History > 2006 > UK > Terrorism (I)
David Parkins
The Guardian p. 33
16.2.2006
British Prime Minister Tony Blair
Comment
Making bad law worse
Creating a new offence of glorifying terrorism is hypocritical
and a threat to
legitimate debate
Louise Christian The Guardian
Thursday February 16, 2006
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/feb/16/t
errorism.uk
Terror trial
hears tapes of plot to blow up
club
· Gang discussed UK targets and training, court told
· Bombing campaign 'was to be part of global jihad'
Friday May 26, 2006
Guardian
Sandra Laville
A British terror cell discussed blowing up the
Ministry of Sound nightclub in London as part of a bombing campaign to kill and
maim people in Britain as a contribution to the global jihad, the Old Bailey
heard yesterday.
One of the defendants said he believed the
gang, which the jury heard had links to al-Qaida, would not be blamed for
killing innocent people if they attacked the nightclub, which has a capacity of
1,800. In secret security recordings, Omar Khyam, 24, of Crawley, West Sussex,
was heard discussing targets as part of a terror campaign in Britain.
Another alleged plotter, Jawad Akbar, appeared to suspect that the men were
under surveillance. "Bruv, you don't think this place is bugged, do you?" he
asked. "No, I don't think this place is bugged bruv," Mr Khyam replied.
The recordings reveal that the men apparently discussed the best targets for an
attack in the UK, for which they could get training in camps in Pakistan. Mr
Khyam discussed targeting utility companies by using recruits with inside
knowledge to cut off electricity, water and gas power supplies across the
country.
Mr Akbar disagreed, suggesting that the Ministry of Sound nightclub would be a
softer target, the court heard yesterday.
"What about easy stuff where you don't need no experience and nothing, and you
could get a job, yeah, like for example the biggest nightclub in central London
where no one can even turn round and say 'oh they were innocent' those slags
dancing around?" Mr Akbar said.
He said that in the UK it was nightclubs and bars which were "really, really
big". "Trust me, then you will get the public talking yeah, yeah ... if you went
for the social structure where every Tom, Dick and Harry goes on a Saturday
night, yeah, that would be crazy, crazy thing man."
Mr Khyam asked: "If you get a job in a bar, yeah, or a club, say the Ministry of
Sound, what are you planning to do there then?" Mr Akbar replied: "Blow the
whole thing up.
Mr Khyam then said: "The resources from this country, the electricity, the gas,
going into alarm engineers, stuff like this yeah, that I'm saying is good, get
brothers in each and every field, from the gas to the electricity to the water
to the alarm engineers, everything."
Mr Akbar replied: "I think the club thing you could do, but the gas would be
much harder. There's people who even get in with their searching stuff, but it's
only the bouncers that search you." Mr Khyam replied: "The explosion in the
clubs, yeah, that's fine, bro, that's not a problem. The training for that is
available ... to get them into the Ministry of Sound really isn't difficult."
The court also heard from Gary Smart, the general manager of the Ministry of
Sound. If the packed club were to be attacked "it is clear that the consequences
could be devastating. With such a large number of people in such a confined
space, the impact could result in loss of life, injury or structural damage," Mr
Smart told the court.
During the recorded conversation, which the prosecution said occurred at Mr
Akbar's home in Uxbridge, west London, on February 22 2004, the men also
discussed the use of terror in the jihad. Mr Akbar said: "I still agree with you
on the point that terror is the best way and even the Qur'an says it, isn't it?
Yeah? I'm not denying that, yeah."
Mr Khyam and his brother Shujah Mahmood, 19, Mr Akbar, 22, and Waheed Mahmood,
34, all from Crawley; Salahuddin Amin, 31, of Luton, Bedfordshire; Anthony
Garcia, 23, of Ilford, London; and Nabeel Hussain, 21, of Horley, Surrey, deny
conspiring to cause explosions likely to endanger life between January 1 2003
and March 31 2004.
Mr Khyam, Mr Garcia and Mr Hussain also deny a charge under the Terrorism Act of
possessing 600kg (1,322lb) of ammonium nitrate fertiliser for terrorism. Mr
Khyam and Mr Mahmood deny possessing aluminium powder for terrorism.
The court has been told that the gang had links to al-Qaida and that some
members had trained at terror camps in Pakistan where they plotted to kill
people in Britain and practised making explosions using ammonium nitrate
fertiliser and aluminium powder.
The case continues.
Terror trial hears tapes of plot to blow up club, G, 26.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1783394,00.html
Ten held in police counter-terror raids
over claims of channelling cash to Iraq insurgency
· Targets include offices of Islamic charity
· MI5 involved in operation which used 500 police
Thursday May 25, 2006
Guardian
Riazat Butt, Vikram Dodd and Jeevan Vasagar
Ten people were arrested yesterday in a series of raids by counter-terrorism
police targeting the alleged funding and support of the insurgency in Iraq.
A total of 500 officers carried out raids on
19 addresses across England, including the offices of an Islamic charity which
is accused by the United States of funding international terrorism and of ties
to al-Qaida.
Police said they could not rule out that money from Britain was being used to
fund suicide bomb attacks in Iraq against UK and US forces and against
civilians.
The operation, which involved MI5, was led by Greater Manchester police, and
followed a year long investigation.
Three people were last night being held under the Terrorism Act, and five people
were arrested under immigration powers and face deportation because they
allegedly threaten national security. Two people were arrested and then released
without charge.
All those arrested were of Libyan origin. Police raids occurred in London,
Bolton, Birmingham, Middlesbrough, Liverpool and Manchester.
At the centre of the raids was a British-based charity called Sanabel, which
says it raises money to aid Muslims around the globe.
In February the US Treasury department froze its assets, alleging Sanabel raised
money for the jihad, and for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which in turn is
accused of links to al-Qaida. One of those arrested yesterday under immigration
powers was Tahir Nasuf, 44, who is listed by the Charity Commission as a trustee
of Sanabel.
Sanabel offices in Birmingham and Manchester and its personnel are believed to
have been monitored by anti-terrorism officers for some time before yesterday's
raid. Last night computers and financial documentation were being examined by
officers for possible links to terrorism - links the charity says do not exist.
In February, after the US published allegations against the charity, Mr Nasuf
said: "It is wrong what they said. I am just a volunteer worker. There is no
relationship, nothing at all. I have done nothing. Sanabel is nothing to do with
the other group. I am angry."
Yesterday, outside Mr Nasuf's Manchester home, his sister-in-law said the raid
had terrorised the family. "My sister told me that before fajr [early morning
prayer] policemen came to the house dressed in black. She was very scared, she
has four children, and didn't know what was going on.
"There was lots of shouting. They took her husband away, she doesn't know why.
He's been arrested before and he had done nothing wrong then."
Charity Commission records show that in the financial year ending in 2004
Sanabel spent around £44,000 on work it described as providing clean water and
education to children in the developing world.
The Guardian has learned that the raids came amid mounting concern among
counter-terrorism officials that funding and support for the Iraqi insurgency is
coming from Britain.
A counter-terrorism source said that investigations into fund raising are
finding that time after time money is going to Iraq, which the source described
as a "hotspot for us". The source said: "People involved in jihad need to have
money to live and travel. Money is also needed for bombs and other jihad
activity."
Michael Todd, chief constable of Greater Manchester police, said the raids were
not connected to any threat to the UK. "We are talking about the facilitation of
terrorism overseas. That could include funding, and providing support and
encouragement to terrorists.
"This is an intelligence-led operation. We have been gathering intelligence,
together with our security service colleagues, for at least a year, looking at
the funding and support of terrorist activities overseas."
Eyewitnesses to the raids described dramatic scenes. Leo Paredes, 27, a student,
was woken at 3am by the sound of police breaking down his neighbour's door in
south Manchester.
He said eight officers in black clothes and wearing masks knocked through the
front door while others went in the back. "They were smashing the front door
with a battering ram to try to break it down," he said. "It was like a movie."
Hassan Amiri, 17, who lives next door to the address that was raided, said he
was woken at 3am by police shouting at the back of the house.
"I looked out of the window and there were six or seven armed police officers in
black uniforms at the back of the house next door shouting 'Stand where you
are'. I didn't know what was going on until I heard on the news that it could be
terrorism. You don't expect that in your neighbourhood."
The Libyans arrested yesterday are not the first to be detained for allegedly
threatening national security. A leading British Libyan dissident yesterday
claimed Britain was being duped by the Libyan regime into arresting its
opponents.
Ali Zew, from the the National Conference of the Libyan Opposition, said: "The
regime can feed false information to Britain, and the regime has done so in the
past. Libyan dissidents in the UK have no connection to terrorism, they are just
against the regime."
Ten
held in police counter-terror raids over claims of channelling cash to Iraq
insurgency, G, 25.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1782517,00.html
Terror suspect numbers soar
MI5 source reveals a 'current, relentless and increasing' security threat since
7 July attacks as radical imam is set to be released from jail
Sunday May 14, 2006
The Observer
Antony Barnett, Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend
The number of Islamic terror suspects in Britain being targeted by the security
service MI5 has soared to 1,200, a 50 per cent rise since the London suicide
bombings last July.
In a stark warning about the threat posed by
Islamic radicals living in Britain, a senior intelligence source told The
Observer that some of the public and politicians were failing to realise the
risk facing the UK: 'In July 2005 we had 800 targets. I wish it was still at
that level.'
He said that MI5 had identified another 400 targets since the bombings,
suggesting that, rather than the threat to security from British-based
terrorists being reduced, it had escalated since the attacks which killed 52
people. In September 2001, the security services estimated the number of
UK-based terror suspects posing a 'risk to national security' at around 250, a
figure that now stands almost five times higher. The intelligence source offered
no explanation as the reason for the continued growth in Islamic radicalisation,
but said the threat was 'current, relentless and increasing'.
Disclosure of this dramatic rise in potential terror suspects comes as it
emerges that the radical imam who played a critical role in influencing one of
the 7 July bombers is to walk free from prison within weeks. Abdullah al-Faisal
was sentenced to seven years in prison in 2003 after being convicted of inciting
murder and racial hatred.
The government's official account of the 7 July bombings published last week
makes it clear that Jermaine Lindsay attended at least one of Faisal's lectures
and listened to his lectures on tapes.
At his trial a court was told how Faisal, who branded non-Muslims cockroaches
that should be exterminated, called on his followers to learn how to use rifles,
fly planes and use missiles to kill 'unbelievers'. In one tape, Faisal - who
attended Brixton Mosque in south London, where the shoebomber Richard Reid met
Zacharias Moussaoui, the only man to be jailed for his part in the 11 September
attacks on America - tells Muslim women to prepare their children for jihad by
giving them toy guns.
The Observer understands Faisal is soon to be released having served little more
than half of his sentence. In preparation for his release, an order for
deportation to his native Jamaica was filed by Home Office officials on 30
March. His lawyers are believed to have made representations to the Home Office
in an attempt to secure his release on parole pending deportation. The move is
likely to raise concerns that Faisal will be free to preach his extremist views
once he has been returned to Jamaica, from where a number of Islamic terrorists
have originated, including Lindsay.
Meanwhile this week lawyers acting on behalf of the family of one of the victims
of the London bombings will notify the Home Secretary, John Reid, they are
launching legal action over the government's response to the 7 July attacks.
Having sought legal opinion following last Thursday's publication of the two
investigations into the attacks, City law firm Leigh Day & Co will commence a
legal challenge against the government's decision not to hold a public inquiry
into the atrocities. Opposition politicians joined survivors of the attacks and
victims' families calling for such an inquiry.
Acting on behalf of the family of Behnaz Mozakka, 47, who was killed when
Lindsay detonated his explosive on the Piccadilly line tube, lawyers will cite a
number of key unanswered question that the government has a 'duty to answer'.
Their case will be brought using human rights legislation which indicates that a
state has a duty to investigate where it can be claimed that a government could
bear some responsibility.
Terror suspect numbers soar, O, 14.5.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1774409,00.html
Evidence points to al-Qaida link to 7/7
bombs
Friday May 12, 2006
Guardian
Alan Travis and Richard Norton-Taylor
There is now "considerable" circumstantial
evidence that al-Qaida was linked to the July 7 London bombings that killed 52
innocent people, the government claimed for the first time last night.
The new home secretary, John Reid, said the
evidence published yesterday in the first official accounts by the police and
security services of the events of 7/7 showed that while there was no "direct
verifiable" al-Qaida link, the circumstantial evidence was considerable.
