnson had waited for a few minutes at the stop, a
bus zoomed up, and Corporal Poole ambled toward the door.
"Come on!" the driver snapped.
Corporal Poole watched intently for buildings and gas stations he had picked as
landmarks so he would know when to signal for his stop.
"I'm a little nervous, but I'll get the hang of it," he said.
He was delighted to move into his new apartment, pick a paint color, buy a
couch, a bed and a set of dishes, and eat something besides hospital food. With
help from his therapists in Palo Alto, he hopes to take a class at a nearby
community college, not an actual course, but a class to help him to learn to
study and prepare for real academic work. Teaching, art therapy, children's
theater and social work all appeal to him, even if he can only volunteer.
Awaiting his formal release from the military, Corporal Poole still hopes to get
married and have children.
That hope is not unrealistic, Dr. Zeiner said. Brain injuries can cause people
to lose their ability to empathize, she said, and that kills relationships. But
Corporal Poole has not lost empathy, she said. "That's why I think he will find
a partner."
Corporal Poole said: "I think something really good is going to happen to me."
Struggling Back From War's Once-Deadly Wounds, NYT, 22.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/22/national/22wounded.html?hp&ex=1137992400&en=d3126b7b679246b4&ei=5094&partner=homepage
The Caregivers
One Family's Persistent Hope: That Their
Soldier Will Wake Up
January 22, 2006
The New York Times
By DENISE GRADY
AUGUSTA, Me. - To Laurie, who married him two
years ago, Harold Gray is still "the guy I felt like I waited for my whole
life." Mercedes, his 6-year-old daughter, likes to think of him racing around
the yard, chased by an angry pet goose as she watched and laughed with her two
sisters, Isabelle and Natalie. His father, George, calls him "an excellent man,"
a carpenter and a proud soldier, tough on the outside but with a dream of
teaching kindergarten.
Even his former wife, Jessica Gray, the mother of his three girls, describes him
with affection: a handsome devil who had a way with women, but a dedicated
father and a good sport as a former-husband whose last, impulsive gift to her
was a hunting license that she used to bag a six-point buck.
More and more, even though he is alive, Harold Gray's relatives talk about him
in the past tense.
On Dec. 26, 2004, Sgt. Gray, then 34, a member of the 133rd Engineer Battalion
of the Maine Army National Guard, was driving in a convoy outside Mosul, Iraq,
when a bomb blew up underneath his truck.
He has been in hospitals ever since. Blind and severely brain damaged, he cannot
speak, move voluntarily or communicate. He is fed through a tube implanted in
his stomach. Though he appears unaware of his surroundings, family members say
they believe he hears their voices when they visit. But his medical records
describe his condition as a "persistent neurovegetative state" from which he is
unlikely to emerge.
"They don't think he has any chance for recovery," said Laurie Gray, 37, who
drives an hour and half each way from her home in Penobscot to spend nearly
every day at his bedside at the Togus Veterans Affairs Medical Center here.
"I've accepted this is the way it could be, but I also haven't given up hope,"
Ms. Gray said. "You never know, there could be a miracle."
His parents say they too are praying for a miracle. "If you don't have hope,
what do you have?" said his mother, Claudette.
At least 1,700 American troops have suffered brain injuries in Iraq, more than
half of them moderate to severe. Sgt. Gray represents the far end of the
spectrum, though military spokesmen have declined to say how many men and women
have been as badly hurt as he.
A month or so after being wounded, he seemed to be on the mend: he could open
his left eye and move his right hand when asked to, take a few steps, say a few
words. But in late February he developed meningitis, an infection of the
membranes around the brain and spinal cord. He never regained consciousness.
In April, doctors operated for a brain abscess and discovered that a cotton ball
had been left inside his head after emergency surgery in Iraq. Whether the
cotton caused the meningitis is impossible to tell, but objects mistakenly left
behind after surgery are a known cause of infection, according to reports in
medical journals.
Late in May, Sgt. Gray was transferred to a hospital in Tampa, Fla., that
specializes in rehabilitation for brain injury. But after six weeks with no
progress, he was sent home to Maine, to the Togus hospital's long-term care
unit, essentially a nursing home.
Ms. Gray has decorated his room with photos of him when he was well.
It is hard to reconcile those strong, rugged images with the motionless figure
in the bed. There are deep depressions on either side of Sgt. Gray's head where
segments of his skull were removed. He is mostly expressionless, though he yawns
from time to time, moves his mouth, sleeps, wakes and opens his left eye.
"Have you had him look at you?" his father asked. "That one eye focuses on you
like he's looking right through you."
Sgt. Gray needs round-the-clock nursing care. Two people are needed to turn him
every two hours day and night to prevent bedsores, and he is incontinent and
catheterized. Though not on a respirator, he does need breathing help: air is
piped into an opening in his neck. He chokes and gags on his own secretions, and
Ms. Gray and the nurses must use suction equipment several times a day to clear
out his windpipe.
The longer a person remains in a state like Sgt. Gray's, the smaller the chances
of recovery. After a year, very few come out of it; it has been 11 months since
Sgt. Gray developed meningitis and became unresponsive.
Asked if Sgt. Gray would want to be kept alive the way he is now, his wife and
other family members said he had never wanted to discuss the subject.
"He was a big, tough guy, and nothing was going to happen to him," Laurie Gray
said. "But me, knowing Harold like I do, he wouldn't want to be like this."
His former wife, Jessica, said: "He always used to say he wouldn't want to live
not knowing anything. If he couldn't function, if he couldn't recognize his
kids, he wouldn't want to live."
Laurie Gray said removing her husband's feeding tube was something she could
never do. But she has signed a do-not-resuscitate order; if Sgt. Gray's heart or
breathing stops, doctors will not try to revive him.
His father agreed with that decision, but Ms. Gray does not know whether his
mother is aware of it. Divorces - Sgt. Gray's and that of his parents - have
divided the family and led to bitterness over money, control and child support.
Laurie Gray hopes to take her husband home in a few months, to a double-wide
mobile home on a quiet road miles from any town, and care for him herself, with
help from family, friends and a part-time nurse's aide. Sgt. Gray's mother said
she was "totally opposed" to the move, because he needed expert care. But his
father said he thought Sgt. Gray would be better off back home.
"He won't ever be the Harold we knew," Mr. Gray said. "If he could just talk to
you - but if he can't, we'll take him the way he is."
One
Family's Persistent Hope: That Their Soldier Will Wake Up, NYT, 22.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/22/national/22gray.html
All's Not Quiet on the Military Supply
Front
January 22, 2006
The New York Times
By TIMOTHY L. O'BRIEN
A 9-millimeter bullet, erupting from the
barrel of a handgun at 1,100 to 1,400 feet per second, can puncture skin,
splinter bone and shred internal organs. A 7.62-millimeter rifle slug, flashing
along at about 2,750 feet a second, dispatches targets at greater distances and
with more accuracy and force than most handgun ammunition. And the human body -
essentially a large, mobile sack of water - offers little resistance to bullets
of any caliber.
Bulletproof vests, made of Kevlar and other fabrics, are meant to shield
vulnerable bodies, giving a veteran cop on the beat or a young soldier on patrol
in Baghdad added protection. Most vests, if properly designed, can stop a
9-millimeter handgun bullet. No vest, unless it is supplemented with heavy,
brittle ceramic inserts, can stop a high-velocity rifle bullet. Over time, or
with repeated exposure to gunfire, all vests degrade and lose their stopping
power. Still, well-made vests offer wearers a measure of security in encounters
that might otherwise prove fatal.
When the Iraq war began in early 2003, analysts say, the American military
hadn't stocked up on body armor because the White House did not intend to send a
large occupational force. The White House game plan called for lightning strikes
led by lithe, technologically adept forces that would snare a quick victory. A
light deployment of troops and a harmonious occupation were to follow, with the
Pentagon anticipating relatively little hand-to-hand or house-to-house fighting.
But as the breadth and duration of the Iraqi occupation grew, the war became a
series of perilous, unpredictable street fights in Baghdad and other cities,
leaving soldiers exposed to sniper fire and close-quarters combat - and in
urgent need of hundreds of thousands of bulletproof vests.