Mr Reid's evidence included:
· The ringleader, Mohammed Sidique Khan, visited Pakistan and possibly
Afghanistan in 2003 and is likely to have had training and met al-Qaida
contacts. Planning for the attack started shortly after a return visit with the
second bomber, Shehzad Tanweer, between November 2004 and February 2005.
· The way they acted was "more than amateurish" with the "compilation of a
simple explosive but a tragically, awesomely effective one".
· Khan's "martyrdom" video, broadcast on al-Jazeera, in which he paid tribute to
al-Qaida and "one or two of their connections". Mr Reid said: "It is quite
possible for that organisation to claim any succesful act of terrorism as that
elevates them, but there is considerable circumstantial evidence there."
The existence of a firm al-Qaida link has always been denied.
The two reports published yesterday -the Home Office narrative of 7/7 and the
parliamentary intelligence and security committee inquiry - show that Khan and
Tanweer had time and again crossed the radar of the security services as
"peripheral figures" in other inquiries but they were not classed as key
targets.
Only limited attempts were made to investigate them because resources meant
there were more pressing priorities who were considered more dangerous at the
time. Ministers insisted that none of the four bombers were ever "fully
identified" by the security services although the MPs detail at least one missed
opportunity.
Evidence points to al-Qaida link to 7/7 bombs, 12.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1773194,00.html
Bombers slipped through net of watching MI5
· Security service forced to prioritise
separate investigation
· Greater resources no guarantee future attacks would be foiled
Friday May 12, 2006
Guardian
Ian Cobain, Richard Norton-Taylor and Rosie Cowan
A lack of resources allowed the July 7 bombers to slip through the security net,
according to two reports published yesterday, and police and the intelligence
services are highly unlikely to be able to prevent all similar attacks in the
future.
Two of the four suicide bombers had come to
the attention of the security service, MI5, time and again, yet the reports'
authors concluded that there was no reason for the authorities to have known
that they posed a threat.
While one report urged greater cooperation with intelligence agencies overseas,
it also concluded that it "seems highly unlikely that it will be possible to
stop all attacks", even if the UK authorities were to become more "intrusive" in
the way they carried out their responsibilities.
Despite media reports based on leaks prior to publication, which suggested that
the group had no links to al-Qaida, the reports from the Home Office and the
cross-party Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) make clear that the four
men were unlikely to have been acting unassisted.
They probably received expert bombmaking assistance from an unknown individual,
and they also had a series of highly suspicious contacts with an unknown
individual or individuals in Pakistan for several months before the bombings.
However, 10 months after the attacks that killed 52 and injured more than 700,
it is clear from the two reports that many questions remain unanswered.
Police and the security service still cannot be sure whether anyone else was
involved, who they may have been, or the role that they may have played. In
addition, the bombers probably carried out a test explosion but no one knows
where or when.
David Davis, the shadow home secretary, said the reports "raised more questions
than answers", while victims' relatives renewed their calls for a public
inquiry. John Reid, the home secretary, said the entire operation had cost less
than £8,000, and had been carried out by men driven by a desire for martyrdom
and "fierce antagonism to perceived injustices by the west against Muslims".
He ruled out a public inquiry, and said that he intended to meet relatives of
victims to give them a chance to ask questions about the findings.
The ISC report said the security service had come across two of the bombers,
Mohammed Sidique Khan, 30, a classroom assistant from Dewsbury, West Yorkshire,
and Shezhad Tanweer, 22, from Leeds, while investigating other terrorism cases.
They had also been observed in Pakistan, where it was "likely that they had some
contact with al-Qaida figures", according to the committee.
The report reveals that before the bombings a photograph was shown to a number
of detainees being held in an unidentified foreign country, but it was not shown
to a detainee who later identified a press photograph as being of Khan. That,
says the committee, was a "missed opportunity". The committee also reveals that
in February 2005 MI5 received a report that two men had travelled to Afghanistan
in the late 1990s or early 2000s. It was only after the London bombings one was
identified as Khan.
A telephone number of a third bomber, Germaine Lindsay, 19, was discovered in
MI5's files after the attacks, although the reason for its presence is not made
clear by either report. Intelligence officials say the phone was recovered from
Lindsay's home after the attacks, but it was unclear whether other people may
have used it.
In an important finding, the committee says MI5 could probably have identified
Khan and Tanweer before the attacks if they had investigated the two men more
fully. But, it adds - and this is a central theme of the committee's report -
priority was given to other terror suspects considered more dangerous. With the
resources at their disposal, MI5 could not have followed Khan and Tanweer, who
were regarded as "peripheral" figures and had not been identified until after
the bombings.
As far back as 2003, MI5 had on its records a phone number registered to a
"Siddeque Khan"and details of contacts between that number and an individual
under investigation.
A review of surveillance data showed that Khan and Tanweer "had been among a
group of men who had held meetings with others under security service
investigation in 2004".
MI5 told the committee there was no evidence that these meetings had been
connected with terrorist plans, the report says. But in 2004 two men identified
after the bombings as being Khan and Tanweer had attended a number of meetings
which were under surveillance by MI5 as part of an "important and substantial
ongoing investigation".
The committee states: "The security service did not seek to investigate or
identify them at the time although we have been told that it would probably have
been possible to do so had the decision been taken.
"The judgment was made (correctly with hindsight) that they were peripheral to
the main investigation and there was no intelligence to suggest they were
interested in planning an attack against the UK.
"Intelligence at the time suggested that their focus was training and insurgency
operations in Pakistan and schemes to defraud financial institutions."
Later in 2004 MI5 launched a new investigation into individuals who had been on
the periphery of the earlier operation. Two of the men are now known to have
been Khan and Tanweer. Even then, however, "resources were soon diverted again
to higher priorities".
The committee concludes: "If more resources had been in place sooner, the
chances of preventing the July attacks could have increased."
It adds: "Greater coverage in Pakistan, or more resources generally in the UK,
might have alerted the agencies to the intentions of the July 7 group."
But police and MI5 had "more pressing responsibilities" at the time, including
the need to thwart a known plot to attack targets within the UK. It was
"understandable", the committee said, that "it was decided not to investigate
[Khan and Tanweer] further, or seek to identify them".
Main conclusions
The Home Office
· The four bombers more than likely had expert bombmaking assistance.
· It was a simple operation, using easily available material, and probably cost
no more than £8,000.
· There were a series of suspicious contacts with person or persons unknown in
Pakistan prior to the attacks.
· "The extent to which others may have been involved in indoctrinating the
group, have known what they were planning, or been involved in the planning, is
unknown," the report says.
· Bombers motivated by perceived injustices in the west's treatment of Muslims
and desire for martyrdom.
Intelligence and security committee
· Two of the bombers - Khan and Tanweer - had crossed MI5's radar several times
while meeting other suspects.
· Decision not to fully investigate due to lack of resources time when another
attack was being planned.
· Chances of preventing the attacks might have been greater had MI5 taken
"different investigative decisions".
· The decision not to investigate further was "understandable" given the lack of
resources.
· Three planned attacks against the UK have been thwarted since 7/7 but police
and the security service are unlikely to prevent all future attacks.
Bombers slipped through net of watching MI5, G, 12.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1773036,00.html
British-born terror shocked police
Friday May 12, 2006
Guardian
Richard Norton-Taylor and Rosie Cowan
The London bombings were a wake-up call for the security and intelligence
agencies and the police who who had been "working off the wrong script",
yesterday's report reveals.
They were shocked that a group of four
"home-grown" young men were prepared to kill innocent civilians and themselves
in a suicide attack. Police officers told the parliamentary intelligence and
security committee that what they learned in July had "overturned their
understanding of ... those who might become radicalised to the point of
committing terrorist attacks".
"We were working off a script which actually has been completely discounted from
what we know as reality," Andy Hayman, the Metropolitan police officer in
overall charge of terrorist operations told the committee in a private session.
Sir David Pepper, director of GCHQ, the government's eavesdropping centre, told
the committee: "What happened in July was a demonstration that there were ***
[deleted] conspiracies going on about which we essentially knew nothing, and
that rather sharpens the perception of how big, if I can use [the US defence
secretary Donald] Rumsfeld's term, the unknown unknown was."
Paul Murphy, the chairman of the committee and the former Northern Ireland
secretary, said yesterday that in many ways the most worrying aspects of the
inquiry into the London attacks was how "plots were hatched in the great cities
of England". Dari Taylor, a committee member, said she had been "startled" by
the speed of the radicalisation.
The July attacks, the committee says, "emphasised that there was no clear
profile of a British Islamist terrorist".
Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the head of MI5, told the committee that it had
been a surprise that the "first big attack in the UK for 10 years was a suicide
attack". Such attacks were still not expected to be "the norm", a view expressed
by the Joint Intelligence Committee shortly before the London bombings.
Yesterday's parliamentary committee report questions this judgment. There were
clearly grounds for concern that some British citizens might engage in suicide
attacks, it says, as the "shoe bombers" and the British-born Tel Aviv bombers
had done.
The difficulty in spotting those likely to become involved in al-Qaida-style
terrorism is highlighted by the Home Office narrative. It points out that there
is "no consistent profile to help identify those who may be vulnerable to
radicalisation". Those involved have come from all types of ethnic and social
backgrounds. Some were relatively well-off and well-educated, some were not.
Some had suffered abuse or hardship as children or had been involved in petty
crime, others were law-abiding and had stable upbringings.
As for the process of radicalisation, the report says "attendance at a mosque
linked to extremists may be a factor".
But it goes on: "Evidence suggests that extremists are increasingly moving away
from mosques in order to conduct their activities in private homes or other
premises to avoid detection." The report adds that extremists are making more
use of the internet.
In many cases, the role of a mentor and the bonding of a group of fellow
extremists appears to have been critical. "Mentors may first identify
individuals from within larger groups who may be susceptible to radicalisation;
then 'groom' them privately in small groups until individuals in the group begin
feeding off each other's radicalism."
There seem to be several common factors in this "grooming". The initial
conversations may focus on being a good Muslim, and talk of injustices to
Muslims around the world, but with no overt reference to extremist propaganda at
first.
"They will then move on to what extremists claim is religious justification for
violent jihad ... and if suicide attacks are the intention - the importance of
martyrdom in demonstrating commitment to Islam."
The narrative concludes: "There is little evidence of overt compulsion. The
extremists appear rather to rely on the development of individual commitment and
group bonding and solidarity."
British-born terror shocked police, G, 12.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1773030,00.html
3.30pm update
Two 7/7 bombers were under surveillance
Thursday May 11, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
David Batty and agencies
Two of the July 7 suicide bombers were under
surveillance by British intelligence but were not fully investigated because of
a lack of resources, a parliamentary committee said today.
The cross-party intelligence and security
committee (ISC) found "intelligence gaps" in security services monitoring of
potential terrorist threats to the UK.
However, it concluded there was no evidence of an "intelligence failure" that
could have prevented the attacks on London's transport system.
The committee found that MI5 officers assigned to investigate Mohammed Sidique
Khan, the ringleader of the four suicide bombers, and Shehzad Tanweer, who
carried out the Aldgate tube bombing, were diverted to another anti-terrorist
operation.
"Prior to the 7 July attacks, the security service had come across Siddeque Khan
and Shazad Tanweer on the peripheries of other surveillance and investigative
operations," its report said.
"At that time, their identities were unknown to the security service and there
was no appreciation of their subsequent significance.
"As there were more pressing priorities at the time, including the need to
disrupt known plans to attack the UK, it was decided not to investigate them
further or seek to identify them.
"When resources became available, attempts were made to find out more about
these two and other peripheral contacts, but these resources were soon diverted
back to what were considered to be higher investigative priorities."
The committee said the chances of preventing the July 7 attacks could have been
increased if MI5 had fully investigated Tanweer and Khan, but concluded the
decision not to do so was "understandable" given other terrorist threats.
It added that a lack of resources had hindered making further investigations
into the pair.
After the attacks, MI5 discovered a telephone number for Germaine Lindsay, who
bombed a train between King's Cross and Russell Square, in its files, the ISC
noted.
The home secretary, John Reid, today set out to parliament the findings of a
Home Office "narrative" of the July 7 attacks.
It concluded that the four bombers were motivated by "a mixture of anger at
perceived injustices by the west against Muslims and a desire for martyrdom".
The bombs were made from readily available materials, and the whole operation
cost the bombers less than £8,000 to prepare and execute.
Mr Reid told MPs it had been difficult to defend the UK against terrorism
perpetrated by "ordinary British citizens with little known history of extremist
views, far less violent intentions".
"At least three were apparently well integrated," he said. "Their
radicalisation, to the extent that we know how and where it happened, was
conducted away from places with any obvious association with extremism.