In the world of military contractors, times like these - when a sudden, pressing
need intersects with a limited number of suppliers - have all the makings of
full-blown financial windfalls. For small vendors, the effect can be even more
seismic than it is for their larger brethren, turning anonymous businesses into
beehives of production and causing their sales to skyrocket. DHB Industries,
based in Westbury, N.Y., whose Point Blank subsidiary in Pompano Beach, Fla., is
a leading manufacturer of bulletproof vests, found itself occupying this
lucrative turf when the military awarded it hundreds of millions of dollars in
body armor contracts in 2003 and 2004.
With sales of just $340 million last year, DHB is a small fry amid giant
military suppliers like Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Halliburton. But DHB offers
a case study of the complexities of military contracting - and of the riches and
responsibilities that accompany it. DHB's dealings also offer a peek into the
vagaries of internal controls and executive compensation that continue to
challenge companies of all stripes, the individuals and institutions that invest
in them, and a public that relies on them for goods and services.
DHB might have remained anonymous if not for a spate of recent events. The
quality and adequacy of vests supplied to soldiers in Iraq has come into
question over the last year, culminating in a Pentagon study, first reported by
The New York Times this month, that said that 80 percent of the Marines who died
in Iraq from upper-body wounds might have survived if they had had body armor
covering more of their torsos. (It was the military, and not manufacturers, that
determined the specifications for the vests DHB supplied the Marines, said DHB.)
The Marines and the Army recalled about 23,000 Point Blank vests from the field
last year after The Marine Corps Times reported that the Marines acquired the
vests despite warnings from Army personnel that the vests had what the newspaper
described as "critical, life-threatening flaws." The Marine Corps issued a
statement in November saying that there was "no evidence to suggest that
soldiers or Marines have been at risk, or that these vests will not protect
against the threat they were designed to defeat."
The Marine Corps declined to respond to repeated interview requests for this
article. An Army spokesman said in an e-mail message that Army officials would
not grant an interview because it "would be inappropriate, considering DHB and
Point Blank Armor business arrangement."
DHB declined to make any of its executives or directors available for
interviews, including David H. Brooks, 51, its founder, namesake, largest
shareholder and chief executive. In regulatory filings, DHB said it had
delivered more than 850,000 vests to the military since 1998, and a company
spokesman, Bruce Rubin, said the vests that the military withdrew were only a
small percentage of those it supplied most recently.
"A significant amount of anecdotal evidence from the field indicates that DHB's
products are doing what they are designed to do - save lives," Mr. Rubin said.
Mr. Brooks, who, along with his wife and children, cashed in DHB stock worth
about $186 million in late 2004, has also courted attention and controversy. In
November, Mr. Brooks held a bat mitzvah party for his daughter atop Rockefeller
Center in New York, which an article in The Daily News said had cost $10
million. Mr. Rubin characterized the figure as exaggerated. He declined to
comment on other elements of the article, which said that Mr. Brooks had used
his company's jet to fetch a clutch of rock and hip-hop stars, ranging from Don
Henley to 50 Cent, to perform at the celebration; that he changed out of an
all-leather, metal-studded suit into a hot-pink suede suit as the party heated
up; and that he supplied guests with goody bags stuffed with $1,000 worth of
merchandise.
The $186 million stock sale occurred four months before reports surfaced of
possible problems with vests in Iraq, and reduced Mr. Brooks's stake in DHB to
15 percent from 48 percent in 2003. It also preceded DHB's announcement last
fall that it would take a $60 million charge to reserve for a potential
class-action settlement and replacement costs related to legal disputes
surrounding vests the company had sold to police departments nationwide. Those
events helped DHB's shares to plunge 76 percent last year, but a lawyer
representing Mr. Brooks said that none of his client's stock sales were based on
nonpublic information.
Over the years, DHB has bestowed unusual financial rewards on Mr. Brooks. From
1997 to 2004, he was entitled to lay claim to 10 percent of the company's annual
profits as reimbursement for personal and business expenses. During that time,
he rang up $2 million in personal charges on DHB's corporate credit cards,
according to securities filings. For one year, between 1996 and 1997, he was
also entitled to 10 percent of the company's annual profit as a bonus, a right
that Mr. Rubin said Mr. Brooks had never exercised. Mr. Brooks' total annual
compensation in 2004, the most recent year for which data are available, was
about $73.3 million. Of that amount, $69.9 million represented options he
exercised as part of his $186 million stock sale that year. DHB itself had
profits in 2004 of $49.5 million.
"The American economic system rewards those who take great risks with
commensurate benefits," Mr. Rubin said of Mr. Brooks's stock sales and
compensation. "The compensation Mr. Brooks received is directly attributable to
the risk he undertook in aiding the capitalization of DHB and achieving
extraordinary results for the company."
Mr. Rubin also pointed out that Mr. Brooks lent DHB more than $20 million and
personally guaranteed its bank loans during the company's earlier and leaner
years - a time when he could not be assured that he would get his money back or
that DHB would turn a profit.
Nonetheless, the Securities and Exchange Commission is currently investigating
aspects of Mr. Brooks' compensation and other corporate transactions, according
to the company's securities filings. Mr. Brooks and the company declined to
comment on the investigation, as did the S.E.C.
This is not the first time that regulators have examined Mr. Brooks' activities.
In 1992, the S.E.C. fined him heavily and barred him from the brokerage business
for five years for improprieties related to an insider trading scandal. That
aspect of Mr. Brooks' résumé appeared in the company's public filings until the
late 1990's, and then disappeared.
Although DHB adopted a new code of ethics in 2003 that required the company to
make "full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure" in its public
communications, a lawyer representing DHB's management, George S. Canellos, said
that the company was legally obligated to notify the public about the 1992
S.E.C. sanctions only for the five years after the agency imposed them. The
absence of more recent disclosure, Mr. Canellos said, "in no way conflicts with
the company's code of conduct or any law or regulation."
In any case, while Mr. Brooks was briefly banished from the securities business,
that did not prevent him from assembling a small group of companies and
eventually becoming the chief executive of a publicly traded company - one that
now supplies a product, bulletproof vests, that is vital to the safety of
American troops overseas.
THE rapid growth in military spending has fattened the wallets of C.E.O.'s
running major defense contractors, according to the Institute for Policy
Studies, a left-leaning research group in Washington. The group, which labeled
Mr. Brooks a "body armor profiteer" in a report it prepared last summer, noted
that the average compensation for C.E.O.'s at 34 leading military contractors
tripled from 2001 to 2004, to $3.9 million. That meant that C.E.O.'s pay
packages were 23 times larger than generals' salaries and 160 times the size of
an average soldier's pay.
The Pentagon awarded more than $230 billion worth of military contracts in the
2004 fiscal year, and how companies of all sizes secured pieces of that pie
depended on different combinations of expertise and political access. Government
and military oversight of the fitness and capacity of suppliers has historically
been plagued with challenges and lapses, and military analysts say that those
problems are magnified during times of war. Some of the concerns that have
cropped up recently about the adequacy of bulletproof vests, they say, are no
surprise.
"This is somewhat similar to the lifesaving drug that is rushed into production
for fear that people will die if they don't get it," said Loren B. Thompson, a
military security specialist at the Lexington Institute, a conservative research
organization based in Arlington, Va. "In a time of war there is great pressure
to equip troops with body armor and other life-saving equipment as soon as
possible."
Other analysts say that the sheer volume of money gushing out of the military's
contracting faucet, the difficulty of overseeing each and every supplier, and
the need to rush armor and weaponry into the field inevitably creates problems.
"If you see some of these big companies scarfing down billions of dollars with
nothing to show for it, then it's not surprising that problems have emerged at
some of the smaller companies," said John E. Pike, founder of
GlobalSecurity.org, a research firm that specializes in military and
intelligence policy. "At the end of the day, the oversight comes in the
testing."
In the span of just six months in 2004, the Pentagon awarded DHB three body
armor contracts worth about $455 million. DHB's entire revenue the previous year
had been only $230 million. DHB, the Marines and the Army would not discuss the
process through which DHB had secured its body armor contracts. The military
began awarding contracts to the company as early as 1998, three years after DHB
paid $2 million to acquire Point Blank out of bankruptcy.