"The willingness of these men to use suicide bombing as their method and to
attack vulnerable, civilian targets ... made them doubly difficult to defend
against.
"That is not a comfortable message. But it is important that we are honest about
it if we are to defend ourselves against the threat effectively."
Mr Reid ruled out a parliamentary inquiry into the bombings, but said he would
be convening a series of meetings with families of the victims.
The reports were published as the security service MI5 announced it would focus
its resources on preventing international terrorism in future, handing over its
work on serious crime cases to the Serious Organised Crime Agency, set up last
month.
Michael Henning, a broker from Kensington, west London, who survived one of the
bombs, said it was a "scandal" that a lack of resources might have allowed the
attacks to happen.
The ISC highlighted how the number of suspected terrorists known to British
intelligence had risen substantially since the September 11 2001 attacks on New
York and Washington and the Iraq war.
Between September 11 2001 and July 2005, the number of "primary investigative
targets" rose from 250 to 800.
Today's report warned that more still needed to be done to improve the way the
UK's security services and police special branches work together to tackle the
threat of "home-grown" terrorism.
It also criticised the government's joint intelligence committee's March 2005
assessment that suicide bombings "would not become the norm in Europe",
suggesting this could have led security agencies to underestimate the possible
threat of "home-grown" terrorism.
"We are concerned that this judgment could have had an impact on the alertness
of the authorities to the kind of threat they were facing and their ability to
respond," the report said.
"We remain concerned that, across the whole of the counter-terrorism community,
the development of the home-grown threat and the radicalisation of British
citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking.
"A common and better level of understanding of these things among all those
closely involved in identifying and countering the threat against the UK,
whether that be the security service, or the police, or other parts of the
government, is critical in order to be able to counter the threat effectively
and prevent attacks."
The committee said greater co-operation between Britain and Pakistan could also
have alerted the intelligence agencies to the July 7 bombers' plans.
In particular, it identified "intelligence gaps" between the two countries over
visits to Pakistan by Khan and Tanweer between 2004 and 2005 to contact
extremist groups and attend training camps.
The Home Office report added that the pair were assessed as "likely to have met
al-Qaida figures during this visit.
But the ISC noted MI5 had discounted the theory that a terrorist mastermind had
fled the country before the London bombings were carried out.
Mr Reid told MPs he would be developing consultations with Britain's Muslim
community to "fight the distortion of Islam which turns young people into
terrorists".
There would be an "inevitable" rise in intrusive activity by security services
in the face of the terror threat, the ISC warned.
However, it added that even with greater resources and more investigations, it
would be "unlikely" that all future attacks could be prevented.
The committee chairman, the former Northern Ireland secretary Paul Murphy, said:
"We found that there was no prior warning from intelligence, domestic or
foreign, of the plans to attack on July 7.
"None of the four bombers had been identified by the intelligence security
agencies as a terrorist threat.
"The fact that the attacks were not prevented showed that there were and are
clear areas for improvement."
The committee concluded that "it was not unreasonable" to reduce the threat
level to the UK from "severe general" to "substantial" given there was "no
specific intelligence of 7 July plot nor of any other group with a current
credible plot".
However, it raised concerned that the reduction in the threat level was unlikely
to have made any difference to the alertness and preparedness of the security
services and police.
"We question the usefulness of a system in which changes can be made to threat
levels with little or no practical effect," said the committee.
A revamp of the terror alert system should be undertaken to better inform the
authorities and the public about the level of threat faced, it recommended.
"This will help avoid inappropriate reassurance about the level of threat in the
absence of intelligence of a current plot," the report said.
The Home Office report also revealed new details about the London bombings.
Bomber Hasib Hussain stopped to buy batteries before blowing up the Number 30
bus in Tavistock Square, possibly indicating he had difficulty setting off his
device.
Two
7/7 bombers were under surveillance, G, 11.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1772529,00.html
11.15am
More resources 'could have stopped July 7
attacks'
Thursday May 11, 2006
Guardian Unlimited
Staff and agencies
The chances of preventing the July 7 London bombings could have been increased
if the security services had been given more resources, a parliamentary
committee said today.
The cross-party intelligence and security
committee (ISC) also warned that more still needed to be done to improve the way
the UK's security services and police special branches work together to tackle
the threat of "home-grown" terrorism.
It said the chances of preventing the bombings on three tube trains and a bus
might have been greater had different investigative decisions been made by the
security services between 2003 and 2005.
The report confirmed that Mohammed Sidique Khan, the ringleader of the four
suicide bombers who carried out the attacks, had been under surveillance by
British intelligence but was not fully investigated.
MI5 officers assigned to investigate him were diverted to another anti-terrorist
operation.
However, the committee said his true identity had not been revealed, and it was
only after the attacks had taken place that the service was able to identify
him.
M15 had come across Khan and another of the bombers, Shehzad Tanweer, on the
periphery of other surveillance operations.
"Nonetheless we conclude that in light of the other priority investigations
being conducted and the limitations on security services resources the decisions
not to give greater investigative priority to these two individuals were
understandable," the report said.
"As there were more pressing priorities at the time, including the need to
disrupt known plans to attack the UK, it was decided not to investigate them
further or seek to identify them.
"When resources became available, attempts were made to find out more about
these two and other peripheral contacts, but these resources were soon diverted
back to what were considered to be higher investigative priorities."
The ISC ruled out an "intelligence failure" being to blame for the failure of
security services to prevent the July 7 bombings.
But it found there were "intelligence gaps", including a lack of cooperation
between Britain and Pakistan over visits by two of the 7/7 bombers to Pakistan
to contact extremist groups and attend training camps.
"Greater coverage in Pakistan, or more resources generally in the UK, might have
alerted the agencies to the intentions of the July 7 group," it said.
However, the report discounted the theory that a terrorist mastermind had fled
the country before the London bombings were carried out.
The report was published as the security service MI5 announced it was suspending
work on serious crime cases to focus its resources on preventing international
terrorism.
Michael Henning, a broker from Kensington, west London, who survived one of the
bombs, said it was a "scandal" that a lack of resources might have allowed the
attacks to happen.
The committee recommended a more transparent threat level and alert system,
warning there would be an "inevitable" rise in intrusive activity by security
services in the face of the terror threat.
It also recommended a revamp of the terror alert system but said it should
recognise the limitations of intelligence gathering and that attacks could be at
the planning stage without being detected.
"We recommend that these limits are reflected in a more standardised and
formalised way within the threat level system and in all threat level reports,"
the report said.
"This will help avoid inappropriate reassurance about the level of threat in the
absence of intelligence of a current plot."
More
resources 'could have stopped July 7 attacks', G, 11.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/attackonlondon/story/0,,1772529,00.html
Guantánamo is symbol of injustice, says
Goldsmith
Thursday May 11, 2006
Guardian
Richard Norton-Taylor
Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, last night called for the immediate
closure of Guantánamo Bay in the most full-blown attack on the US detention
centre by a member of the government.
Going far further than cabinet ministers,
notably Tony Blair, have done in their criticism, he described the existence of
the camp on Cuba as "unacceptable".
He added: "It is time, in my view, that it should close. Not only would it, in
my personal opinion, be right to close Guantánamo as a matter of principle, I
believe it would also help to remove what has become a symbol to many - right or
wrong - of injustice."
The "historic tradition of the United States as a beacon of freedom, liberty and
of justice deserves the removal of this symbol", he said.
Speaking at a conference on international terrorism at the Royal United Services
Institute in London - at which he defended the government's succession of
anti-terror laws - Lord Goldsmith said it was "essential in some cases to be
flexible" and accept some limitation of rights. But he said: "There are certain
principles on which there can be no compromise. Fair trial is one of those."
That was the reason, he said, why the government was unable to accept the US
military tribunals proposed for those detained at Guantánamo Bay. Lord
Goldsmith's remarks reflect growing anger among lawyers about Guantánamo Bay.
Last week, Lord Justice Latham and Mr Justice Tugendhat said evidence that
British residents held in the camp were deprived of their fundamental rights was
a "powerful" argument for demanding that the government insist on the release of
British residents there. But they added: "Decisions affecting foreign policy are
a forbidden area" for the courts.
The Bush administration has consistently defended the treatment of detainees at
Guantánamo, insisting that its existence is legal under international law.
Lord Goldsmith last night described the European convention on human rights,
which imposes an absolute ban on torture, as "the bedrock of protection for
fundamental rights in Europe".
However, he questioned whether Britain should be stopped from deporting foreign
terrorist suspects to countries where they may be tortured if they pose a risk
to the British public.
Guantánamo is symbol of injustice, says Goldsmith, G, 11.5.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guantanamo/story/0,,1772226,00.html
7/7 ringleader 'had direct link with terror
cell'
Sunday May 7, 2006
The Observer
Antony Barnett, Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend
Britain's intelligence services will face a
fresh barrage of criticism on Thursday when a parliamentary committee publishes
a report into the London terror attacks that shows a direct link between the
bombers' ringleader and a terrorist cell.
The Parliamentary Intelligence and Security
Committee (ISC) has been studying the lessons of the 7 July bombings and will
make wide-ranging recommendations on how the security services should adapt to
the changing face of terrorism.
Its report will be published alongside the government's official account into
the bombings, which confirms that the four bombers - all from the north of
England - carried out a cheap and simple plot to bomb London using techniques
they had found on the internet.
The ISC has found there was a direct link between the bombers' ringleader,
Sidique Khan, who killed six people when he blew himself up on a tube train at
Edgware Road, and a terrorist cell that had been under surveillance by the
security services.
The revelation will prove damaging. Previously it was believed Khan was linked
to the cell only through a third party. That he had direct links to the group
under surveillance raises questions over why he was not placed under closer
supervision.
After the London bombings, it emerged that Khan travelled to Pakistan, where he
met with radical Muslim groups. But the committee heard that, though the
intelligence agencies had been monitoring Khan in the UK, they did not believe
him to be a terrorist threat, instead thinking he was intent on committing
fraud.
The ISC report also looks at how the Foreign Office deals with warnings from
overseas of potential attacks. It raises questions over the paucity of
intelligence-sharing between British and Pakistani intelligence services.
According to those familiar with its contents, the report will also say that
intelligence failures surrounding the London bombings were chiefly down to a
lack of resources.
7/7
ringleader 'had direct link with terror cell', O, 7.5.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1769381,00.html
The real story of 7/7
It was England's worst terrorist attack, killing 52 people and injuring more
than 700. This week, the Home Office publishes its official account of the
London suicide bombings of 7 July. Using police and intelligence records, Mark
Townsend presents the definitive account of how four friends from northern
England changed the face of western terrorism
Sunday May 7, 2006
The Observer
3am Hasib Hussain rolls sleepily from the sofa
in the living room of his parents' home in Holbeck, Leeds. Dressed in the grey
T-shirt, jeans and trainers that would become familiar to millions, the
18-year-old wanders through the red-bricked terraces of Beeston and waits
outside the front door of his best friend, Shehzad Tanweer.
3.15am In a deserted and dark Colwyn Road,
Hussain and Tanweer, 22, stand beside a silver-blue Nissan Micra that Tanweer
had hired days earlier. Although their movements at this stage are not captured
on CCTV, it is thought they are now joined by Sidique Khan, 30, whose role as a
primary school teaching assistant in Beeston had earned the respect of those
still sleeping in the surrounding streets.
3.30am After a sort drive across south Leeds, the trio pull up outside 18
Alexandra Grove, Hyde Park. Inside, lying in the bath upstairs, is the
bomb-making factory that Khan had put together using recipes from the internet.
Primitive in essence, the peroxide-based explosives were made from drain
cleaner, bleach and acetone, bought without attracting suspicion in nearby
shops. Costing a few hundred pounds, the London bombs, based on a derivative of
TNT called triacetone triperoxide or TATP, were paid for by Khan. No evidence
exists of support from al-Qaeda. Speculation that the four suicide bombers used
the services of an Egyptian chemist studying at Leeds University are dismissed
in the Home Office narrative, to be published on Thursday.
3:45am The trio carefully load five identical black rucksacks into the boot of
the Nissan Micra. Each contains 10lb of explosive material with detonators
packed inside plastic bottles, which in turn are packaged within containers from
a nearby garden centre.
4am-5am Speed cameras track the car heading south through the city's leafy
suburbs. To their left they pass Beeston, where Khan lives, an impoverished
district of Leeds soon to become the focus of the world's media. The bombers
join the southbound M1 at junction 40 and their progress is tracked as they
journey south along the spine of England.
4.30am Germaine Lindsay says goodbye to his wife Samantha Lewthwaite, 21,
heavily pregnant with their second child, and leaves their rented semi-detached
home in Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, in a hired red Fiat. Negotiating the B489,
Lindsay arrives at Luton train station around 5am. The 19-year-old attaches a
pay-and-display ticket to the vehicle's windscreen, from which DNA would later
be extracted to identify his remains.
6:30am After 160 miles on the M1, the Nissan Micra turns off at junction 11,
arriving at Luton train station car park at around 6:50am. There, amid the first
of the day's commuters, is the imposing frame of Lindsay, a carpet fitter from
Huddersfield. Like the others, Lindsay is judged in the narrative to have been
exasperated by western foreign policy. Palestine, Chechyna and, in particular
Iraq, are cited as factors motivating their deadly mission.
7am The four don their military-style rucksacks in the increasingly busy car
park. Khan had loaded the Nissan Micra with more explosives than required.
Contrary to speculation though, no fifth bomber was ever expected to carry a
fifth rucksack of explosives holding two nail-encased bottles that were later
found wedged beneath the front passenger seat. In the boot 14 components for
explosive devices are also left. CCTV cameras, designed to capture car thieves,
film the four engaged in a final prayer.
7.21am Looking like day-trippers, the four stroll onto the southbound platform
of Luton station. Leading the group is Hussain, his hands tucked in pockets.
Lindsay follows, his white trainers poking from beneath a pair of loose jeans.
Khan comes next, with only a white cap visible. Bringing up the rear is Tanweer,
who had spent the previous night playing cricket. Tanweer appears relaxed, his
rucksack slung over one shoulder.
7:40am The four bombers catch a Thameslink train, which winds through the
affluent commuter belt of Hertfordshire towards King's Cross.
8:26am The quartet are captured walking across the concourse of London's busiest
station. They are chatting; Hussain is laughing. Minutes later, they are huddled
in a final, earnest conversation.
8.42am Tanweer catches the Circle Line east towards the heart of the City,
entering the second carriage of six on train number 204 where he stands by its
rear sliding doors.
8.43am Khan boards Circle Line train number 216 headed west. He stands by its
first set of double doors in the second carriage.
8.49am Lindsay gets onto Piccadilly Line train number 311 travelling towards the
West End and stands by rear doors in the front carriage. The train is described
as 'extraordinarily full'. More than 900 passengers are crammed on board.
Hussain, meanwhile, waits for a Northern Line service towards Camden.
8.50am Tanweer places his rucksack on the floor around 40 seconds after the tube
pulls out from Liverpool Street. Twenty feet below Spitalfields' historical
streets, the cricketer detonates his device. Yards away, Michael, a consultant,
witnesses a 'flash of orange-yellow light and what appeared to be silver
streaks, which I think was some of the glass going across.' Then, silence and
darkness. Smothered in blood, Michael assumed he was dying.
8.51am Khan lowers his rucksack onto the floor next to his carriage's rear
sliding doors less than 20 seconds after the train leaves Edgware Road station.
Moments later, passengers recall 'an orange fireball' sweeping through
carriages. John McDonald, a teacher, standing yards from where Khan killed
himself, said: 'Small splintered pieces of glass were sticking in my head and
face. I could not breathe; my lungs were burning.' Above ground, London Fire
Brigade receive the first emergency call.
8.53am Lindsay's delayed train leaves King's Cross three minutes after the
bombers' agreed deadline for simultaneous detonation. Train 311 has travelled
just 261m towards Russell Square when Lindsay detonates his pack 20m below the
district of St Pancras. Again, passengers hear a violent bang. For the third
time in a matter of minutes, pitch blackness descended on a packed crowd of tube
passengers.
8:55am Panic engulfs train 216, trapped below Paddington Basin. The low groans
of the dying are heard. Shrieks emanate from outside carriages as passengers are
hurled from the tube by the blast. McDonald sees a man known only as Stan
trapped inside the hole where Khan had detonated his device. 'Stan was calm and
conscious and looking at me.'
9am A broken-down train having thwarted his intention to catch the Northern
Line, Hussain resurfaces, looking bewildered and bemused, onto the King's Cross
concourse and stumbles into the first signs of pandemonium. The teenager wanders
absent-mindedly into Boots the chemist before leaving the station.
9:06am Inside train 206, passengers check bodies for a pulse. At least four are
deemed dead. As the dust clears, a shaft of light illuminates Stan. His shirt
has been blown off, the lower half of his charred body disappears beneath the
mangled train floor. 'It was very peaceful and serene. The maintenance light
from the tube threw a soft beam of light onto Stan's face,' said McDonald.
9.10am Emergency services are called to the underground. Moments later, the
capital's alert system, devised in the wake of 9/11, is activated.
9.12am Passengers from train 204 fumble through the tunnel to Liverpool Street,
past the twisted remains of the second carriage. Michael remembers bodies on the
track. 'Two were motionless; one was just showing signs of movement.' In the
gloom, he passes a woman blankly cradling the head of a hideously injured
commuter. 'The whole body dynamic looked wrong, the way the lady was lying.' She
is Martine Wright. She has lost both her legs above the knee. For another hour
the 33-year-old will be held in the gloom, the last person to be pulled alive
from the Aldgate tube bombing.
9.15am Amid fears more explosions will follow, Transport for London chiefs
decide to evacuate the entire underground system for the first time in the
network's history. A series of 'bangs' is explained by a massive, mysterious
power surge on the network. Seemingly alone in the darkness, McDonald attempts
to keep Stan alive. 'I kept on telling him not to worry. I asked that, if he
understood me, to blink his eyes twice, which he did.'
9:16am First passengers to escape train 311 reach Russell Square after 15-minute
walk through tunnel. Many are injured, some have blood pouring from their ears.
Commuters claim no ambulance or doctors are waiting for them. Chaos descends
upon the capital. Metropolitan police told by the underground control centre
that explosions have occurred.
9:10am Hussain wanders along the gridlocked Euston Road. He calls Khan. There is
no answer. He dials Tanweer. Again nothing. Lindsay, too, is incommunicado. He
leaves messages for all three, the youngster's tone increasingly frantic. At the
same time, TfL change their explanation of events from 'power surge' to 'network
emergency'. Scotland Yard announce there have been seven major 'incidents'.
9:25am Those wounded in the Aldgate blast taken by bus with police escorts to
the Royal London hospital. Meanwhile, on train 216, McDonald draws strength from
Stan's bravery. 'I could see he was dying from his injuries. He never shouted or
cried. He knew he was dying, he remained calm and peaceful.'
9:30am More than 150 bleeding and soot-smothered passengers emerge from Edgware
Road station and congregate outside a nearby Marks & Spencer store. Former
fireman Paul Dadge ushers Davinia Turrell, 24, from the scene as she clutches a
surgical burns mask to her face. The photograph of the 'mask woman' becomes the
first iconic image of 7 July.
9.33am Half-a-mile-away Hussain boards number 30 bus which has been diverted off
the now closed Euston Road. As the double-decker crawls south along Woburn
Place, Hussain sits down at the rear of the upper floor.
9.35am Aboard train 216, two passengers appear from the gloom and, taking
guidance from McDonald, squeeze beneath the second carriage and finally free
Stan. 'One of the men was calling Stan's pulse to me, which was fading and
finally stopped. He died being held by his fellow passengers. They laid him down
gently on the track.'
9:38am Bus passengers note a peculiarly distracted 'man of Mediterranean
appearance' who keeps dipping into his rucksack at the rear of the number 30 bus
to Hackney.
9.40am British Transport Police announce major incidents on the underground at
five stations. Scores of ambulances arrive at affected stations.
9.47am Bomb explodes on number 30 bus in Tavistock Square outside the British
Medical Association. Two minutes later, police receive a 999 call from the
scene. 'There's people lying on the road. There's people trying to get out. I
think there's an ambulance on the way, but there's people dead and everything,'
said one.
Here the Home Office narrative ends. Within hours, Islamic terrorist groups
attempt to claim responsibility. That the perpetrators might be four British men
acting alone is not contemplated.
10.00pm More than 12 hours later, in the lounge of a terraced home in Holbeck,
Leeds, a mother is fretting. Her teenage son was meant to be in London for a
night out with 'mates'. Unable to contact him, Maniza Hussain contacts Scotland
Yard's missing persons helpline. The police get their first break.
The
real story of 7/7, O, 7.5.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1769440,00.html
Attorney General calls for Guantanamo to
close
Lord Goldsmith risks row with White House by denouncing detention centre as
'unacceptable'
Sunday May 7, 2006
The Observer
Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend
The Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, is set
to trigger a diplomatic row between Britain and the United States by calling for
Guantánamo Bay to close.
The decision by the government's chief legal adviser to denounce the detention
centre in Cuba as 'unacceptable' will dismay the Bush administration, which has
continually rejected claims that the camp breaches international laws on human
rights.
But Goldsmith will tell a global security conference at the Royal United
Services Institute this week that the camp at Guantánamo Bay must not continue.
'It is time, in my view, that it should close.' An urbane lawyer who eschews the
limelight, Goldsmith is not known for shooting from the hip in such unequivocal
terms; however, it is clear he has harboured grave doubts for some time over the
legality of Guantánamo under international law.
'There are certain principles on which there can be no compromise,' Goldsmith
will say. 'Fair trial is one of those - which is the reason we in the UK were
unable to accept that the US military tribunals proposed for those detained at
Guantánamo Bay offered sufficient guarantees of a fair trial in accordance with
international standards.'
Although privately some senior ministers believe Guantánamo should be closed
down, no one has so far condemned the camp in such open and trenchant terms. To
date, the strongest criticism of the camp has come from Peter Hain, the Northern
Ireland minister, who said on Newsnight in February that it was his personal
belief that the camp should close, while the Prime Minister said only that it is
an 'anomaly' that will have to end one day.
Goldsmith's speech will be welcomed by human rights groups and senior members of
the judiciary who have long campaigned for the government to use its influence
to persuade its ally to close the camp. The former Law Lord, Lord Steyn, now
chairman of the human rights group, Justice, said last month that 'while our
government condones Guantánamo Bay the world is perplexed about our approach to
the rule of law.'
Steyn made it clear that if the British government were to criticise Guantánamo
it would have significant consequences. 'You may ask: how will it help in regard
to the continuing outrage at Guantánamo Bay for our government now to condemn
it?' Steyn said. 'The answer is that it would at last be a powerful signal to
the world that Britain supports the international rule of law.'
In February, a high court judge, Mr Justice Collins, condemned America's
approach to human rights after reading a report by the UN human rights
commissioner which found evidence of torture at the camp. 'America's idea of
what is torture is not the same as ours and does not appear to coincide with
that of most civilised nations,' Collins said.
Last week, two high court judges heard a legal argument that the government
should demand the release of three British residents held in Guantánamo on the
grounds that they had been subjected to torture. Lawyers for the men said the
government should lobby for their release because they were being detained
'unlawfully'. But Lord Justice Latham and Mr Justice Tugendhat said that, while
the argument was a powerful one, 'decisions affecting foreign policy are a
forbidden area'.
Goldsmith will use his speech to acknowledge the judges' concerns and point out
that the increased terrorist threat has increased divisions between the
government and legal experts.
'I would suggest that the greatest challenge which free and democratic states
face today is how to balance the need to protect individual rights with the
imperative of protecting the lives of the rest of the community,' Goldsmith will
say.
'The UK government is constantly being criticised for striking the wrong
balance. Sometimes the criticism comes from the right, from those who see the
Human Rights Act as a charter for criminals and terrorists which impedes the
executive's freedom of manoeuvre at every turn. Sometimes the criticism comes
from the left, from those who see in every government initiative a threat to
civil liberties. Such criticism is inevitable.'
Attorney General calls for Guantanamo to close, O, 7.5.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,,1769383,00.html
US-style terror alerts for UK
MPs to recommend clearer public warnings in
wake of London bombings
Monday April 17, 2006
Guardian
Richard Norton-Taylor and Oliver Burkeman in New York
A cross-party committee investigating the
background to the July 7 bombings is expected to recommend a transparent
official public warning system for the threat posed by terrorist attacks. It
would be similar to the kind that has proved controversial in America.
The idea, which is likely to be one of the
conclusions in the intelligence and security committee's annual report next
month, has caused consternation among the security services. The issue is at the
heart of an intense debate involving MI5, the Home Office, and the committee, in
the wake of the attacks on London.
At present, threat levels are determined by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
(Jtac) which handles more than 50,000 items of intelligence every year.
Jtac came under the spotlight when leaks revealed that it lowered the terrorist
threat level from "severe general" to "substantial" just a month before the July
7 suicide bombings. It then raised the threat level to "critical". It was about
to downgrade the threat level again on the morning of the failed attacks of July
21.