Neither DHB nor Mr. Brooks appears to be a big political contributor. Mr. Brooks
made a $25,000 contribution to a fund-raising arm of the Republican National
Committee last June, his only political contribution since 1990, according to
campaign finance records maintained by the Center for Responsive Politics; DHB
and Point Blank themselves do not appear in those filings at all.
But DHB has been an active client of three Washington lobbyists - Grayson
Winterling, John C. Tuck, and Michael P. Flanagan - each of whom lobbied the
Defense Department or undisclosed members of Congress on DHB's behalf, according
to federal records. None of the three men returned phone calls seeking comment.
DHB executives declined to discuss their relationships with the lobbyists; Mr.
Rubin, the company's spokesman, said that DHB, "like many other companies, has
engaged lobbying firms to help it understand federal government contracts and to
facilitate working relationships."
It is unclear whether the Pentagon was aware or concerned about quality-control
problems at DHB, and the entire industry it inhabits, in recent years. In 2002,
the New York Police Department returned 6,400 Point Blank vests to DHB for
replacement after state government tests showed that some of the vests were
defective. DHB said it believed that the vests it sold to the police department
were "safe and effective."
A confrontation in 2003 with a union representing DHB's employees in Florida led
to the workers accusing the company of shoddy quality control. The union also
filed a complaint with the S.E.C. asserting that DHB had not publicly disclosed
that Mr. Brooks's wife, Terry S. Brooks, controlled the company, Tactical Armor
Products, that supplied plates used in DHB's vests. The S.E.C. began its
investigation of DHB the next year.
A few small companies dominate the body armor industry, and military
publications have described DHB as the largest supplier of bulletproof vests to
the Army. One of its former leading competitors for military vest contracts,
Second Chance Body Armor Inc., was forced into bankruptcy in 2004 after state
governments and police associations sued it for supplying police officers with
what they said were defective vests.
At the heart of those cases was a material called Zylon, made solely by a
Japanese company, Toyobo, and billed by it as having greater tensile strength
than Kevlar or steel. But lawsuits filed against Second Chance and other
companies that use Zylon, including DHB, contend that Zylon degrades when
exposed to heat and moisture.
The suits, all of which are in the process of being settled, contend that Toyobo
notified the companies in the late 1990's of possible problems with Zylon but
that the companies, including DHB, kept selling vests made from it. Second
Chance documents uncovered in the litigation shed light on how that company
weighed its responsibilities as Zylon-related failures began emerging.
According to a letter sent by Richard C. Davis, the president of Second Chance,
to his board in 2002, the company could "continue operating as though nothing is
wrong until one of our customers is killed or wounded," which he said was
undesirable because once someone died in a Zylon vest, then "we will be forced
to make excuses as to why we didn't recognize and correct the problem."
Mr. Davis said Second Chance's other option was to stop making the vests
completely and offer upgrades to customers. According to one of the lawsuits
filed against it, Second Chance did not notify police officials of the Zylon
problems and offer them upgrades until a year after Mr. Davis wrote that letter.
Second Chance referred all questions about the company to Armor Holdings,
another body armor company that bought most of its assets out of bankruptcy. An
Armor Holdings spokesman declined to comment on issues involving Second Chance's
Zylon-related liabilities, which he said Armor Holdings did not assume when it
bought the company's assets.
The Armor Holdings spokesman said that the company still believed that vests
made from Zylon were sound, and Toyobo has stated that it stands by its product.
But the National Institute of Justice, a branch of the Justice Department that
certifies the safety of vests used in law enforcement, said last August that it
would no longer approve Zylon vests.
DHB said that none of the vests it had supplied to the military contain Zylon
and that it, too, believes that Zylon-based vests it sold to police officers and
other law enforcement officials remain safe. But it is replacing those vests
anyhow, it said, in order to comply with the new federal guidelines against
Zylon.
For whatever complications have arisen in Mr. Brooks's industry because of
questions about the safety of bulletproof vests, his representatives say that
the riches he has reaped are rewards for his prescience about the industry's
potential. Mr. Brooks unearthed that opportunity after the S.E.C. barred him
from his earlier profession.
In 1992, according to S.E.C. records, regulators charged Mr. Brooks, who was 37
at the time, and his brother, Jeffrey Brooks, with "recklessly" failing to
prevent an employee at a brokerage firm they ran from "engaging in illegal
trading activity." The commission said that an employee had been buying and
selling well-known media stocks using inside information as part of a scheme
engineered with a Morgan Stanley analyst. The S.E.C. said that the Brooks
brothers and the firm they controlled, Jeffrey Brooks Securities, aided the
scheme and that David Brooks copied the insider trades made by his employee,
pulling in about $291,000 in illicit profits for himself and the firm.
Without admitting or denying charges that the commission filed against them in a
civil complaint, David and Jeffery Brooks agreed to pay a $405,000 joint
penalty. The S.E.C. also banned David Brooks from associating with any brokerage
or investment firm for five years. Jeffrey Brooks, who later became one of DHB's
early and largest shareholders, declined to respond to a request for an
interview.
David Brooks found a way around this setback by using a publicly traded holding
company he controlled, DHB, to buy Point Blank three years later, adding the
troubled body armor concern to a small stable of companies that also included an
orthopedics products supplier and a maker of sports gear, according to public
filings. Today, body armor accounts for 98 percent of DHB's sales.
From the outset, DHB has struggled with management issues. DHB was sometimes
late in filing financial records with regulators; was governed by just five
directors (two of whom were Mr. Brooks and another DHB executive) who met
irregularly; and has had three outside auditors resign since 2001.
When one of the auditors, Grant Thornton, resigned in 2003, it notified DHB's
board that there were "deficiencies" in internal control procedures relating to
the preparation of the company's financial statements, according to securities
filings. Grant Thornton also expressed reservations about "understaffing" in
DHB's accounting and finance department. When yet another firm, Weiser LLP, gave
up its auditing duties early last year, it told DHB that it was concerned about
"deficiencies" in the way DHB priced its inventory.
Not to worry, DHB says. Gary Nadelman, a member of the company's audit
committee, said in an e-mail message that DHB "believes that its internal
controls are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that its financial
statements and public disclosures are materially accurate."
THE DHB board, which has been expanded to seven members and still includes Mr.
Brooks, has granted unusually generous perks to the company's founder. Under a
1996 employment agreement approved by the board's compensation committee, Mr.
Brooks was entitled to annual bonuses equal to 10 percent of DHB's profits each
year. That was replaced in 1997 by a new plan granting him annual reimbursement
for business and personal expenses up to 10 percent of DHB's profits. DHB also
reimburses Mr. Brooks for all expenses associated with a residence and office he
uses in Florida. The company also reimburses Mr. Brooks' children for a jet they
own whenever DHB uses it for business purposes (a bill that amounted to about
$860,000 in 2004).
In the summer of 2004, DHB's compensation committee repealed the portion of Mr.
Brooks's employment agreement that entitled him to a 10 percent cut of corporate
profits for his business and personal expenses. DHB declined to say what
precipitated the change, but at the time Mr. Brooks had rung up about $2 million
in personal expenses on DHB credit cards. A spokesman for the company said that
Mr. Brooks's debt was offset by money DHB owed him and that the company now
considers the personal expenses repaid. Mr. Brooks's wife, Terry, has also had a
fruitful relationship with DHB. Her company, Tactical Armor Products, sold $18
million worth of body armor components to DHB in 2004, according to securities
filings. Although Tactical Armor is characterized as an outside supplier in
DHB's filings, it manufactures some of its products in a Tennessee plant that
DHB owns. Tactical Armor paid DHB about $40,000 in rent and bought about $7
million in raw materials from the company in 2004.
"These related-party transactions have been publicly disclosed and carefully
evaluated by independent directors of the board, who were satisfied that the
terms of all transactions were fair to the company," said Mr. Rubin, DHB's
spokesman.
The head of DHB's compensation committee, Jerome Krantz, a life insurance
underwriter with the Krantz Financial Group, declined to be interviewed. In
response to questions about Mr. Brooks's compensation, Mr. Nadelman, who is also
a compensation committee member, said in an e-mail message that DHB's board had
exercised proper judgment.
"The overarching responsibility of the board is to provide oversight and create
management incentives for the successful operation of the company and to build
long-term shareholder value," he wrote. "The company thinks they have done this
very well."