Confusion about the criteria which determine the terrorist threat levels agreed
by Jtac assessors is compounded by the existence of a separate "alert" status,
critics say. This sets the level of protection that should be given to public
and official buildings and transport systems but not to the infrastructure of
the UK as a whole. It is set on the advice of MI5 and appears in the entrance
halls of public buildings. Black is the lowest state of alert and red the
highest.
Under the Jtac system "moderate" is the lowest threat level and "severe
specific", which assumes an attack is imminent, the highest. A public official
warning system would be unified and is likely to appear on government websites
and would be available to the media.
Patrick Mercer, Conservative spokesman on homeland security, believes the threat
assessments should be made public. "Currently, the threat levels are deeply
confusing", he told the Guardian. He said he failed to understand why the
government did not publish them.
The Home Office is understood to be grappling with the problem. The security and
intelligence agencies are concerned that if the threat levels are published they
could be misinterpreted. It would also place them under greater scrutiny.
Recommending a downgrade in the threat level early last June, Jtac said many of
its concerns focused on a "wide range and large numbers of extremist networks
and individuals in the UK". It did not foresee "home grown" bombers, let alone
suicide bombers who attacked London tube trains and a bus on July 7.
Security sources have said they are concerned about the "integrity" of the
threat assessment system, and the need to avoid the temptation to keep it
artificially high. They also say that the system in the US, where threat alerts
are regularly announced, could lead to a "crying wolf" syndrome in the UK. Other
Whitehall officials are concerned about how to keep the public alert while
avoiding alarm or panic.
Critics of the high-profile American terror threat system, first introduced in
2002, say it is useless at best, and, at worst, subject to being manipulated for
political ends.
In theory, the colour-coded hierarchy of threats has five levels - low, guarded,
elevated, high and severe - but it has never fallen to low or guarded, and never
risen to severe. Instead, it has been raised from elevated to high, on a
nationwide scale, five times, including around the first anniversary of 9/11 and
the start of the war in Iraq. In New York, it has been at high all along.
One of the most controversial uses of the elevated level came in August 2004, in
the thick of the election campaign, immediately after a Democratic convention
thought to have been a triumph for John Kerry. "I am concerned that every time
something happens that's not good for President Bush, he plays this trump card,
which is terrorism," Mr Kerry's former rival for the Democratic nomination
Howard Dean told CNN at the time.
But since the specific criteria for each threat level are kept secret, it is
impossible to know when raising it is justified - or, indeed, whether the lack
of an actual terrorist strike on each such occasion so far shows that it works,
or that it is pointless.
Nor is it made clear exactly how ordinary people should respond. "A terrorist
alert that instills a vague feeling of dread or panic, without giving people
anything to do in response, is ineffective," the security expert Bruce Schneier
has written.
The US homeland security department's published guidance says that during a time
of elevated threat citizens should "ensure disaster supply kit is stocked and
ready". When the threat is high, they should "exercise caution when travelling
... expect some delays, baggage searches and restrictions at public buildings."
US-style terror alerts for UK, G, 17.4.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1755302,00.html
Terror law an affront to justice - judge
Control orders breach human rights
Thursday April 13, 2006
Guardian
Vikram Dodd and Carlene Bailey
A high court judge branded the government's
system of control orders against terrorism suspects "an affront to justice"
yesterday and ruled that they breached human rights laws.
The ruling by Mr Justice Sullivan came after a
challenge to the first control order issued against a British Muslim man,
alleged by the security services and the home secretary to have been planning to
travel to Iraq to fight UK and US forces.
At least 11 control orders have been issued, allowing the government to restrict
the liberty and movement of people it claims endanger public safety because of
their involvement in terrorism but who can not be tried in the courts.
The judge said the anti-terrorism measures were "conspicuously unfair" and
dismissed supposed safeguards of suspects' rights as a "thin veneer of
legality". He had to say "loud and clear" that the laws were unfair otherwise
"the court would be failing in its duty."
But he said the laws passed had been drafted in a way that prevented the courts
overturning control orders.
In this case, the judge said, Charles Clarke had made his decision to issue the
order based on "one-sided information", but he was "unable to envisage the
circumstances" allowing the court to quash the home secretary's decision. As a
result, the judge said, he would have to leave the order in place, even though
he ruled that it contravened human rights law.
The ruling gives hope to two Muslim men who will go to the high court next month
to challenge control orders they are subject to. They are relying on broadly
similar arguments to the ones Mr Justice Sullivan found so convincing.
The judgment led government critics to point out that twice in two years the
courts have found that anti-terrorism laws breached human rights. It also came
on the eve of new laws coming into effect designed to tackle the threat of
Islamist violence.
The Home Office rejected the court's ruling and vowed to appeal. "The ruling
will not limit the operation of the act," the Home Office said in a statement.
"We will not be revoking either the control order which was the subject of this
review, nor any of the other control orders currently in force on the back of
this judgement.
"Nor will the judgment prevent the secretary of state from making control orders
on suspected terrorists where he considers it necessary to do so in the
interests of national security in future."
The independent reviewer of the government's anti-terrorism laws, Lord Carlile,
said if the appeal was not successful ministers would have to consider amending
the law.
He told the BBC: "I hope we will not get another piece of rushed legislation. I
think this really does need mature reflection."
Muddassar Arani, solicitor for the Briton, who is of Arab heritage, said: "This
was the first British Muslim subject to a control order and he's being treated
as a second-class citizen.
"It is clear the home secretary is acting as the judge, jury and prosecutor."
The man, a student originally from South Yorkshire, was stopped by
counter-terrorism officials on March 1 2005 trying fly to the Middle East from
Manchester airport, and then again the next day at Heathrow. He says he was
travelling to Syria for a holiday, but security services say he was planning to
fight in Iraq.
In September 2005 Charles Clarke signed a control order against him, revoking
his passport, banning him from buying plane tickets, and banning him from
airports and train terminals from where he could travel abroad.
The judge said the system was unfair because the man could not know the
evidence, which was so sensitive it had to be kept secret from the accused.
A special advocate could not properly represent him, because the secret evidence
could not be discussed with the client. The judge said: "If, as in this case,
the substantial part of the case against him is not disclosed to the individual
in question, it is difficult to see how the very essence of the right [of access
to the court] is not impaired."
Mr Justice Sullivan said the court cannot review whether the facts exist to
support the home secretary's suspicions and therefore "the overall procedure is
manifestly ineffective and unfair".
This meant the Briton's right to access to a court, guaranteed by the European
convention on human rights, was denied and the judge ruled the control order
system was "incompatible" with human rights law.
Mr Justice Sullivan concluded: "Controlees' rights ... are being determined not
by an independent court ... but by executive decision making untrammelled by any
prospect of effective judicial supervision." Closing the case and addressing
lawyers for the Muslim man, Mr Justice Sullivan made clear his frustration at
the control order system: "If you erect a structure where people in the position
of your client, to be frank, don't have a chance, the secretary of state is
always going to win."
The system of control orders replaced the "Belmarsh system", whereby foreign
nationals suspected of terrorist involvement could be detained without charge or
trial.
Lawyers for the Briton say counter-terrorism officials racially abused him after
he was first stopped travelling.
The government was granted leave to appeal, but last night they faced a torrent
of criticism from Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and civil liberties
campaigners.
Shami Chakrabarti, director of Liberty, said: "Fundamental human rights, such as
the right to a fair trial, are what distinguish democrats from terrorists and
dictators. The government's policy is in tatters - we hope that this time they
are listening."
The judiciary dealt a second blow to Mr Clarke yesterday by finding he was wrong
to try to refuse a British passport to an Australian national held in Guantánamo
Bay by the US. David Hicks qualifies for a British passport, but the court of
appeal rejected a challenge by the home secretary to an earlier court decision
that he must grant citizenship.
Terror law an affront to justice - judge, G, 13.4.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1752773,00.html
Leak reveals official story of London
bombings
· Al-Qaeda not linked, says government
· Internet used to plan 7/7 attack
Sunday April 9, 2006
The Observer
Mark Townsend, crime correspondent
The official inquiry into the 7 July London bombings will say the attack was
planned on a shoestring budget from information on the internet, that there was
no 'fifth-bomber' and no direct support from al-Qaeda, although two of the
bombers had visited Pakistan.
The first forensic account of the atrocity
that claimed the lives of 52 people, which will be published in the next few
weeks, will say that attacks were the product of a 'simple and inexpensive' plot
hatched by four British suicide bombers bent on martyrdom.
Far from being the work of an international terror network, as originally
suspected, the attack was carried out by four men who had scoured terror sites
on the internet. Their knapsack bombs cost only a few hundred pounds, according
to the first completed draft of the government's definitive report into the
blasts.
The Home Office account, compiled by a senior civil servant at the behest of
Home Secretary Charles Clarke, also discounts the existence of a fifth bomber.
After the bombings, police found an unused rucksack of explosives in the
bombers' abandoned car at Luton station, which led to a manhunt for a missing
suspect. Similarly, it found nothing to support the theory that an al-Qaeda
fixer, presumed to be from Pakistan, was instrumental in planning the attacks.
A Whitehall source said: 'The London attacks were a modest, simple affair by
four seemingly normal men using the internet.'
Confirmation of the nature of the attacks will raise fresh concerns over the
vulnerability of Britain to an attack by small, unsophisticated groups. A
fortnight after 7 July, an unconnected group of four tried to duplicate the
attack, but their devices failed to detonate.
However, the findings will draw criticism for failing to address concerns as to
why no action was taken against the bombers despite the fact that one of them,
Mohammed Siddique Khan, was identified by intelligence officers months before
the attack. A report into the attack by the Commons intelligence and security
committee, which could be published alongside the official narrative, will
question why MI5 called off surveillance of the ringleader of the 7 July
bombings.
Patrick Mercer, shadow homeland security spokesman, said the official
narrative's findings would only lead to calls for an independent inquiry to
answer further questions surrounding 7 July.
He said: 'A series of reports such as this narrative simply does not answer
questions such as the reduced terror alert before the attack, the apparent
involvement of al-Qaeda and links to earlier or later terrorist plots.'
The official Home Office report into the attacks does, however, decide that the
four suicide bombers - Siddique Khan, Hasib Hussain, Shehzad Tanweer and
Jermaine Lindsay - were partly inspired by Khan's trips to Pakistan, though the
meeting between the four men and known militants in Pakistan is seen as
ideological, rather than fact-finding.
A videotape of Mohammed Siddique Khan released after the attacks also featured
footage of Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The Home Office believes
the tape was edited after the suicide attacks and dismisses it as evidence of
al-Qaeda's involvement in the attack.
Khan is confirmed as ringleader of the attacks, though the Yorkshire-born
bomber's apparent links to other suspected terrorists are not discussed for
legal reasons.
The report also investigates the psychological make-up and behaviour of the four
bombers during the run-up to the attack. Using intelligence compiled in the nine
months since, the account paints a portrait of four British men who in effect
led double lives.
It exposes how the quartet adopted an extreme interpretation of Islam,
juxtaposed with a willingness to enjoy a 'western' lifestyle - in particular
Jermaine Lindsay, the bomber from Berkshire.
According to the report, the attacks were largely motivated by concerns over
foreign policy and the perception that it was deliberately anti-Muslim, although
the four men were also driven by the promise of immortality.
Leak
reveals official story of London bombings, O, 9.4.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1750139,00.html
Amnesty demands public inquiry on rendition
flights
Wednesday April 5, 2006
Guardian
Richard Norton-Taylor
Amnesty International today calls for an independent public inquiry into all
aspects of British involvement in secret CIA "extraordinary rendition" flights.
The call comes as it reports details of more than 200 CIA flights passing
through British airports.
It also reveals US efforts to ensure
conditions and locations where detainees were held were kept secret. Four of the
CIA's 26 planes have landed and taken off more than 200 times from British
airports over the past five years, Amnesty says. They include Stansted, Gatwick,
Luton, Glasgow, Prestwick, Edinburgh, Londonderry and Belfast. Others used are
RAF Brize Norton in Oxfordshire, Biggin Hill in Kent, and RAF Leuchars in
Scotland, as well as the Turks and Caicos islands, a British overseas territory
in the Caribbean.
Amnesty's report - Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and
"Disappearance" - shows a pattern of nearly 1,000 flights directly linked to the
CIA through "front" companies, most of which, it says, have used European
airspace. A further 600 CIA flights were made by planes hired from US aviation
companies.