On Friday, DHB shares closed at $4.95, down 70 percent from their 52-week high
of $16.59. "We live and work in extremely difficult, often threatening times,"
DHB notes on one of its body armor Web sites. "We never forget that our
customers rely on us to protect their lives."
All's
Not Quiet on the Military Supply Front, NYT, 22.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/22/business/yourmoney/22vests.html
U.S. tally of wounded drops 26%
Posted 1/15/2006 11:18 PM
USA TODAY
By Matt Kelley
WASHINGTON — The number of U.S. troops wounded
in Iraq fell by more than a quarter in 2005 from a year earlier, Pentagon
records show. Military officials call that a sign that insurgent attacks have
declined in the face of elections and stronger Iraqi security forces.
U.S. Air Force personnel load one of 5,939 U.S. servicemen wounded in Iraq onto
a cargo plane Nov. 9.
By Jacob Silberberg, AP
The number of wounded dropped from 7,990 in 2004 to 5,939, according to the
Defense Department. There hasn't been much change in the number of deaths,
however. Pentagon figures show 844 U.S. troops were killed in the Iraq war
during 2005, compared with 845 in 2004.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has announced plans to cut the number of U.S.
troops in Iraq to about 130,000, down from about 160,000 for last month's
elections. Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
has said he's optimistic that security in Iraq will continue to improve and more
U.S. forces could leave.
U.S. military leaders say that one of the biggest changes was in the number and
quality of Iraqi forces. About three dozen Iraqi battalions, each with about 700
soldiers, are taking the lead in battling insurgents, said Army Lt. Gen. John
Vines, commander of multinational forces in Iraq. There were no such battalions
in early 2005, he said.
Those Iraqi forces are better trained and equipped than they were a year ago,
but their contribution to Iraq's long-term stability is in question, said
military analyst Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution in Washington.
"We really don't know how ethnically cohesive they are and how much their
loyalty is to the central government rather than their ethnic kinsmen," O'Hanlon
said. "Their long-term political loyalties remain to be tested, although their
technical skills are getting better."
Vines told reporters in a videoconference Friday that violence also ebbed
because some of the Sunni Arabs who make up the backbone of the insurgency
decided to participate in last month's elections. "We have indicators that many
who we believe may have been involved in violence are seeing that they can and
must reject that violence," he said.
Another factor is the lack of the kind of fierce urban fighting that U.S. forces
saw in Fallujah during 2004. Casualties spiked when forces led by Marines raided
the insurgent stronghold in April and November 2004. The highest number of
American troops wounded in battle for any month in Iraq was 1,424 that November.
Vines and other commanders say coalition and Iraqi forces also are doing a
better job of preventing and disrupting planned attacks.
Army Maj. Gen. William Webster, the commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad, said
the number of suicide car bombs and roadside bombs fell by half during 2005.
Only about 10% of insurgent attacks cause injuries or damage now, down from
about 25% a year ago, Webster said late last year.
Rumsfeld has said that one possible reason the death rate has not fallen as
quickly is that many of the successful attacks have been particularly deadly. In
August, for example, a huge bomb destroyed a Marine vehicle, killing 14.
U.S.
tally of wounded drops 26%, NYT, 16.1.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-15-wounded-troops_x.htm
Economic View
When Talk of Guns and Butter Includes Lives
Lost
January 15, 2006
The New York Times
By LOUIS UCHITELLE
AS the toll of American dead and wounded
mounts in Iraq, some economists are arguing that the war's costs, broadly
measured, far outweigh its benefits.
Studies of previous wars focused on the huge outlays for military operations.
That is still a big concern, along with the collateral impact on such things as
oil prices, economic growth and interest on the debt run up to pay for the war.
Now some economists have added in the dollar value of a life lost in combat, and
that has fed antiwar sentiment.
"The economics profession in general is paying more attention to the cost of
lives cut short or curtailed by injury and illness," said David Gold, an
economist at the New School. "The whole tobacco issue has encouraged this
research."
The economics of war is a subject that goes back centuries. But in the
cost-benefit analyses of past American wars, a soldier killed or wounded in
battle was typically thought of not as a cost but as a sacrifice, an inevitable
and sad consequence in achieving a victory that protected and enhanced the
country. The victory was a benefit that offset the cost of death.
That halo still applies to World War II, which sits in the American psyche as a
defensive war in response to attack. The lives lost in combat helped preserve
the nation, and that is a considerable and perhaps immeasurable benefit.
Through the cold war, economists generally avoided calculations of the cost of a
human life. Even during Vietnam, the focus of economic studies was on guns and
butter - the misguided insistence of the Johnson administration that America
could afford a full-blown war and uncurtailed civilian spending. The inflation
in the 1970's was partly a result of the Vietnam era.
Cost-benefit analysis, applied to war, all but ceased after Vietnam and did not
pick up again until the fall of 2002 as President Bush moved the nation toward
war in Iraq. "We are doing this research again," said William D. Nordhaus, a
Yale economist, "because the Iraq war is so contentious."
Mr. Nordhaus is the economist who put the subject back on the table with the
publication of a prescient prewar paper that compared the coming conflict to a
"giant role of the dice." He warned that "if the United States had a string of
bad luck or misjudgments during or after the war, the outcome could reach $1.9
trillion," once all the secondary costs over many years were included.
So far, the string of bad luck has materialized, and Mr. Nordhaus's forecast has
been partially fulfilled. In recent studies by other economists, the high-end
estimates of the war's actual cost, broadly measured, are already moving into
the $1 trillion range. For starters, the outlay just for military operations
totaled $251 billion through December, and that number is expected to double if
the war runs a few more years.
The researchers add to this the cost of disability payments and of lifelong care
in Veterans Administration hospitals for the most severely injured - those with
brain and spinal injuries, roughly 20 percent of the 16,000 wounded so far. Even
before the Iraq war, these outlays were rising to compensate the aging veterans
of World War II and Korea. But those wars were accepted by the public, and the
costs escape public notice.
Not so Iraq. In a war that has lost much public support, the costs stand out and
the benefits - offsetting the costs and justifying the war - are harder to
pinpoint. In a paper last September, for example, Scott Wallsten, a resident
scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, and Katrina Kosec, a
research assistant, listed as benefits "no longer enforcing U.N. sanctions such
as the 'no-fly zone' in northern and southern Iraq and people no longer being
murdered by Saddam Hussein's regime."
Such benefits, they found, fall well short of the costs. "Another possible
impact of the conflict, is a change in the probability of future major terrorist
attacks," they wrote. "Unfortunately, experts do not agree on whether the war
has increased or decreased this probability. Clearly, whether the direct
benefits of the war exceed the costs ultimately relies at least in part on the
answer to that question."
The newest research was a paper posted last week on the Web
(www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/cost_of_war_in_iraq.pdf) by two antiwar
Democrats from the Clinton administration: Joseph E. Stiglitz of Columbia
University and Linda Bilmes, now at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
Their upper-end, long-term cost estimate tops $1 trillion, based on the death
and damage caused by the war to date. They assumed an American presence in Iraq
through at least 2010, and their estimate includes the war's contribution to
higher domestic petroleum prices. They also argue that while military spending
has contributed to economic growth, that growth would have been greater if the
outlays had gone instead to highways, schools, civilian research and other more
productive investment.
The war has raised the cost of Army recruiting, they argue, and has subtracted
from income the wages given up by thousands of reservists who left civilian jobs
to fight in Iraq at lower pay.
JUST as Mr. Wallsten and Ms. Kosec calculated the value of life lost in battle
or impaired by injury, so did Mr. Stiglitz and Ms. Bilmes - putting the loss at
upwards of $100 billion. That is more than double the Wallsten-Kosec estimate.
Both studies draw on research undertaken since Vietnam by W. Kip Viscusi, a
Harvard law professor.
The old way of valuing life calculated the present value of lost earnings, a
standard still used by the courts to compensate accident victims, generally
awarding $500,000 a victim, at most. Mr. Viscusi, however, found that Americans
tend to value risk differently. He found that society pays people an additional
$700 a year, on average, to take on risky work in hazardous occupations. Given
one death per 10,000 risk-takers, on average, the cost to society adds up to $7
million for each life lost, according to Mr. Viscusi's calculation. Mr. Stiglitz
and Ms. Bilmes reduced this number to about $6 million, keeping their estimate
on the conservative side, as they put it.
None of the heroism or sacrifice for country shows up in the recent research,
and for a reason.
"We did not have to fight this war, and we did not have to go to war when we
did," Mr. Stiglitz said. "We could have waited until we had more safe body armor
and we chose not to wait."
When
Talk of Guns and Butter Includes Lives Lost, NYT, 15.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/business/yourmoney/15view.html
US army in Iraq institutionally racist,
claims British officer
Thursday January 12, 2006
The Guardian
Richard Norton-Taylor and Jamie Wilson in Washington
A senior British officer has criticised the US
army for its conduct in Iraq, accusing it of institutional racism, moral
righteousness, misplaced optimism, and of being ill-suited to engage in
counter-insurgency operations.
The blistering critique, by Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who was the second
most senior officer responsible for training Iraqi security forces, reflects
criticism and frustration voiced by British commanders of American military
tactics.
What is startling is the severity of his comments - and the decision by Military
Review, a US army magazine, to publish them.
American soldiers, says Brig Aylwin-Foster, were "almost unfailingly courteous
and considerate". But he says "at times their cultural insensitivity, almost
certainly inadvertent, arguably amounted to institutional racism".
The US army, he says, is imbued with an unparalleled sense of patriotism, duty,
passion and talent. "Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly
hierarchical outlook, a predisposition to offensive operations and a sense that
duty required all issues to be confronted head-on."
Brig Aylwin-Foster says the American army's laudable "can-do" approach
paradoxically led to another trait, namely "damaging optimism". Such an ethos,
he says, "is unhelpful if it discourages junior commanders from reporting
unwelcome news up the chain of command".
But his central theme is that US military commanders have failed to train and
educate their soldiers in the art of counter-insurgency operations and the need
to cultivate the "hearts and minds" of the local population.
While US officers in Iraq criticised their allies for being too reluctant to use
force, their strategy was "to kill or capture all terrorists and insurgents:
they saw military destruction of the enemy as a strategic goal in its own
right". In short, the brigadier says, "the US army has developed over time a
singular focus on conventional warfare, of a particularly swift and violent
kind".
Such an unsophisticated approach, ingrained in American military doctrine, is
counter-productive, exacerbating the task the US faced by alienating significant
sections of the population, argues Brig Aylwin-Foster.
What he calls a sense of "moral righteousness" contributed to the US response to
the killing of four American contractors in Falluja in the spring of 2004. As a
"come-on" tactic by insurgents, designed to provoke a disproportionate response,
it succeeded, says the brigadier, as US commanders were "set on the total
destruction of the enemy".
He notes that the firing on one night of more than 40 155mm artillery rounds on
a small part of the city was considered by the local US commander as a "minor
application of combat power". Such tactics are not the answer, he says, to
remove Iraq from the grip of what he calls a "vicious and tenacious insurgency".
Brig Aylwin-Foster's criticisms have been echoed by other senior British
officers, though not in such a devastating way. General Sir Mike Jackson, the
head of the army, told MPs in April 2004 as US forces attacked Falluja: "We must
be able to fight with the Americans. That does not mean we must be able to fight
as the Americans."
Yesterday Colonel William Darley, the editor of Military Review, told the
Guardian: "This [Brig Aylwin-Foster] is a highly regarded expert in this area
who is providing a candid critique. It is certainly not uninformed ... It is a
professional discussion and a professional critique among professionals about
what needs to be done. What he says is authoritative and a useful point of
perspective whether you agree with it or not." In a disclaimer he says the
article does not reflect the views of the UK or the US army.
Colonel Kevin Benson, director of the US army's school of advanced military
studies, who told the Washington Post the brigadier was an "insufferable British
snob", said his remark had been made in the heat of the moment. "I applaud the
brigadier for starting the debate," he said. "It is a debate that must go on and
I myself am writing a response."
The brigadier was deputy commander of the office of security transition for
training and organising Iraq's armed forces in 2004. Last year he took up the
post of deputy commander of the Eufor, the European peacekeeping force in
Bosnia. He could not be contacted last night.
US
army in Iraq institutionally racist, claims British officer, G, 13.1.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1684561,00.html
Documents tie shadowy US unit to inmate
abuse case
Thu Jan 12, 2006 9:37 PM ET
Reuters
By Will Dunham
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Newly released military
documents show U.S. Army investigators closed a probe into allegations an Iraqi
detainee had been abused by a shadowy military task force after its members used
fake names and asserted that key computer files had been lost.
The documents shed light on Task Force 6-26, a special operations unit, and
confirmed the existence of a secret military "Special Access Program" associated
with it, ACLU lawyer Amrit Singh said on Thursday.
The documents were released by the Army to the American Civil Liberties Union
under court order through the Freedom of Information Act. They were the latest
files to provide details of the numerous investigations carried out by the Army
into allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq.
A June 2005 document by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command in Iraq
described its investigation into suspected abuse of a detainee captured in
January 2004 by Task Force 6-26 in Tikrit, deposed President Saddam Hussein's
hometown. His name was redacted, but he was mentioned as the son of a Saddam
bodyguard.
The man was taken to Baghdad international airport, documents stated. The United
States maintains a prison there for "high-value" detainees.
He told Army investigators that U.S. personnel forced him one night to remove
his clothes, walk into walls with a box over his head connected to a rope around
his neck, punched him in the spinal area until he fainted, placed him in front
of an air conditioner while cold water was poured on him, and kicked him in the
stomach until he vomited, the documents stated.
'FAKE NAMES'
Investigators could not find the personnel involved or the man's medical files,
and the case was closed, the files stated. A memo listed the suspected offenses
as "aggravated assault, cruelty and maltreatment."
"The only names identified by this investigation were determined to be fake
names utilized by the capturing soldiers," the memo stated. "6-26 also had a
major computer malfunction which resulted in them losing 70 percent of their
files; therefore they can't find the cases we need to review."
The memo said the investigation should not be reopened. "Hell, even if we
reopened it we wouldn't get anymore information than we already have," the memo
stated.
Singh said previous documents indicated Task Force 6-26 was linked to other
instances of detainee abuse in Iraq.
"This document suggests that Task Force 6-26 was part of a larger, clandestine
program that we think may have links with high-ranking officials, because
obviously someone high up had the authority to put this program in place," Singh
said in a telephone interview.
Army spokesman Paul Boyce said the Army had taken allegations of detainee abuse
"extremely seriously."
"The Army has gone to great extent in travel, interviews, documentation and
concern to make sure that each and every allegation was thoroughly reviewed,
thoroughly examined and, when appropriate, acted upon either through nonjudicial
or judicial punishment," Boyce said.
A document stated Army investigators were not able to fully investigate suspects
and witnesses because they were involved in the Special Access Program and due
to the classified nature of their work.
The task force is stationed out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the document
said. The base houses the Army Special Operations Command.
Documents tie shadowy US unit to inmate abuse case, R, 12.1.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-01-13T023734Z_01_KWA309367_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-ABUSE-TASKFORCE.xml
Army Sending Added Armor to Iraq Units
January 12, 2006
The New York Times
By MICHAEL MOSS
WASHINGTON, Jan. 11 - Army officials said
Wednesday that they had decided to send additional body armor to Iraq to protect
soldiers from insurgents' attacks.
The ceramic plates now worn by most members of the military shield just some of
the upper body from bullets and shrapnel, and the Army said it would buy plates
that would extend this protection to the sides of soldiers. The officials spoke
after a closed session of the Senate Armed Services Committee, held after The
New York Times reported last week that a Pentagon study had found that extra
armor could have saved up to 80 percent of the marines who died in Iraq from
upper body wounds.
In at least 74 of the 93 fatal wounds that were analyzed, bullets and shrapnel
struck the marines' sides, shoulders or areas of the torso where the protective
plates did not reach.
The Marine Corps, which commissioned the study in December 2004, began buying
side plates in September for its 26,000 troops in Iraq. Army procurement
officials said they began studying a similar move last summer after receiving
requests from troops in Iraq, but were hampered by the need to supply a much
larger force of 160,000 individuals.