Amnesty says detainees were abducted or handed over to US guards by other law
enforcement agencies before being "disappeared". In what it says is the only
detailed information to emerge from an Eastern European or Central Asian "black
site" prison, detainees had described being prepared for transportation by
black-masked "ninjas".
It describes the case of three Yemeni men - Muhammad al-Assad, Muhammad
Bashmilah and Sala Qaru - held for more than a year at a suspected "black site".
After cross-referencing prayer schedule data and the position of the sun and
flight times, Amnesty believes the likely location of the prison is Romania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Macedonia, Albania, Georgia or Azerbaijan.
Information on the numbers and whereabouts of all terror suspects rendered
should be publicly available, detainees should be brought before a judicial
authority within 24 hours of being held, and any plane carrying detainees, or
suspected of doing so, should be identified to the aviation authorities of the
country where it lands, Amnesty says.
Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, has said the US would not render a detainee
through Britain without the government's permission. He says the Clinton
administration asked four times and the UK twice declined its request; there is
no evidence the Bush administration had asked.
Amnesty demands public inquiry on rendition flights, G, 5.4.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1746827,00.html
Official: Iraq war led to July bombings
Sunday April 2, 2006
The Observer
Mark Townsend, crime correspondent
The first official recognition that the Iraq
war motivated the four London suicide bombers has been made by the government in
a major report into the 7 July attacks.
Despite attempts by Downing Street to play
down suggestions that the conflict has made Britain a target for terrorists, the
Home Office inquiry into the deadliest terror attack on British soil has
conceded that the bombers were inspired by UK foreign policy, principally the
decision to invade Iraq.
The government's 'narrative', compiled by a senior civil servant using
intelligence from the police and security services, was announced by the Home
Secretary, Charles Clarke, last December following calls for a public inquiry
into the attacks.
The narrative will be published in the next few weeks, possibly alongside the
findings of a critical report into the London bombings by the Commons
intelligence and security committee.
Initial drafts of the government's account into the bombings, which have been
revealed to The Observer, state that Iraq was a key 'contributory factor'. The
references to Britain's involvement in Iraq are contained in a section examining
what inspired the 'radicalisation' of the four British suicide bombers, Sidique
Khan, Hasib Hussain, Shehzad Tanweer and Germaine Lindsay.
The findings will prove highly embarrassing to Tony Blair, who has maintained
that the decision to go to war against Iraq would make Britain safer. On the
third anniversary of the conflict last month, the Prime Minister defended
Britain's involvement in Iraq, arguing that only an interventionist stance could
confront terrorism.
The narrative largely details the movements of the four bombers from the point
when they picked up explosives in a rucksack from a 'bomb factory' in Leeds to
the time when the devices were detonated on the morning of 7 July.
Alongside Iraq, other 'motivating factors' for the bombers, three of whom came
from west Yorkshire and one from Buckinghamshire, are identified. These include
economic deprivation, social exclusion and a disaffection with society in
general, as well as community elders. A videotape of Mohammed Sidique Khan was
released after the attacks, in which he makes an apparent reference to Iraq,
accusing 'Western citizens' of electing governments that committed crimes
against humanity. Osama bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, also appeared on
the tape, repeating his claim that Blair's decision to go to war in Iraq was
responsible for the outrage.
The Home Office account of the July atrocity also chronicles in detail the trips
to Pakistan made by Khan and Shehzad Tanweer and is understood to confirm that
the two met al-Qaeda operatives. However, the final report will not name the
militants known to some of the London bombers in case criminal proceedings are
taken against them.
Leaks last week from the intelligence and security committee similarly confirmed
how Khan, the mastermind of July 7, slipped through a security net. MI5 called
off surveillance on him in the months before the bombings, in which 52 people
were killed. The Home Office narrative supports the parliamentary committee's
general view that the security services are not to blame. Despite the trips
abroad, however, the narrative says that the London suicide bombers were only
ever peripheral players in terrorist organisations and that, on the whole, there
was 'nothing exceptional' about them before the attack.
Recent letters to the Home Office from the law firm Leigh Day & Co - acting for
the family of one victim - warned that an independent inquiry was essential to
explore 'what could be done to prevent such attacks happening again, and how to
protect and save lives in the future'.
Official: Iraq war led to July bombings, O, 2.4.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1745085,00.html
4.15pm
Bomb plotters claimed to be al-Qaida, court
hears
Monday March 27, 2006
Press Association
Guardian Unlimited
One of the men accused of plotting an Islamist
bombing campaign in Britain claimed to be working for a high ranking al-Qaida
figure and offered to organise explosives training, the Old Bailey heard today.
The supergrass Mohammed Babar described two
meetings with Omar Khyam, 24, of Crawley, West Sussex, in early 2003 while they
were both in Pakistan, including one at a wedding.
Babar told the court how he had to leave the wedding after receiving a call from
another of the alleged plotters, Waheed Mahmood, 34, also of Crawley, saying he
needed to see him "right away".
Despite being one of the witnesses at the ceremony in Lahore in March of that
year, Babar said he went to see Mr Khyam, also known as Ausman, and Mr Mahmood
at the city's railway station.
At the meeting, Mr Khyam allegedly told him, "We are working for Abdul Hadi",
whom the court has earlier heard described as the third most senior man in
al-Qaida.
Babar, a US citizen who is immune to prosecution in the UK and who is giving
evidence for the crown, said that when Mr Khyam said "we", he took it to mean
not just himself but the others in the group, including Mr Mahmood and another
of the defendants, Salahuddin Amin.
Babar was giving evidence in the case of seven British men accused of plotting
to carry out a bombing campaign in the UK.
He described a second encounter with Mr Khyam and another man they knew, when he
allegedly said he knew someone who could offer them explosives training.
Mr Khyam mentioned there were "brothers" who were using aluminium powder and
refined sugar to create explosives, Babar alleged.
"Although they did not say, I was under the impression that it was Ausman
[Khyam] and Waheed who were offering the training," the American said.
Babar said he came to Britain in April 2003 to raise money for a military
training camp.
He met some of the accused, who said they had set up a similar camp in Kashmir
to give training in firearms, explosives and hijacking.
Babar claimed Waheed Mahmood asked him if he knew of anyone who was interested
in attending the camp. He said he would only take people interested in fighting
in Afghanistan.
But Babar told the court the invitation was only a front for getting potential
terrorists to work for them in the UK.
He said: "I didn't think they had any intention of sending people into
Afghanistan.
"They only said it so people would come. Then they were telling them it was
difficult and they could not go and fight. There was only one other option -
working with them in the UK."
The seven men accused of being part of the terror cell are Omar Khyam, 24, his
brother Shujah Mahmood, 19, Waheed Mahmood, 34, and Jawad Akbar, 22, all from
Crawley, West Sussex, Salahuddin Amin, 31, from Luton, Beds, Anthony Garcia, 23,
of Ilford, east London, and Nabeel Hussain, 20, of Horley, Surrey.
They deny conspiring to cause explosions likely to endanger life between January
1 2003 and March 31 2004.
Mr Khyam, Mr Garcia and Mr Hussain also deny a charge under the Terrorism Act of
possessing 600kg (1,300lb) of ammonium nitrate fertiliser for terrorism.
Mr Khyam and Shujah Mahmood further deny possessing aluminium powder for use in
terrorist activities.
Bomb
plotters claimed to be al-Qaida, court hears, G, 27.3.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1740821,00.html
Seven with alleged al-Qaida links deny
plotting terror bomb campaign
· Men arrested before finalising target, says
QC
· Defendants had gathered components, court told
Wednesday March 22, 2006
Guardian
Rosie Cowan, crime correspondent
Seven British men with alleged links to
al-Qaida plotted to carry out a terrorist campaign in the UK with homemade
explosives containing more than half a tonne of fertiliser, the Old Bailey heard
yesterday.
The defendants, mainly of Pakistani descent,
had most of the necessary bomb-making components ready but were arrested in
March 2004 before they had finalised a target, said David Waters QC, opening the
prosecution case.
One of the accused, Omar Khyam, had discussed potential attacks on pubs,
nightclubs or trains, and it was significant that another, Waheed Mahmood,
worked for a major gas and electricity supplier, according to Mr Waters.
Most of the gang are accused of having undergone training at terrorist camps in
Pakistan in the past few years. And they all "played their respective roles" in
the plan to make a bomb or bombs, which would be used "to kill or injure
citizens of the UK", said Mr Waters.
Khyam, 24, Jawad Akbar, 22, Waheed Mahmood, 33, and Shujah Mahmood, 18, all from
Crawley, West Sussex; Anthony Garcia, 27, from Ilford, Essex; Nabeel Hussain,
20, from Horley, Surrey; and Salahuddin Amin, 30, from Luton, Bedfordshire, are
charged with conspiracy to cause explosions with intent to endanger life. Khyam,
Garcia and Hussain are accused of possessing 600kg of ammonium nitrate
fertiliser - discovered by police in a storage unit in west London - for
terrorist purposes, and Khyam and Shujah Mahmood are charged with possessing
aluminium powder, which can also be used to make bombs. All seven defendants,
who sat in the dock flanked by 11 prison officers, deny the charges.
Mr Waters said the court would hear details about another conspirator, Momin
Khawaja, currently awaiting trial in Canada, who had a "vital role" in this
plot.
A US citizen, Mohammed Babar, who has already admitted his part in the "British
bomb plot", will testify at the Old Bailey in a few days' time.
The prosecutor said Babar had pleaded guilty in the US to obtaining ammonium
nitrate and aluminium powder for use in UK bomb attacks. Babar, who lived in
Pakistan from 2001 to 2004, has been given immunity from prosecution, the court
heard.
Training
Most of the defendants, whom Babar called the "Crawley lot", visited him there,
where they underwent terrorist training in explosives techniques and worked out
how to get bomb components and bring them to the UK.
Khyam and Amin both told Babar they worked for a man called Abdul Hadi, whom
they claimed was "number three in al-Qaida".
Khyam, whom Mr Waters described as "very much at the centre of operations", said
he wanted to carry out operations in the UK because it was as yet unscathed and
should be hit because of its support for the US.
"The majority of that contact [with Babar] was in Pakistan and it involved, for
the most part, one theme - the acquisition of training and expertise,
particularly in relation to explosives," said Mr Waters.
Babar alleges that he first met Waheed Mahmood at the end of 2001, and later
learned he was an al-Qaida supporter. He met Khyam in November 2002, while on a
fund-raising trip to England.
Later, in Pakistan in 2003, Babar, Khyam and Amin discussed transporting
detonators back to the UK, and small radios were bought so the detonators could
be hidden inside, the court heard.
Babar had obtained aluminium powder at Khyam's request and later found out
ammonium nitrate was being kept in his flat in Lahore, where Khyam was staying.
Khyam and Amin received two days training in explosives theory and practice in a
house in Kohat, Pakistan, and in July 2003 Khyam and his brother Shujah went to
a terrorist training camp in Kalam.
Experience
The Old Bailey heard that Garcia also attended, and used his experience to teach
others how to dismantle and reassemble weapons. Akbar later joined them.
Ammonium nitrate and aluminium powder were taken to the camp and they carried
out experiments, one of which blew a hole in the ground, even though they used
less than 1kg of ammonium nitrate.
The defendants, who returned to England later in 2003, adopted several measures
to avoid detection, including using false names. Waheed Mahmood stressed that
laptops and mobile phones should be disposed of on a regular basis and Khyam and
Babar used code in their emails, for example "cigarettes" meant "detonators".
But they were arrested on March 30 2004, following a seven-week undercover
surveillance operation by Scotland Yard's anti-terrorist and special branch
squads and the security services. Bugs were placed at an address where Khyam was
staying in Slough, Berkshire, and Akbar's then home in Uxbridge, west London,
and in Khyam's car, and the suspects, including Khawaja who came to England for
a weekend in February 2004, were followed and taped.
The trial, which is expected to last at least six months, continues.
Seven
with alleged al-Qaida links deny plotting terror bomb campaign, G, 22.3.2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1736523,00.html
Top police 'clear' Met chief over Menezes
· Ian Blair backed by senior officer's account
· Tragic mistake not revealed for 24 hours
Sunday March 19, 2006
The Observer
David Rose
The first detailed police account of the
aftermath of the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, the Brazilian killed after
being mistaken for a terror suspect, can be revealed today by The Observer.
The testimony by a top Scotland Yard officer
confirms that the police did not know for nearly 24 hours that they had shot a
man with no terrorist links. His account backs claims by the head of the
Metropolitan Police, Sir Ian Blair, that he was unaware until the following
morning that de Menezes was innocent.