The Army had begun supplying small quantities of side plates to soldiers much
earlier in the war through its Rapid Equipping Force. Armor Works of Tempe,
Ariz., which is making the plates for the marines, said it shipped 250 sets in
November 2003.
Another manufacturer, the Excera Materials Group of Columbus, Ohio, said that
since late 2004 it had shipped 1,000 sets of side plates to Special Forces
personnel, the Air Force and individual units that used their own procurement
money to buy the armor.
Citing security concerns, the Army has in recent days urged armor contractors
not to disclose information about their work, even if the information is not
classified, industry officials said.
"Neither you nor any of your employees are authorized to release to anyone
outside your organization any unclassified information, regardless of medium,
pertaining to any part of your contract," says a letter from an Army research
and procurement unit that The Times obtained.
In Congress on Wednesday, Army and Marine officials defended their efforts to
procure additional armor, saying they had to weigh the benefits of additional
plates against adding weight and restricting mobility. Citing those concerns,
Marine officials said last week that they remained reluctant to buy shoulder
plates or larger plates for the chest and back.
"This is a continuous evolution," Maj. Gen. Stephen M. Speakes, the Army
director of force development, said after the Senate briefing.
Army
Sending Added Armor to Iraq Units, NYT, 12.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/12/national/12armor.html?hp
In Strong Words, Bush Defines Terms of
Debate on Iraq
January 11, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON, Jan. 10 - President Bush issued a
stark warning to Democrats on Tuesday about how to conduct the debate on Iraq as
mid-term elections approach, declaring that Americans know the difference
between "honest critics" and those "who claim that we acted in Iraq because of
oil, or because of Israel, or because we misled the American people."
In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars here, Mr. Bush appeared to be trying
to pre-empt a renewal of arguments about whether to begin a withdrawal
immediately, as Representative John Murtha argued in November, or whether to
keep a large presence in Iraq through the year.
Democrats themselves have been deeply divided on that issue, even while
criticizing Mr. Bush's conduct of the war.
In some of his most combative language yet directed at his critics, Mr. Bush
said Americans should insist on a debate "that brings credit to our democracy,
not comfort to our adversaries." That follows a theme that Vice President Dick
Cheney set last week, when he said critics of the administration's conduct of
the war risked undercutting the effort to defeat the insurgency.
At a meeting at the White House on Thursday with former secretaries of state and
defense, Mr. Bush was warned several times that if he neglected to build support
at home, he could face the problems that the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon
administrations faced with Vietnam.
Mr. Bush's response was to insist that he had a strategy to win the war in Iraq
- something administration officials say they do not believe their predecessors
had in Vietnam - and he repeated that in his speech.
"We have a responsibility to our men and women in uniform, who deserve to know
that once our politicians vote to send them into harm's way, our support will be
with them in good days and in bad days," Mr. Bush said. "And we will settle for
nothing less than complete victory."
By referring to a vote, Mr. Bush was apparently alluding to the Congressional
resolution authorizing the use of force against Saddam Hussein, if necessary.
Part of the White House strategy in recent months has been to note how many of
the administration's critics voted for that resolution, and turned against the
war only after it became difficult.
Mr. Bush was speaking in the same hotel ballroom where last month he described
the effort to reconstruct Iraq, admitting to major mistakes in the early part of
that process. But in that speech he faced a skeptical audience: the Council on
Foreign Relations, whose members greeted him with tepid applause.
Today, in front of 425 members of the V.F.W., Mr. Bush received standing
ovations. The group, which recently passed a resolution supporting the Iraq
action, interrupted Mr. Bush repeatedly as he predicted that progress would be
made in fighting the insurgency and in stabilizing the newly elected government.
At the same time he acknowledged the charges of human rights violations by the
Iraqi police, who he said have been "accused of committing abuses against Iraqi
civilians."
"That's unacceptable," he said, and he said the United States was adjusting how
it trains the Iraqi officers, including the establishment of an ethics and
leadership institute in Baghdad to establish a curriculum for the nine police
academies.
Mr. Bush made no references to the disclosures during the past year to
Americans' abuses of detainees, in Iraq and elsewhere.
He also acknowledged the slow progress in restoring basic services, but argued
that the problems paled in comparison with the progress he sees in Iraq.
"The vast majority of Iraqis prefer freedom with intermittent power, to life in
the permanent darkness of tyranny and terror," he said, an amplification of the
theme he promoted in December in an effort to build support for the war at home.
He also pressed countries that have promised aid to Iraq to make good on their
pledges. He praised Slovakia and Malta for forgiving all of Iraq's previous
debts to those countries - though their concessions amounted to a couple of
hundred million dollars. Among large countries, only the United States has
forgiven all past Iraqi debt.
But it was Mr. Bush's warning to Democrats that led him into new territory.
"There is a difference between responsible and irresponsible debate, and it's
even more important to conduct this debate responsibly when American troops are
risking their lives overseas," he said. But he never singled out his critics by
name.
Only one Democratic member of Congress attended the speech: Representative Adam
Schiff, whose district includes Pasadena and other Los Angeles suburbs. Mr.
Schiff was part of a bipartisan group of lawmakers who met with Mr. Bush last
month, and he was invited by the White House to attend the speech.
"I think that the new initiative of the president to reach out to Democrats and
former officials is positive," Mr. Schiff said in an interview after the speech
was over. "I agree that we need to conduct a debate on Iraq in constructive
terms."
But, he said, "some of the culprits in coarsening the dialogue on the war have
been Republicans, including the vice president at times."
Any effort at finding what the White House calls a "common ground" on Iraq
strategy, he said, "has to be coupled with a cessation of calling people who
disagree with the strategy 'unpatriotic.' "
In discussing Iraqi politics, Mr. Bush directly addressed Sunni Arabs, a
minority in the new government, saying, "Compromise and consensus and
power-sharing are the only path to national unity and lasting democracy."
He added, "A country that divides into factions and dwells on old grievances
cannot move forward and risks sliding back into tyranny."
In
Strong Words, Bush Defines Terms of Debate on Iraq, NYT, 11.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/11/politics/11prexy.html
Cost of Iraq war could top $2 trillion:
study
Mon Jan 9, 2006 8:23 PM ET
Reuters
By Jason Szep
BOSTON (Reuters) - The cost of the Iraq war
could top $2 trillion, far above the White House's pre-war projections, when
long-term costs such as lifetime health care for thousands of wounded U.S.
soldiers are included, a study said on Monday.
Columbia University economist Joseph E. Stiglitz and Harvard lecturer Linda
Bilmes included in their study disability payments for the 16,000 wounded U.S.
soldiers, about 20 percent of whom suffer serious brain or spinal injuries.
They said U.S. taxpayers will be burdened with costs that linger long after U.S.
troops withdraw.
"Even taking a conservative approach, we have been surprised at how large they
are," said the study, referring to total war costs. "We can state, with some
degree of confidence, that they exceed a trillion dollars."
Before the invasion, then-White House budget director Mitch Daniels predicted
Iraq would be "an affordable endeavor" and rejected an estimate by then-White
House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey of total Iraq war costs at $100 billion
to $200 billion as "very, very high."
Unforeseen costs include recruiting to replenish a military drained by multiple
tours of duty, slower long-term U.S. economic growth and health-care bills for
treating long-term mental illness suffered by war veterans.
They said about 30 percent of U.S. troops had developed mental-health problems
within three to four months of returning from Iraq as of July 2005, citing Army
statistics.
Stiglitz, who won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 and has been an outspoken
critic of the Bush administration's Iraq policy, and Bilmes based their
projections partly on past wars and included the economic cost of higher oil
prices, a bigger U.S. budget deficit and greater global insecurity caused by the
Iraq war.
They said a portion of the rise in oil prices -- about 20 percent of the $25 a
barrel gain in oil prices since the war began -- could be attributed directly to
the conflict and that this had already cost the United States about $25 billion.
"Americans are, in a sense, poorer by that amount," they said, describing that
estimate as conservative.
The projection of a total cost of $2 trillion assumes U.S. troops stay in Iraq
until 2010 but with steadily declining numbers each year. They projected the
number of troops there in 2006 at about 136,000. Currently, the United States
has 153,000 troops in Iraq.
HIGHER COSTS
Marine Corps Lt. Col. Roseann Lynch, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said on Monday that
the Iraq war was costing the United States $4.5 billion monthly in military
"operating costs" not including procurement of new weapons and equipment.
Lynch said the war in Iraq had cost $173 billion to date.
Another unforeseen cost, the study said, is the loss to the U.S. economy from
injured veterans who cannot contribute as productively as they otherwise would
and costs related to American civilian contractors and journalists killed in
Iraq.
Death benefits to military families and bonuses paid to soldiers to re-enlist
and to sign up new recruits are additional long-term costs, it said.
Stiglitz was an adviser to U.S. President Bill Clinton and also served as chief
economist at the World Bank.
(Additional reporting by Charles Aldinger in Washington)
Cost
of Iraq war could top $2 trillion: study, R, 9.1.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-01-10T012256Z_01_YUE003941_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-COST.xml
Bloody Thursday for US military in Iraq
Fri Jan 6, 2006 11:36 AM ET
Reuters
By Ross Colvin
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Thursday was one of the
bloodiest days for U.S. forces in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, with 11 soldiers
dying in a fresh spasm of violence that also killed 130 Iraqis, the U.S.
military said on Friday.
Roadside bombs, favored by the insurgents but feared by U.S. soldiers for their
devastating effectiveness, accounted for seven of the American deaths.
U.S. commanders have expressed concern in recent months at the growing use of
more powerful and sophisticated bombs.
George W. Bush and his Republican party face pressure at home over the rising
American death toll, but the U.S. president said on Wednesday a cut in troops
would be based on the situation on the ground and decisions by military
commanders, not a timetable imposed from Washington.
The United States hopes the formation of a coalition government encompassing
leaders of Iraqi's Shi'ite, Kurdish and Sunni groups after last month's election
will help undermine the Sunni Arab-led insurgency and pave the way for a troop
withdrawal.
Thursday's deaths take the number of U.S. fatalities since the start of the war
to oust Saddam Hussein to 2,193, according to Reuters figures.
It was the highest daily U.S. death toll since December 1, when 11 U.S. soldiers
were also killed, and was also the deadliest day in Iraq overall for four
months.
In the worst incident on Thursday for the Americans, five soldiers died in
Baghdad when a roadside bomb hit their patrol. Two more were killed in a similar
incident elsewhere in Baghdad.
In Falluja, a Sunni Arab stronghold, two Marines were killed by small-arms fire
in separate attacks, the U.S. military said in a statement on Friday.
Two U.S. soldiers and scores of Iraqi police recruits were killed when a suicide
bomber blew himself up in the western city of Ramadi as 1,000 men queued to be
security-screened at a glass and ceramics works used as a temporary recruiting
center.
Hospital sources said 70 people died and 65 wounded.
Bush said on Wednesday a reduction of U.S. troops planned after the December
election was under way and would result in a net decrease of several thousand
troops below the pre-election level of 138,000.
He has refused to set a schedule, saying that would only embolden the enemy, and
that a pullout would be dictated by the progress of Iraqi forces in taking over
security.
Thursday's suicide bombers killed 123 people and wounded more than 200 in all in
attacks near a Shi'ite holy shrine and the Ramadi recruiting station.
Bloody Thursday for US military in Iraq, NYT, 6.1.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-01-06T163603Z_01_EIC645805_RTRUKOC_0_US-IRAQ-RAMADI-USA.xml
Military and civilian deaths in Iraq
Fri Jan 6, 2006 11:36 AM ET
Reuters
(Reuters) - Thursday was one of the bloodiest
days for U.S. forces in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, with 11 soldiers dying in
a fresh spasm of violence that also killed 130 Iraqis, the U.S. military said on
Friday.
Seven U.S. soldiers were killed in Baghdad, two in the Ramadi suicide bombing
and two in nearby Falluja, underscoring the perilous task U.S.-led troops face
in the center and west of the country.
The following are the latest figures for military deaths in Iraq since the
U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, in line with the most recent information from
the U.S. military.
U.S.-LED COALITION FORCES:
United States 2,193
Britain 98
Other nations 94
IRAQIS:
MILITARY Between 4,895 and 6,370#
CIVILIANS Between 27,736 and 31,263*
# = Think-tank estimates for military under Saddam killed during the 2003 war.
No reliable official figures have been issued since security forces were set up
in late 2003.
* = From www.iraqbodycount.net, run by academics and peace activists, based on
reports from at least two media sources.
Military and civilian deaths in Iraq, R, 6.1.2006,
http://today.reuters.com/News/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-01-06T163600Z_01_WRI659730_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&related=true
Book: CIA ignored info Iraq had no WMD
Posted 1/3/2006 8:32 AM
USA Today
WASHINGTON (AP) — A new book on the
government's secret anti-terrorism operations describes how the CIA recruited an
Iraqi-American anesthesiologist in 2002 to obtain information from her brother,
who was a figure in Saddam Hussein's nuclear program.
Dr. Sawsan Alhaddad of Cleveland made the dangerous trip to Iraq on the CIA's
behalf. The book said her brother was stunned by her questions about the nuclear
program because — he said — it had been dead for a decade.
New York Times reporter James Risen uses the anecdote to illustrate how the CIA
ignored information that Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction. His
book, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration
describes secret operations of the Bush administration's war on terrorism.
The major revelation in the book has already been the subject of extensive
reporting by Risen's newspaper: the National Security Agency's eavesdropping of
Americans' conversations without obtaining warrants from a special court.
The book said Dr. Alhaddad flew home in mid-September 2002 and had a series of
meetings with CIA analysts. She relayed her brother's information that there was
no nuclear program.
A CIA operative later told Dr. Alhaddad's husband that the agency believed her
brother was lying. In all, the book says, some 30 family members of Iraqis made
trips to their native country to contact Iraqi weapons scientists, and all of
them reported that the programs had been abandoned.
In October 2002, a month after the doctor's trip to Baghdad, the U.S
intelligence community issued a National Intelligence Estimate that concluded
Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear program.
In the book, which quotes extensively from anonymous sources, Risen said the NSA
spying program was launched in 2002 after the CIA began to capture high-ranking
al-Qaeda operatives overseas, and took their computers, cellphones and personal
phone directories.
The CIA turned the telephone numbers and e-mail addresses from the material over
to the NSA, which then began monitoring the phone numbers — in addition to
anyone in contact with the telephone subscribers, the book said, saying this led
to an expansion of the monitoring, both overseas and in the United States.
The book said the NSA does not need approval from the White House, the Justice
Department or anyone else in the Bush administration before it begins
eavesdropping on a specific phone line in the United States.
In another chapter on a "rogue operation," the book said a CIA officer
mistakenly sent one of its Iranian agents information that could be used to
identify virtually every spy the agency had in Iran. The book said the Iranian
was a double agent who turned over the data to Iranian security officials.
The book said the information severely damaged the CIA's Iranian network, and
quoted CIA sources as saying several of the U.S. agents were arrested and
jailed.
Book:
CIA ignored info Iraq had no WMD, UT, 3.1.2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-01-03-book-cia_x.htm
Muslim Scholars Were Paid to Aid U.S.
Propaganda
January 2, 2006
The New York Times
By DAVID S. CLOUD and JEFF GERTH
WASHINGTON, Jan. 1 - A Pentagon contractor
that paid Iraqi newspapers to print positive articles written by American
soldiers has also been compensating Sunni religious scholars in Iraq in return
for assistance with its propaganda work, according to current and former
employees.
The Lincoln Group, a Washington-based public relations company, was told early
in 2005 by the Pentagon to identify religious leaders who could help produce
messages that would persuade Sunnis in violence-ridden Anbar Province to
participate in national elections and reject the insurgency, according to a
former employee.
Since then, the company has retained three or four Sunni religious scholars to
offer advice and write reports for military commanders on the content of
propaganda campaigns, the former employee said. But documents and Lincoln
executives say the company's ties to religious leaders and dozens of other
prominent Iraqis is aimed also at enabling it to exercise influence in Iraqi
communities on behalf of clients, including the military.
"We do reach out to clerics," Paige Craig, a Lincoln executive vice president,
said in an interview. "We meet with local government officials and with local
businessmen. We need to have relationships that are broad enough and deep enough
that we can touch all the various aspects of society." He declined to discuss
specific projects the company has with the military or commercial clients.