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Alan Given, one of the officers in command of the
Met's firearms unit, also reveals that the officers were initially 'buoyant'
after the shooting, thinking they had 'protected Londoners' from a dangerous
assailant.
The account - the first from anyone directly involved in the shooting or its
aftermath - comes in an exclusive interview with Given, the most senior officer
directly responsible for the CO19 tactical firearms team who shot de Menezes at
Stockwell tube station on 22 July last year. Given met the officers who killed
de Menezes that afternoon, and later attended a series of high-level meetings
about the investigation into it.
His evidence goes to the heart of the 'Stockwell II' inquiry by the Independent
Police Complaints Commission into Blair's claims that he was not briefed about
de Menezes's innocence until the following day. If the inquiry were to find
against Sir Ian, it would put pressure on him to resign. 'Stockwell 1' is the
already-completed IPCC report into the shooting itself, which has gone to the
CPS.
Given said that he saw Assistant Commissioner Alan Brown, who was co-ordinating
work by several Yard departments on the shooting, shortly before he went home at
11pm on the Friday. 'When I left, I had no indication that the wrong person had
been shot,' said Given. 'Alan had no clue that we had made a mistake. I did not
learn the truth until the following day.'
Last week, the commissioner was the subject of a series of media leaks that led
to calls for his resignation. He apologised for taping phone calls with IPCC
officials and with the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith.
Later reports that his private office knew that de Menezes was innocent by the
afternoon of 22 July were denied. Together with other senior officers, Given
insisted that Sir Ian had become the target of a 'grossly unjustified' campaign.
Given said that, having briefed the commissioner, he went to Leman Street police
station in east London to see the two officers who shot de Menezes, at about
4.30pm on the day of the shooting. 'They were behaving in a very professional
way,' he said. 'They'd done the job that we ask firearms officers to do - to go
out into potentially dangerous situations and shoot someone.
'They were sombre, clearly concerned that they had shot a man dead. There wasn't
even a sniff of the fact that there had been a tragic mistake. There was no
rejoicing, but the mood was buoyant.'
Given said he also spoke to Commander Cressida Dick, the firearms team chief who
is thought to have given the order to shoot. She, too, had been convinced that
de Menezes was a terrorist.
Throughout the day, he revealed, a 'Gold group' met at two-hourly intervals at
Scotland Yard, at which senior officers from all the departments involved with
the shooting presented their latest findings. Some meetings were attended by
Given in person, others by a member of his staff, who briefed him later.
According to Given, Sir Ian 'has tried to be as open and honest as he can,' he
said. 'He's now facing a campaign that is grossly unfair, much of it based on
information that is totally inaccurate.'
Last week, other senior police figures strongly backed the commissioner,
including Chris Fox, president of the Association of Chief Police Officers, who
suggested that the campaign was fuelled by elements of the media and a minority
inside the police who were opposed to Sir Ian's support for racial diversity and
ethnic minority recruitment.
Sir Ian, he said, was accused of being 'politically correct,' where in fact,
'what he's trying to do is be fair'.
Top
police 'clear' Met chief over Menezes, O, 19.3.2006,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1734385,00.html
MI5, Camp Delta, and the story that shames
Britain
Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna are among
eight British residents who remain prisoners at the U.S. Naval Air Station at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. They are jailed because British officials rendered them
into the hands of the CIA in Africa, a fact that may explain why the British
government refuses to intercede on their behalf. Bisher and Jamil have been
wrongfully imprisoned now for more than three years. This is the story of their
betrayal by the British government and their appalling treatment at the hands of
the CIA and the U.S. military.
Published: 16 March 2006
The Independent
By George B. Mickum
The author, a partner with Washington law firm
Keller and Hackman, represents Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna. This exclusive
report is compiled from conversations with his two clients, their declassified
letters and declassified legal responses, and information provided by the US
Military
Several weeks after 11 September 2001, two MI5
agents arrived at Bisher al-Rawi's family home to recruit him to work for
British Intelligence. The visit was part of an effort to recruit scores of
individuals from London's Muslim community for reconnaissance work and to assist
the war on terror.
ABU QATADA
In particular, MI5 sought contacts with some of the Muslim clerics preaching in
London. Mr al-Rawi was a perfect candidate, educated, fluent in English, and a
friend of a Muslim cleric named Abu Qatada. The agents presented identification,
introducing themselves to Mr al-Rawi as "Alex" and "Matt". However, they are the
same names the agents used throughout the Muslim community in London.
The agents asked Mr al-Rawi wide-ranging questions, which he answered candidly.
At the end of the meeting, they asked if would agree to speak to them again.
Two more meetings took place at Mr al-Rawi's family home in London. At the
agents' suggestion, Mr al-Rawi started meeting them at a coffee shop in Victoria
station. Shortly after, the agents asked Mr al-Rawi to work for MI5 on a more
formal basis. He agreed. Over the next nine months, meetings took place in hotel
rooms in and around London.
Throughout Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5, his agents pressured him to
accept payment for his services. He refused all such overtures. The only thing
Mr al-Rawi , 38, who is Iraqi born, ever accepted from MI5 was a mobile
telephone. He took it to put an end to the agents' demand for him to be
contactable.
As his work with MI5 continued, Mr al-Rawi became increasingly alarmed about his
relationship with MI5 and his potential exposure. Eventually, he sought
assurances from Matt and Alex that his work as an intermediary between MI5 and
Abu Qatada would not get him into trouble. Ultimately, he requested a meeting
with MI5 and a private attorney, suggesting the human rights lawyer Gareth
Peirce. MI5 refused.
To assuage his concerns and convince him to continue working for MI5, the agents
set up the first of two meetings with an MI5 lawyer whom they called " Simon".
Alex and Matt were present at both meetings. Simon introduced himself to Mr
al-Rawi as a lawyer with MI5. He conceded that Simon was not his real name.
Simon assured Mr al-Rawi he was running no risk by working with MI5 and that MI5
and Simon himself would come to his aid if Mr al-Rawi found himself compromised.
Simon told him that all he needed to do was record the date and time of his
conversations with Simon, and MI5 would be able to identify and locate Simon. Mr
al-Rawi's refusal to insist on a meeting with a private attorney would have
devastating consequences.
Abu Qatada was completely aware of Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5. Mr
al-Rawi carried questions and answers between the parties, served as a
translator, and participated in negotiations with Abu Qatada. "All I did in
Britain was try to help with steps necessary to get a meeting between Abu Qatada
and MI5. I was trying to bring them together. MI5 would give me messages to take
to Abu Qatada, and Abu Qatada would give me messages to take back to them."
It was during this time that Mr al-Rawi's good friend, Jamil el-Banna, a
Jordanian British resident, became involved. While the British Government was
publicly asserting that Abu Qatada's whereabouts were unknown, Abu Qatada was
actively engaged in a dialogue with British officials that involved Mr al-Rawi
and Mr el-Banna. Mr al-Rawi asked Mr el-Banna to drive Abu Qatada's wife and son
to meet Abu Qatada in London. Mr el-Banna followed Mr al-Rawi, who led the way
on his motorcycle. When Abu Qatada was arrested, Mr el-Banna taxied his wife and
child home at the request of the British officials on the scene. Mr el-Banna
never was arrested: the police thanked him for his assistance. He was never even
questioned because everyone was aware of his limited involvement. Based on this
involvement, he has been tortured and jailed for three years.
ARREST IN GAMBIA
Mr al-Rawi then turned his energy to his brother Wahab's long-planned mobile
peanut oil factory, a project in Gambia.
Gambian authorities detained Mr al-Rawi, Mr el-Banna and their friends
immediately after the group landed in Africa. Indeed, shortly after the arrest,
Gambian authorities told the arrested group that the British had told them to
make the arrests.
There is no question that British officials rendered Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna
into the hands of CIA officials in Africa in November of 2002. During one of Mr
el-Banna's more than 100 interrogation sessions, his interrogator told him his
adopted country had betrayed him
A British citizen, Abdullah El Janoudi, who accompanied Mr al-Rawi and Mr
el-Banna to Gambia, confirms that a large American by the name of Lee told him
British officials had the group arrested. He also confirms that during the
interrogations that took place every two days, the CIA continued to press for
incriminating evidence about Abu Qatada that linked him with al-Qa'ida.
In Africa, the CIA had a complete file on Mr al-Rawi that included his hobbies,
information that can only have come from British Intelligence. Mr al-Rawi states
that "from the very beginning in the Gambia the CIA said, 'The British told us
that one of you was helping MI5.' By the second day in the Gambia, they [the
CIA] were asking me to work for the US in Britain. I said I would not."
AFGHANISTAN
Although Mr al-Rawi's brother Wahab and another friend were released after a
month and returned to England, Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were rendered at the
end of 2002 in a CIA Gulfstream jet, one of a fleet of jets used by the CIA in
its "extraordinary rendition" programme, in which the US transports victims to
foreign countries for the express purpose of torture.
Mr el-Banna's account of his arrest reads:
Detainee: "When they came and arrested and handcuffed me, they were wearing all
black. They even covered their heads ... They took me, covered me, put me in a
vehicle and sent me somewhere. I don't know. It was at night. Then from there to
the airport right away.
Tribunal president: An airport in Gambia?
Detainee: Yes. We were in a room like this with about eight men. All with
covered-up faces.
Tribunal president: Were you by yourself at that time?
Detainee: Yes. They cut off my clothes.
Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were taken to the notorious "dark prison" in Kabul,
Afghanistan. There, both men were imprisoned underground in isolation and
darkness and tortured over two weeks. They were held in leg shackles 24 hours a
day. They were starved, beaten, dragged along floors while shackled, and kicked.
Round-the-clock screams from fellow prisoners made sleep impossible.
Subsequently, they were transferred to the US Air Force base at Bagram,
Afghanistan. Although they were chained hand and foot and hooded, while waiting
to be transported, their captors beat them. Mr el-Banna, in particular, was
beaten repeatedly.
In Bagram, they were imprisoned and tortured for another two months. They were
beaten, starved, and sleep deprived. What is particularly noteworthy is the fact
that the only information the interrogators were interested in was information
about Abu Qatada. Over the years, CIA and military interrogators have repeatedly
attempted to suborn testimony from both men, linking Abu Qatada to al-Qa'ida. Mr
el-Banna has repeatedly refused offers of freedom, money, and passports in
exchange for false testimony.
GUANTANAMO BAY
Ultimately, both men were transported to Guantanamo, a trip so harrowing that a
government informer, who was posing as a prisoner and had to be transported and
treated the same as other prisoners, stated in a television interview that, at
the time, he wished someone would shoot him. Forced to wear darkened goggles,
face-masks and earphones, chained at the ankles, handcuffed behind their backs
with thin plastic that caused incredible pain, and, in some cases, lasting
damage, starving and sick prisoners who had been deprived of sleep were forced
to maintain a sitting position, legs forward and chained without moving for
nearly 24 hours.
If they moved they were beaten, kicked, hit with blunt objects. The government
informer lasted barely one month in the intolerable conditions in Guantanamo
before demanding freedom. During the first month at Guantanamo in which both
were kept in strict solitary confinement, the pair were interrogated six hours
per day and kept in the interrogation room for 14 hours per day, sometimes in
freezing temperatures to induce hypothermia, one of the many techniques approved
for use by the Bush administration. In some cases they were short-shackled,
hands behind heels, for the entire time.
During his lengthy incarceration, Mr el-Banna has repeatedly asked his
interrogators to administer a polygraph test, but the military has refused.
However, the military's unwillingness to give him a lie detector deviates from
standard prison policy. Former interrogators at Guantanamo confirm that a
"passed" polygraph test is a prerequisite to be transferred to Camp IV, the
lowest security prison camp on the base.
Mr el-Banna is in Camp IV. Mr al-Rawi, who also is in Camp IV, had a polygraph
administered, but the military has refused to turn over the results and there is
no mention of it in records produced by the military.
Indeed, the military has taken great pains to prevent any exculpatory
information from creeping into the official records to ensure prisoners have no
chance to exonerate themselves. In Guantanamo, Mr al-Rawi has met perhaps 10
different CIA agents. One agent who went by the name "Elizabeth" told him:
"Don't think that leaving here will come without a price." Mr al-Rawi said: "She
asked me whether I would work with them, and I said no. [She] suggested, 'How
about working with MI5?'"
MI5 MEETINGS
Mr al-Rawi's relationship with MI5 did not end with his arrest. He has met MI5
agents at Guantanamo on numerous occasions. He first met an MI5 agent in the
early autumn of 2003, fully shackled. After some perfunctory questions and
answers that confirmed his work with MI5, the agent offered him an oblique,
belated apology: "Sorry about all this." Several months later, Alex, the MI5
agent with whom Mr al-Rawi worked in London, interrogated him at Guantanamo.