"We have on staff people who are experts in religious and cultural matters," Mr.
Craig said. "We meet with a wide variety of people to get their input. Most of
the people we meet with overseas don't want or need compensation, they want a
dialogue."
Internal company financial records show that Lincoln spent about $144,000 on the
program from May to September. It is unclear how much of this money, if any,
went to the religious scholars, whose identities could not be learned. The
amount is a tiny portion of the contracts, worth tens of millions, that Lincoln
has received from the military for "information operations," but the effort is
especially sensitive.
Sunni religious scholars are considered highly influential within the country's
minority Sunni population. Sunnis form the core of the insurgency.
Each of the religious scholars underwent vetting before being brought into the
program to ensure that they were not involved in the insurgency, said a former
employee, who spoke on condition of anonymity because Lincoln's Pentagon
contract prohibits workers from discussing their activities. The identities of
the Sunni scholars have been kept secret to prevent insurgent reprisals, and
they were never taken to Camp Victory, the American base outside Baghdad where
Lincoln employees work with military personnel.
Lt. Col. Barry Johnson, a spokesman for the American military in Baghdad,
declined to comment.
After the disclosure in November that the military used Lincoln to plant
articles written by American troops in Iraqi newspapers, the Pentagon ordered an
investigation, led by Navy Rear Adm. Scott Van Buskirk.
Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top commander in Iraq, said that a
preliminary assessment made shortly after the military's information campaign
was disclosed concluded that the Army was "operating within our authorities and
the appropriate legal procedures."
Admiral Van Buskirk has finished his investigation, several Pentagon officials
said, but it has not been made public.
Lincoln recently sought approval from the military to make Sunni religious
leaders one of several "target audiences" of the propaganda effort in Iraq. A
Lincoln plan titled "Divide and Prosper" presented in October to the Special
Operations Command in Tampa, which oversees information operations, suggested
that reaching religious leaders was vital for reducing Sunni support for the
insurgency.
"Clerics exercise a great deal of influence over the people in their communities
and oftentimes it is the religious leaders who incite people to violence and to
support the insurgent cause," the company said in the proposal, a copy of which
was reviewed by The New York Times.
In some cases, "insurgent groups may provide Sunni leaders with financial
compensation in return for that cleric's loyalty and support," the proposal
said, adding that religious leaders are motivated by "a need to retain
patronage" and a "desire to maintain religious and moral authority."
Unlike in many other Middle Eastern countries, sermons by Iraqi imams are not
subject to government control, enabling them to speak "without fear of
repercussions," the document said.
The Special Operations Command said in a statement that it did not adopt the
Lincoln plan, choosing another contractor's proposal instead. When the Lincoln
Group was incorporated in 2004, using the name Iraqex, its stated purpose was to
provide support services for business development, trade and investment in Iraq.
But the company soon shifted to information warfare and psychological
operations, two former employees said. The company was awarded three new
Pentagon contracts, worth tens of millions of dollars, they said.
Payments to the scholars were originally part of Lincoln's contract to aid the
military with information warfare in Anbar Province. Known as the "Western
Missions" contract, it also called for producing radio and television
advertisements, Web sites, posters, and for placing advertisements and opinion
articles in Iraqi publications. In October, Lincoln was awarded a new contract
by the Pentagon for work in Iraq, including continued contact with Muslim
scholars.
Lincoln has also turned to American scholars and political consultants for
advice on the content of the propaganda campaign in Iraq, records indicate.
Michael Rubin, a Middle East scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a
Washington research organization, said he had reviewed materials produced by the
company during two trips to Iraq within the past two years.
"I visited Camp Victory and looked over some of their proposals or products and
commented on their ideas," Mr. Rubin said in an e-mailed response to questions
about his links to Lincoln. "I am not nor have I been an employee of the Lincoln
Group. I do not receive a salary from them."
He added: "Normally, when I travel, I receive reimbursement of expenses
including a per diem and/or honorarium." But Mr. Rubin would not comment further
on how much in such payments he may have received from Lincoln.
Mr. Rubin was quoted last month in The New York Times about Lincoln's work for
the Pentagon placing articles in Iraqi publications: "I'm not surprised this
goes on," he said, without disclosing his work for Lincoln. "Especially in an
atmosphere where terrorists and insurgents - replete with oil boom cash - do the
same. We need an even playing field, but cannot fight with both hands tied
behind our backs."
Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting from Baghdad, Iraq, for this
article.
Muslim Scholars Were Paid to Aid U.S. Propaganda, NYT, 3.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/02/politics/02propaganda.html
844 in U.S. Military Killed in Iraq in 2005
January 1, 2006
The New York Times
By DEXTER FILKINS
BAGHDAD, Iraq, Dec. 31 - At least 844 American service
members were killed in Iraq in 2005, nearly matching 2004's total of 848,
according to information released by the United States government and a
nonprofit organization that tracks casualties in Iraq.
The deaths of two Americans announced by the United States military on Friday -
a marine killed by gunfire in Falluja and a soldier killed by a roadside bomb in
Baghdad - brought the total killed since the war in Iraq began in March 2003 to
2,178. The total wounded since the war began is 15,955.
From Jan. 1, 2005 to Dec. 3, 2005, the most recent date for which numbers are
available, the number of Americans military personnel wounded in Iraq was 5,557.
The total wounded in 2004 was 7,989.
In 2005, the single bloodiest month for American soldiers and marines was
January, when 107 were killed and nearly 500 were wounded. At the time, American
forces were conducting numerous operations to secure the country for the
elections on Jan. 30. The second worst month was October, when 96 Americans were
killed and 603 wounded.
More than half of all 2005 American military deaths, 427, were caused by
homemade bombs, most planted along roadsides and detonated as vehicles passed.
American commanders have said that roadside bombs, the leading cause of death in
Iraq, have grown larger and more sophisticated. Many are set off by remote
detonators and are powerful enough to destroy heavily armored tanks and troop
carriers.
The totals were compiled by Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, a nonprofit group
that tracks American service members killed and wounded in Iraq. The Associated
Press, which keeps its own statistics, reported the year's death toll as
slightly lower, saying that 841 had been killed.
Death totals for Iraqis have been more difficult to estimate, and vary widely.
Iraq Body Count, an independent media-monitoring group, estimates that about
30,000 Iraqis have died since the war began in 2003.
On Saturday, violence flared across Iraq. In Khalis, north of Baghdad, a bomb
killed five members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Sunni political party that
defied insurgent threats and fielded candidates in the Dec. 15 election. Since
2003, at least 75 party members have been killed.
In central Baghdad, a roadside bomb struck an Iraqi police patrol, killing two
officers.
At Camp Victory, the American military headquarters just outside Baghdad, Gen.
Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged Iraqi political
leaders on Saturday to form a new government as quickly as possible to avoid the
kind of delay that stalled the political momentum after the vote last January.
"Clearly, the sooner that they're able to come to agreement on who their leaders
are going to be, the sooner that those leaders then can act to appoint the rest
of the country's key leadership," General Pace told reporters traveling with him
on a troop visit.
In historical terms, the number of casualties in Iraq is still relatively small.
At the height of the Vietnam War, the American military was sustaining 500
killed and wounded each week. At the Battle of the Somme in 1916, about 58,000
British soldiers were killed or wounded on the first day.
In interviews, American commanders have said the relatively unchanging number of
deaths in Iraq from 2004 to 2005 belies the progress that had been made here
against the guerrilla insurgency and in setting up democratic institutions.
Three nationwide votes were held this year.
Although the number of attacks against American and Iraqi forces in and around
Baghdad has grown over the past year - to about 28 per day now from about 22 a
year ago - only about 10 percent of those attacks inflict casualties, said Maj.
Gen. William G. Webster Jr., the commander of American forces in and around
Baghdad.
A year ago, about 25 percent of attacks inflicted casualties.
More than 400 car and suicide bombs struck the country in 2005, although the
number has dropped sharply in recent months. In April, for instance, there were
66 suicide and car bomb attacks, compared with 28 in November.
Eric Schmitt contributed reporting from Camp Victory, Iraq, for this article,
and an Iraqi employee of The New York Times contributed from Baghdad.
844 in U.S.
Military Killed in Iraq in 2005, NYT, 1.1.2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/international/middleeast/01iraq.html
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