Among other things, Mr al-Rawi told Alex the Americans wanted him to work for US
intelligence.
In January 2004, Martin and Matt, the other two MI5 agents that Mr al-Rawi
worked with in London, met Mr al-Rawi in an interrogation room. During that
meeting, agents proposed that Mr al-Rawi return to working with MI5 upon his
release. He agreed. The following day, the agents told him it would take them
one to six months to get him home.
Former Guantanamo interrogators report that all prisoner interviews with foreign
intelligence officials are videotaped. The trial judge in charge of both men's
cases granted them motion to preserve that specific evidence along with copious
other evidence we have managed to identify.
REVIEW TRIBUNAL
I advised the men more than one month before I travelled to Guantanamo in
September 2004, advising them not to appear before the CSRT (Combatant Status
Review Tribunal) or participate in the process. My letters were not delivered
until after each had participated in his tribunal. I advised them against
participating, among other reasons because the tribunals were permitted to rely
on information obtained under torture. Both men were not even permitted to
review all the evidence against them, and thus had no chance to defend
themselves.
The following testimony from a CSRT proceeding demonstrates the Bush
administration's commitment to providing prisoners with meaningful due process.
In response to the charge "While living in Bosnia, the detainee associated with
a known al-Qa'ida operative" the following colloquy, which could have been
lifted from the pages of The Adventures of Alice in Wonderland, took place:
Detainee: Give me his name.
President: I do not know.
Detainee: How can I respond to this?
President: Did you know of anybody who was a member ofal- Qa'ida?
Detainee: No, no.
President: I'm sorry, what was your response?
Detainee: No. If you tell me the name, I can respond and defend myself against
this accusation.
President: We are asking you the questions and we need you to respond to what is
on the classified summary.
Although both men never were anywhere near Afghanistan or Iraq, never were
involved in any wrongful activity, never possessed a weapon of any kind, they
were powerless to defend themselves against the charge that they had associated
with Abu Qatada, "a known al-Qa'ida operative", even though Abu Qatada has never
been charged with any crime or been shown to be a member of or involved in
al-Qa'ida. But, the full extent of both men's betrayal by MI5 does not end here.
At the tribunal, Mr al-Rawi testified under oath about his relationship with MI5
and his role as a liaison between MI5 and Abu Qatada. He informed the tribunal
that MI5 had expressly approved of his role: "During a meeting with British
Intelligence, I had asked if it was OK for me to continue to have a relationship
with Abu Qatada. They assured me it was."
Mr al-Rawi requested that the MI5 agents Alex, Matt, and Martin appear before
the tribunal to confirm his work with MI5 and Abu Qatada. Very much out of
character, the tribunal president recognised the obvious importance of such
testimony and "determined that these three witnesses were relevant". He
instructed the military prosecutor to make inquiries and to determine whether
the British Government would make the witnesses available .
The British Government not only refused to allow the witnesses to appear, it
refused to confirm the accuracy of Mr al-Rawi's account, thereby ensuring both
men's fate and consigning them to indefinite imprisonment. The following account
is taken from Mr al-Rawi's CSRT:
President: Detainee has requested three witnesses who would testify that he
supported the British Intelligence Agency. We have contacted the British
Government and at this time, they are not willing to provide the tribunal with
that information. The witnesses are no longer considered reasonably available,
so I am going to deny the request for those three witnesses.
Later in the proceeding, the president issued the following clarification: " The
British Government didn't say they didn't have a relationship with you, they
just would not confirm or deny it. That means I only have your word."
Mr el-Banna's CSRT hearing was so procedurally defective that it would make good
farce were the result not so devastating. The only evidence considered by the
tribunal was that he drove Abu Qatada's wife and son to visit him during the
time British authorities were engaged in discussions with him. In fact, his CSRT
hearing was postponed and reconvened three times on 25 September, 28 September,
2 October and 9 October 2004 to allow the military's prosecuting attorney to
collect and present additional evidence to the tribunal.
At the conclusion, Mr el-Banna's personal representative, a soldier and
non-lawyer who could be compelled under the CSRT rules to testify against him
courageously dissented from the tribunal's conclusion, including a formal
statement in the CSRT record: "The personal representative states that the
record is insufficient to prove that the detainee is an enemy combatant."
Although Mr al-Rawi disclosed his involvement with MI5 during our first meeting
in 2004, he has been loath to go public with this information. But there are few
options left available to both men.
Congress voted to ban torture by an overwhelming majority in December 2005, but
President Bush signed the bill into law with a clarifying "signing statement"
that allows him to ignore it whenever he chooses. Of more immediate concern is
Congress's recent legislative reversal of the Supreme Court's decision to allow
prisoners at Guantanamo to file petitions for habeas corpus . In response to the
passage of the Detainee Treatment Act, the US government moved quickly to
dismiss all of the habeas cases filed by prisoners at Guantanamo, including
those filed by Mr al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna.
NO RETURN
Neither man can return to the UK because their visas have expired. The British
Government adamantly refuses to reissue them visas or allow them to return home
on humanitarian grounds. If the cases are dismissed, the US military intends to
transfer Mr al-Rawi to Iraq and Mr el-Banna to Jordan. There, each will be
jailed with the host country's pro-American acquiescence. Recent reconnaissance
indicates the US government is negotiating with foreign governments to jail
prisoners from Guantanamo indefinitely.
Why the British Government has treated these two men as it has, I cannot say.
What seems most likely is that they were simply expendable pawns in Great
Britain's and America's attempt to create a case against Abu Qatada
My security clearance allows me to review all of the classified evidence in the
cases, including all the evidence the tribunal relied upon to conclude that Mr
al-Rawi and Mr el-Banna were enemy combatants. There is no evidence in the
record, classified or unclassified, which supports the military's determination
that these are enemy combatants. None.
The African business trip that ended in
chains and imprisonment
By Robert Verkaik
Jamal el-Banna and Bisher al-Rawi were
arrested at Banjul airport, Gambia, in November 2002 on suspicion of links to
terrorism.
The two friends were in a party of five businessmen who were trying to start up
a peanut oil venture. Two other British nationals detained at the same time were
flown home.
The Government argues that Mr al-Rawi, an Iraqi citizen in his late thirties and
Mr el-Banna, a Palestinian in his forties, who have both brought up families in
Britain, are British residents with limited rights.
After their arrest, the two men were interviewed by the Americans and flown in
chains to Bagram in Afghanistan. In early 2003, they were taken to Guantanamo
Bay.
Last month Mr Justice Collins ruled that Mr el-Banna and Mr al-Rawi should have
their case for judicial review heard in the High Court, and that claims of
torture at the camp meant the Government might have an obligation to act. But
the Government maintains: "It is only through ... their nationality that persons
can ... enjoy the obligations placed on a state by international law."
MI5,
Camp Delta, and the story that shames Britain, I, 16.3.2006,
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article351561.ece
Police 'faked Tube death log'
Special Branch 'altered record' in attempt to switch the
blame for de Menezes shooting
Published: 29 January 2006
The Independent
By Sophie Goodchild, Chief Reporter
Extraordinary allegations that Special Branch officers
deliberately falsified vital evidence to hide mistakes which led to the killing
of Jean Charles de Menezes at a south London Underground station were made last
night.
According to claims in the News of the World, police altered the contents of a
logbook, which detailed the Brazilian electrician's final movements, in a bid to
cover up their blunders.
The 27-year-old was shot dead at Stockwell Tube station, in the wake of the
London bombings, by police exercising a shoot-to-kill policy.
Specific words were understood to have been changed to cover up the fact that
surveillance officers had wrongly identified Mr de Menezes as terror suspect
Hussein Osman.
Alterations were hastily made to amend the wording of the official log once the
shocking truth emerged that the dead man was not, in fact, the extremist wanted
in connection with the failed 21 July Tube bombings.
This was in a bid to pass the blame for the shooting on to the firearms officers
who actually shot the electrician and on to senior officers at Scotland Yard who
were in charge of the operation.
These revelations are reportedly contained in the report of the Independent
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). Last night, despite calls to the
Metropolitan Police, the Home Office and the IPCC, The Independent on Sunday was
unable to corroborate or substantiate the claims.
The family of the dead man said the revelations were "shocking" and demanded an
immediate public inquiry. Asad Rehman, the family's spokesman, said these latest
reports reinforced their belief that there had been a deliberate cover-up over
Mr de Menezes death.
"It reinforces their belief that his killing was not the result of a catalogue
of errors but that there was something more malign behind this," said Mr Rehman,
who has written to the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service
demanding an official inquiry into Mr de Menezes' death. "Yet again, the family
has to find out through leaks what might have happened to Jean Charles. We
believe a public inquiry is the only solution for the real truth to be
established."
The story, if proved correct, will add to the controversy surrounding the
shooting. Sir Ian Blair, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, is already
facing a separate inquiry into complaints made by Mr de Menezes' family that he
made misleading comments about the shooting to the public.
The Stockwell killing has also highlighted communications failures between
surveillance teams and commanding officers as well as calling into question
Operation Kratos, the Met's secret policy on dealing with potential suicide
bombers.
The IPCC review of the Stockwell killing was handed to lawyers at the CPS just
over a week ago. Copies have also been delivered to Charles Clarke, the Home
Secretary, as well as to the Metropolitan Police Authority and to Scotland Yard.
It is expected that they could take up to a year to decide if there are
sufficient grounds on which to bring a prosecution against any of the officers.
However, sources quoted by the News of the World allege that the IPCC report
reveals that the log was altered from "it was Osman" to read instead "and it was
not Osman".
The alteration should have been signed but was not. This was regarded as a
clumsy error by the IPCC investigators. Their report says: "This looks like an
attempt to try to distance Special Branch from the decision [to shoot de
Menezes].
Extraordinary allegations that Special Branch officers deliberately falsified
vital evidence to hide mistakes which led to the killing of Jean Charles de
Menezes at a south London Underground station were made last night.
According to claims in the News of the World, police altered the contents of a
logbook, which detailed the Brazilian electrician's final movements, in a bid to
cover up their blunders.
The 27-year-old was shot dead at Stockwell Tube station, in the wake of the
London bombings, by police exercising a shoot-to-kill policy.
Specific words were understood to have been changed to cover up the fact that
surveillance officers had wrongly identified Mr de Menezes as terror suspect
Hussein Osman.
Alterations were hastily made to amend the wording of the official log once the
shocking truth emerged that the dead man was not, in fact, the extremist wanted
in connection with the failed 21 July Tube bombings.
This was in a bid to pass the blame for the shooting on to the firearms officers
who actually shot the electrician and on to senior officers at Scotland Yard who
were in charge of the operation.
These revelations are reportedly contained in the report of the Independent
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). Last night, despite calls to the
Metropolitan Police, the Home Office and the IPCC, The Independent on Sunday was
unable to corroborate or substantiate the claims.
The family of the dead man said the revelations were "shocking" and demanded an
immediate public inquiry. Asad Rehman, the family's spokesman, said these latest
reports reinforced their belief that there had been a deliberate cover-up over
Mr de Menezes death.
"It reinforces their belief that his killing was not the result of a catalogue
of errors but that there was something more malign behind this," said Mr Rehman,
who has written to the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service
demanding an official inquiry into Mr de Menezes' death. "Yet again, the family
has to find out through leaks what might have happened to Jean Charles. We
believe a public inquiry is the only solution for the real truth to be
established."
The story, if proved correct, will add to the controversy surrounding the
shooting. Sir Ian Blair, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, is already
facing a separate inquiry into complaints made by Mr de Menezes' family that he
made misleading comments about the shooting to the public.
The Stockwell killing has also highlighted communications failures between
surveillance teams and commanding officers as well as calling into question
Operation Kratos, the Met's secret policy on dealing with potential suicide
bombers.
The IPCC review of the Stockwell killing was handed to lawyers at the CPS just
over a week ago. Copies have also been delivered to Charles Clarke, the Home
Secretary, as well as to the Metropolitan Police Authority and to Scotland Yard.
It is expected that they could take up to a year to decide if there are
sufficient grounds on which to bring a prosecution against any of the officers.
However, sources quoted by the News of the World allege that the IPCC report
reveals that the log was altered from "it was Osman" to read instead "and it was
not Osman".
The alteration should have been signed but was not. This was regarded as a
clumsy error by the IPCC investigators. Their report says: "This looks like an
attempt to try to distance Special Branch from the decision [to shoot de
Menezes].
Police 'faked Tube death log' , NYT,
29.1.2006,
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article341765.ece
|